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I.—THE TRUE IDEA OF DIVINE KOSMOS.

ALTHOUGH I hold the evolution of thought in human history to be rationally continuous and progressive, with no really absolute contradictions between the stages of belief, yet it would be idle to deny that the discoveries of physiology are likely to prove little short of revolutionary in their effect on orthodox and ordinary notions about such subjects as Free Will, Responsibility, the nature of Moral Evil, and its relation to God. "The last acquired faculty in the progress of human evolution," says Dr. Maudsley, "conscience is the first to suffer when disease invades the mental organization." "Conscience is a function of organization—the highest and most delicate function of the highest and most complete development thereof." One may object to this mode of expression; still the fact it endeavours to express cannot be explained away. The writer is a high authority in regard to insanity; and in reading his works I think the general impression derived is, that you can with difficulty distinguish between cases of insane criminality, and cases of criminality not usually regarded as insane. Indeed, on p. 26 of his "Responsibility in Mental Disease," he virtually says this. Moral insanity is counted by our best medical authorities as disease quite as much as intellectual insanity. What Dr. Maudsley says of the cruelty of our treatment of the insane till quite lately is very striking, and he no doubt explains the causes correctly. The lower animals and some savages evince the

same antipathy and cruelty toward any of their number who fall sick. So in madness we cannot but feel that a man, being alienated from himself and his kind, is something of a reproach to the nature of humanity. "At bottom this might seem to be a curious evidence of the law of natural selection, whereby a diseased member that is unfitted for the natural functions of its kind, is instinctively extruded from companionship." Indignation, punishment, especially capital, is the form in which the law of survival of the fittest, and extrusion of the evil, directly reveals itself in human feeling. But pity, and desire to improve or cure, work out the same law in a higher manner. Yet while especially careful not to sacrifice the higher human virtues of mercy and generosity, we ought not to neglect the physical methods of race-improvement which Nature points out by her laws. But if the nervous organization (essentially connected as that is with all the other corporeal functions) have been slowly built up through past ages, and if the functions of the spiritual self be (at all events, here in our earthly life) indissolubly related to this organization, as all investigation tends to make increasingly evident, then immoral and unrighteous conduct must be essentially related to what may be termed disease or insanity of the higher nervous cerebral centres, and perhaps to that of the body in general—except where it is owing to the imperfect and comparatively recent organization of these centres, which prevents their energizing firmly, uniformly, automatically. This, far from being an unmoral doctrine, is the very contrary. For physiologists recognize sin as disease, in-sanity, dis-order; as itself, together with intellectual madness, though unreason, yet subject to intelligible and reasonable causation; as largely curable when the laws that govern it are understood, curable by moral and mental no less than by physical means; finally, as a station on the line of progress. *That sin is a madness* is in fact the most moral, and, in the profound sense, *theological*, doctrine possible. "He from himself is ta'en away." Esquirol declared that "moral alienation is the proper characteristic of mental derangement." Dr. Maudsley indeed founds a distinction between

madness and ordinary vice on the possibility of discovering in some cases evidence of previous disease, either in the criminal, or in some ancestor or relation—not necessarily mental, but nervous; for instance, epilepsy, chorea, or severe neuralgia. Yet it may be urged that such might always be discovered if we knew more of the circumstances, more of a person himself, or his ancestors and relations. But if we are to regard all wrong-doing as result of “insane neurosis,” why not all folly also? However, there is a border-land, he says; and in nature there are no hard and fast lines between one condition and another; one passes over into another; certainly “great wits are oft to madness near allied;” this is very strikingly illustrated and explained by Dr. Maudsley. By Mussulmen (as by the Greeks of old), madness is regarded as something sacred, as a result of Divine inspiration (*μανία*—*μαντική*). In Syria I have myself seen madmen revered by Moslems, and tortured in a dismal cave by Christians. “It is truly remarkable how much mankind has been indebted for its originating impulses to individuals, who themselves, or whose parents, have sprung from families in which there has been some predisposition to insanity.” Well then, ought crime to be punished at all? But, replies Dr. Maudsley, do we not in reality punish insanity? The measures which are necessarily adopted for the proper care of the insane, and for the protection of others, are a punishment. “If we are satisfied that our prison-system is the best that can be devised for the prevention of crime and for the reformation of the criminal, we may rest satisfied that it is the best treatment for the sort of insanity from which criminals suffer. No fear, therefore, of the practical ill consequences need deter us from looking on criminals as the unfortunate victims of a vicious organization and a bad education.” For madmen are (within limits) capable of being acted upon by ordinary deterrent motives, and reformatory influences applied, with judgment. With all this I agree; and moreover, if capital punishment be justifiable at all, it surely is so even on this view—that is, where vice, rather than patent madness, distinguishes an act; for I do not see

that you can *identify* the latter delusion stage of madness with an earlier one that is simply vicious, even if you grant, with Dr. Maudsley, that it is the same progressive disease: I do not see what you would gain by so doing. Besides, it might be much kinder to cut the incipient maniac off from what is in store for him if you let him live. But with Dr. Maudsley's next assertion I hardly do agree. "What in this age it would seem right that we should do, is to get rid of the angry feeling which may be at bottom of any judicial punishment, and of all penal measures that may be inspired by such feeling." Now I do not think this follows. Where there is intellectual delusion, that may be proper; but even then the madman is sometimes capable of being appreciably influenced in his conduct by moral considerations. "If a person be suffering from *disease* which lessens or destroys his power of self-control, it is not justice to treat him as if he were free from disease, and were a completely responsible agent." Now I would ask Dr. Maudsley: Is it not practically "*disease*" which lessens our power of self-control whenever we do wrong? Is there not, in his opinion, some peculiar molecular constitution of the physical organism which accounts for this, though it may be no more appreciable by microscope or chemical analysis than the disease of brain which accompanies recognized "insane neurosis"? Yet of course I am willing to admit that there may be *more* moral turpitude where there is not positive impending madness, or obvious disease; that is, a crime may be more in accordance with the whole normal character, not being so much of the nature of a bent imposed on a man in opposition to his proper and usual character.

A strange fact is, that the insane often feel *remorse* for some crime which they have been impelled to commit, though obviously under influence of insane impulse at the time. So all of us in our sane right moods feel remorse for what we have done in our wrong insane moods. But it no more follows that we could have done otherwise than that the madman could. However, on the whole, we seem to blame (and I think most thoughtful people will agree that we are right to blame) more

or less in proportion as there is more or less appreciable struggle between moral feeling and desire to do a wrong act ; but we allow for the more or less over-mastering power of the desire or temptation. Still we must recollect that a man whom we blame may be in advance of his generation ; he is not necessarily behind it, with less moral feeling about some point of duty than the majority, or than the good men of his day. He may be wanting in conscience, or have a really retrograde ideal ; he may have sophisticated his conscience ; but he may also be like some enlightened person, who in the middle ages should have felt and exposed the enormities of the religious Inquisition. In fact, Masters in any department, whether in conduct, in knowledge, or in art, are a minority ; though they are *seldom* so far in advance as not in a little while to carry the majority with them when it is a question of conduct, and when moral education is fairly general among the people. Yet of course the weakness of moral feeling depends on *organization*, quite as much as does the overwhelming character of desire, except so far as both depend on education and circumstances, which also we allow for in apportioning blame. But the precise degree in which these might have developed moral sense, had they been different, must remain quite uncertain, so that our censure must be somewhat rough-and-ready ; and it does not appear that a bad man's organization is *really* more capable of conformity to a given ideal standard that is held to be normal in a civilized country, than a savage's is.

When will people learn not to judge everybody's power of self-control or right will by their own, or that of some hero ? "*The human will can*" do this, that or the other. This is the very falsehood of "the metaphysical method." "*The human will*" can do wonders : how unfortunate that we have none of us got *that*, but only *a* human will, our own, which, alas ! can do so very much less ! *The human will* can control the movements of *the* human limbs ; but *a* paralytic or *an* epileptic patient's human will can do nothing of the sort. For so-called homicidal mania and kleptomania, it would seem that there is no struggle possible at the moment when some over-

mastering impulse takes possession of a man. If it is not demoniacal possession (who shall say there is not this element in the phenomenon after all?), it is possession by diseased, abnormally potent cells, and their evil mental correlates. At other times a man may revolt against his tyrants, but not then. He is blinded and whirled away as in a fire-blast. The human "person" is in fact a multitude—more or less well organized, or "blindly battling"—innumerable monads, themselves infinite and intelligent. Thus probably on our own behaviour as extra-regarding monads or atoms, on the perfection of our organization as a race, may depend the welfare of more godlike monads or personalities, of whom we may form part. But there is a chaos, as well as a kosmos in man and the world. In accident, sudden death, blood-poisoning, in cases of sudden madness from physical causes,—nay in any madness, gradual or otherwise—what a terrible breaking-in of a disorder upon order, moral and intellectual! Still, as Science enlarges her bounds, all tends to submit to laws. The chaos is but such to ignorance, is member of a kosmos too vast for us to comprehend.

You cannot judge the savage and maniac by the same moral standard as the civilized sane man; because intellectual advancement, correct knowledge, a well-organized synthesis of numerous complicated relations—these things are necessary to enlightened moral intuition and to right conduct. But when the former elements are present, our ideal is violated if the latter be absent. Yet in real truth the last of these former conditions, at any rate, is wanting in the bad civilized man. There is wanting in him the well-organized synthesis of numerous complicated relations, which the good man possesses. For some reason or other, he is born without a full measure of that organic intuitive synthesis of sympathetic, active elements with intellectual, that constitutes the essential basis of normal and governing moral sense. You may therefore develop him intellectually up to the usual standard, without being able to develop him morally up to it. Or you may develop his sympathetic feelings, and even his conscience of right and wrong, together with his understanding; but you may still be unable

to develop his *will*, in the full sense of right will, *on account of this very want of innate organic synthesis*, which in him is not so complete as it has been rendered in other members of the race by gradual accretions of inherited experience, by slow adaptations of ever-complicating personality to its infinite environment. And yet quite possibly a different education, perhaps apparently a worse one, *might* have succeeded in doing this. No doubt society largely *manufactures* its criminals, as the greatest living European poet has shewn. What shall be said, too, of priestly education? Perhaps that it ought scarcely to be tolerated any longer. But as regards what can be done with unpromising raw human material, look at the noble behaviour of those trained pauper boys on board the Goliath!

What shall we say, then, of a person who has come through the ages with us, who has in the race been learning by suffering and by joy, and yet who, at all events in some particulars, is worse than we are ourselves? Well, conceivably, if we knew more, we might trace in him the influence of certain tendencies that are foreign to ourselves, travelling along a distinct ancestral line, though obscured now and then by crossing tracks, but recurring according to laws, not yet fully understood, of atavism or reversion, and issuing from a social centre where the action we reprobate was deemed laudable, and in those circumstances may possibly have been so; or such tendencies may have travelled upward from the brute, and only recur in certain individuals, though in them masked, and as a rudimentary organ once fully developed recurs in descendants: the habit may be transformed and unreasonable now, though useful and intelligible then.

But whatever the history of this state of things may be, what we naturally censure is the bare fact of actual failure to fulfil in any respect our own ideal of conduct. And we cannot help feeling that a person who so fails ought to be punished—to suffer—while another who fulfils it ought to be rewarded. Now is this feeling justifiable or not? My own belief is, that while the more minute and accurate knowledge of all the conditions which we have now, ought to modify, temper and purify

this feeling, still the feeling itself is natural, right and wholesome. For if a person be in any sense immortal, suffering must, by the very nature of things, be entailed upon him by his failure to conform to the ideal; since he will be sooner or later brought into collision with the constitution of the universe, which reason must inform; as is proved by the slow and sure establishment of this very human ideal which he violates, seeing it was by suffering that the ideal itself was established; and all persons or things tend upward to their ideal; though for the moment, in doing so, they may degenerate and decay, passing into different, yet identical things and personalities, in order to complete their true being. The anger, or desire to punish, which a good man cannot help feeling, is itself, if it takes effect, a part of this deserved suffering; another part is the privation which a man's own wickedness entails on him of the higher kind of happiness proper to goodness; another is the pangs of awakened conscience and struggling will, when a man awakes to higher life. Then, again, there must be some mysterious identity of the successive generations; and we know that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. The *root*, however, of the desire to hurt and punish a bad man is probably the instinctive feeling that such suffering is in reality somehow *remedial*. The purpose of chastisement in order to reformation may not be consciously present; but implicitly that element is present in the comparatively blind and austere idea of Nemesis; even in the crude impulse of revenge; which crude impulse is again implicit in the reaction of a physical force, which has been unduly held down by another's antagonism. One has taken more than his share—will not yield that which is justly owing to the personality and requirements of others; the others, therefore, will injure (or partially destroy) him by the natural and reasonable impulse to seek their own rights. That impulse, when purified, and organized in society, becomes judicial punishment. Such punishment is *remedial*; it tends to prevent the wrong-doer from repeating his offence, and tends also to eradicate the propensity toward such offences in others. Now to say that we

ought *only to pity* the offender, and want to make him better, is to say that we ought to have no feeling of indignation at the wanton injury done to others by a selfish man. Certainly, if we had none, our pity for the criminal, and our calm desire to protect society might prove inadequate to the due protection of it. And the knowledge that he provokes social indignation is a motive of weight with the offender, is apt to beget in him too the proper hatred of his own conduct. For on the opposite view it should be maintained that we ought not to be angry with ourselves when we do wrong. Yet certainly a due measure of self-reproach is both natural, and powerfully remedial.

Still, the justification of our praise and blame, and the full explanation of whatever sense of spontaneity in human action may be ours, lie deeper than our present knowledge. At any rate, the visible apparatus of thought and will machinery, which we call the brain, seems, with its less intricate convolutions in the savage corresponding to his lower intellectual and moral development, to put a visible and tangible barrier before the old notion of metaphysical Free Will, which is also perfectly untenable on other grounds, as I have shewn in this Review (July, 1876), and worse than useless in regard to responsibility. With reference to the influence of brain upon will, we must remember that the spiritual power, whether we call it instinct, desire or reason, is largely concerned in building up the brain out of the lowest forms of protoplasm. There is implicit spiritual power in every cell; life itself can only be conceived as spiritual. The self-originating or self-existing Power, which was before in other phases of its development, now passes into this special self-conscious stage in a particular personality; but it is the same Power, whether we name it will or motives, of which will is resultant and expression; or external world, which is thought and will not yet fully developed. This Power must surely be regarded as acting by immanent necessity of reason, rather than contingently and at random. In natural adaptation of means to ends, crystallization of thought in so-called primary (and, as I believe, also in second-

ary) uniform qualities of matter, we know our own inmost nature as it is in its external sphere of existence. Take extension, for instance. May not that be defined as passive quantity of certain substantial qualities? But sensation and perception reflect this, are moulded, so to speak, upon it; thought, therefore, has a corresponding quantity of quality; if there be allowed to be material existence at all, there must be extension, the form of thought, and extension, the form of matter, corresponding: though, of course, if Hume and Mill are right, all is mere panorama of each individual's subjective feelings, and then matter need not trouble us at all; but that theory I need not here discuss; it seems to me nonsense. One, many, substance, form, matter—all the "categories" are in mind and matter. But take more special characteristics. Poets find them interchangeable. Language itself finds them so, and only exists on the basis of their being so. Take motion. Motion is change of relative position. Thoughts, then, as certainly move as do atoms or railway trains. Cells and atoms too have memory, discrimination, love, hate, judgment. Or take force. There is my force of will when I push—muscular force, directed by will, and claimed as mine; and there is intuitively known to be resisting force in the solid thing that I push against. Time is common to mind and matter. And whether Space mean abstract extent, or possibility of unimpeded motion, space too may be said to be common to both. Beauty, the ideal, is in nature, answering, though inadequately, to our own; but without beauty in nature, the ideal in our spirits could never have been born. You can only express the subtlety of truth in both spheres by metaphors, by analogies, by symbols, by types. The one world is interpreted by the other. Some, indeed, say that the *Ding an Sich* (or totally unknown thing) affects us, but with a knowledge of itself totally false to its own activity. Now I agree that the knowledge is inadequate, but only so far as it is false. I believe the qualities we perceive are indeed there, so far as the thing is a thing in connection with us at all, though that thinghood and connection is very

inadequate to exhaust the totality of its own reality, as it is in the Kosmos, and may manifest itself to others. But anyhow it must be admitted that we are affected by the *Ding an Sich* in certain uniformly orderly and intelligible manners, which is indeed enough for the purpose of my argument. In my view, all matter is blindly intelligent; but there is no explicit dualism of subject and object, as there is in persons, though a dualism be implicit; while in God the dualism becomes again implicit. Thought is "for itself," "comes to itself," in personality by differencing itself from its "other," which is matter—*necessarily therefore implied, created, existing in the evolution of finite intelligence*. Design implies dualism; but in God there is none. His mode of procedure, therefore, is unlike ours, is superior: in nature, again, there is no design, because no dualism. But there is something like it. Darwin shews that species are modified by the idea of beauty to which animals are sensible, and beauty is a special object of natural processes. We can only know Nature; we can only influence and act in the sphere of nature, realizing our ideals of the beautiful in art, adapting her to our needs by inventive design, incarnating moral ideals in social intercourse and civil polity; on condition that we ourselves, while differing from nature, shall yet also be *essentially one with Her*, who is indeed at once our mother and our destroyer, who having conceived us re-absorbs us into her own substance again. As mechanism passes through chemistry into life and thought, so thought re-descends through intelligently organized protoplasm to chemical and mechanical energy: the one process were impossible without the other, and to the higher process the present concurrence of the lower is necessary; though, as matter may be without full consciousness, so may consciousness in the superhuman sphere be without matter.

Yet neither brain nor mind in any person or creature appears to be built up without help from other finite intelligences, not only those of ancestors on earth, and those educating the infant, but probably also from others who have dwelt elsewhere. These must have impressed a direction, a bent, a

character, an impulse, on the vital, chemical and mental forces—on the molecules and mind-elements that go to form each personality. Nay, the gradual growth of one person probably implies the gradual dissolution of others, this being needed to furnish the necessary condition.

It must be granted that the first initiative seems to reside with matter. In the human foetus, the kind of consciousness and will that shall emerge seems to rest with the kind of physical organism that is pre-formed through the agency and constitution of parents and ancestors, reacting upon those special external influences, whether intelligent or unconscious, always different in every case, that wake perception and volition. It is indeed impossible to conceive that the intellectual and volitional constitution of parents and ancestors has not stamped itself indelibly on the spermatozoon and ovum, seeing that the resulting individual is a being of the same species, and shews so many signs of belonging to particular families—becomes a particular man, not a reptile or a fish. Still the infant has a special nature of its own also, an implicit intelligence and will involved with its own vital organism, and developed by its own special law of assimilation of external elements; but this is always conditioned by ancestral influence and surrounding circumstance. [Our not having any distinct sense of personal identity with lives previous to birth seems to shew that we are all low in the scale of life after all; and this sense of identity with lives before and after, this far-reaching more intuitive memory will come as we rise higher in the scale of moral and intellectual being. What is distinctively meant by personal immortality (and yet by no means in our narrow sense after all) depends, therefore, on dignity of existence.] But if we accept, as I do, the development hypothesis as the best provisional explanation of the *modus operandi* of creation, we travel back to creatures without moral sense, finally even without proper consciousness, even to chemical and mechanical forces. Thus the very kind of consciousness and will that shall hereafter be able to mould organic matter seems itself determined by the constitution of organic and other matter, upon which

organic matter is in turn dependent. Yet we praise and reward, or blame and punish, human actions that are ultimately determined by these apparently blind external forces !

I think it will be enough to reply, that, however they are determined, here they are ; and it is not their origin or causation, but themselves, that seem to us ideal and praiseworthy, or unideal and censurable. Still I should also reply, that, even if the chemical be implicit in the mechanical, and the vital in the chemical, and the conscious in the vital, and the moral in the conscious, which is what I believe—yet that to be implicit is not to be explicit—that existence takes on a distinctly different, nobler and richer kind of life in taking on each of these new conditions. What dominates each separate element, and the properties latent in each separate element, molecular motions or other properties, so as to mould them first into given chemical substances, and then into given vital organisms ? What, again, differentiates these into ever more complex organizations ? If you talk of forces at all, it must be proper to speak of mechanical, chemical and vital force. What, again, makes consciousness proper emerge from the specialization of general sensibility ?

We must remember that forces, elements, molecules, properties, ether, atoms, void, are but provisional modes of conceiving the external universe after all, which have a regulative, phenomenal, but only a very relatively constitutive, or absolute noumenal value. The truth is, we have experience of how certain modes of external being we call “elements” have acted in certain relationships ; so we isolate them in our minds, and call these ways of acting their properties ; being apt to fancy that they have a really separate entity with a lot of properties locked up in them, which enable them all to get together now and then, and add these properties, or the rhythms of all their molecular motions, together, thus giving you at once the varied universe. But this or any similar conception is surely unphilosophical in the extreme. We are obliged to isolate a thing in conception, no doubt ; but it is never isolated for all that, except as humanly conceivable ; and the manner of its action

we discern in an utterly imperfect degree ; while apart from its action it is itself nothing. The logical laws, or necessities of thought and knowledge are implied in its very structure, and in every exercise of its functions. "Inheritance" does not account for the necessity of intuition ; only *fact*—internal or external, or both—can account for it. For any event you know intuitively there is a sufficient cause. How does "inheritance" touch that ? Our intuitions must correspond to external fact, unless the whole of consciousness be a lie, and if there be any external fact at all. The external world must in that case share half the responsibility of uniform experience, our faculties sharing the other. If we impose our thought on things, yet things must have a uniform capacity for being thus thought ; if they impose our thought on us, then our thought and they agree. Again, if our thought be all, then outer and inner world, being one, agree admirably. Only then we must take the whole of thought fairly. Anyhow, that which is uniformly intelligible must in some sense be intelligent, or at least partake of the same nature as the intelligence that understands it. Subject and object agreeing, they must be radically identical. Some say the external world has developed our reason, accounts for it entirely ; *then it must agree and correspond with it perfectly, be of the same substance, i.e. the external world must be Reason.* The uniformly varying affinities, weights, sizes, forms, of the hypothetical atoms of material elements (only to be conceived by externalizing the categories or forms of thought itself), and the uniform rhythmic motions or other properties of these, if they be assumed, with Tyndal and Huxley, to be the "potential" intelligible universe, can only be conceived as themselves intelligence operating to produce a complex result,—intelligence, moreover, acting in a concerted, harmonious, rational fashion throughout all these atoms and controlling forces. For the action of each supposed atom and element is strictly dependent on, *forms therefore but a truncated part of*, the true idea of the action, both simultaneous and successive, of all elements and atoms ; while its own mode of manifestation is ever changing ; it emerges from one mode of existence, and disappears into

another. That is part, then, of its very idea or essence. What brings the complex result about cannot possibly be *each atom or molecule taken separately*—for then there were no concert or harmonious unity provided for—but must necessarily be *all taken together*, and, strictly speaking, all as they are in the effect, not merely as they are before—for the special novel complexity of the effect has to be accounted for. Creative power is implied at every stage of motion or change (as I have shewn in the *Contemporary Review*, Feb. 1874); that is to say, the “potential,” if the word imply *power to emerge at a given time*, is really not in the *preceding* stage of existence, but in the whole Divine Kosmos, which includes both past, present and future,—is, however, implicit in the past, because the past is only past and isolated to us. Alas! that Aristotle should not yet have convinced the world that form is older than matter, that form dominates matter, not matter form, although in time the reverse order appears to prevail—matter appears first. But when we regard the time-process of phenomena, atoms, elements, forces, &c., then we must conceive of these as in themselves blindly intelligent, unconscious intelligence; yet I admit that this is a human, inadequate way of regarding them. They are otherwise in their true noumenal being. If the time-development of humanity took place in the manner suggested by Mr. Spencer in his very interesting second volume of *Psychology*, it was certainly the very reverse of a tentative, accidental kind of development, implying as it did fixed inherent laws at every stage of progress, and laws operating together to produce the highest conceivable intelligible and even intelligent result. When I speak of “laws,” I mean orderly, harmonious, intelligible ways of acting, in concert with other agencies, to produce intelligible, complex, differentiated, yet integrated and self-reproducing results—each of the apparent failures of organisms unfitted to survive itself fulfilling its own purpose, both obviously for the organism itself, however comparatively short and poor its existence (all is comparative so far as survival or excellence goes), and in view of larger issues, not always manifest, which the formation, defeat and destruction of such

organisms brings about ; while it seems necessary (therefore reasonable) that there shall be a struggle for existence, in order to bring out the latent energies of individuals and species most adapted to the conditions, most fitted to survive. Moreover, it will be found that the lesser and the greater, the innumerable varieties of life, the successful and unsuccessful, help one another in more positive ways ; they come forth together, and are mutually necessary to one another. It is most important to remember that neither our physical nor our moral ideals are absolute, but relative. In both nature and man, therefore, we shall find them often quietly ignored, in favour of an ideal out of sight and of quite different scope. Still our ideals seem to us absolute, as Kant puts it—"Act so that thy action may become a rule for all rational creatures." And herein lies one of the contradictions of our limited intelligence, which Hegel and his school in vain would hypostatize and deify as final, as absolute. Doubtless our own ideal, and the very different ideals actually fulfilled by others, are but broken lights of a greater ideal, which includes and satisfies them all, in which the very individuals that seem such utter failures to us are perfected and justified both to themselves and to their fellows. Thus misery and deformity become transfigured for all our scorning—a scorning, however, that has its justification also.

These lower "unsuccessful" lives *are* to perish—as men count perishing, and want of success—the highest kind of existence is not destined for them, at least now ; and, indeed, how can all have the same kind and measure of existence all at once ? Where then would be the discord, the difference, the strife ? conditions of harmony, of life, of love, that seeks in another what it has not in self ? of pity, sacrifice, generosity, curiosity, sounding the depths of infinite being ? And yet there is a power antagonistic to the destructive power, tending to the elevation of all : all do seek an ideal ; that is the Reason, the Love, that draws all upward into itself, yet cannot prevail in some creatures, while they are in their actual circumstances—cannot prevail, because it would not be well on the whole, nay, *not even for them as members of the whole, as in the deepest sense selves*, that it should

at the present stage of their existence prevail—yet shall and must prevail even in these. Conciliation here again is to be found by intelligence vaster than our own. But *Faith* trusts and acquiesces. Taking God in this fullest meaning of the word, we see how much truth there is in the Calvinistic doctrine that God “seeks His own glory,” that even “the wicked praise Him,” that “He hardens whom He will.” Being, non-being; unreason, reason; contingency, necessity; evil, good; become one in a deeper intuition we cannot fathom; where there is no time, nor causality, nor space, nor finite, nor infinite. Hegel (attempting rigorously to deduce the categories of Kant), having led us up to the essential identity of these contraries, did not take the further step, which now, however, philosophy *must* take. Schelling’s Indifference-point has to be conciliated with Hegel’s Logical process. (Yet I sincerely trust that no so-called “originality” may be proved against me. I believe that I am supported by authoritative revelation and reason.) *I now, then, venture to point out that all these fundamental Notions or Ideas of human Reason are essential to the constitution of such supreme Intuition; are stages in the passage of spirit and nature toward this goal; are true, therefore, and not illusory (as the Know-nothing school of Kant, Hume, Mansel, Comte, maintain)—but true, with a limited human truth only. No doubt we could deduce all the system of Knowledge and Being from fundamental Ideas of Reason (even “one’s writing pen,” as Hegel was asked to do—for I cannot share the orthodox metaphysical contempt for mere phenomena, for mere material things), if we had the ultimate fundamental Intuition. But Hegel mistakes in assuming that our logical notions are this fundamental intuition, and, gigantic as his intellect is, he has therefore failed in such attempted deduction. Hence also his contempt for inductive science, for the method of experience, is not justified. We are bound to adopt that Baconian method, because our principles or ideas can never rise to the fulness of the Divine creative ideas, from which indeed the world of thought and being does flow. Our logical notions and our intuitions*

can alike but give us glimpses of those ideas ; they are but those Ideas in the forming, the eternal Ideas reflected in troubled waters of time. But it is fortunate that we cannot jump off our own shadow, as modern Agnosticism recommends—an able critic having recently written a book to prove that *Shakspeare* himself belonged to this brand-new sect of “Know-nothings” ! For our intuitions are indispensable as the frame work of experience. Can it be really wise, then, to revile or ignore these ; to use them at haphazard, since use them we must, rather than try, as men have always done before, to use them intelligently ? Surely this is a mere passing craze of limp bewilderment and disappointment ; not supreme wisdom after all ! When we have done exulting over our new material toys—the rich and cultured among us, I mean—then shall we think of adjusting our new knowledge to the grand inheritance of grave beliefs bequeathed to us by our fathers. Yet beyond seeing that the very idea of this Divine intuition *involves* the historic or time-process, and the mutually contradictory categories of logic, we cannot, of course, by the very nature of the case, comprehend the link between the two spheres : *we must have the higher form of knowledge before we can do that.* God as Creator also embraces, and is, the creature ; but the creature as it is in its ultimate idea, in its perfect reality. Yet to that belongs the time-process of the creature. But God is otherwise in that ; He is out of Himself ; therefore, as conciliating and destroying the contradictions and imperfections of the creature, He is *separate from it—so far, then, may be conceived as personal.* Here, then, I suggest the truth of both Theism and Pantheism. But our reason is of course at fault in dealing with this supreme region of being, and must contradict itself ; which, however, proves nothing as to its inability to know that there is a truth higher than and comprehensive of its own thought ; to have the glimpse of it that I have here endeavoured in some imperfect degree to express ; for this thought and the world are only thus rationally conceivable at all.

Curious that Mr. Spencer should *contrast* his genesis with

the idea of genesis by intelligent creation ! Why, does not he see that he is elaborately describing a process of genesis by intelligent creation ? External Nature is simply Mind, Reason, Will, in the process of forming—Mind, Reason, Will, in its material or external garb. Mind, Reason, Will, are external Nature reflected in upon itself, become self-conscious subject, intelligently designing ; as before, without conscious purpose, though with plenty of unconscious purpose for all that. So, after all, it appears that, however early in its progress we take Will, even at the earliest material stage, it is indeed Will that we are praising or blaming. There is implicit moral sense even in gravitation. All has confused ideation, as Leibnitz says ; but because the human body and brain are the microcosm, the concentrated virtue of material elements or forces, thus raised to a triple degree of power, therefore we are conscious voluntary personalities. I do not say, indeed, that minds in their time-existence cause that which is before them in time ; but they have a being in the Reason or Will that is out of time, which yet involves their existence in time, and therefore brings it to pass ; human minds too being on their way to a higher mode of existence. Matter and Mind, Time, Space and Causality, themselves have but a relatively constitutive validity—regulative categories they mainly are—which are capable of being merged in the greater perfection of other ideas. If new senses were added to us, what a difference even in our fundamental ideas might occur ! Is there not one all-inclusive Being, whose intuition comprehends all out of time, and yet by the constitutive immanent necessity of such intuition, creates all, in successive moments, in limited quantities, with various qualities ? That Being is God. Of course we cannot, by the very nature of the case, comprehend or define such a Being ; for our comprehension and definition must necessarily be through those very intuitions or categories, which are in that Being themselves transcended by inclusion and comprehension. We are finite ; God is infinite. From the lowest, formless Hyle, or matter, God ever forms Himself up to Absolute Spirit—forms Himself by immanent Reason and Love, not

without the necessary antagonism of Unreason and Hate, which are the Sudras and Drudges of the universe. But it is all-important to remember that, though His Eternal Being involves this time-development as necessary to its own constitution, reality and perfect self-affirmation, yet He and all in Him have an eternal quite other being, that is now all at once, and knows no becoming, no change; wherein past, present and future, are comprehended in one "I am."

The material universe is God's organism or body; but the material universe is not to Him as we conceive it. Thought, and Extension are indeed, as Spinoza says, His attributes; but in the supreme sphere they are no longer, in our sense, thought and extension. Still there is a hierarchy. And we are monads in a higher monad. There is probably one supreme Logos, or creative Reason, below the highest One. There is one Voice with infinite reverberations; there are infinite ivory balls one within another; in God, will, reason and nature, are one; taken up, that is, transfigured, into a richer and profounder reality. Consciousness mounts ever higher; and the chambers once occupied by it are now tenanted by unconscious intelligence, its minister (in the nervous system), till consciousness itself becomes at last as automatic as the unconscious, and God is all in all. Intuitive glances of genius, moral, spiritual, intellectual; emotionally imaginative creations of genius; heroic lives; are an example of this. Still the understanding with us helps in all these. But the mere relativity of time and space conceptions becomes more and more evident every day as science progresses. A May-fly beating its wings so many millions of times in a second, who can tell whether its existence of an hour is not longer to it than a man's to him? And the idea of space, too, absolutely depends on the intellectual measure of it. What we once learned slowly, laboriously, we now do mechanically, without effort, all at once—for instance, singing, walking, playing on an instrument—nay, calculating, reasoning. Some, too, seem to calculate intuitively, and generally according to the difference of faculty is the rapid and simultaneous, or the slow and

successive, seizing of all the points and positions of a given truth. There are instinctive judgments, often quite correct, formed by women. And in "clairvoyance" you have another mode of knowing. Love, too, is intuitive in its perception; and love is higher than duty; is the "fulfilling of the law." The human Idea of the Logos is incarnate in Christ. The "first Mover is unmoved," "actus purus," pure form, without potentiality, without matter. So alone is the changing world intelligible. For preceding changes, whether in matter, *or in a mind*, cannot furnish the full sufficient reason for subsequent changes, for actual phenomena. *Because they are different.* And if you say, with Hegel, *they are implicitly* the subsequent changes, still you want an unmoved and unmoving Nous to make implicit explicit, simply because the Future, *as Future*, cannot energize; for it does not exist. The ordinary idea of God, then, as an artificer external to the Kosmos, but a designer like ourselves, though immensely superior, will not hold water—as I have ventured to argue in the Contemporary Review. You would want another God to account for the processes of His mind. But to the conception I suggest this difficulty does not apply. If the "Metaphysics" were complete, we should probably recognize it to be that of Aristotle. And how can the world be extruded from God? external to Him, yet created from His substance? How can *we* be so? Though *imperia in imperio* in one sense no doubt we are; the more so as we rise higher. So personal, yet all-embracing, does being become as it rises; so untrue is the idea of Nirvana.

At present, however, good and evil are to us good and evil; and *we must beware of effacing the essential distinction which a human reason, necessarily subject to time conceptions, ought to feel, and must at all hazards feel between them*; though conceivably we may, when our intuitions are greatly modified by enlargement, comprehend them under a wider idea—somewhat as we no longer feel toward sickness or madness the extreme horror and repulsion felt by the lower races, and even our own immediate ancestors. We often feel angry with stupidity, though half believing ourselves un-

warranted in so feeling, except so far as we fancy a stupid person might have been wiser if he had chosen to try: can we indeed be sure that there is not in this view *some* justification for such a feeling? The want of will and endeavour to inform and cultivate oneself does imply *some* moral defect; and how frequently is madness itself the result of moral weakness, of vicious excess! To say that is but the beginning of the disease is easy, and may be quite true; yet, as I have argued, it is culpable for all that, and *may* be checked, together with the disease itself, by disapproval and punishment, judiciously or, still better, lovingly administered. Madness is, again, often the result of moral weakness and vicious excess in the parents or ancestors of a person. And such instinctive censure, whether of ignorance or of madness, as we may, after learning much about it, still feel, is perhaps, as I have suggested before in a similar reference, rooted in the fact of a mysterious solidarity between the living person and the ancestral tree of which he is a leaf: in ancestors the evil may have been more or less moral. Nor ought individuals to be regarded as completely different from their ancestral stock. How, after all, does mere "personal identity" in the vulgar sense fail and fade even in the course of the present life! How unlike is the child to the man—how unlike the youth to the old man!

But moral evil does in truth, as theology maintains, appear to be the most fundamental discord of all; for it is discord in the highest sphere of all. "*Corruptio optimi pessima.*" Now if it be the most fundamental, is it not also to be regarded as in some sense the true, efficient cause of all other evils? In the very nature of things it involves all others—intellectual unreason, pain, that repulsive dissolution we name death; for it is the very principle of dissolution and death. Spiritual death is the fountain of all other, if form indeed be the cause of matter, not matter of form. Moral evil is implicit in sickness, and suffering, and madness, and ignorance, though these be before it in historical development, in personal lives; they are moral evil in the forming. But even this beforehand in

time is not an easy question to decide upon—Which is first, chicken or egg? Take in all worlds, and their necessary connection; then is it hard to say which kind of evil is first. For on the extinction of a given system or world, the next created or developed may inherit the germ of moral evil from it; the nebula may be said potentially to contain that germ.

Yet I agree with Mr. Bain, that pain is probably the inevitable starting-point and awakener of our voluntary life. And pain evidently arises simultaneously with a distinctly conscious life in the animal world. But as conscious life advances, and harmonious adjustment becomes organized between the self and its environment, we may hope for a diminution of all kinds of evil under the intelligent presidency of the conscience, ever growing more enlightened and more powerful. Yet when we think of this environment as infinite, and the adaptability of the subject as infinitely capable of expansion, no doubt there seems to grow before us a fresh difficulty—new forms of evil, new forms of pain, subtler, more terrible, seem to present themselves; only we must remember that infinitude itself is a provisional conception. After some indefinite advance, will not the creation expand so as to be finally absorbed in the Creator, in whom subject and object are one; from whom, again, we must conceive it as lapsing by immanent necessity of being? But we are told, it is true, that the earth will fall into the sun; that the sun will lose its heat; that, finally, heat itself will be so dissipated through space as to be incapable of transformation into working, living, conscious force. On this I would remark, that before some cataclysm of this kind, the human race, or some race succeeding it, may attain to a transcending of time and space in thought and will; therefore in conditions of existence; which would liberate it from the destructive power of a catastrophe essentially dependent on time, and space, and force, as we now conceive them: but if this be not so, then elsewhere in other worlds progress must be more favourably situated; for recollect that from this time and space, and causality point of view the Kosmos is infinite; while we ourselves shall, by the law of solidarity and essential

identity, partake of such progress, though not in connection with this life and this planet. Fancy the Kosmos, after either having been from everlasting, or having got itself created, becoming first senile and imbecile, and then finally extinct, not in one part or in successive parts, but *as a whole*, in a few million years hence! This conception testifies to the un-wisdom of studying *only* this or the other special science, and sneering too complacently at all religion and philosophy. As some wag said in the "Saturday Review," the positive philosophy is indeed a rather negative philosophy!

We are to recollect that each thing, each organism, each infant, has behind it the infinite past, a past infinitely filled with beings, whose existence must, if we could comprehend all the links that bind all to all, be indissolubly bound up with its own. The world is full of everlasting echoes and reverberations, ready in their own time to become again living, veritable, echo-producing sounds. So that imperfection, suffering and sin, are not without their cause and basis in the past: there is in very deed "original sin," and original mischief of all kinds, brought about by the concentrated wickedness of finite creatures of many kinds, though counteracted and tempered by the good which they and others have also begot; the whole, however, being overruled, so as to move toward "one divine event." But this is only to say that the wickedness and goodness, the pleasure and the pain, are still operative in the new-born; have not ceased to exist as living principles, have only changed their guise and personality. We do well, then, to be angry with ourselves or with the wrong-doer beside us, though we ourselves, and he may be cunningly masquerading under the specious appearance of some innocent new-born. Innocent new-born! hast thou not been wandering about the worlds from the beginning? And well might some elsewhere be able to reveal to us thy wonderful and terrible deeds, in ancient times, in spheres remote—as man, as demon, as tiger of the forest—who knows?—or perhaps, indeed, we are entertaining an angel unawares!

And yet I believe it might be more philosophical, and true

to the very inmost truth of things, if we regarded sin and suffering, ignorance and madness, as all one at the root—as all various phases of the one awful, though inevitable, fall out of the bosom of God—one cataract-plunge into the nethermost Abyss—yet also as a tragedy-drama dream of His soul, that makes Him what He is. As without chemical antagonism life would not be, so without moral evil spiritual life would not be. But in the higher sphere this antagonism disappears; only, however, as absorbed in superhuman harmony; made latent therein, held in solution, not precipitated. In serene heights of Divine Light there is no darkness at all; yet the chaos, and the blind battle, and the agony, are as fiery living pillars, that glow ever out of gloom to uplift the palace of the City of God, lurid trunks that bear the fruitage and flowerage of Divine glory! Eternity is the serpent Circle, involving every phase and variety of being, with essential identity and return of all upon itself, engendering and absorbing. The modes of evil all engender one another. Ignorance, unwitting violation of fixed laws, is one great cause of suffering and sorrow. If I ignorantly walk into a pit or ice-crevasse, or stand under a tree where the lightning must strike, I perish—or if I ignorantly speak a word above my breath in a region of avalanches; and this whether it was or was not possible for me to know all the laws that concern my safety. How can I avoid all poison germs in the air? Knowing the laws, I may be impotent to apply knowledge; and disease carries me off in spite of doctors; if not, then old age. I know not the “Elixir Vitæ.” If children and their parents go up into a room at Christmas where a tree is lighted, where there are to be beautiful presents and merry games, and if their weight prove too much for the beams of the floor, then the god of gravitation will order a sudden general massacre of them in the midst of their merriment—a very Herodian, or Bulgarian massacre of the innocents, with no qualms of compunction whatsoever—as happened lately in a neighbouring land; yet that is not the end—not even of the poor moaning survivors, who are worse off

than any others—not even if they “curse God and die.” The end is out of sight, and very different.

But *all* limited modes of being work for their opposites, because in sooth they *are* their opposites. Not only do evils engender one another—evil works good, and good evil. There is some truth, however partial, in Mandeville’s thesis, that “private vices are public benefits.” Excess of vice, too, leads to reaction in favour of virtue, or to the annihilation of the vicious by a robuster race. But, on the other hand, good intentions may do harm, partly by their unwisdom and misguided zeal, partly by the hatred of bad men for a goodness that reproaches them and interferes with their pleasures, making them uneasy. Men, though they do not love evil as evil, may hate goodness as goodness, before they Mephistophelically disbelieve in it entirely. Puritan asceticism led to Restoration licence. The Inquisition had good intentions. Well, it delayed human progress; cut off the best men and their possible descendants; inflicted frightful misery; entailed on us a heritage of folly and pain; is largely, moreover, responsible for the atheistic counter excesses of “Revolution.” Again, force wise measures on a people unprepared, and behold the triumph of bigotry and error! But, on the other hand, railway accidents cure ignorance and carelessness; and, after all, the monastic system of the middle ages distinctly bore some good fruit; nor could we have done without it. Men, moreover, needed religion; and “the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church.” Truth calls for martyrs; so is her reign established—slowly, though she seem to perish. The Redeemer we owe to sin and Satan, to the bigotry of Jews, and the corruption of Gentiles. Now the Redeemer is nobler than unfallen Adam, than animal innocence. God’s blessedness, and ours in Him, involves the Fall. The eternal harmony involves, while it resolves, the everlasting discord. “’Tis better to have loved and lost, than never to have loved at all.”

Still, though we are evil, and our evil is odious and horrible

just in proportion as we are out of God, out of the universal will, in the phenomenal and separate selfish creature will—yet also is it true that we often feel evil to be *inflicted*, that we rise in revolt against the limitations of our creature lot, overwhelming us, insects of an hour, with so many ills not of our own devising, not of our own choice. Who of us asked for this “bitter boon, our birth”? There is what Aristotle terms *passive* as well as *active* Reason. The idea of each one involves an evolution from past, present and future causes, which are not, though in some sense they are, himself. Pity and awe surely, as well as indignation, we ought to feel for those who are destroying themselves, for those whose inheritance of sin and sickness has brought them into so fearful a strait of mortal calamity, of which we know so little the origin and the end! Who maketh us to differ from this or that criminal? We too yield to our temptations, however we may plume ourselves upon not yielding to his. Christ pitied and prayed for his murderers: “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” It is not we who destroy ourselves; it is we who are driven as by the gods to do it—by the *gods*, I say, not by God—by the dark, imprisoned, sundered and sundering demons—shadowy, isolated Nature powers, whom, though issuing from and constituting Him, God ever resists and destroys. Persons—yes, and whole races—tired out and despairing because of all the evil done under the sun, because of the helpless conflict and world-weariness in themselves—have longed for annihilation—not for more life, but for none. The darkly brilliant Schopenhauer even in Europe feels and deliberately systematizes this longing into a philosophy. It appears in Byron, in Heine, in Buddha, in the Hindoo, and in many a noble soul at certain stages of national life. The gods drive mortals mad for a punishment in Greek drama; but what of the inevitable Fate that brought the sin upon them, and which now deserves the curse? Striking, that not one has ever desired to do evil as evil, but that many, worn out with pain, have desired to cease and be no more! They, drowning in chill waters of oblivion,

did indeed cease to be, and yet they ceased not. He only who attains to union with the Eternal ceases to change, and rests in peace.

The power that compels us to be what we are, in so far as that power makes for evil and suffering, must be rightly regarded as dark and evil ; but the very same Power, in doing thus, "makes for righteousness" and bliss ; hence we see how partial are our views of either ! What that Power is and does in itself, in all the fulness of its reality, is higher and better than we can conceive. Only to us, in a necessary moment of its ever adorable progress, is it evil. But if our rebellion lead to defiance in favour of right, and to vindicate the oppressed, well. That is God in us as the World Spirit freeing Himself from the stifling sloughs of dead notions, dead customs, dead religions. It is a righteous protest against inadequate, corrupt and human conceptions of God, which, though once vital, now make of Him a tyrant and enemy, so that He becomes a devil, in alliance with unrighteous bigots and despots, whose royal or sacred vestments veil hideous lineaments of a prophet and minister of evil.

Venus is indeed a goddess ; yet if she pale not before "the Galilean," she becomes what the Christian names her, verily a devil ; and devils, however potent, alluring or terrible, may not claim the good man's worship. He is greater than they when he resists them ; God is in him and with him. By their priests and inquisitions they may tear him ; but though they break, they shall not bend him. If to hell they will send him for not worshiping them, "to hell he will go." Prometheus, and Galileo triumph after all ; the insolent gods bow down to them whom they terrified with their lightnings. We, in our isolated moments, feel the boundless Ocean of the alien, of the far-off, of the past and future, darkly threatening, lift us on heaving, resistless, ravening billows ; but we sleep, we dream ; yet dimly we may attain to trust, and to know that this Ocean is indeed no other than our own fundamental Being, from whose universal bosom for a moment it is right and

necessary that we as personal emerge. This Ocean, because we are banished therefrom, seems dark and merciless and overwhelming ; but restored thither, glorified and absorbed, we shall feel that it is one of glory.

RODEN NOEL.

II.—HOURS OF THOUGHT ON SACRED THINGS.

Hours of Thought on Sacred Things: a Volume of Sermons.

By James Martineau, LL.D., D.D., &c. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1876.

THIS book is well named—provided we give to the word “Thought” the very highest sense of which it is susceptible. A sermon of Mr. Martineau’s always signified an “Hour” (or, alas! generally only thirty or forty minutes) of very hard thinking indeed for his hearers, and, it is presumed, a preliminary four or five hours of meditation for the writer of the discourse. He never assumed the tone of the Prophet: “Thus saith the Lord, through my consciousness;” still less (it is needless to say) that of the Priest: “Thus saith the Church, through me her minister.” Nothing could be further from the yet more common pulpit practice of “holding a brief” for one or another form of doctrine than his mode of discussion. Indeed, not a little disappointment was sometimes expressed that it was possible to attend his chapel for a twelvemonth without ascertaining the complete outline of his opinions, and that casual listeners occasionally carried away quite erroneous impressions, from which he might have guarded them by explaining that he understood as a metaphor what other preachers insisted upon as a fact. He did not (as Theodore Parker fitly did in a different *milieu*) “keep before his mind the dullest member of his congregation, and resolve that he should understand everything he said.” Mr. Martineau apparently thought that in one small chapel in London, Men might reasonably

ask to be supplied with strong meat, while Babes received a superabundance of milk at fifty churches in the neighbourhood.

But if Mr. Martineau's idea of a sermon did not correspond with any of these ordinary types, it was nevertheless seemingly definite enough in another way. To one who was privileged to listen to him for several years, he seemed habitually to rise up in strong and steady flight into the loftiest regions of human contemplation, bearing with him all who could breathe the rarefied air into which he quickly passed, and where for a time he hovered. The mere fact of reaching such elevation above the trifling businesses and pleasures of daily life, was like the ascent to the stillness and freshness of the mountain-top from the noise and turmoil of the streets; and when his hearers dropped down once more to the concerns of earth, even if they did not carry any very special lesson to guide their paths, they felt they had gained a view of the road of life *from the heights*, altering the proportions and rectifying the perspective of duties and desires, and making little things seem truly little, and only great things great.

It is difficult to estimate the value of this volume to its readers in England and America. When the sermons of which it is composed were in progress of delivery, the members of the Portland-Street congregation, Sunday after Sunday, were wont to regret that the discourse of the day should not be repeated again on the following week, that they might better make it their own,* or that no entreaty would induce their minister to permit them to print it. Failing such satisfaction, elaborate Notes, amounting to volumes, were taken down, borrowed from hand to hand, copied and re-copied, demonstrating the sincerity of the wishes of many to renew again and again the impressions they had received. Of course somewhat must needs be lost in the change from the *viva voce* address to the printed book. There have been true apostles whose "bodily presence was weak and their speech

* This practice is observed with excellent effect, it is said, at the Brahmo Mandir in Calcutta. An assistant reads each Sunday, before the prayers and sermon of the day, what Keshub Chunder Sen preached the previous Sunday.

contemptible," so that when their disciples have received their thoughts without seeing or hearing them in the flesh, they have lost little or nothing. The preacher whose book is before us is, on the contrary, so complete and powerful an individuality, the outward man so true to the inward, the voice so fitting an organ for the meditative music which it renders, that, in missing the actual presence of their author, these sermons lose more, perhaps, than those of any other living orator. Certainly the use to which the discourses of other divines are not unfrequently applied, namely, of supplying the pulpit famine of indolent or overworked clergymen, will scarcely await them. He will be bold indeed who imagines that he may adopt a single paragraph out of them without betraying his theft when he attempts to read it as his own.

It must remain, then, a certain, not inconsiderable, deduction from the spell of these discourses to those who heard them as originally delivered, that they no longer come living from their author's lips, and that his voice neither renders the full significance of their poetry, nor aids their halting apprehension up the steep places of argument, paved as they are with metaphors so rich and rare, that it is difficult to resist the temptation to pause and pick them up. But allowing for this inevitable drawback, there can be but one sentiment among those who listened to these noble sermons in the little temple which became the spiritual home of so many, otherwise homeless, wanderers, no less than of its rightly proud Unitarian heirs. A great and long-sought boon has been graciously given to them. Their hearts, as well as the shelves of their libraries, ought to be the richer and better for it.

As regards the public, outside of Mr. Martineau's congregation, there are few social phenomena more curious to speculate on than the position which he and his works notoriously hold. It might have been naturally assumed that in such a centre of the world's thought as London, sermons would be valued by a great number of persons in proportion to their philosophical, their spiritual, or, at the lowest estimate, to their rhetorical worth; and that even the inevitable mental laziness

of the Sunday morning to men overworked throughout the week, would not hinder the best intellects from crowding to share the finest intellectual food which was offered in the land. It would really have seemed, however, on the contrary, that something like a special education must have been necessary to prepare his hearers for Mr. Martineau's discourses of later years, and that only his own trained congregation thoroughly took them in. The strangers (even unusually cultivated persons) who went to hear him generally received an impression, not unlike that of having been hurried breathless over a beautiful road. They had gained a glimpse of grand and lovely views, but they had been unluckily unable to follow their guide more than half-way. The thread of his argument had slipped from them while they stopped to admire the pearls which were strung so thickly upon it. They had, perhaps, sighed beforehand over the poverty and narrowness of ordinary sermons; but these discourses erred on the other side—were too high, too deep, too broad, too rich. When they came to find ideas (and such ideas!) presented to them in handfuls, they found themselves unable to grasp them, and let them fall out of their fingers as a child treats too large a nosegay. The materials for at least a dozen orthodox homilies packed into one, and not a single commonplace to rest upon and take breath by the way. It was too exhausting even for robust sermon-hearers. They could never say, like Tennyson's Northern Farmer, that they

“Thowt 'a said what 'a owt to a said,”

—what they expected every preacher to say, and so they came away a little disconcerted.

The same thing did not altogether apply to Mr. Martineau's earlier volumes. The “Endeavours after the Christian Life,” beautiful and admirable as they are, made no such inordinate demands on the strained attention as his sermons of recent years; and, as they could be read peacefully at home, they were not only dearly prized by the author's immediate *co-religionnaires*, but bought, studied and beloved by hundreds of

persons who either could not, or would not, have ever found their way under the portico of Portland-Street chapel. Well-used copies may to this day be continually found on the little private bookcases of bedrooms, boudoirs and "dens," in mansions where the inexperienced visitor would least expect any leaven of heresy to lurk. This new book—since the world's education is advancing by rapid strides, and Nicodemus no longer needs the shelter of night—ought to be twice as much prized and cherished as those earlier essays, if only the mental indolence of readers of the class of which we are speaking will permit them to undertake the effort of intellect, heart and conscience together, which must needs be made to study them aright. Even to those who have little religious feeling, it would seem the sermons must have attraction from the unapproachable beauty of their style, making whole pages of them rich and fanciful as a poem of Shelley, suggestive and profound as the finest passages of *In Memoriam*. But to those who care for the substance of Mr. Martineau's thoughts as well as for their splendid clothing, the book will be something more precious than can be measured by any standard of literary excellence. Nay, I could almost imagine them half regretting that the garniture should be so magnificent as it is. They needed a staff to aid them to climb Life's Hill of Difficulty, or to descend the yet more trying slippery declivities into the Valley of Humiliation; and instead of an alpenstock, Mr. Martineau has given them a crozier, all inwrought with enamel and jewelled with rubies and pearl.

But this ungracious thought would not long linger in any such reader's mind. The treasures of spiritual experience which these sermons contain—the rarest, as they are the most precious, of all the communications which one human soul can make to another—give to the book a value which throws into the shade every other characteristic, whether of powerful argument or radiant eloquence. The author sometimes seemed, to those who listened to him in the pulpit, to be before all things a great metaphysician. At another time he handled the latest theories and discoveries of physical science as if he had spent

his life between an observatory and a laboratory. Again, he left these topics, and shewed himself a profound Biblical critic, rich with all the lore of a Kalisch or an Ewald. And yet again, he seemed to be a man living not among books so much as among men and women, keenly alive to all the affections and duties and the play of passions and interests of ordinary life. And amid all these changing phases—metaphysician, physicist, critic, man of the world—he was ever and always the poet, who saw the beautiful, the noble and the holy, wherever they existed, and knew the spell of words to conjure up the sense of their presence in the hearts of those who heard him. There was one thing more. He was a profound religious thinker, not in the sense merely of being an able and subtle theologian, but as being one of those of whom the old Chaldean oracle affirmed, “The stronger souls receive light through themselves.” He spoke of what he knew, and testified what he had seen. A certain number of his sermons only dwelt on topics of this spiritual kind, touching the soul’s inner history. It is of these that the present collection is formed. I need say no more to express their exceeding value.

An analysis of these “Hours of Thought” would be a very superfluous offering to the readers of the *Theological Review*, every one of whom may be fairly assumed to have already perused the book before these pages see the light. In truth, to give any account, however brief, of these discourses, would need a volume in itself, so full is each of weighty matter, and so many topics of deep and varied reflection does it include. As to a *critique* of the sermons, it seems impossible that anybody should ever write one, seeing that those who are willing or able to take their lessons to heart will be the last to place themselves in any such attitude of judgment. There are books we may read sitting in the seat of the critic, as there are others whose leaves we idly turn as we lie on the grass of a summer’s day, or on the sofa by the winter’s fire; but this volume is no more of the first class than of the second. It is a book to be read in our quietest hours, when we can lend ourselves wholly

to the uplifting of the soul on the wings of a stronger spirit. It is a book to use as a well from whence to draw living water when our hearts are dry and our faith is faint; and there are not many phases of the inner life, I believe, for which some help or refreshment will not be found in it. For the days of doubt, there are the sermons on the Witness of God with our Spirit, and that on the Moral Quality of Faith; for those of sorrow, the Messengers of Change; for those of penitence, the wonderful pages on Divine Justice and Pardon Reconciled; and for those of our highest longing and aspiration, the sermon rightly named, "Rest in the Lord."

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

III.—THE NEW MS. OF CLEMENT OF ROME.

Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Κλήμεντος ἐπισκόπου Ρώμης αἱ δύο πρὸς Κορινθίους ἐπιστολαὶ, ἐκ χειρογράφου τῆς ἐν Φαναρίῳ Κων πόλεως βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Παναγίου Τάφου νῦν πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμεναι πληρεῖς μετὰ προλεγομένων καὶ σημειώσεων ὑπὸ Φιλοθέου Βρυννίου μητροπολίτου Σεργῶν : ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει. 1875.

Clementis Romani ad Corinthios quæ dicuntur Epistolæ. Textum ad fidem Codicum et Alexandrini et Constantinopolitani nuper inventi recensuerunt et illustraverunt Oscar de Gebhardt, Adolphus Harnack. Lipsiæ. 1876.

Clementis Romani Epistolæ. Edidit, commentario critico et adnotationibus instruxit Adolphus Hilgenfeld. Lipsiæ. 1876.

THE book at the head of our list is the first complete edition of the two Epistles to the Corinthians ascribed to Clemens Romanus. The only manuscript of these works known to exist before 1875 was the famous Codex Alexandrinus of the British Museum. The two Epistles had at one time been given completely in this MS. at the end of the New Testament, but time or the rough hand of man had dealt harshly with this

portion of it. From the first Epistle one entire leaf had been cut out. The edges of some leaves were badly worn and moth-eaten, and words had become indistinct through the use of tincture of gall. The second Epistle was in a still worse condition. It broke off in the middle of a sentence, and no indication was given how much had been taken away. Amid the search for manuscripts in the East, the mind of the patristic scholar often longed for some other manuscript which might complete and confirm the text of Codex Alexandrinus. Tischendorf at one time had his hopes greatly raised. He was told that there was an ancient manuscript of both Epistles at Ferrara, but when he reached that place he could find only a worthless life of Clement. Light, however, has at length come from the East. Philotheus Bryennius, Metropolitan of Serrae, came upon a manuscript written in A.D. 1056, containing not only the two Epistles of Clement, but a complete copy of the Epistle of Barnabas, along with the Epistles of Ignatius and the "Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles." He describes the Library in which he found it as the Library at Fanari of Constantinople, belonging to the Patriarchal Metochion* of Jerusalem.

We have given nearly all the information in regard to this manuscript which Bryennius has vouchsafed to impart to us. He does not say anything of the history of the Library or of the manuscript. He supplies us with no external testimony to its antiquity. He mentions the fact that he was aided in the collation by his illustrious friend, the Metropolitan of Korytzas, Dorotheus Evelpis. We have to trust entirely to the honour of these two Greek clergymen for the fact that a really genuine manuscript has been found, and to internal evidence. We cannot think that this is an entirely satisfactory method of procedure. When a manuscript is discovered, all the external testimony that can be adduced should be adduced. In this particular case we are met with a puzzling circumstance.

* Sophocles gives as the meaning of *μετόχιον*, "the residence of an agent of a monastery in a city."

Gebhardt and Harnack state that a catalogue of this Library was prepared by Bethmann in 1845, and exists in Pertz's Archiv, but no mention is made of our Codex. Was it in the Library then? Still more unsatisfactory is the absence of such external testimony when so important a Codex as the Sinaiticus is concerned. Tischendorf rescued a portion of this manuscript from the waste-basket in 1844. In 1853 he could hear nothing of it. In 1859 he accidentally found it in the possession of the steward, the most complete copy of the Old and New Testament in existence, with the Epistle of Barnabas and the Pastor of Hermas. Could not the monks state its history during the period of 1844 to 1859? Could they not have detailed the efforts they made to gather the scattered fragments together? Could not the steward have told when he became the custodian of the work? All this information would be exceedingly interesting in itself and very valuable for posterity. This generation may have perfect confidence in Bryennius and Tischendorf. But circumstances might arise at a long subsequent period which might awaken doubts as to the genuineness of the manuscripts. The appeal to internal evidence may prove to be unsatisfactory. And then what is there? It might well be urged that if a Tischendorf were inclined to forge a manuscript, he had unrivalled opportunities of so doing. No one was so well versed in manuscripts as he. None knew so well as he all the forms of the letters, all the mistakes of copyists, all the various readings. And it might also be said that there is no guarantee that the terrible results of a discovery of such a practice would be sufficiently deterrent. Chatterton was not deterred. Constantine Simonides was not deterred. Nor were these influenced by a base love of gain, but an eager desire to shew their power. A fascination was upon them which blinded them to all consequences. We cannot therefore but think it a grave error both in Tischendorf and Bryennius that they have not adduced external testimony to the history of their manuscripts.

In the case of the Epistles of Clement, the internal evidence is entirely in favour of the genuineness of the manuscript.

The portion of the first letter published for the first time has the same characteristics of style as the portion previously published. Its matter is different from what one would have expected, but is perfectly in harmony with the rest. Its nature also can explain its excision from the Alexandrian MS. It is to a large extent liturgical, and possibly some priest may have found it convenient to cut the prayer out for some particular service. The conclusion of the second Epistle is also in harmony with its commencement, and the style is the same. And lastly, Mr. Bensly has found a Syriac translation of the two Epistles, which guarantees satisfactorily the genuineness of the Constantinopolitan Codex.

The slight glance at the edition of Bryennius brings prominently before us the uncertainty of the work of the critic when he labours without sure foundation. The various editors, from Junius downwards, have tried to fill in the lacunæ of the Alexandrian Codex. In many instances it was impossible to go wrong, for only two or three letters had to be filled in. But whenever there was a larger space, they have almost invariably missed the right word, even though there could be no doubt of the sense. We shall take the seventh chapter of the first Epistle as a specimen. The larger blanks are these :

1. σεμνὸν τ	σεως
2. κανόνα	ωμεν
3. τερπνὸν	σδεκτόν
4. ποι	ος
5. ἡμᾶς	ωμεν εἰς
6. Χριστοῦ	μεν
7. θεῷ	αὐτοῦ.

The manuscript reads :

1. σεμνὸν τῆς παραδόσεως
2. κανόνα καὶ ἰδωμεν
3. τερπνὸν καὶ τί προσδεκτόν
4. ποιήσαντος
5. ἡμᾶς ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς
6. Χριστοῦ καὶ γνῶμεν
7. τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ θεῷ.

No critic conjectured the first, second and sixth. Junius was right with the fourth and fifth. Tischendorf was right with the third. No one suggested the exact form of the seventh, though Bleek conjectured πατρί, and Professor Lightfoot, καὶ πατρί. At the same time, some happy conjectures have been confirmed. Tischendorf and Lightfoot were able, by a careful examination of the Alexandrian MS., to suggest readings which are now proved to be correct, but to which others had only approximated. And Laurent's emendation of ἐπαφροι into ἐγγραφοι, is ratified by the Constantinopolitan Codex, and proves that sometimes a bold change may be the right one.

Critics are very fond of suggesting how larger gaps should be filled up. There was one leaf absent from the first Epistle. This blank was deemed an appropriate receptacle for such fragments as were attributed to Clemens Romanus. Only one of these passages is found in the newly-discovered manuscript. Every critic attributed one other fragment at least to this Epistle, and some assigned more than one.

There was a dispute in regard to the length of the complete second Epistle. Professor Lightfoot argued from the Sticho-metria of Nicephorus that about five-sixths of the whole Epistle had been lost. Gebhardt thought this calculation wrong, and believed it to be nearer the truth that only one leaf had been lost, as in the first Epistle. Neither of them was correct, though Gebhardt was nearer the truth. The editors have made twenty chapters of the Epistle, twelve out of the old and eight out of the new; and this division gives a good idea of the proportion of the new matter to the old.

The question that will first suggest itself to the critic, in dealing with the new manuscript, is naturally its value as compared with that of the Alexandrian Codex. The German editions whose titles are set down at the head of this article differ in regard to this point. Hilgenfeld thinks that the Constantinopolitan is the best, and has generally followed it in the constitution of his text. Gebhardt and Harnack, on the other hand, have given the preference to the Alexandrian.

We think that Hilgenfeld is right, and we shall try to prove this.

The differences between the two manuscripts are numerous, but most of them are not of great consequence ; and they can be easily classified.

First, we have differences resulting from the mistakes of the transcribers in hearing and in spelling. These consist of slight omissions, of errors arising from the identity of the pronunciation of ϵ and $\alpha\iota$, or of ι , υ , $\epsilon\iota$ and $\omicron\iota$, of one or two homoioteleuta, and similar slips. The Constantinopolitan is on the whole much more accurate in these respects than the Alexandrian.

Second, a large number of the differences consist in the adoption of different tenses. Where the Alexandrian has an aorist, the Constantinopolitan has the perfect ; where the Alexandrian has a present participle, the Constantinopolitan has an aorist, or vice versa. It is scarcely possible to conceive that this difference is not the result of deliberate alteration. A slight examination of them will convince any one of this. The principal of them are as follows :

	A.	C.
c. 1.	βλασφημηθῆναι	βλασφημείσθαι
c. 2.	ἐξετείνετε	ἐξετείνετε
c. 7.	ικετεύσαντες	ικετεύοντες
c. 12.	παραγινόμενους	παραγενομένους
c. 13.	στηρίξωμεν	στηρίζωμεν
c. 17.	ἀτενίζων	ἀτενίσας
c. 27.	ἀπολείπωμεν	ἀπολίπωμεν
c. 36.	ἀτενίσωμεν	ἀτενίζωμεν
c. 44.	πολιτευομεν . .	πολιτευσαμένων
c. 65.	ἀπαγγέλλωσιν	ἀπαγγείλωσιν.

In all these cases, the reading of the Constantinopolitan manuscript is unquestionably to be preferred. In one or two others, the reading of the Alexandrian is preferable ; but in most that remain, a decided opinion is not warranted, as it was within the option of the writer to use one or other of the forms, according to the idea that was in his mind. They are :

A.	C.
c. 12. ἐλάλησας	λελάληκας
c. 12. γέγονεν	ἐγενήθη
c. 18. εἵπωμεν	εἵπομεν
c. 15. γεννηθήτω	γεννηθείη
c. 16. ποιήσωμεν	ποιήσομεν
c. 20. προσπεφύγοντας	προσφεύγοντας
c. 25. τελευτηκότος	τελευτήσαντος
mistake for τετελευτηκότος	
c. 25. πεπληρωμένου	πληρουμένου
c. 49. ἔδωκεν	δέδωκεν.

Hilgenfeld has adopted the readings of the Constantinopolitan Codex in all these cases except εἵπομεν. Gebhardt and Harnack have felt compelled, in at least three instances out of our first list, to give up the readings of the Alexandrian. There cannot be a doubt that here the Constantinopolitan is by far the best. But, strangely enough, when we come to the second Epistle, we are forced to an opposite conclusion. There is the same deliberate alteration, but in all cases the Alexandrian Codex seems to us correct, and the Constantinopolitan wrong. They are as follows :

A.	C.
c. 4. ὁμολογῶμεν	ὁμολογήσωμεν
c. 7. φθείρας	φθείρων
c. 8. ποίη	ποιήση
c. 8. ἀναπλάσσει	ἀναπλάσει
c. 8. βοηθήσει	βοηθεῖ
c. 11. ἠκούσαμεν	ἠκούομεν.

Third. A series of differences has arisen from one manuscript giving us a simple verb where the other gives us a compound, or from one giving a verb compounded with one preposition, and the other the same verb compounded with another preposition. In some instances the reading of the Alexandrian Codex is to be preferred, but in the great majority of the cases the Constantinopolitan readings are better, and indeed so clearly better, that Gebhardt and Harnack have

adopted them. Instances are: ἐνεστερνισμένοι, c. 2, for ἐστερνισμένοι; ἐγγενᾶται for γενᾶται, c. 25; and ἐπήνεγκεν for προσήνεγκεν, c. 47.

Fourth. The Codex Alexandrinus has many Hellenistic forms where the Constantinopolitan has the Attic forms, or rather the forms of the κοινὴ διάλεκτος. We shall give instances:

A.	C.
ἀπροσωπολήπτως	ἀπροσωπολήπτως
ζῆλος, acc. sing.	ζῆλον
συλλημφθέντες	συλληφθέντες
τύφος, acc. sing.	τύφον
ἐλεᾶτε	ἐλεεῖτε
εὐλογοῦσαν	εὐλόγουν
προείλαντο	προείλοντο
χρᾶσθαι	χρῆσθαι.

The Constantinopolitan is not altogether free from freaks in this matter. It has χρᾶται where the Alexandrian reads χρῆται. It has the Attic form γλώττης, and it has introduced the optative twice. One of these instances we have noticed already. In the other, c. 45, the Alexandrian reads εἴπομεν, the Constantinopolitan, εἴποιμεν. The optative in such a connection without ἄν is meaningless, and therefore Hilgenfeld is right in adopting the emendation εἴπωμεν. To our surprise, Gebhardt and Harnack have followed the Constantinopolitan reading. In another instance, both manuscripts have εἶη, Epistle II. c. 12, after ὅταν; but the emendation into ᾗ is so simple and natural, that εἶη should unquestionably be altered.

Besides these differences, the Constantinopolitan has a tendency to be more accurate in all grammatical matters, such as δῆλη where the Alexandrian reads δῆλος, ὑπερτάτη instead of ὑπερτάτω with a feminine noun.

Which of the two manuscripts is right in this matter? This is a rather difficult question to answer; but we think that here, again, the Constantinopolitan is right in regard to the first Epistle, and wrong in regard to the second. There can be no doubt that the first Epistle proceeded from the Roman

Church. Now the remains that we have of the Greek of the Romans prove that that Greek was not Hellenistic, and there is no reason why it should have been so. The only exception to this is the Pastor of Hermas; but the Greek of that book is still a problem. It has a great deal more of the Hellenistic and Neo-Hellenic than any work that has come down to us anterior to the works of Ptochoprodromus. It may indeed be affirmed that Clement was strongly influenced by the Septuagint, with which he was well acquainted, and this is no doubt a consideration which possesses weight. But still, when we examine the work of Clement, we are led to believe that his Greek was the Greek of the cultivated Roman. Our reasons for this are not indeed very satisfactory, but so far as they go they point to this conclusion. For instance, a note of the Hellenistic is the disuse of the optative. But Clement uses it frequently, and there is one instance of *ἵνα* with the optative after a past-principal verb, if the reading is correct. In the whole of the New Testament there is not one instance. And there is none in the second Epistle of Clement. Then, again, the form *κατέλιπον* is used throughout by Clement in the first Epistle. The first aorist subj. *καταλείψωμεν*, is employed in the second. *κατέλειψα* would naturally come into use only when *κατέλιπον* and *κατέλειπον* were pronounced in the same way. And as a fact, Dr. Veitch, in his *Irregular Verbs*, questions whether *ἔλειψα* occurs in Attic, and does not give one instance of *κατέλειψα* even in later Greek, except in the participle *καταλείψας*. It is the form employed in modern Greek. These and a few similar notes lead us to believe that the transcriber of the Alexandrian manuscript has inserted his own Hellenistic where Clement had the ordinary Greek forms, except in passages from the Septuagint, and that the Constantinopolitan transcriber has altered the Hellenistic forms of the second Epistle into the classical, as when he changes *παθεῖται*, intended as a future of *πάσχω*, into *πέισεται*. In doing so, these transcribers followed a common practice. They did what the transcribers of Plautus and Terence did to their authors. And no one doubts that this is the case with the Alexandrian

manuscript ; for the transcriber has again and again the Neo-Hellenic accusative of the third declension in *ν*, as ἀσφαλην. No editor has ventured on following the manuscript in this respect, and yet it is a difficult matter to determine where one is to draw the line in Hellenistic or Neo-Hellenic forms.

Fifth, we have more important differences, which arise from one having the correct reading and the other the incorrect, or where each has a quite different word, and the one will not account for the other. In both classes of differences, the Constantinopolitan manuscript has the advantage, though it is not to be followed blindly. Thus it has in c. 35, πιστῶς, where the Alexandrian has the meaningless πίστεως; and in the same chapter it has ἀφιλοξενίαν where the Alexandrian Codex has absurdly φιλοξενίαν. In c. 38, the Constantinopolitan gives τημελείτω, which makes good sense, where the Alexandrian has μητημελειτο, which is evidently corrupt. In c. 41, the Constantinopolitan has εὐαρεστέιτω, which gives a much better sense than εὐχαριστέιτω, the reading of the Alexandrian, although Gebhardt and Harnack prefer the latter. These might be mere emendations ; and indeed Hilgenfeld suggested πιστῶς, and Mill ἀφιλοξενίαν.

In the case of words which are entirely different, the Constantinopolitan has, again, the advantage, though in many cases it is impossible to decide from the mere words themselves. Thus the Constantinopolitan has ἀμαρτίας, φθόνος, περιστάσεις, where the Alexandrian has ἀνομίας, ἔρις and περιπτώσεις. But in some cases the Constantinopolitan readings are to be preferred. Thus σιγῆς in the Constantinopolitan is so plainly to be preferred to φωνῆς of the Alexandrian, that Gebhardt and Harnack have adopted it. Again, in c. 2, μετὰ δέους καὶ συνειδήσεως of C. is at any rate sense, and therefore to be preferred to the reading of A., though we suspect that both are corrupt, and that something like μετὰ τελείας συνελεύσεως is the sense ; for it is the absolute completeness of the number of the elect that the writer seems to wish to express. The superiority of C. in such passages is attested by the circumstance, that though Gebhardt and Harnack prefer the Alexandrian, they have

adopted for the most part the readings of the Constantinopolitan.

The plain inference from all this investigation is, that the Constantinopolitan is on the whole much the more accurate and trustworthy manuscript, and that therefore, when we are left solely to external testimony, its reading is to be preferred.

It is singular that in some of the most corrupt passages both manuscripts agree, or at least the new one does not release us from the difficulty. Thus the Danaïdes and Dirce are found in both, the latter under the form of Δειρ και in two separate words in the Constantinopolitan. Notwithstanding the recent ingenious explanation that these were names applied in mockery to the Christians in the amphitheatre, we cannot but think that the passage is corrupt. The sedate letter of one church to another is not a document in which nicknames would be introduced under any circumstances. We think it far more likely that γενναῖαί τε καὶ δοῦλαι, or some such designation of the women, were the words actually used. In the difficult passage about bishops, the Constantinopolitan reads ἐπιδομήν, which is not more intelligible than the troublesome ἐπινομήν of the Alexandrian, but suggests the emendation ἐπίδομα, which in the sense of "addition" gives exactly what is wanted. The corrupt passage in c. 10 of the second Epistle is still corrupt in the Constantinopolitan; but its new reading of προαιρούμεθα suggests the emendation, οὐκ εἰς τὴν ἀρέσκειαν ἀνθρώπων οὔτινες προσάγουσι φόβους ἀνθρωπίνους προαιρούμεθα. In the passages, too, which are now printed for the first time, corruptions exist, and both Hilgenfeld and Gebhardt and Harnack have been very happy in some suggestions. We may add to these that ἐλλόγιμος is used in a new sense in Epistle I. c. 58, and different from the meaning of the word in other passages of the same writing, but that most probably it should be changed into ἐλλογούμενος, or ἐλλογιζόμενος, or ἐκλελεγμένος, or something similar.

We turn from the text to the new subject-matter for which we are indebted to the Constantinopolitan manuscript. Here, in the first Epistle, the gain is not great. We have seen

already that the manuscript agrees with the older one in regard to some of the passages which are manifestly corrupt. Curiously enough, however, it furnishes us with a new reading in the one passage which some thought proved Clement's belief in the divinity of Christ, and which they thought had been overlooked by Photius when he stated that Clement's first Epistle did not contain the loftiest language in regard to Christ. The passage was: "All of you were humble-minded and free from all vain boasting, subjecting yourselves rather than subjecting others, giving more willingly than receiving, content with the journey-supplies of God, and, giving heed to his words, you carefully stored them up in your hearts, and his sufferings were ever before your eyes." It was argued that the "his" of "his sufferings" could refer only to God, and that thus Christ who suffered was thought of as God by Clement. The Constantinopolitan manuscript reads, "the journey-supplies of Christ," and "his sufferings" are therefore the sufferings of Christ. And if we are to go by the authority of manuscripts, this unquestionably is the reading to be adopted. The Constantinopolitan is so decidedly superior to the Alexandrian, that in any disputed passage its authority must stand highest. At the same time, we acknowledge that the reading is by no means certain. Transcribers of the fourth and subsequent centuries seem to have had no hesitation in substituting God or Lord for Christ, or adding these words to his name. How could they? They had no idea of punctual accuracy, and the terms were to them synonymous. We have instances of this in all our manuscripts of ecclesiastical writers. In c. 4 of our first Epistle, A reads $\theta\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, C reads $\kappa\upsilon\rho\iota\omega$. In c. 50, A reads $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$, C reads $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. In the second Epistle, c. 9, A has $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, C has $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$. In fact, the transcriber would no doubt often make such changes unconsciously, and probably we have an instance of this in c. 19 of the second Epistle, where we read, $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$. These words do not give us any rational meaning; but change the $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\nu$ into $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu$, and we get exactly what is required.

We cannot, then, be certain of the reading. We are inclined

to think that, whether the reading be *χριστοῦ* or *θεοῦ*, the *παθήματα* is a mistake for *μαθήματα*. The change is slight, and the sense is greatly improved.

The new portion of the first Epistle is to a large extent occupied with a beautiful prayer, which, as might have been expected, was partially incorporated in the Apostolical Constitutions. We cannot expect to have much doctrinal light from such a prayer. But still the new matter explains to us one important fact—the reading of the Epistle in the churches, and the early belief in its inspiration. The letter most positively claims to be inspired. The Roman Church asserts its divine direction in two passages. The first is: “If any disobey what has been said by Him through us, let them know that they will involve themselves in sin and no small danger,” c. 59. “Him” is God. The second is: “For ye will afford us joy and gladness if, becoming obedient to what has been written by us through the Holy Spirit, ye cut off the unlawful anger,” c. 63. Unquestionably, here, the words “through the Holy Spirit” may go with “ye cut off,” as Harnack takes them, but it is far more likely that they go with “written.”

The information which we get from the second Epistle is much more definite. We know now positively that the work is not an Epistle, but a Homily read in the church after the reading of the Scriptures. “Wherefore, brethren and sisters,” he says, “after the word* of truth I read to you a Homily, that you may give heed to what has been written, in order that you may save both yourselves and him who reads amongst you.” There is, however, no clue to the date nor to the place. Harnack thinks that the allegorical interpretation of Gen. i. 27, “God made man, male and female,”—the male being, according to Clement, Christ, and the “female” the Church,—could not have been made later than 170 A.D. Nor do the words that follow, *ὅτι τὰ βιβλία καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι*, militate against this inference, but rather for it, as *τὰ βιβλία* is the Old Testament, and *οἱ ἀπόστολοι* reminds one of Justin’s *τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποσ-*

* “God” in the manuscript.

τόλων. The doctrine of the Homily might also be alleged in favour of an early date. The writer's sentiments are exactly similar to those of the Pastor of Hermas. The Church was "created before the sun and the moon." "It was spiritual like our Jesus, but was manifested in the last days to save us. But the Church being spiritual was manifested in the flesh of Christ, making it plain to us that if any one of us keeps it in the flesh and does not corrupt it, he will receive it in the Holy Spirit," c. 14. The connection between chastity and the ultimate reception of the Spirit is a special feature of the ninth Similitude of Hermas. And the writers of the Homily and of the Pastor of Hermas agree also in speaking of Christ as the Spirit. "Such an one," says the writer of the Homily, "will not partake of the Spirit which is Christ," c. 14.

We find also the same tone in the Homily as in the Pastor of Hermas. Man is to be saved by his holy deeds, and special stress is laid on special virtues. "Alms, then," he says, "is a good thing, as being repentance from sin; fasting is better than prayer, but alms is better than both." Harnack drew attention to all these points in his first notice of the new manuscript in the Theolog. Literaturzeitung, No. IV., 1876, and inferred that the Homily was the production of the Western Church; and he has since tried to shew that the external history of the work, so far as it can be traced, is in favour of this hypothesis.

Hilgenfeld, on the other hand, has revived the suggestion of Dodwell, that Clemens Romanus has been confounded with Clemens Alexandrinus. Dodwell remarked that there was considerable resemblance between the style of the *Eclogæ Propheticae* and the second Epistle of Clement. Hilgenfeld has pointed out similarities between the Homily and the work of Clemens Alexandrinus, *τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος*; besides these facts, Clemens Alexandrinus is the only other writer who quotes the Gospel according to the Egyptians, and some of the passages are the same as those quoted by the writer of the Homily. And if Clemens Alexandrinus were the writer, it is easy to see how it might be attributed to Clemens Romanus. Some transcriber found it with the name Clemens attached to

it. He imagined it to be the work of the Roman. The Roman had written one letter to the Corinthians ; St. Paul had written two. Clement's second work must therefore be the second Epistle to the Corinthians. But neither of the hypotheses proposed is altogether satisfactory, and the problem of the date and the authorship still awaits solution.

JAMES DONALDSON.

IV.—THE NEW ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT.

THERE can be no doubt that Lord Sandon's Act of last session was intended quite as much for the discouragement of the Birmingham League as for the encouragement of elementary education. Now, without endorsing all the aims of that energetic society, we are bound to admit that its strong point is the proposal of a definite and feasible plan by which elementary instruction can obviously be made compulsory and universal, whatever else it may become. But this plan, involving as it does the creation of elective School Boards everywhere, and the consequent triennial agitation of the ratepaying public by educational discussions, is manifestly dangerous to the already existing system, so far as the latter is based on traditions of ecclesiastical privilege. Whatever may be our prejudices on the one side or on the other, there is no use in disguising this tendency of Mr. Forster's invention. It may not be very clearly exhibited yet. The denominational system will only little by little lose the impetus given to it by the "spurt," got up under the stimulus of the wager against time offered in the proclamation of a year of grace. By the operation of the cumulative vote, a large minority of most Boards, and the majority of some, consist of members who represent the interests of denominational schools rather than those of national education. And even where zeal for the new system is strongest, economy very obviously suggests the prudence of

protecting and even fostering the old schools that are doing good work. But notwithstanding all these favourable conditions, there are already signs that the struggle for life is too hard for many of these creations of a bygone world. For instance, it is an ominous fact that while the so-called voluntary schools in London were reckoned upon in 1871 for 350,000 places,* they are now not actually providing more than 287,000.† And this is all the more remarkable, because the National Society boasts with natural pride of the erection and enlargement of several schools within the last five years. On the other hand, the School Board, which at the former date confined itself to the modest proposal of building for 100,000 children, has already provided for 50,000 more than that number, and has arranged sites and plans for 32,000 in addition to these. The diminution of 63,000 places in the one case, and the increase of 82,000 in the other, is a very remarkable phenomenon, however it may be explained.‡ We believe the same process must necessarily go on with varying speed in all places where the Board-school system has taken firm root. And therefore we regard it as both natural and consistent in a Government which is nothing if not ecclesiastical, that it should have taken steps to neutralize so alarming a tendency of previous legislation. It is the old story of the Atlantic and the enterprising mop over again. But our imperturbable confidence in the ultimate result should enable us to discuss with judicial impartiality the accidental good and the essential evil of the method devised to prevent it.

The main idea on which the new Act was constructed was this, that the nation wanted universal education, but did not want universal School Boards. And the chief incentive to speedy legislation was the conviction that, unless universal

* Report of the School Board to the Education Department, 1872.

† Report on the Operation of the Compulsory Bye-laws in London, 1876.

‡ The 350,000 school places of 1871 were not all actually existent. Some were in projected schools that were never built. But these did not amount to 10,000. Again, many were transferred to the Board. But in either case the decay of the "voluntary" system was the cause.

instruction was secured in some other way, the public apathy about School Boards would be succeeded by another wave of enthusiasm. But supposing that some other and less objectionable method of ensuring universal education could be found, it might be possible to guarantee, for generations to come, the power and the privileges still possessed by the ecclesiastical system. This fundamental principle of the new measure was received with so much favour by the Conservative majority at present in power, and with such faint protests from the paralysed Liberal minority, that Lord Sandon, during the progress of the Bill, felt encouraged to enlarge its scope in a more obviously reactionary direction. For there is a very large number of School Boards which have neither built schools, nor accepted transfers, nor acquired sites, but have contented themselves with acting as school-attendance committees. Yet the duty of these Boards to provide school accommodation in case of necessity, and the special facilities conferred on them by the Act of 1870 for raising money for this purpose, make their very existence a standing menace of rivalry with the denominational schools. And besides, many rich men, apathetic to sectarian interests, might be slow to subscribe for any addition to the old schools while a Board existed whose duty was to enforce the contributions of all for such a purpose; but the same men, if the Board were out of the way, would goodnaturedly give their money, rather than wait the wrangling, and official correspondence, and inevitable red-tapery, which must precede its re-establishment. Thus if provision were made for the dissolution of School Boards without schools, many parishes and even towns might be rescued from the enemy, and the widening domain of the obnoxious system would be not only limited but curtailed. Hence the forty-first section of the new Act, which opened the eyes of many Liberals too late to perceive the hands of Esau, after they had been listening for so long with closed lids to the mild and amiable voice of Jacob.

From these preliminary remarks it will be seen that in any review of the position of National Elementary Education as modified by Lord Sandon's Act, three topics demand successive

attention. The first of these is the alleged unpopularity and inconvenience of the School-Board system, and the necessity for securing universal instruction by other means. The second is the adaptation of the Act to secure the proposed end in the absence of School Boards. And the remaining point is the bearing of the new law upon districts where these Boards already exist.

I. During the late discussions in Parliament, the unpopularity of School Boards was treated by their opponents, and even by some of their faint-hearted friends, not so much as an opinion to be proved, but as a fundamental assumption—the admitted ground on which the whole argument about fresh legislation was to be based. But “much has happened” since then. And it is questionable whether the confidence of reaction, or the faint-heartedness of liberalism, has most reason to feel humiliated by the rebuke of events. It was well for Lord Sandon’s success that his measure was introduced just before the triennial recurrence of the more important School-Board elections. For these afford the best practicable test of the favour with which Mr. Forster’s institution is regarded just where it is in fullest action. We say the “best practicable test,” because it is difficult to suggest any other; but the conditions under which that test is applied at the present time are by no means favourable to the Boards. For they have sown lavishly, but the time for the harvest is not yet. Here and there, in exceptional spots, where quick returns are possible, a considerable amount of fruit has been reaped. And this is especially the case in a field that has lain fallow for too long—the wild and neglected children who are the offspring of Mr. Bright’s “residuum.” It is not merely that thousands, whom no voluntary system could have grasped, are sent to industrial schools; but that, in spite of Lord Shaftesbury’s benevolent fears, it is certain that a handsome, well-appointed board school has a much speedier and more effective moral influence on the dirty, dishevelled, miserable children of this class, than the old “ragged schools,” which are being “improved off the face of the earth.” The very name of the latter is of itself a

charter to raggedness. Boys and girls who every day pass in and out of a door over which is the bold inscription, "Tinker's Lane Ragged School," may very well be excused if they keep a vague impression that privileges and attentions of a special kind are associated with rags. But in a board school there is no intimation that torn jackets and trousers are specially welcome. They are no hindrance to admission, as any one may see for himself who will take the trouble to visit some East London schools. But they are soon felt to be a reproach; and, as they are the consequence not of poverty but of neglect, they are gradually but surely replaced by patches and darning. The process is happily familiar to many local managers of board schools in low neighbourhoods, and there can be no doubt that such ocular demonstration of a civilizing influence at work has softened the heart of many a grumbling ratepayer.*

But the immediate and tangible results, which have drawn us into this digression, are, after all, exceptional, and, like other "works of the Lord," are only "sought out of them that have pleasure therein." In the main our remark stands good, that the test of periodical elections is at present applied under conditions rather unfavourable than otherwise to School Boards. They have laid a new rate; but they have not sensibly diminished any of the old rates, as it is fondly hoped that they will. They have expended much money on improved school buildings; they have spared no expense in apparatus; they

* Sir Charles Reed, Chairman of the London Board, in resuming his duties after the last Midsummer vacation, said: "Emphatic testimony has been borne by the Commissioners of Police to the marked diminution of juvenile crime and vagrancy effected by the humane and persistent efforts of the Board. Thus the Commissioner of the City Police lately wrote to me that 'the Inspectors of Police in charge of the several divisions within the City, are unanimous in assuring him that there has been, within the last two or three years, a very considerable reduction in the number of children who previously infested the public thoroughfares.' The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has also written a letter, from which it appears that the Superintendents of the great majority of the Police divisions are of opinion that the working of the Board is of a beneficial character, and has a salutary effect in checking juvenile crime, as shewn by the diminished number of juvenile offenders arrested. The good effects will probably become more apparent in future."

have made little or no attempt to resist the inevitable rise in the cost of good teaching. And yet, up to the date of the last Government returns (1874-5), the results shewn by board schools on examination were only very slightly superior to those of denominational schools. Of course, all this excites no surprise in those who had formed a rational estimate of the time that must elapse before the new machinery gets into full working order, or takes sufficient hold of a whole generation of children to mould their later life. But, unfortunately, those who form rational estimates of any novelty whatever, are rare exceptions, rather than ordinary ratepayers. And if their votes at elections had expressed impatience and disappointment, we for our part should hardly have been surprised. But the actual facts shew a very different state of feeling. In Bradford, in Leeds, and in all the principal centres of population, where School-Board elections have recently taken place, those members who announced a determination to work the institution to its utmost capacity were in highest favour, while those who too effusively shewed a disposition to sympathize with the woes of denominational managers have either been rejected, or have owed their successful position on the poll to the cumulative vote.

The most remarkable illustration of this popular feeling was given by the recent elections in London. The population concerned there is so vast and its character so various, that we may fairly suppose those elections to represent average national opinion, or at any rate to be a very considerable factor in forming it. The actual results were wholly unlooked for on both sides. Canon Gregory, who for three years had played the part of Goliath to the Philistine camp in the metropolis, was so confident of success, that he and his friends believed all they had to do was to delay the selection of sites and building of schools until after the 30th of November, in order to be perfectly secure against School-Board aggressiveness. On the other hand, the advocates of the "Board policy" had been assured so often of their unpopularity, that they began to believe it themselves. They feared that, in the new Board,

parties would be at a dead-lock, and their utmost expectation was a majority of two or three. Their adversaries, on the contrary, predicted a reactionary majority of ten. The actual results were a surprise to both alike; for the declaration of the poll shewed a clear majority of twelve in favour of the policy hitherto pursued. The details of the elections in the various metropolitan divisions brought out results even more remarkable still. All the former members of the Board who offered themselves for re-election were returned except one, and he was perhaps more adverse than any except Canon Gregory to the School-Board system. Out of thirty candidates recommended by a central committee as favourable to the Board policy, not one was rejected. Not one of the ten boroughs returned an adverse majority. In no case except that of Southwark was an opponent of the Board at the head of the poll; and in most divisions the liberal candidates distanced their competitors by thousands of votes. In short, the last election of the London School Board may very well be regarded as the Sedan of the sectarian opposition to the system. It by no means ended the war, but it makes the ultimate issue plain and inevitable.

It may be said, perhaps, that when Lord Sandon and his supporters enlarged on the unpopularity of School Boards, they did not refer to urban, but to rural districts. We do not remember that any such distinction was made at the time; but even if it was, it is little to the purpose; for the rural districts have had very slight chance of trying whether they liked the system or not. And as exponents of rural opinion, we should prefer very much to take the unions of agricultural labourers, rather than clergymen, magistrates and churchwardens, upon whom Lord Sandon seems chiefly to have relied. We know of few things more pathetic in the history of human toil and suffering than the cry for intellectual light uttered at the meetings of these unions, a cry uniformly taking the form of a demand for School Boards. But we may be reminded of urban populations like that of Birkenhead, which, whether to their honour or disgrace, have with all the emphasis of enor-

mous majorities rejected the proposal of a School Board. It is not fair, however, to take such exceptional cases as a test of the temper of the country. And as to the particular instance just mentioned, there is no doubt that a natural wish to try first the effect of Lord Sandon's Act went very far to determine the recent decision of the inhabitants.

Apart, however, from the popularity or unpopularity of the School-Board system, it may be argued that it is not adapted to rural parishes, where the number of people of sufficient intelligence to work it form a very small proportion of the population. But, in the first place, if the whole of London can be worked by one Board, there seems no reason why a whole county, or at least a Parliamentary division of a county, should not be treated in the same way. And in that case there ought to be no difficulty in finding suitable candidates. In the next place, if the area of choice be sufficiently extensive, many representatives of the working class may be found whose lack of education is compensated by shrewd mother-wit, and whose sense of a want in their own early life is a sharp spur to philanthropic exertion.

II. While, however, we may not be prepared to admit that any sufficient case has been made out against an extension of the School-Board system, on the ground either of its unpopularity or of its unsuitability to rural districts, the need for the enforcement of universal elementary education is so urgent, that sound patriotism must needs welcome any method which gives fair promise of securing the desired end. How far, and with what drawbacks, the Elementary Education Act of 1876 is adapted to this purpose, we now proceed to inquire.

It is undoubtedly a gain that, for the first time in the history of English law, it is declared to be "the duty of *every* parent of *every* child to cause such child to receive elementary instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic."* Probably England and the United States are the only countries in the world where, on a matter of such vital and universal import-

* Elementary Education Act, 1876, sec. 4.

ance, there could have been for five years one law for the country and another for the towns. But we gladly admit that the anomaly is only an illustration of our tentative and "rule-of-thumb" methods of legislation, on which it is our custom, not without many good reasons, to pride ourselves. Still, five years of such an unequal law were quite enough. And amongst the unacknowledged debts of a Tory Government to School Boards, we may reckon this, that the latter, by their judicious boldness in experimenting on popular feeling, have enabled the former to add a new duty to the recognized legal obligations of all English parents. On this section of the new law, if on no other, there has been an all but unanimous feeling throughout the community.

Nevertheless, it is a serious thing to add a new duty to the list of legal requirements to which all English parents are to be subject. If it is not to remain a dead letter, it must be supplemented by both penalties and facilities—the first to enforce, the latter to enable obedience. And it is just on such points that all practical difficulties arise. The penalties now prescribed are aimed at all employers, as well as parents, thus giving universality to indirect as well as to direct compulsion. From the first day of this year, no employer is allowed to take into his service any child under the age of nine years. And next year the limit of age is to be raised permanently to ten. Any one contravening this law is liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings; and as that penalty may be imposed every time the offence is repeated, it will no doubt be sufficiently deterrent. Hitherto the limit of age for employment has been only eight. And the prohibition of the barbarism by which drunken and idle parents have profited by the wages of mere infants, distinctly raises our country in the scale of civilization. There are, however, some exceptions allowed, the expediency of which, so far as children under ten are concerned, appears doubtful. Thus, if there is no public elementary school within two miles of the child's home, he may go to work. Or if he is at work only during the holidays, or out of school hours, so that he receives instruction "for full time at a

certified efficient school, or in some other equally efficient manner," the employer is exempt. That is, if by some ingenious arrangement a child of eight or nine can be sent to school for five hours a day, and made to work for five hours more, the law has no censure for the employer, unless he may happen to be touched by the Factory and Workshops Acts. Surely it would have been better to have allowed the prohibition of infant labour to remain absolute. The third exception is less open to objection. The local authority may, by public notice, permit the employment of children over eight, "for the necessary operations of husbandry and the ingathering of crops," provided that the period or periods of such labour do not exceed six weeks in all during the year.

As to children over ten, when the Act comes into full operation, which will not be till 1881, no one will be allowed to take them into employment until they have completed their *fourteenth* year, unless they bring a certificate of having passed the fourth standard of the Education Code,* or of having attended an efficient school for five years, 250 times in each year. This is undoubtedly a stringent provision; and by a prudent arrangement it is only to be brought into operation gradually. The standard of proficiency is applied at once, and no one can well complain that it is too high. But during the present year, the age of exemption is twelve; next year it will be thirteen, and in 1879 fourteen. On the other hand, the alternative qualification of school attendance is at present only two years, and this is to be gradually extended until it reaches five years in 1881. But all children who have completed their eleventh year before the 1st January in the present year, are entirely exempt from this provision. All the exceptions described above apply of course, and with greater propriety, to

* The fourth standard is as follows: *Reading*—To read with intelligence a few lines of poetry selected by the inspector. *Writing*—Eight lines slowly dictated once from a reading-book. Copy-books to be shewn (improved small hand). *Arithmetic*—Compound rules (money) and reduction (common weights and measures). *Grammar*—Parsing of a simple sentence. *Geography*—Outlines of geography of Great Britain, Ireland and Colonies. *History*—Outlines of history of England to Norman Conquest.

children between ten and fourteen ; and there is this in addition, that half-time attendance is allowed, in accordance with the Factory Acts, or with the bye-laws of the proper local authority.

Such are the main provisions with regard to juvenile labour. If they can be enforced, they will soon make it evident, even to the most stupid parent, that it is his manifest interest to send his children regularly to school. But, unfortunately, however evident the interests of stupid people may be, they have a perverse habit of stolidly disregarding them. And if that were allowed in the present case, the children and the country at large would suffer more from such a law than the parents. So far as the above enactments go, they only ensure that if a boy does not go to school, neither shall he go to work. But this is not sufficient. For such is the want of foresight amongst the lowest classes, that the inevitable effect would be to leave loitering about the streets and lanes a number of idle boys and girls, neither at school nor at work, a ready prey to the well-known fate predicted for them by Dr. Watts. It has therefore been felt necessary to provide for direct compulsion in the absence of School Boards. As to the special machinery for applying this compulsion, we shall have a word to say presently. It is the same as that for the enforcement of indirect compulsion. Meanwhile, we continue to speak of it as the "local authority." We have seen that the law now makes elementary education to be one of the necessities of life for children. If a parent "habitually and without reasonable excuse neglects to provide" this, or if a child "is found habitually wandering, or not under proper control," in that case a complaint may be laid before a magistrate's court, and the parent may be ordered to send the child to school. In the order, the name of some particular school is to be mentioned, "being either such as the parent may select, or, if he do not select any, then such public elementary school as the court thinks expedient." Should this order be disobeyed, the parent is to be summoned before a magistrate, and if he has no sufficient defence he may be fined five shillings.

On a second complaint being established, by a severe provision, to which we invite particular attention, the child may be taken away from his parents and consigned to an industrial school until the age of sixteen years. It is true that a discretion is left with the court, which may, by a curious arrangement, allow the parent to keep his child in idleness at an outlay of half-a-crown a week.* But though there is thus scope for a leniency which might neutralize the law, the sternness of the other alternative, at the option of the court, is scarcely in keeping with the general temper of our educational legislation. That on a second complaint of what may amount only to boy-like truancy, a magistrate should have the power, if he chooses, of breaking up an English home, and separating parent and child for five or six years, is an astounding illustration of the levity with which human rights may be treated by a Legislature whose Argus eyes are all concentrated on ecclesiastical interests.

The possibility of such a Draconian penalty will appear all the more extraordinary when we note the constitution of the "local authority" responsible for enforcing the law outside the jurisdiction of School Boards. This local authority is to be a "school-attendance committee," appointed annually, in boroughs by the municipal council, and in parishes by the guardians. In the latter case, which will of course be far the more frequent, one-third at least of the committee is to consist of *ex-officio* guardians. Such committees will have some of the powers of School Boards, especially that of framing bye-laws to enforce school attendance. And whether they avail themselves of this power or not, it will be their duty to see that both employers and parents conform to the law we have described. The scheme looks well on paper, but only so long as we can forget the sort of ecclesiastical serfdom which prevails so largely in the rural districts. Wherever this serfdom preserves the sweet simplicity of the dark ages in its obedience

* No complaint can be repeated after a less interval than two weeks; and as the highest penalty is five shillings, the cost to the parent would be half that sum per week. See the Act, sec. 12.

to authority, no friction may be caused. But if such men as Joseph Arch speak truly, the agricultural labourers are awaking from their lethargy, and among their first signs of life is a demand for an unsectarian system of education. They are tired of schools in which, as one of their speakers declared, their children are mainly occupied "in gabbling the catechism and singing amen." Besides, rural Nonconformity, though scotched, is not quite dead; and it is precisely when you tread on him that a scotched snake becomes dangerous. In such a condition of society, it may certainly be difficult—failing School Boards with household suffrage—to suggest anything better than the new scheme; but it would be more than difficult, it would be impossible, to suggest anything worse. In discussing such questions, it ought always to be premised that the "conscience clause" is a mockery and a delusion. Our mode of treating the poor hitherto has scarcely been calculated to engender in them either moral courage or spiritual sensitiveness. And any one who remembers his own school-days must know very well that a large amount of moral courage is necessary, on the part both of parents and children, if peculiar arrangements of any sort are to be made to distinguish the latter from their schoolfellows. Besides, however the causes of the impression may be disputed, there is without doubt a universal impression amongst poor parents, that to avail themselves of this invidious clause will inevitably entail on them substantial disadvantages. Those who have watched the operation of the Education Acts in large towns, are aware that the clause is almost a dead letter.* If parents do not like the religious character of a school—as when, for instance, the clergyman who governs it is a ritualist—they never think of sending their children for secular, and withdrawing them from religious instruction; they prefer keeping them away altogether. But in country districts, where there is no choice of

* Amongst the artizan class there are a large number of enthusiasts for the principle of "secular schools." But these men rarely or never think of withdrawing their own children from religious instruction at school; they do not care to take the trouble, or they fear being singular.

schools, and where every one knows every one else's business, the position of such parents is doubly difficult. The law declines to supply them with suitable schools, and any slackness of attendance on the part of their children is instantly observed and noted. This would be hard enough in any case, but it is made worse by the sort of paternal despotism under which the rural poor for the most part live. In a town with a School Board, the local authority is constituted by popular election, and the tribunal which decides on infractions of the law is entirely separate from and independent of that local authority. But with the rural districts, under Lord Sandon's Act, how different will the case be ! There the local authority is constituted by the guardians, and is bound to give a prominent place to the rector, who is most likely an *ex-officio* guardian. And of the "court of summary jurisdiction" before which complaints are to be laid, the rector, as magistrate, is an important—in many instances, the most influential—member. It matters little whether he takes part in delivering judgment or not. His view of the case is already known, by the fact of the complaint being laid, and that view is sure to rule. The case then stands thus. A rural clergyman may make the one school of the district repulsive to the people by ritualistic doctrine and offensive symbolism. And then he can protect himself against failure of scholars by compelling them to come in. He can appoint a school-attendance committee in harmony with his own views ; and if he does not sit in judgment on his own complaint—which, by the way, there is nothing in this law to prevent—he can, at any rate, make sure of the result. He can insist on the Methodist gardener or the Independent grocer sending his son to a school which the father regards as a hot-bed of Popery. And on a second refusal he can take the boy away from his parents and consign him to an industrial school for five years. It is of no use to say that no one would so dare to outrage public opinion. We never know what "fantastic tricks" may be played by "brief authority." There is a Spanish proverb about a beggar on horseback, which seems peculiarly applicable to the clergy

when mounted on that high-stepping, hard-mouthed steed, the law. Whether the sort of persecution we have sketched out be *morally* possible or not in the present day, remains to be seen; but that it should have been made *legally* possible, which it undoubtedly has been, is nothing less than a scandal to fair feeling and a disgrace to the Legislature.

No penalties can enforce law unless adequate facilities are given for its observance. This principle has not been overlooked, but it has received very inadequate attention. It seems an offence against English liberty to require every man to send his children regularly to school, unless facilities are offered for his doing so without violence to his conscience or his self-respect. How conscience is treated we have seen, and self-respect does not fare much better. As the rate of wages is largely dependent upon the average estimate formed of the necessities of life, and as down to this very year education was never considered a necessary of life in England, it follows that there must be a very considerable number of people to whom school fees just make the difference between a sufficiency and an insufficiency of food, clothing and furniture. Allowance ought to be made for these people. It is not their fault that at the time of their marriage they could not foresee this addition to the legal responsibilities of parents. Neither is it their fault that they cannot understand the worth of education. It is the multitude of such people which forms one of the strongest arguments for a free-school system. But whatever may be thought of that, at any rate it must be conceded that it is always a perilous thing to familiarize the struggling poor with the circumstances of pauperism. Yet this is just what the new Act does. It compels the poor who are not paupers to apply to the guardians for school fees, and so it introduces them to the vestibule of the workhouse. The guardians in Bolton have, we observe, endeavoured to neutralize this evil by proposing to send delegates to sit with the School Board for the purpose of hearing such applications. But the legality of the suggested procedure seems uncertain. The establishment of a species of elementary school scholarships by the

Government is a more generous provision, but it will not touch the neediest class. Still, it looks curiously like the thin end of a principle which broadens out into a system of free common schools.

III. We have left so little space for describing the bearing of the new law upon School-Board districts, that we must content ourselves with merely indicating the points of contact. All the provisions we have mentioned, except the school-attendance committee, are equally applicable to School-Board districts. But the Board has the option of acting on its own bye-laws, if the latter happen to be more stringent than the Act. For instance, many School Boards require children to pass the fifth standard before they are exempt from school attendance. The new law only requires the fourth. But the bye-laws of such Boards still continue in force, and they can insist on higher attainments than those required by imperial law. On the other hand, Boards cannot in their bye-laws require attendance after the child's thirteenth year. But in 1881 they will be responsible for seeing that no child gets employment under fourteen, unless the requisite certificate is produced. School Boards are no longer troubled by the notorious 25th clause of the old Act. They are not allowed to pay fees to denominational schools, that office being, as we have seen, handed over to the guardians. But they can still remit fees in their own schools. There have been many speculations as to the motives of the Government in conceding such an apparent advantage to an obnoxious system. Let us hope it was pure generosity. But probably there was some calculation on the effects of a process which promised to send all the poorest children to Board schools, and therefore, by a sort of natural selection, tended to raise the social position and efficiency of sectarian schools. Whether the calculation was correct remains to be seen, and first appearances will probably be fallacious.

The most threatening aspect of the new Act towards School Boards is presented by the clause so suddenly and cunningly introduced for the extinction of Boards not possessing schools.

This clause is already beginning to tell. The Council of Stalybridge has resolved to take advantage of it, and the School Board for Stockport will probably have cause to regret that it did not pursue a bolder policy by establishing its own schools. Not improbably, the reactionary intentions of this clause will also be realized elsewhere. But the advocates of School Boards need not be in the least degree alarmed. In so brief a paper we have necessarily confined ourselves to one aspect of the subject—the policy embodied in the Act on the question of universal and compulsory instruction. It acknowledges the national will; but it endeavours to stifle the evolution of ideas usually associated with that phrase, by committing mainly to the clergy the fulfilment of the people's resolve. If the plan succeeds, it will be a new phenomenon in the history of the world. And it strikes us that some rather startling results of recent School-Board elections may be in a measure accounted for by the revulsion of popular feeling caused by the mere attempt.

J. ALLANSON PICTON.

V.—RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM: ITS ULTIMATE RESULTS.

SOME two or three years ago there appeared in the columns of a weekly newspaper, well known for its advocacy of the extremest Radical views, the following advertisement:

“FREE-THOUGHT EDUCATION.—A Parent is desirous of hearing of some first-class boarding-school where the Bible is treated as a human book, where the ceremony of church-going is dispensed with, and where an effort is made to found morality upon a rational basis.”

This advertisement, put forward by some one who had adopted the title of “free-thinker” as a title of compliment, may be very fairly accepted as describing the theological posi-

tion of those to whom the spread of "free-thought" is a work of conscientious earnestness. And, to speak briefly, it would be very easy to imagine such persons answering those who might question the truth of their position in some such terms as these: "We are free because we seek the truth, and the truth only. We protest that the world has been for centuries living in dreams of divinity and metaphysics, which were, perhaps, well suited to its childhood, but which it befits us, as living in the age of the world's manhood, to put from us as fruitless deceits. We hold in our hands truths of science experimentally verifiable, and which contradict to the uttermost those theories which we have been taught to accept as truths. We, the free-thinkers, are pre-eminently the true thinkers, and it is the truth that has made us free."

Granting all this, then, for the moment, let it be noticed what is the main support of the "free-thinker" in this his position. One of the writers in a tolerably well-known series of popular "free-thought" publications, has, in a pamphlet discussing the relationship of the Book of Common Prayer to the present age, expressed himself as follows :*

"The present age is an age of wonderful improvement in art, science, and literature. . . . Religion cannot remain stationary while every other kind of knowledge is progressing. . . . Considering, then, how vastly our views of nature and of life have been enlarged by the discoveries of modern science, it is no wonder that the Book of Common Prayer is now found to be behind the age."

Without stopping to remark on the somewhat dubious nature of the inference that "religion is a kind of knowledge," it is enough to say that in this argument is to be seen the great battering-ram of the army of "free-thought;" the only difference of opinion in the ranks of that army being a difference of opinion with regard to the extent to which this weapon is to be employed; some, like the writer above quoted, being desirous merely to assail the outworks of the besieged city;

* The Prayer Book adapted to the Present Age. By W. Jevons. Published by Thomas Scott, Upper Norwood.

others discontented with anything short of its being entirely razed to the ground. That this is the weapon chiefly employed, however, every one is aware, both those who use it and those against whom it is used. The only mistake is, that the argument is not carried far enough ; for it must be clear to every logical mind that if scientific discovery is to be allowed to exercise itself on the Book of Common Prayer, there is no point at which its use can be consistently laid aside until the very root of the matter is reached. For instance, a certain amount of astronomical knowledge has induced the author of this pamphlet on the Book of Common Prayer to include such sentences as these in his scheme for an improved Liturgy :

“ Worthy art Thou, O God, of our profoundest veneration ; for by Thee it was that we were called into existence, and made inhabitants of this planetary world which is so richly fraught with tokens of Thy providence. It was Thy Almighty power that launched it in its orbit, and made it tributary to that stupendous orb which faintly reflects Thy glory.”

Now, though this is an improvement which might have been creditable to and in harmony with the age of Copernicus, it can scarcely be said to be in harmony with the present age. For clearly a Liturgy which is really to harmonize with the best supported astronomical theories of the present age must take account of the nebular hypothesis ; and whether the nebular hypothesis leaves any room for an *a priori* argument in favour of a Liturgy at all, is a consideration which may be left to those who have a mind for it.

The scientific argument, as has been said, is (not only with this able and conscientious writer, but also with many others on the same side) not carried far enough. The “ free-thinker,” if he once begins to look to modern science for his support, cannot consistently and safely stop till he rests upon that “ solid basis ” (as it has been called) of Evolution which made such wild havoc of the harmony of the meeting, two or three years ago, of the British Association at Belfast. If anything is to be tested by that system of reasoning which is generally

described as scientific, then everything must be so tested. The importance of recognizing this necessity is so great, that it might almost be said that no one has a right to criticise theology from a scientific point of view unless he is prepared to go this length,—to come down to the “solid basis” of Evolution and take the consequences. For any halt made, at an intermediate position will only involve him in hopeless confusion, and leave him in the uncomfortable position assigned to Mahomet’s coffin—suspended between two worlds of philosophy, to neither of which he can claim to belong.

Thus, then, it will be seen that the apprehension so frequently expressed in religious circles, that, if once the test of scientific analysis is allowed in respect of matters of religion, there is no point short of Atheism at which the inquirer can stop, is, in a sense, exceedingly well grounded. The ordinary man of business (and the whole British population consists mostly of such) must either believe in the religious traditions in which he has been brought up, or he must, if he have a regard for logic and be really in earnest, go on till he finds his feet resting on that “solid basis” of Evolution already alluded to ; a basis which, like the highway in the Pilgrim’s Progress, is safe only for those for whom it is safe. He may begin, like the Liturgical reformer already quoted, with thinking it no harm to bring the Copernican system of astronomy within the scope of his public worship ; or, in the following of Dr. Colenso, he may take exception to the arithmetic of the Pentateuch. He may perhaps go a little farther, and think it no harm, especially in such very distinguished company as he will find there, to leave himself no standing ground except the impregnable fortress of “faith in God.” But here, even, he is not safe ; the disease of criticism which he has contracted “eagerly pursues him still ;” and having begun simply with a doubt in the probability of a miracle, or the assertion of the superiority of the Copernican system of astronomy over the Ptolemaic, he finds himself at last compelled to face the questions, “What is faith ? What is God ?”—questions before which the supposed impregnability of his fortress rapidly

vanishes into air, leaving him, if he would be true to the sincere spirit in which his inquiries began, with but one course open before him—to forsake his last standing ground, and to come forth and lie down desolate amid the dry bones of utter materialism, under the dominion of the unclean spirits of Darwin and of Strauss, and of all things which, in his original position, seemed utterly unholy and abominable.

Sincerely, then, might it be said to him, Do not take that first step, do not thus run the risk of undermining your own moral happiness. Unfortunately, however, so many have taken that first step, and so many have been persuaded, owing to the pressure of a well-meant but miscalculated opposition, into thinking it to be virtue to take not that step only, but many more beyond it, that it is impossible to argue on the subject as if such a mischief as this (and a mischief it must truly be regarded) were now only for the first time threatened. So far is this from being the case, that it is much to be feared there are many persons who, if they have not reached the bottom of the pit, are yet very few steps removed from it. To these it might be said that, as it was formerly their mistake, so it is now their misfortune, that they have not carried the process of scientific analysis far enough ; they have not discovered the way out at the farther side of the slough ; and that either because they have not the power to see it, or because they prefer to stay where they are. Pressed down by the weight of that scientific Calvinism which is so thoroughly repudiated by all really great scientific minds ; doubting, because they are told that all their mental actions are associated with changes of matter, whether they have any minds or thoughts at all ; it is extremely probable that they may come to fulfil the fate predicted for the Reprobate in the Seventeenth Article—"fall into desperation, or into wretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation." And therefore, in the abstract, entire sympathy might be felt with those orthodox preachers against the first steps in "infidelity," as the phrase is. But, knowing that practically such warnings are of no avail, and that the tendency towards a

scientific analysis of religious matters is the sign of a "time-wave" which nothing can resist, it may perhaps be a better thing to say to the "free-thinker," in his own interest, and possibly in the interest of religion also,—“Do not stand pottering with questions about miracles and inspiration and so on; rather accept the whole scientific position boldly, and save yourself from the demoralizing consequences of successive defeats; make up your mind that Biblical science is totally inaccurate; that the Biblical histories are to all intents and purposes fictional; that the existence of a personal God is an unverifiable proposition; that religious doctrines are merely the shadows of man's own nature cast upon the uncertainties around him; that thought is the collateral of changes in matter; that Darwinism is substantially true, and Evolution the great principle of the universe. Then you will be at least adopting a position of consistency, and, if there is any truth in these religious doctrines at all, if they have any real value in the universe, you will be at least taking the best course, by reason of its consistency, towards ascertaining scientifically what their value is.”

Such advice might seem startling, but nevertheless it might be most sincerely given as the best advice under the circumstances; and the best it certainly would be if, as may possibly be shewn, it is upon this advice, upon this principle, that the Christian world is slowly and unconsciously acting in respect of this very conflict (as it is generally called) between Science and Religion,—acting in that silent and mysterious way which leaves nothing untouched among all the innumerable interests involved, and brings at last out of an apparent confusion a voice of harmony which might indeed, in the sense of the well-worn proverb, be called the voice of God. It is to this complete, and yet perhaps not altogether, in external appearance at least, startling change of general opinion that reference is here meant in speaking of the ultimate tendencies of religious scepticism,—ultimate, as being the final result, even if in some respects a reactionary result, of the conscientious carrying forward of that process of scientific analysis of religion

to which allusion has been made. But before making an attempt to trace that process through its further stages, let us see why it would have to be regarded as mischievous if it were to stop short at the point already reached—if it were to take the unhappy pilgrim simply into the very depths of the slough of religious negation and leave him there.

It is not enough, in a paper like the present, simply to be content with re-echoing that product of so many individual experiences,—that a life deprived of its religious sanction and illumination is liable to become morally deteriorated. Some reason must be assigned for this, and a reason, too, which shall be drawn rather from a philosophical than a theological source; for it were scarcely fair to expect the thorough-going sceptic to condemn himself by an argument drawn from those very considerations from which he is so desirous to be free,—scarcely fair, even were it indeed possible. Granting, as almost all will grant at once, that an impaired morality is a mischief both to the individual and to his surroundings, the question then arises, What reasonable ground is there, if any, for the assertion so often made, that an impaired morality is the result of any marked subjection of religious beliefs to scientific analysis?

Now if it is considered for a moment upon what a healthy moral existence mainly depends, the ground for this assertion will be very plainly recognized. Morality is essentially personal; it consists in the conjoint action of innumerable personal impulses and personal checks (for such checks are personal even though it should be through the persons of others that they make their appeal); and the course taken in respect of morals is the exact balancing of all these impulses and checks. There is, however, this marked difference between checks and impulses,—that whereas the latter are so closely interlaced with the mere physical existence as to act unconsciously, and irrespective of all differences of religion, nationality or culture, the former are in a very great degree indeed dependent for their force and nature upon these differences. The desire for wealth is as strong in the Englishman as in the Fuegian,

and yet the Englishman would never so much as dream of murdering his neighbour for the sake of a tenpenny nail or its equivalent ; nor, because a man regarded himself as a piece of clock-work, would he think of sacrificing a single shred of those appetites which are natural to him as a man. Impulses, then, will continue to exercise their force, no matter what the degree of culture present, or what a man's opinion about himself. Very differently does the case stand when we come to deal with checks ; these, as a moment's reflection will shew, depend so much not only upon degrees of culture, but also upon a man's opinion about himself and his relation to the universe, that any sudden change of such opinions in a person of any given degree of culture, is almost certain to influence him, in respect of moral checks, very seriously indeed. True, he would not be likely to go very far away from his original conduct, because there is around him the power of society to restrain him within certain limits ; but yet in respect of acts which society tolerates, he might very easily lose that love for the highest ideal, that abhorrence of merely average morality, with which he was previously imbued ; and those who can appreciate how delicate are the balancings of society, and to what an extraordinary extent their delicacy increases as society becomes more civilized and more complex, will not need to be told that even such a partial deterioration as this is not a thing to be made light of. Now as morality is so intensely personal a matter, as its checks present themselves, like its impulses, always in a personal aspect, nothing will be more likely to impair the force of moral checks than an impaired sense of personality. The man who imagines himself to be a piece of clock-work, or the man who may regard himself as a certain power of protoplasm, will be extremely liable to estimate his degree of moral responsibility from a protoplasmic or mechanical standpoint ; and that in either case the sense of moral responsibility will suffer deterioration, it needs no argument to shew. An impaired sense of personality, then, means an impaired morality ; and what can there be more calculated to lessen the sense of personality than the adoption, in its abso-

lute and naked sense, of that theory of Evolution, in the light of which men are but the gradual developments from a primeval mist? It is hence, then, that danger and mischief are threatened to any one who, having reached the first apparent extreme of a scientific analysis of religion, is unable or unwilling to go farther,—hence, from that impaired sense of personality which brings after it an impaired sense of moral responsibility, and a consequent weakening of those checks which are so necessary for the due regulation of deep-rooted impulses.

Here, then, it may be said is the whole position of the objector to any scientific analysis of religion conceded—conceded, too, from a point of view which, so far from being religious, is almost purely scientific. Conceded, yes; and in some respects much more than conceded; for the true scientific student knows much better than the pure religionist can ever know, how serious a danger to social stability and social progress is threatened in the weakening, even by ever so little, of that sense of personal responsibility which is at the basis of all morality. For by the scientific student, civilization cannot be regarded as having proceeded by leaps or starts. The catastrophic theory of social science can by him be no more accepted than the catastrophic theory of geological or biological advancement. To him everything is a growth, slow, harmonious and complete; a growth in which no natural unequalness can be compensated for by any external interference, and which can only be said to have reached any given standard when all the countless forces that are involved make such standard both natural and permanent. There is no such thing as “jerry-building” in social matters when viewed from this standpoint; you cannot put in a prop here or a wedge there at your convenience when you find the superstructure becoming too heavy for the foundations; all must be exactly proportioned and harmonious together, or the result will suddenly be found out to be no result at all. More than this, the scientific student, knowing the unfathomable depths of the foundations of human society, and knowing how little, as compared with this depth, the most civilized society differs from the most savage, must

needs attach to even very slight advances in moral culture an importance which probably far exceeds that attached to such advances by any other class of thinkers. He knows how hard it has been to advance; how it has been only by the most infinitesimal movements at a time that any advance has been accomplished; and he knows, too, what a new face has been more than once given to the entire surface of society by the new combinations such minute advances have produced. Knowing this, how can he do otherwise than dread the converse of such a state of things? how can he do otherwise than look on with alarm when he sees, from whatever cause, the personal appreciation of a high standard of moral responsibility suffering diminution,—when he sees (as he must too often see) the acceptance of the negative conclusions of a scientific criticism of religion accompanied by a decrease of moral sensitiveness? Nor is it necessary that such a decrease should shew itself in acts; it is sufficient if it leads to a regarding merely as concessions to social usage what have previously been cherished as the highest of religious duties; and that such a decreased sensitiveness as this, even though never leading to any difference in action, can have a most deteriorating effect on the whole moral system, let those many persons bear witness who must themselves have experienced it.

This, it may be said, is a granting of the position of the religious objector with a vengeance; and it might not unfairly be asked, If this is the direction in which society is tending in respect of religious matters, what outlook of hope can there be? Before endeavouring to answer this question, one or two things must be mentioned, drawn from the same scientific armoury, as points to be kept in mind while arguing on the whole question. In the first place, it should be remembered that, the extent of the whole change that is being effected being (as will be seen) comparatively very small, it may very well be that many, or perhaps even the majority, will scarcely be conscious of the transition. In any pitched battle it is never the whole of the troops that come into action, nor is the victory won only by those who are killed and wounded; and, similarly, in any

general change of opinion on any topic, it may be quite possible for the majority to take possession of the new position without having been practically under fire at all, and scarcely able to appreciate their debt to those who have been in the front rank as skirmishers, and who have suffered the pain of the conflict. And, in the next place, it must be remembered that this very increase of intellectual conscientiousness which has brought about the present conflict between Religion and Science, can hardly help being associated with an increased moral conscientiousness which will go very far indeed, during this time of transition, towards neutralizing the bad effects that might be otherwise expected to result from a decreased sense of personality. This, which it is most important to remember, is really no new thing to talk about ; for surely it must often have come within the range of every experience to observe to what extent a moral instinct (so to speak) can make up for a defective intellectual apprehension.

Having, then, traced the action of religious scepticism to their furthest negative results, it now remains to be seen to what other results it may lead if consistently carried further. That there is a strong *a priori* argument in favour of some further important results being reached, is evident when we consider what has been done, simply through the observance of facts, in acknowledged sciences. Now, apart from all religious theories, it is quite evident that religion, as it exists among us, presents many interesting facts—facts which no doubt, like any other class of facts, are capable of being brought into such relation to and comparison with each other, as to give us some more or less trustworthy generalizations. And seeing that those sincerely interested enough in religious matters to reach the furthest negative position with regard to religion cannot well let their interest die out at that point (and such interest would persist in spite of any wish to check it), it cannot but be that, this position once reached, attention would begin to be turned to the facts of religion as facts presenting matter for most serious consideration. Before, however, entering upon this branch of the present subject, one most necessary

distinction must be made. We are now dealing with facts, and not with theories ; and though perhaps it may be almost incumbent on us to apologize for bringing such really contemptible matters under notice in these pages, still a word must be said to remind our readers how utterly beyond the scope of any serious consideration are those theories about religion which are too often put forward in popular pamphlets on subjects more or less akin to the present. Particularly we allude to the theory (and we should be ashamed to allude to it at all, did we not find it receiving the indirect support at least of some well-known names) that all religion has had its origin in an endeavour on the part of the more cunning of mankind to hold their neighbours in subjection. It would be utterly incomprehensible, did we not know to what extent an emotional prejudice can overcloud even the clearest intelligence, how such an utterly baseless and self-contradictory conclusion could exist in the mind of any person endowed with the smallest degree of reasoning power ; and it is only the too patent fact that it does exist that can be our excuse for referring to it at all.

What, then, will be the first fact with regard to religion which will fix the attention of the scientific investigator (as the religious sceptic may now perhaps more properly be called)? Generally, the fact of the universal existence of religion cannot but seem to him a fact of most extraordinary magnitude and importance ; specially, the fact of the existence of Christianity in Europe will appear in no less striking an aspect, if, indeed, it does not appear the more striking fact of the two. Knowing that every fact must not only be caused, but also be traceable to a cause proportionally adequate to its importance, it will be impossible for him not to ask by what causes, or combination of causes, it has come to pass that the fact of Christianity—the universal referring, even though in different ways, of all religious life to one personal centre—has persisted through all the changes of race, dynasty, and social organization. Further, having regard to that progress, moral as well as social, that has for so many centuries been going on

in Europe, he must necessarily be led to ask, In what respect has Christianity contributed to that progress? For, being now under purely scientific leadership, and having forsaken that theory of social progress which may, perhaps, for want of a better word be called Providential, and which sees in all steps forward the interference, more or less direct, of an external supernatural power,—having forsaken this theory, he must be scientific in all things. Progress, he knows, cannot be accomplished save by the working together of innumerable factors, nor can it be accomplished save by an economy of forces so strict that every unnecessary or superfluous element will be thrown aside and neglected. But Christianity, he sees, has not been thrown aside or neglected; on the contrary, it seems in many respects, and in spite of all its own variations and internal disputes, to have been the one constant quantity in all successive changes. Why this has been, he must needs ask; and the only possible sincere answer he can give is one which will bring him face to face with a fact (to call it so) so wonderful, and so suggestive of deep thought, that it might well be called the basis of a new revelation.

Those who, from the strictly orthodox point of view, talk of the “kingdom of Christ” as spreading over the earth, are too apt, partly from habit and partly from the constant employment of that concrete symbolism so largely indulged in by Hebrew writers, to look at the process by which this has been accomplished from one side only. The image which most naturally rises before their minds is that of a warrior reigning by force of conquest, and not that of a constitutional monarch elected by universal suffrage. And hence they have been too liable to lose sight of the very thing which is really the stability not only of the spiritual kingdom they speak of, but of every political kingdom also. We in England, at least, ought to know something about the power and worth of public opinion,—public opinion, that is, not as stirred up for certain immediate ends in a passionate manner, but as existing in the form of a deep and well-balanced and often unconscious assent to the general condition of things. If, then, the power and

worth of public opinion in England with regard to political matters be so great, what must be the power and worth of a general European consent with regard to the central figure of European religion? Viewing the "kingdom of Christ" from this point, may it not well strike the scientific investigator as something more marvellous than the greatest marvel of the more orthodox tradition, that public opinion in Europe, differing as widely upon many points as diversities of race and of culture can possibly effect, should yet be in agreement upon such a matter as this? Whence, he must needs ask, has come this general agreement in the public voice? How has it been that so many individuals, in all ages and of all imaginable degrees of culture, have consented, in a religious sense, to have "this man to reign over them"? How are we to account for this greatest marvel of the process of natural selection?

It is here, in the presence of the immeasurable magnitude of this fact, that one jealous for the maintenance of the orthodox tradition might well cry out, "This is but a part of God's scheme of salvation through Christ; this is but the work, on myriads of individual souls, of God's spirit preparing the way, as the forerunner of the advent of His Son into men's hearts!" We should feel but little disposition to quarrel with any one who, from such a point of view, should speak thus of this fact; though we are not quite sure that his enthusiasm would stand the test of the consideration that, if Christianity is to be thus regarded, a similar sanction must be allowed to those Eastern religions, such as Buddhism, which number so many millions under their standards. Regarding the matter, however, still from a strictly scientific standpoint, it is quite certain that we have a fact before us which it will task all the resources of philosophy to explain. Philosophy, indeed, is absolutely powerless to explain it at all. Mr. Darwin's "Descent of Man" is stiff reading enough for any one; and we know how far short he falls of absolute proof in even his happiest sketches of the development, by natural selection, of physical traits. But to trace the causes by which innumerable individuals have been led to agree in a common consent upon a matter of

the kind under discussion, and to determine, as we should have to do, by what means it is that such common consents come to be formed at all,—this would be a task beyond the power of any human thought. The further back we went, the greater would be the temptation to introduce an external directing cause, and to do this at any point would be to grant almost the whole of the orthodox position. We should, in fact, find ourselves placed in this dilemma,—that we must either acknowledge that a divine revelation is possible (working, of course, as much through the minds of those who receive it as through anything external to them), and that Christianity is such a revelation ; or that Christianity is a fact of the universe, as inconceivably great as it is unfathomably mysterious.

Here, however, a momentary digression must be made in order to anticipate an objection to this whole manner of dealing with the question which is only too likely to be advanced. There are those who, whether arguing broadly or narrowly it matters not at this moment to consider, who, viewing Christianity through one side of its history—the side on which it is coincident with European barbarism, and not that on which it is coincident with a gradual advance from such barbarism—are ready to assert that Christianity has had, and can have, no such effect upon progress as has been described ; that it has been a religion of cruelty and persecution, holding back the cause of humanity instead of advancing it. That such an opinion should be formed when Christianity is considered in respect of its external history, is in some sense justifiable ; but it must be borne in mind that, for the purposes of the present argument, this is just the manner in which we are precluded from regarding it. The ferocious persecution by the Spaniards of the unoffending inhabitants of the New World ; the oppression of the Jews in Europe ; the fanatical crusades against the Moors ; the individual treacheries and persecutions through which such valiant men as John Huss and Michael Servetus met with their death—these are matters of which Europeans, equally with Christians, must ever feel ashamed. But it must not be forgotten that in all these cases it is the manners

of the time reflected into Christianity that shocks, and not Christianity giving colour to the manners of the time. Regarding the establishment of Christianity as the result of a great unconscious accord among countless individual minds, it is in the working of Christianity upon individual minds that we must look for its effect as an essential and important element in European progress. And here how can it be traced, when its force must in the majority of cases have been manifested rather in a negative than in a positive manner,—rather in the repression of a brute impulse than in the kindling of a fiery enthusiasm? That it could exercise this latter power upon individuals, the history of Europe amply bears witness; but what are the few names which find a mention in that history compared with the myriads of unknown struggling souls who scarce knew what it was that enabled them to be a shade more human than their fathers?

Retracing our steps from this digression (which is scarcely a digression, after all), how, it must next be asked, is the scientific investigator to regard this great fact of Christianity, to which he dare not apply the name of a revelation? How is he to regard that process of natural selection by which Christianity has become the religion of Europe during her progress towards civilization? And what is he to say about that universal sense of moral need which, as he cannot but believe, a reception of Christianity has alone been able to satisfy? That Christianity has a supernatural sanction, that it can claim attention as a divine revelation,—this he cannot but regard as absolutely untrue (using the word “absolutely,” of course, as opposed to relatively); and yet now, viewing Christianity from his own chosen standpoint, he finds himself presented with an absolute truth with regard to it of such magnitude as to completely outweigh (and this we say fearlessly) the absolute truth which he has rejected. For it is a picture which seizes and dwells on the imagination with the force of an Apocalyptic vision—this picture of so many European myriads, of all kindreds and nations and tongues, finding in the Prophet of Nazareth the realization of their own highest

moral possibilities. Looking at this picture, and feeling its influence, might not the scientific investigator well experience a regret that the facts which it includes can by himself be attributed to no cause, but must ever remain an unfathomable mystery? Might he not, this point once reached, consider whether that belief by which the more orthodox would account for these facts—the belief in a divine revelation for a certain end—may not be in some degree well grounded? Or might he not at least suspect that what he felt bound to regard as absolutely false, might yet be, after all, relatively true?

Absolutely false, and yet relatively true. This is a position from which many, no doubt, whose conscientiousness is in excess of their imagination, will recoil with horror. "Truth," they will say, "must be all true, absolutely true, or it is not true at all. We cannot allow ourselves to be dragged into such Jesuitical refining as this. Give us absolute truth, and we will eagerly embrace it; but relative truth we unhesitatingly reject." Alas! then, that all truth must be rejected; for what truth, apart from mathematics, is more than relative? what absolute truth is there which is not, after all, the concentrating of a number of relative truths into a single focal point? Take the truths of which we are most certain, and which are based on the widest general experiences—the truths of sight, sound, muscular resistance. Are these absolute truths? Or do we not know how they are liable to vary with our own varying physical conditions? If, owing to difference of physical organization, one man shall see that as green which another sees as red, what can there be existent but relative truth with regard to the colour of the object gazed at? Bring ten thousand who see red, however, against the one whose perception shews him green, and the truth of the matter is absolutely established. No, not absolutely in fact, however absolutely for all practical purposes; for as long as it is possible for there to be a difference of opinion, so long the truth is only relative. It is a truth of the highest degree of relativity, no doubt, and the one man would probably accept the

verdict of the ten thousand as conclusively proving his own defect. But though he yields to the ten thousand for all practical purposes, let him challenge them to argue the matter out to its ultimate conclusions, and it will be odd if he does not land both them and himself in a maze of uncertainty.

Let another instance be brought forward as an illustration. Absolute security, we say, is to be found in the Consolidated Fund. We have as little doubt that we shall receive our annual interest on any money we may invest in that quarter, as we have about the solidity of the ground we stand upon. Nay, probably many persons would be far more surprised at not receiving their dividends than they would be at finding that the supposed solidity of the street they walk along to get them was a delusion. Even to members of the legal profession—the profession whose emoluments depend on the degree of scepticism developed—the three per cents. are as solid a reality as anything that the universe contains. And yet how completely relative is our ground of confidence in even the three per cents.; how completely is the security we rely upon dependent on the maintenance of conditions, the failure of any one of which would make the security valueless, and that without seriously prejudicing the stability of general terrestrial conditions! So fondly have we in this instance, not to speak of numberless more that could be mentioned, raised up for ourselves an absolute truth out of a score of truths which, taken separately, we should at once recognize as relative merely. An absolute truth—that is, absolute enough for all practical purposes; how devoid of all real absoluteness our legal advisers would tell us not to vex ourselves with thinking.

So, then, in matters of the most practical kind, we find ourselves daily recognizing the fact that a truth may be practically absolute, and yet only absolutely relative; and we find, too, that it is the general voice that determines the question in these matters. Life, we see plainly, could not go on, unless we were able to treat such truths as the three per cents. as absolute, if we were obliged to go into the whole question of general and national credit, prior to the purchase of a hundred

pounds' worth of stock. Why then not be content to make the same distinction in other directions? Why not admit the force of the popular voice in matters of religious belief? Why not cease to vex ourselves by reminding ourselves continually of the absolute falsity of those beliefs which, as we cannot but see are, by every rule that can be drawn from our commonplace acts, possessed of so high a degree of relativity as to render them, for all practical purposes, absolutely true? For we have seen plainly, and must conscientiously recognize the fact that we have seen plainly, that there is a point at which, in respect of commonplace things, it becomes necessary for us, if we would avoid the imputation of eccentricity, or even insanity, to hold fast as absolute a truth which we could easily shew to be relative merely.

Why not? Because, we shall be instantly told, these matters of religious belief are of such overwhelming importance to us, that we cannot afford in respect of them to run the risk of self-deception. True, they are of the vastest importance, and in the universal recognition of this fact, whether in the minds of the most thoroughly orthodox or the most thoroughly sceptical, is to be found the real spirit of this time—a time so intensely and earnestly religious that it criticises religion itself. And perhaps some apology to this earnestness may seem to be needed for bringing forward such instances as have been mentioned as affording parallels to this highest question of all. Parallels, however, they are in kind, but never parallels in degree; for if general acceptance has power to convert a relative into an absolute truth, then there is infinitely more to be said for a belief in the divine institution of Christianity than for a confidence in the three per cents. For let us think of the infinite number of chances against such a thing happening as that all European ages and races should thus, with such unerring precision and such unconquerable pertinacity, have fixed on the name of one man as the symbol of all that is morally best within themselves—let us think of the infinite number of chances against such a thing happening, and say that it is the work of chance, of coincidence, of fortuitous

combination of circumstances. Let us do this, and what then? What of the power that brought about this combination of chances—the power, by whatever name we call it, or whether we regard it as personal or impersonal, that has shaped the destinies of the Western world? Is it blind, aimless and unintelligent—a machinery set in motion by something still beyond it, about which we dare not allow ourselves to indulge in a conjecture? It may be possible to regard it thus as long as we are engaged with matters of pure knowledge; but as soon as we step within the boundaries of the world of morals, as soon as we come in contact with the personal considerations with which morality deals, of which morality is composed—then to keep ourselves still within the limits of such an impersonal creed becomes impossible;—impossible, because to do so would be an outrage upon the natural flow and order of our mental associations. Dim though that Personality may be, far off (and the farther the better) as we may place it from the theatre of our own immediate actions, still it is there, undeniable, though dimly outlined and utterly unapproachable. And what but this Personality has set before the myriads of individual European lives the one figure which, of all others imaginable, could have the power to raise those lives, one by one and ever so little in each separate case, above the point from which they were left to start by the lives preceding them?

Will it not then be found, as the last result of a conscientious scientific criticism of religion, that it is still for all practical purposes true enough that Europe possesses a divinely revealed religion in Christianity? True enough! it will be said; can that be true enough in respect of such a matter which is less true than a truth of mathematics? To give an assurance in reply to this question must at the present moment be vain. Religion has been too much, owing to the prevalent intellectual activity, infected with the desire to give the first place to clear intellectual conception to be able willingly to listen to the voice that would recal her into her proper domain of moral action. When, however, the reaction sets in and reli-

gion becomes practical once more, it will not demand from the soul that would fain use it an examination of its whole relationship to the universe on one hand, and to human thought on the other. Enough that it contains an ideal which, by the force of centuries of association, is the one ideal by which men may be saved from slavery to their lower desires ; enough that in it is embedded the hope of that immortality for which man will never cease to wish.

F. REGINALD STATHAM.

VI.—THE LIVERPOOL UNITARIAN CONTROVERSY OF 1839.

Unitarianism Defended : a Series of Lectures by Three Protestant Dissenting Ministers of Liverpool, in Reply to a Course of Lectures entitled, "Unitarianism Confuted," by Thirteen Clergymen of the Church of England. Liverpool : Willmer and Smith, 23, Church Street. London : John Green, 121, Newgate Street. 1839. Now re-issued in their original and unaltered form by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1876.

THOSE whose memory can carry them back to the year 1839, and who had almost any kind of connection with Liverpool at that time, can scarcely fail to remember the occurrence of the theological controversy between Unitarians and their opponents which then and there took place. The re-issue of the Lectures on the Unitarian side in an unaltered form by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association seems to afford a fitting opportunity for recalling the circumstances in which that controversy originated, and some aspects of it which, however imperfectly reproduced, can hardly be contemplated without interest and instruction. The writer of this article narrowly escaped, by a change of residence into another county three years previously, from the dangerous, if not to him

damaging, honour of being associated as the third combatant with the two distinguished men who headed the defence. And this circumstance alone, independently of the important character of the discussion itself, and his own long and intimate connection with Liverpool and the combatants, is sufficient to account for the interest he feels in this memorial volume, and the willingness with which he avails himself of the opportunity of its re-issue to recal some of the characteristic incidents, and to notice some of the more striking features, as they present themselves to his mind and memory, of this memorable passage of arms.

The Rev. Fielding Ould, minister of Christ Church, Liverpool, published a letter, dated Jan. 21st, 1839, addressed "To all who call themselves Unitarians in the town and neighbourhood of Liverpool," inviting them, in apostolic phrase, as "Men and Brethren," to attend in his church a course of lectures which he, with twelve other associated clergymen, proposed to address to them in "the tenderest charity, the purest love, and the most affectionate sympathy with those in the extreme of peril, and that an *eternal peril*" (the italics are not ours). He also *announced to the public* (and here the italics are ours) that his "reverend brethren and himself" intended to meet on the day immediately preceding the commencement of the course, for the purpose of *solemn humiliation* before God, and earnest prayer for His blessing on their efforts to enlighten those whom they believed "to have been blinded by the god of this world." There is no reason whatever to doubt the perfect sincerity of this invitation, but it is impossible to repress a smile at its simplicity when there rise up before our memory, among a large number of men of high social standing and education thus addressed by the writer of the letter, the special forms of William Rathbone, Thomas Thornely, Christopher Rawdon, Henry Booth, George Holt, the Yateses, William Jevons, William Shepherd, Edward Roscoe, Thomas Bolton, John Hamilton Thom, Blanco White and James Martineau.

The challenge—for of course it had to be regarded in that light by "the defenders of the faith" impugned—was accepted

in a well-reasoned, dignified and courteous, but sometimes pungent letter, in which the writers explain, in reply to the question, "whether it is not a sweet and pleasant thing to tell and hear together of the great things which God has done for our souls," the conditions under which such conference may be "sweet and pleasant," and add, "but such conference is not 'sweet and pleasant' where, fallibility being confessed on one side, infallibility is assumed on the other; where one has nothing to learn and everything to teach; where the arguments of an equal are propounded as a message of inspiration; where presumed error is treated as unpardonable guilt; and on the fruits of laborious and truth-loving inquiry, terms of reprobation and menaces of everlasting perdition are unscrupulously poured." The public correspondence of which this was the commencement continued through some twenty letters, and is still interesting and instructive, though dealing principally with the preliminaries of a treaty of discussion, which broke off unsigned. The three Unitarian ministers had proposed a written and published discussion, in addition to the lectures to be given by both sides; and this (after themselves proposing a platform discussion, which was declined) the Trinitarian ministers apparently accepted on Feb. 8th. But subsequently sentiments so dreadful had been expressed by the three Unitarians, such as that they did not believe "in a written and infallibly accurate revelation from God to man," and that the occurrence or performance of "miracles" was not necessarily a protection against possible inaccuracy in reasoning, that a discussion with them had become impossible; and accordingly Messrs. M'Neile, Fielding Ould and Byrth write, March 18th:

"While, therefore, we shall continue to use all lawful methods of argument and persuasion, in the hope of being useful to those who, though called Unitarians, are not so entirely separated from our common humanity (!) as you seem to be, we have no hesitation in saying that, with regard to *yourselves* as individuals, there appears to be a more insurmountable objection in the way of discussion than would be offered by ignorance of one another's language, because the want of a common medium of language could be supplied by an

interpreter, but the want of a common medium of reason cannot be supplied at all."

The oddity of such reasons for declining discussion (with persons the very frightfulness of whose errors should of itself have been, with gentlemen who were so desirous of saving their fellow-townsmen from "damnable heresies," an additional motive for entering upon it and continuing it) was so great, that not unnaturally conjecture was busy that there must have been other reasons also, though unpublished, for this very singular course. It was believed that the then Bishop of Chester had interposed—on the ground, probably, rather of dignity than of fear, and a disinclination to subject the firm traditions of the Church to the test of "reason and Scripture" as applied by schismatics. Certainly Dr. Hook, the late Dean of Chichester, then Vicar of Leeds, significantly remarked, in his sermon preached at St. Peter's Church shortly after this controversy (in which Evangelical clergy had alone engaged), that the only difference between the highest supra-lapsarian Calvinist and the lowest Socinian was in their powers of logic; that is, that the sin common to both alike was schism in not "hearing the Church." This banding together in the same faggot both "the Evangelical faction" and the heretics, must have been trying to Dr. M'Neile and Mr. Ould. On rather different grounds, Mr. Campbell, the then Rector of Liverpool (who, with his habitual tact, liberality, dignity and good sense, had forborne from taking any part in the crusade), was currently reported to have said, "I told them to leave them alone."

The most serious matters, however, happily for the cheerfulness of human life, are rarely entirely exempt from amusing incidents; and it turned out, though, fortunately for himself, we believe it was not generally known at the time, that the Coryphæus of the controversy, the Rev. Fielding Ould, had not, in his desire to enlighten his heretical fellow-townsmen, trusted to his unaided genius even in his own opening discourse, but had borrowed the divisions and headings in substance, and numerous paragraphs almost literally, from Andrew Fuller's "Calvinistic and Socinian Systems Examined and Compared."

We believe that the late Rev. Franklin Baker, of Bolton, first, from the very considerable stores of his reading, drew the attention of the *Liverpool Albion* to this fact, and that the Rev. Dr. Shepherd, of Gateacre, taking the hint, followed up the exposure with congenial delight; for in the months of August, September and October, 1841, we find him writing four letters to the editor of that paper, exposing in detail all the particulars of this literary—we are sorry to say, too, this theological—larceny. These were afterwards republished in a pamphlet, largely circulated, but now scarcely accessible, entitled, “The Clerical Cabbage Garden,” and enriched with humorous mottos, such as “*Qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti*,” from Horace (Sat. i. iii. 116), and from the “Bold Stroke for a Wife:”

“*Periwinkle*. I have heard him mention you with much respect; your name is——?”

“*Colonel*. PILLAGE, Sir.

“*Periwinkle*. Ay, Pillage. I do remember he called you PILLAGE.”

After placing in parallel columns the original words of Fuller and the very slightly altered ones of Ould, he mentions how White, in his History of Selborne, says that “all the owls in his parish hoot in B flat;” how Synesius in a pastoral declares, “magis impium esse mortuorum lucubrationes quam vestes furari” (congratulating Mr. Ould that he did not live in the fifth century under the Bishop of Ptolemais); and how Cotton Mather, in his *Magnalia Christi Americana*, narrates that a tanner, ambitious of being a preacher, goes to Brentford and avails himself of one of Mr. Gray’s sermons. Peter Stent, who usually read a sermon in the absence of any regular minister, had, as it happened, selected the same sermon for reading if there had been occasion, and so followed the preacher throughout, till he came to a place in the sermon that spoke of *Glasgow sinners*, which the tanner dexterously turned into *New England sinners*, and that was all the variation in the whole sermon.

On re-reading, at an interval of thirty-seven years, this witty, searching, unsparing pamphlet, we can understand how truly

Dr. Shepherd would write to his friend Franklin Baker: "I never performed any literary task with more *gout* than the exhibiting of F. O." "The town of Liverpool is placarded with an advertisement of the work, with the mottos of which, especially the last, I am particularly proud. I have not been in town since the announcement appeared, and have not heard how the dose works." "What number of copies do you think may be vended in Athens?" (a name by which he was fond of designating Bolton). It was confidently reported at the time, and Dr. Shepherd himself affirmed it, that he went into St. John's Market, and buying the very largest red cabbage he could meet with, sent it by a boy, with his compliments, to the Rev. Fielding Ould's house; and this is not unlikely to be literally true, as the possible limits in his practical jesting are not to be confidently defined.*

To revert to the proper order of our narrative, however, the momentous February the sixth arrived. The Rev. Fielding Ould appeared, according to promise, arrayed in clerical costume—but, better than promise, arrayed also before the unconscious audience in the "heads and divisions" of discourse, and often the very texts, stately sentences and narrow sense, supplied by the old Baptist minister. Christ Church was of course crowded, and the three defendants, who had signified their intention to be present, had extreme difficulty in getting admission, and indeed scarcely less on the following week (through

* It must be remembered that the age of practical jokes, even in what was reputed good society (from the younger members of the Royal Family when George the Third was King, and their immediate associates, down to the "broad" clergy and the older Nonconformist ministers), had not wholly passed away. We do not mean, of course, the brutal practical jokes played by brainless young men, bringing ruin on intellects and persons superior to their own, such as the present Duke of Cambridge has shewn his determination to stamp out of the army, but those like the one attributed to Dr. Shepherd, not very refined indeed, but exceedingly intelligible. Few things could be finer than to observe the two apostolic young men (for at the time we first knew them in Liverpool the eldest was under thirty) who headed this controversy as defendants, moving about in society on the outskirts of this age of rather rough wit, with their mingled modesty, dignity and courtesy, quietly helping to put an end to it and supplement it with something less vulgar, but often not at all less humorous.

the crowds round the doors and in the street) in reaching the interior of Paradise-Street Chapel when Mr. Thom gave the first lecture in reply. Subsequently, however, a pew was set apart for the use of the defendants in Christ Church, which popularly went by the name of "the condemned pew;" and there they sat each of the thirteen nights, bearing (in the reminiscent language of one of them) "the declamatory denunciation or the whining pity showered upon them, amid the responsive groan of the pious audience, by the energy or the feebleness of the preacher." We regret to add that the clergy themselves not only failed to reciprocate this desire of fair-play by their own presence at the Unitarian lectures, but used their utmost efforts, and with prevailing success, to keep away their people also.

Great as was the excitement occasioned by these Lectures, remarkable as was undoubtedly the power and ability of those we are noticing, it has been argued that a re-issue of them now is entirely out of date. We heartily wish it were. If by the expression, "out of date," is meant that the writers (the two principal at least) would not of their own choice enter again on such an arena, or discuss the same questions on exactly the same assumed basis, nothing can be more true. But if it is meant that this re-issue is out of date on the ground of the arguments it meets being no longer urged, and the refutations it supplies being no longer needed, nothing can be less true. Not that no improvement of any kind has taken place in the tone and language of popular controversy. We do really hope and believe that, except in entirely incompetent and uneducated quarters (and here we know it still is used), such phraseology as occurs in "Unitarianism Confuted" would be nearly unknown. In the *Dedication* of the first lecture, the words, "degrading assumptions of the God-denying heresy of Unitarianism," stare us in the face. Charges of "daringly tampering with the canon of Scripture" (especially the initial chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke); "denying the eternity of punishment, righteously awarded to the impenitent and disobedient;" of being "an unhappy school;" of being guilty of "hackneyed

artifice ;” of “waging unwearied hostility against the mind of God ;” “of being engaged in the unsanctified labour of dishonouring the word of God ;” of “bearing some such proportion to the Christian Church as monsters bear to the species of which they are the unhappy distortions,”—are brought against the defendants even in the general preface to the collected volume, which must therefore have received the sanction of each of the thirteen clergymen. But the texts, the explanations, and arguments which we find in these Trinitarian Lectures are to this day echoed from ten thousand pulpits. Indeed, they are substantially the same as have rolled down the stream of time for 1500 years ; and the reasonings of St. Augustine, which, coming fresh from the mint of his burning brain, had a subtlety, coherency, interest and ingenuity about them, and have ever since fascinated and held captive the system-loving mind of Europe,—are precisely the reasonings, accompanied by precisely the texts, adduced with full faith and confidence not only by the clergy in this controversy, but by the average clergy now, only enfeebled and vulgarized by the wear and tear of centuries and the passage through clumsy hands.* The work of disabusement is unhappily by no means done. It has indeed made immense progress, in a variety of directions, since these lectures were first given. But Liverpool itself (like Warwickshire, which has been said to have made a great effort of nature in the production of Shakespeare, and to have remained barren ever since) has wearied of the particular strife and effort, never kept up the combat, and, with very occasional exceptions, never reverted to it. The principal men engaged in that controversy have found it intolerable† to dwarf their

* Lord Macaulay, in a letter to Mr. Thomas Flower Ellis (*Life*, Vol. I. p. 465), says that Augustine “expresses himself in the style of a field-preacher.” We suspect it is the field-preacher that expresses himself in the style of Augustine, i.e. according to the vulgar tongue and the common version. It is his more familiar acquaintance with Exeter Hall than with Augustine, and a little neglect of chronological cause and effect, that has misled this good man, this great writer and this “glutton of books,” into the above comparison.

† What labourer in this field has not often sympathized with Mr. Martineau in these words—occurring in the lecture on the Deity of Christ—“I enter on this

mental life and impede their mental freedom by continuing to argue on premisses that were incomplete, if not incorrect, and have advanced in sympathy only with the higher and bolder thought of the age. And so the weary—and yet, as regards the still existing wants of others, the useful and noble—work is left to men who perhaps do not sacrifice powers so rare and fine to the humble task they undertake.

Each of these lectures was preceded by a brief devotional service, and thirty-nine hymns, three for each occasion, were printed for the use of the audiences, from “An Unpublished Hymn Book,” since very extensively known. And as we look at them,* and recal the familiar sounds of their ancient piety, a sense of sadness steals upon us at the reflection that so many of our race should be so wedded and united to special forms and modes of devout expression as not to be able to recognize in them the feeblest notes of Christian praise, but should even denounce the users, and in some instances the authors, of them, in the terms we have quoted from the general preface of Unitarianism Confuted.

In order to understand the special and almost oppressive burden of the duty imposed upon the Unitarian side in this controversy, we have to bear in mind that the attack was conducted by thirteen clergymen, each selecting the one topic on which he himself was best prepared. The defence was conducted by three men, one of whom, Mr. Martineau, had to take five, and each of the others four subjects, selected by their

miserable logomachy with the utmost repugnance, and am ashamed that in vindication of the simplicity of Christ we should be dragged back into the barren conflicts of the schools.”

* Among them were the familiar ones, beginning :

- “ Both heaven and earth do worship Thee.”
- “ Happy the souls who first believed.”
- “ Receive Messiah gladly.”
- “ Pour, blessed Gospel, glorious news for man.”
- “ A voice upon the midnight air.”
- “ Holy as Thou, O Lord, is none.”
- “ God of Jesus, hear me now.”
- “ Spirit of grace and health and power.”
- “ Life nor death shall us dissever.”

opponents. These three men were contemporaneously engaged in the usual duties of their ministerial office and social life, their Sunday services and Sunday classes. One (Mr. M.) was also heavily engaged in the task of almost daily secular instruction ; while Mr. Thom, who in about two months had to produce and publish for these lectures what amounted to an octavo volume of some 400 pages, had just entered on the editorship of the new series of the " Christian Teacher." They had also simultaneously to conduct a private and public correspondence, of sometimes a worrying nature, in reference to the details of other projected forms of extending the public discussion, and in explanation of numerous misunderstandings or misrepresentations that arose in connection with the several lectures. The singular calmness, depth, fulness and completeness of the lectures composed in these circumstances, still on re-reading them excites our admiration, not unmingled with wonder. This impression in Liverpool was profound. Certainly, it was long and long before they could be met without inquiries being made as to how they were after their arduous exertions. All these matters combined induce us to characterize this as the most celebrated pulpit Unitarian controversy of our century. It was reviewed in the principal Anglican periodicals and in the " Eclectic " and " Congregational," the notice in the " Eclectic " being very able and enthusiastically appreciative, especially of Mr. Martineau's part in the work. But in the periodicals circulating among Unitarians, no review appeared. The preliminary correspondence was printed in the " Christian Reformer " and in the " Christian Teacher ; " and a short extract from the *Liverpool Courier*, under the head of Intelligence, telling of the delivery of the first lecture by Mr. Thom, was given in the " Reformer." After that it observed an ominous silence, and from that time to this no trace can be found in our literary chronicles of such a book as " Unitarianism Defended " having come into existence, and the writer of this, the first notice of the volume, was warned of the antiquarian nature of the task he was undertaking, and of the dubious wisdom of unearthing so remote a

piece of the past—yes, and of the *passé*. But the parallel proceedings in Cyprus, Mycenæ, South Italy, and even England, encouraged him. The truth is, this controversy, so far from being in those days *passé*, was regarded as sadly too advanced. The admissions and assertions that seem to us now so guarded, so inevitable, and so indispensable, were then contemplated by the older, and, we are sorry to add, many of the younger men, with suspicion and alarm, as involving a too free, even a destructive criticism. The old position of a nearly infallible book-revelation had not disappeared ; at any rate, the imprudence of publicly questioning it was very widely felt. We are sure, too, that there mingled with this conservative reticence a feeling that it would have been scarcely loyal to men fighting so heroically under the banner to make them objects of critical attack. Hence the *alta silentia* of the “Christian Reformer ;” while all who know Mr. Thom can easily apprehend the reasons of the silence of the “Christian Teacher” on a controversy in which he himself bore so distinguished a part. The “Inquirer” and other newspapers and periodicals now circulating among Unitarians had not commenced their existence. And it must surely be in part traced to this shadow of the cross upon these men, that no general denominational desire till now has arisen for the freer and wider circulation of material, to which, in wealth of wisdom, force and dignity of argument, calm devotion and a profound and pervading religiousness, no tracts or sermons or lectures that we have ever seen issuing since from the Unitarian press can put in a superior—we do not like, and think dangerous, universal affirmatives or universal negatives, or we should say, an equal—claim.

Take up the first lecture, on “The Practical Importance of the Unitarian Controversy :” we know nothing on the subject at this hour that we would sooner reprint for general use than this lecture. It is true that in this, as in most of the other lectures, there are inevitable allusions to the charges or positions of opponents, and some of these no doubt, in their present exact form, might be excluded or modified with some advantage to the unity of effect. But even these are themselves

almost uniformly made subservient to the advancement of some great positive truth which is quite independent of the special statements of the controversialist. So that if the local colouring and the often petty necessities of the dispute were removed, the substance would stand out in the light, with no disfiguring veins. This could only be done by the authors themselves. Perhaps they have been wise not to do it. We think it not improbable that the only effect would have been to spoil their own work, and to improve it till they had improved it out of all original form and life.

In Mr. Thom's second lecture there is, from the nature of the subject, necessarily more fence and argument and simply logical fervour. The utterances of the spirit that came from the seclusion of tranquil, holy thought, which fill the first lecture, are in large measure driven back before the grosser forms of humiliating intellectual error which it was necessary to expose. Besides, the dogs of war were loosed. Mr. Byrth had put forward as the offensive title of his lecture, "The Unitarian Interpretation of the New Testament based upon Defective Scholarship, or on Dishonest or Uncandid Criticism." Mr. Thom in his reply, disdaining to embody the insult in the title or in the main scope of his treatment of a great subject, and leaping over all petty temporary differences and disputes, gave as the title of his lecture what we have always regarded as in itself a rich and pregnant assertion of a great truth, "Christianity not the Property of Critics and Scholars, but the Gift of God to all Men." And we can imagine, what we heard at the time, how the pale and spare figure of the man swelled into a fulness of dimension beyond itself as he uttered the words :

"Though no one honours scholarship more, or has a profounder veneration for its noble functions, and altogether renouncing the vulgarity of depreciating its high offices, and maintaining wherever I have influence, especially for our own Church and in our own day, the necessity for a learned ministry, able to refresh their souls at the original wells, and, unfrighted by confident dogmatism, to give a reason for the faith that is in them, I yet declare that Christianity is a religion for the people; that the Gospel was originally preached

to the poor; that Christ is manifested to the heart and soul of every man whom he attracts by heavenly sympathy; that when not many wise, not many learned were called, the lowly but honest in heart recognized the divine brightness, and sat at the feet of Jesus docile and rejoicing; and I protest altogether against any learned aristocracy, any literary hierarchy, any priestly mediators, having more of the true light that lighteth every man than the humblest of their brethren who has taken to his heart the free gift of God, and loves the Lord Jesus Christ with sincerity."

Mr. Thom's third lecture was on "The Unscriptural Origin and Ecclesiastical History of the Doctrine of the Trinity," in reply to the Rev. D. James's, "The Doctrine of the Trinity proved as a Consequence from the Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ." This lecture, occupying, with the notes and preface, upwards of a hundred octavo pages, is Mr. Thom's most massive and laborious contribution to the controversy. It is full, searching and exhaustive. But there was no time, in the short interval between the lectures, for a proper manipulation, arrangement and presentation of the varied materials brought together.* Following Cudworth's† learned chapters on the Christian and pre-Christian Trinities, and avoiding the *βαθμῶν*, the *περιχώρησις*, the *ὁμοουσία* and the *μονοουσία* of the forms of this subtle metaphysico-theological doctrine, he yet gives the essence of the origins with remarkable clearness and force. Whether the pre-Christian genesis of the doctrine is strictly part of its ecclesiastical history we are not sure, but the exposure of the first is certainly necessary to the understanding of the second. And now that Mr. Gladstone has introduced this generation to the theology of Homer, Plato and his various

* Nothing can be better than the way in which Mr. Thom himself puts this in the preface to his last lecture: "I cannot but express my own regret, and point it out to public notice, that we have been necessitated by circumstances not to prepare merely and deliver as pulpit addresses, but to print and fix in a permanent form, dissertations upon most important and agitated questions within a period of time altogether insufficient to do any justice, I will not say to the subjects, but even to our own ideas of the subjects." "I am aware, for my own part, that it (our case) might have been much strengthened by additional force of evidence and clearness of statement."

† Intellectual System of the Universe.

followers may have a clear right to be introduced into the ecclesiastical world, and we ourselves could make out a very fair Christian (orthodox) system, including atonement, from the tragedies of Æschylus alone. The crushing weight of the numerous authorities quoted in this lecture, and the irresistible force of the reasoning founded upon them, leave us at a loss to account for the fact that the morning after the evening of its delivery Liverpool did not awake to find itself Unitarian. But it didn't; and as long as our perhaps 15,000 churches repeat the doxology in the ears of the people twenty times a day, and close every sermon with, "Now to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost," it seems almost as impossible for Trinitarians in the mass to become Unitarians, as it would be for the Mahometan, hearing the pensive cry of the muezzin five times a day ring from the minarets of the mosques, "To prayer, to prayer: there is no God but God!"—to become Trinitarian.* The only fault we can see in this

* That the parties to both sides of this controversy had no eye to what, in an old-fashioned and antiquated phrase, is sometimes called "proselyting," we dare not say. But that the men to whom we have hitherto principally referred were absolutely unconscious (guiltless, if it be a guilt) of such an aim, the whole tenor of their lives and the whole complexion of their character shew. If such had been, however, the aim of either side of this "*Disputa del Sacramento*," the result was nearly an absolute failure. We never heard the name of a single Unitarian in Liverpool mentioned who had become in consequence orthodox; and only those of two men—and these were of high character and large brain power—who had the courage to separate from their ecclesiastical surroundings and join the worshipping society of Unitarians, and these with their families remain to this day firm to the faith they then embraced. No doubt others—there is evidence to prove it—were first affected by these lectures to "think yet again" of these matters, and in various degrees departed from orthodoxy. The truth is, the public combat was dropped. The battle was regarded as fairly fought out and done with. It had the effect, indeed, of *clenching* the Unitarianism of Liverpool for one generation. But as for the rest, as in the olden days of Abijah and Jeroboam, the battle is still "*before*" as well as "*behind*." The modern Corinth has a character of its own, which requires special study and adaptations. It is something quite different from Athens and from Sparta, and is certainly a good way off the region of Bœotia. The men who all over England sway in Corporations and Municipalities and School Boards, who permeate with liberal influences the daily, weekly and periodical press, whose voice is influentially heard in society and parliament, are content with this action, and like neither the narrowness nor the obnoxiousness of what they call sectarian life. They form invisible ingredients and alteratives in English society, do not care to attach

powerful lecture (which deserves to be re-arranged and re-published on its own merits) is, that the forces brought on the field are greater than the strategy employed in directing them. Mr. Thom comes, the Telamonian Ajax of this controversy, his heavy armour sometimes impeding the ease of his movements, but overwhelming the enemy with destruction, and routing him again and again, and "thrice he slays the slain."†

Mr. Thom's last lecture, "The Comforter," from the compactness and limitation of the controversial part of the subject, is liable to no such objection. And we cannot part from the lecturer without giving one more extract, though we doubt whether our very extracts are not in effect unjust, because, where there is so much that we should like to quote, what we happen to hit upon may by its special force as a fragment do actual injustice to the idea of the whole. The claim put forth by his opponents to the exclusive possession of the Holy Spirit, not only as hallowing their spiritual nature, and thus making them superior as men, but as guiding their intellectual powers, and thus rendering them virtually infallible as critics, receives a weighty and impassioned rebuke :

"We only ask how this can be made clear either to other men, or to themselves? Have they alone sincere convictions on these subjects? Have they alone sought the truth with the toils and prayers of earnest and humble minds? Have they alone emptied themselves of all prejudice, and desired only the pure light from God? Have they alone put worldly considerations from their hearts, and left all things that they might follow Christ? What evidence is there in their position, or in their sacrifices, that only the Spirit of God can be their guide, for that they are manifestly self-devoted to the cause of truth? Are *they* the meek adherents to persecuted principle, so that against the outward storm nothing short of the inward witness

themselves to any panacea, and shrink from the discipline, the restraints, the exposure, the courage and the effectiveness of any pronounced and distinct, even if Macedonian, phalanx.

† We are reminded of the description, when Hector challenged the bravest of the Greeks to single combat, Ajax came forward among several others, and the lot falling upon him, he approached Hector, and dashed him to the ground with a huge stone.

of the Spirit can be their omnipotent support? Do they alone give evidence by the scorn and insult which they cheerfully bear for Christ's sake and the gospel's, that they must be taught of God, for that no men could endure this social persecution unless God was with them? Ah, my friends, does it become the followers of popular opinions to turn to the persecuted, and say, *we* who float upon the world's favour, we who have no sacrifices to bear for conscience' sake, we to whom godliness is a present income (*πορινημός*) of all that men most love—we give evidence of being supported through all this peace and popularity by the Holy Spirit—but *you*, whom we persecute and scorn, you whom we lecture and libel, you who have to bear upon your inmost hearts the coarse friction of intolerance and of rude fanaticism, you, though you have to endure all this, give no evidence that your convictions of Christ and your faith in God are dear unto you,—you are voluntary sufferers, and the distresses of your position, which we shall aggravate in every way we can, are no proof that you stand the rude peltings of the pitiless storm, only because you dare not abandon conviction, or turn away from what you believe to be the light of God within you?"

The second lecture was delivered by Mr.* Martineau. Its title was, "The Bible, what it is and what it is not," in reply to Dr. Tattershall's, "The Integrity of the Canon of Holy Scripture maintained against Unitarian Objections." One would have thought that to the mildest student of ecclesiastical history the simplicity of Dr. Tattershall's title would be astonishing. The Canon! What Canon? Which Canon? The Canon of Josephus? or the Canon of Jerome? or the Canon of Eusebius? The Canon of Laodicea? or the Canon of Trent? or the Canon of the sixth Article of the Church of England? "A certain volume reaches our hands," replies Dr. Tattershall (speaking of the entire remains of a whole national literature, within certain dates), "and we may inquire whether it is in all its parts authentic, truthful, credible, unmutilated and uncorrupted; and these inquiries being answered in the affirmative,

* We prefer adhering to the designations in use at the time of the lectures, when the late Bishop of St. David's was styled Mr. Thirlwall. We shall be glad also to join in the acclamations which will rise when Oxford follows the example of Harvard and Leyden, and when with tardy repentance she makes a pilgrimage to York, and offers the highest honour she can confer on John Kenrick.

the Bible is the Word of God, and to every portion of the Word of God, as well as to that delivered by Moses, is the direction suitable, 'Ye shall not add to the Word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it.'" Into the chaos of this darkness had Mr. Martineau to conjure some light; on the profound and unconscious ignorance of the teachers of the English people had he to pour the ray of a not too dazzling or confusing knowledge. How patiently and admirably, how perspicuously, and with what mingled tenderness, picturesqueness and boldness, he discharged this difficult task, those who know his style will readily realize. To make extracts from the lecture would be like taking links from a concatenation. No doubt the exigencies of the position, the necessity of having some common platform of meeting, despair of educating the clergy, and still less (at that time) the people, into some knowledge of the real questions at issue, induced Mr. Martineau, after describing "the gradations of evidence" and other "qualifying" considerations, to allow that "we approve the general decision of the Protestant Churches, and adopt as authentic the Canon as it stands." This is one of the directions in which these Lectures are said to be out of date, and no longer to represent the actual present convictions of the authors.* Not exactly so. The position that the whole contents of our Bible are separately and collectively an infallible test of truth and a final appeal, is one thing, and the position that as it stands it contains not only the possible germs, but the mature and completed form of English orthodoxy, is another. Both of these positions were maintained as true by the plaintiffs in this action; the reply of the defendants was, Granting even for the sake of your assertion and a common ground the first, we deny the second. So throughout: this lecture is not an absolute but a relative statement of conviction, containing teachings which may be incomplete according to the fulness of the subject and the fulness of the author's then and

* This is unquestionably true of several positions—remarkably, for instance, of this: "The Gospel of St. John is more certainly authentic than the other three." The Bible, p. 3.

present state of knowledge upon it, but not necessarily untrue as regards the one, or inconsistent as regards the other. Thus, "miracles, then, are simply awakening facts," but "not affording infallible proof" to specific "doctrinal ideas." "I discern in the Bible the Word of God, but by no means the words of God." "I believe St. Matthew to have been inspired, but I do not believe him to have been infallible. I am sure that he nowhere puts forth such a claim." "Holy men of God spake, moved by the Holy Spirit; that those also who recorded these speeches wrote by the Holy Spirit; that in addition to the superhuman message there was a superhuman report of it, is a notion of which no trace can be found in the apostolic writings." No doubt all these expressions indicate a certain stage of inquiry, and although the author may himself have passed that stage, it is one that others have to go through, and others are in, and a guiding hand such as is here afforded is still useful. It is a great mistake to suppose that all the public require is to be presented with results. For any safe and wise issue, the processes must be gone through. This is one of the things that make these Lectures still valuable, and justify the Association in re-issuing them, and the authors in, however reluctantly, consenting to that re-issue.

From the close of the lecture we make these extracts as characteristic :

"Christianity is a progressive thing; not a doctrine dead, and embalmed in creeds, but a spirit living and impersonated in Christ." "It is with Scripture as with nature. The everlasting heavens spread above the gaze of Herschel, as they did over that of Abraham; yet the latter saw but a spangled dome, the former a forest of innumerable worlds. To the mind of this profound observer, there was as much a *new creation*, as if those heavens had been, at the time, called up and spread before his sight. And thus it is with the Word of God. As its power and beauty develop themselves continually, it is as if Heaven were writing it now, and leaf after leaf dropped directly from the skies. Nor is there any heresy like that, which denies this progressive unfolding of divine wisdom, shuts up the spirit of heaven in the verbal metaphysics and scholastic creeds of a half-barbarous period,—treats the inspiration of God

as a dry piece of antiquity, and cannot see that it communes afresh with the soul of every age; and sheds, from the living Fount of truth, a guidance ever new.”*

Mr. Martineau's second lecture was on “The Proposition ‘that Christ is God,’ proved to be False from the Jewish and the Christian Scriptures;” that is to say, we presume, that no such doctrine is propounded in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. It is in reply to perhaps the weakest of all the lectures, delivered by the most amiable and venerable of the disputants; and it is to our minds so unanswerable, that we are in constant amazement at the monstrous and absurd doctrine it controverts holding its ground a day. Without attempting to enter into the familiar details of an argument and of evidence so well known, and so lucidly, patiently and forcibly put, we make one extract, which will carry its own interest with it.

“It is then as the type of God, the human image of the everlast-

* As was to be expected from the persevering and narrow hostility which was rife at that time, and has not wholly died out yet, to any attempt at “improving” the Common Version as a kind of impiety, “the Improved Version” figures largely in this controversy. Among the numerous misunderstandings which had to be corrected, occurs this ludicrous piece of inaccurate eloquence by Mr. Ould: “The shades of Belshan, Lindsey, Jebb, Priestley, Wakefield, *et cetera*, might well be astonished to see their learned labours so contemptuously spoken of by ‘the modern disciples of their school.’” Now it so happens that, excepting two, all these good men were dead before the commencement of that work, and of the two survivors, one, Mr. Lindsey, was unable to take any part in it. (Note to Bible Lecture). It is not, however, surprising that an English clergyman should not be very well read in the ecclesiastical history of so slighted a branch of the Church universal. But as Unitarianism gets more and more hold of the public mind, and an ever-increasing number of its ministers come from other folds, it becomes important that its history, which is the history of thought, should be carefully studied, especially by those who are not indigenous, and who have very little knowledge of its traditions. As its course is traced, it will be found to be one of the most, if not the most, momentous of ecclesiastical periods, because, apart from political revolution, the struggles of churches and creeds and ecclesiastical ambitions, it has pursued a course of pure development. Alas! that the one man who, from his perspicuity of style, breadth of sympathy, largeness and comprehensiveness of intelligence and reading, and crystal candour, would have done this work most instructively — John James Tayler—is no more among us! His *Retrospect*, even in its most recent edition by Mr. Martineau, covers too wide a field to admit of any complete treatment of this special period, and Mr. Martineau has been himself too conspicuous an agent and originator in the changes of the last forty years to be the chronicler.

ing Mind, that Christ becomes an object of our *Faith*. Once did a dark and doubting world cry, like Philip on the evening of Gethsemane, 'Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us ;' but now has Christ 'been so long with us' that we, 'who have seen him, have seen the Father.' This I conceive to have been the peculiar office of Jesus ; to *show us*, not to *tell us*, the spirit of that Being who spreads round us in Infinitude, and leads us through Eternity. The universe had prepared before us the *scale* of Deity ; Christ has filled it with his own *spirit* ; and we worship now, not the cold intellectual deity of natural religion ; not the distant majesty, the bleak immensity, the mechanical omnipotence, the immutable stillness, of the speculative Theist's God : but One far nearer to our worn and wearied hearts ; One whose likeness is seen in Jesus of Nazareth, and whose portraiture, suffused with the tints of that soul, is impressed upon creation."

The next lecture, "The Scheme of Vicarious Redemption inconsistent with itself, and the Christian Idea of Salvation," occupies, with the notes and preface, a hundred pages. It has always been considered the most remarkable of the five. It is certainly a wonderful piece of argumentation, subtle and ingenious in the extreme. It may be the true treatment of the subject. In that case it is so by the exact reproduction of the rabbinical reasoning it expounds. But to our minds an air of unreality pervades the whole matter—text and comment alike. The subject is removed from the world of real thoughts and things, into the realms of pure casuistry. To a great extent we believe this to have been the actual case, and that the ingenuity and explanatory representations of Paul have found a fitting counterpart in his commentator. First, Christ by his death and passing into heaven ceased to be a Jew, the type of his nation, and became a man, the type of his race, and thus salvation by him became universal. Second, by his death, "temple, sacrifice, priest, remain to us, only glorified into proportions worthy of a heavenly dispensation : our temple, in the skies ; our sacrifice, Messiah's mortal person ; our priest, his ever-living spirit." If such is the apostle's argument, it is right in discussing the teaching of the apostle to reproduce it. But in that case we turn, not without relief, from the school of

Gamaliel and its cases and precedents, to the intense reality and the burning moral force of these words :

"If indeed there were in Christianity two deliverances, discriminating and successive, it would be more in accordance with its spirit to invert this order ;—to recal from alienation first, and announce forgiveness afterwards ; to restore from guilt, before cancelling the penalty ; and permit the *healing* to anticipate the *pardoning* love." "If the outward remission precedes the inward sanctification, then does God admit to favour the yet unsanctified, and sin keeps us in no exile from Him."—"With what consistency can the advocates of such an economy accuse its opponents of dealing lightly with sin ? What ! shall we, who plant in every soul of sin a hell, whence no foreign force, no external God, can pluck us, any more than they can tear us from our identity ;—we, who hide the fires of torment in no viewless gulf, but make them ubiquitous as guilt ;—we, who suffer no outward agent from Eden, or the Abyss, or Calvary, to encroach upon the solitude of man's responsibility, and confuse the simplicity of conscience ;—we, who teach that God will not, and even cannot, spare the froward till they be froward no more, but must permit the burning lash to fall, till they cry aloud for mercy, and throw themselves freely into His embrace ;—shall we be rebuked for a lax administration of peace, by those who think that a moment may turn the alien into the elect ?"*

We have left ourselves no room for observation on the remaining lectures of Mr. Martineau, on "The Christian View of Moral Evil," and "Christianity without Priest or Ritual." Nor have we space to do more than notice the four lectures by the Rev. Henry Giles, on "One God and Mediator," &c., "Man the Image of God," "Creeds, the Foes of Heavenly Faith," &c.,

* Mr. Byrth (who soon after, and in the course of the same year, received a degree of D.D. from Oxford) had a collateral controversy with Mr. Thom, and subsequently also a private correspondence with Mr. Martineau, which, though not exactly contemporaneous with this controversy, had relation to it, and was honourably published in the Life of Dr. Byrth by the Rev. G. R. Moncrieff in 1851. Mr. Byrth had rebuked Mr. Martineau's strong language about Archbishop Magee as "an outrage on the memory of departed greatness ;" and after receiving Mr. Martineau's defence of himself said, "that if any expressions of his at all resembled those quoted from Magee's book, he could wish them obliterated by tears of contrition." Dr. Byrth also presented Mr. Martineau with a copy of Gerard's edition of the Greek Testament, bearing the autographs of Newcome Cappe and his wife.

and "The Christian View of Retribution Hereafter." These are plain and sensible lectures, not without passages of eloquence and pathos. By the side of productions by such men as Mr. Martineau and Mr. Thom, they may not impress the reader by their originality or genius. They are now in a sense old-fashioned, but we do not like them the worse for that, for the oldest truths are often the highest, and the oldest arguments the most permanently powerful. And they very fairly represented the prevailing type of Unitarian thought and argument, being on the whole richer and larger in tone, if less exact in statement, than the usual controversial matter of the day. In this age of lecturing, few of our men could fail to be wiser, and few of our libraries fail to be richer, by the possession of this cheap but still very valuable volume.

CHARLES WICKSTEED.

VII.—THE LEGEND OF PETER.

Pierre, a-t-il été à Rome? traduit de Zeller. Par A. Marchand.
Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacker. 1876.

ONE of the clearest results of criticism, as applied to the origins and history of the Christian Church, is, that the domain of mythology extends much further than had been supposed at a time when mythology and pagan religion were, so to speak, synonymous terms, and the former only the methodical exposition of the latter. Scientifically speaking, the word Mythology means an assemblage of beliefs, having no basis in reality, the simple product of the imagination as dominated by the religious sentiment, and under its inspiration absolutely creating persons and facts which, though represented as realities, were entirely chimerical. Only the insight of the philosopher, or of the philosophical theologian, succeeds in discovering the inner meaning, sometimes profound, often poetical, of these unconscious fictions, in which primitive humanity expressed its spirit and depicted its religious emo-

tions. The multitude sees in them only a mass of superstitious error, and places a gulf between these strata of myths and legends, heaped one upon the other, and the divine, historical, positive realities, of which the Old and New Testament record the succession, and whose order throughout the ages is, notwithstanding some temporary and adventitious errors, continued in the development of the Church.

The scientific theology of our time is no longer able to look at things in this light. It is not that it sees more objective reality in the pagan myths. It is not that it banishes all the beginnings of Christianity to the region of myth, as in quarters where it is not known it is accused of doing. But it cannot deny the force of the evidence for the fact that there is also a Christian mythology, which began to be formed in the first days of Christianity, which has slowly grown up, and which, favoured by the ignorance and imaginative vivacity characteristic of the Middle Ages, has become almost as voluminous as the pagan theology with which it is strictly analogous.

This remark might be applied to a large part of the traditional doctrine which is still an object of belief by the great majority of Christians. What is the grand drama, which begins in Eden with the fall due to the infernal cunning of the Serpent-devil, which is continued in heaven in the conflict between the exigencies of Eternal Justice and the inclinations of Divine Love, and which has its *dénouement* on Calvary in the substitution of the incarnate Son, offering to the angry Father his own innocent blood as compensation for the sins of the guilty race? Is it not an august, sombre, incredible mythology, to which nothing real, nothing objective, has ever answered, but which always recommends itself to the meditative thinker by the grand and austere ideas which in this strange history have clothed themselves with a body and made themselves objective? And ought we not to say the same of that material hell, that place of eternal anguish, where the fire never ceases to devour bodies that can never be consumed, and demons, frightfully hideous in form and face, are busy from age to age in torturing the damned? Let us remark here that the very ima-

gination which has been so prolific of these infernal representations has shewn the greatest poverty when it has applied itself to describe the heaven of the happy. As a general thing, the Paradise of the legends is mortally tiresome. Its only occupation is everlasting psalm-singing. The sacred flower of Buddha, motionless upon the stagnant waters, might serve as a symbol for the elect of the Christian mythology as well as for the state of unconscious immobility towards which the disciples of the Hindu moralist aspire.

But it is in the domain of hagiography that the mythological feeling of the Christian generations has had the freest scope. The Reformation, by condemning the veneration of saints, in great part dried up the stream which in the Middle Ages flowed inexhaustibly, and which still flows in the Catholic world. It is only by taking account of this that it is possible to explain the facility, to our minds so marvellous, with which the Catholic piety of to-day assimilates not only dogmas which absolutely contradict both history and good sense (e.g. the Immaculate Conception, the Sacred Heart, the Infallibility of the Pope), but also narratives, the legendary and absurd character of which is clearly obvious to every independent thinker—apparitions of the Virgin, miracles of the most astounding character, and all that we see resulting from them. There certainly manifests itself, at a particular point of religious development, a poetic faculty, in the old sense of the word; that is to say, an inventive, a creative faculty, which naively invents impossible things, and which, when once it has begun its flight, is arrested by no realistic scruples. Fettered in our days by scientific education, and habits of reflection, examination, analysis, it still, under certain circumstances, is unmistakably and powerfully active, and helps us to understand what it was in ages when it had to contend with no counteracting influence. The worst is, that in our time so many hindrances to intellectual emancipation and progress are caused by institutions and claims the basis of which is purely mythological. At every moment we are obliged, in political and religious debate, to take account of these things, almost as if, at the *dénouement* of

a drama which we had been witnessing at the theatre, we were obliged to modify our conduct in accordance with the imaginary events of which we had been spectators. Nothing more clearly sets in the light of day this unpleasant side of the contemporary situation than the mythology which has formed itself about the name and person of the apostle Peter. It is in virtue of this mythology that powerful states are called upon to modify their policy and their constitution ; that Italy cannot yet confidently abandon herself to faith in the decree which proclaims her unity as a nation ; that Spain cannot attain to religious liberty ; that France fears lest the happiest results of her Revolution should be compromised ; that the powerful empire of Germany bristles with laws, possibly necessary, but certainly lamentable ; that every country in Europe is compelled to ask itself how it must act towards those of its subjects who, fancying that in the voice of the Pope they hear the voice of God, offer to their sovereign or to their national law only a loyalty which is wavering, doubtful, subject to the will of a foreign priest. Why is all this ? Because the Pope is held to be the successor of Peter, first Bishop of Rome, and to have inherited all his prerogatives ; because Peter is believed to have been appointed by Christ absolute chief of his Church, his representative and lieutenant upon earth. The situation of the Catholic world might be summed up in these words, which recal the phrase of another apostle : " We are of God, because we are of the Pope, who is of Peter, who is of Christ, who is of God, and himself God."

If, however, the purely mythological origin of these claims were not only demonstrated, but also recognized and admitted, by thoughtful persons, all this papist scaffolding would crumble to pieces as a house of cards falls at the breath of a child. And it is this which gives a peculiar interest to the essays, scientific in principle but popular in form, which for some time theologians of renown have set themselves to compose, with a view of making a breach in the popular belief as to the origin of the Papacy ; essays which, while faithful to the severest demands of historical criticism, aim to present the facts in a

form acceptable to the general reader. For in that lies the special difficulty of the case.

Among the writings, already numerous, called forth by this question, a place of honour must be given to the monograph of Professor Zeller, of Berlin, "*Die Petrussage*," which has been translated into French by M. Alfred Marchand (or Kaufmann), a native of Alsace, who since the annexation has taken refuge in France. M. Marchand's causes of complaint against Germany happily do not prevent his continuance of the task which, before the events of 1870, especially belonged to Alsace—that, namely, of acting as interpreter between the mind of Germany and the mind of France, which are in many respects so opposite, yet which would find their mutual advantage much more in mutual approximation than in conflict. Professor Zeller has peculiar qualifications for the task which he has imposed upon himself. His scientific reputation dates from the time when, with Baur, Schweigler and others, he made part of that valiant Tübingen phalanx—now scattered either by death or orthodox reaction—whose immense services neither over-boldness, nor exaggeration, nor even eccentricity, should make us forget. And in especial the elucidation of the Legend of Peter belonged of right to a representative of the Tübingen school. It forms a part of the mass of evidence which that school has furnished to the history of the Church, in bringing to light the too much forgotten struggles of which primitive Christianity had been the theatre. No doubt the contradictions involved in the Legend of Peter had been noticed and established long before the Tübingen school existed. The early Protestant controversialists had not failed to insist upon the improbability of Peter's Roman Episcopate, or upon the refutation furnished by the New Testament of the pretensions of those who would make him a primitive Pope. But, in the first place, we cannot deny that there are some details of the evangelical history which really seem to confer upon him a certain priority, at least in point of honour, over the other apostles. But still more, the tradition of his abode and his Episcopate at Rome goes back as far as the middle of the

second century. Many Protestant theologians hesitate to deny it outright. And, more than this, before we can deal completely with a legendary tradition, we must do more than point out its incoherences or even its contradictions ; we must also be able to indicate the causes, the interests, the tendencies, to which it owes its formation, and its acceptance by the believing multitude. And this is precisely what the Tübingen school has done.

But is this the same thing as to say that the pamphlet of the Berlin Professor is entirely satisfactory as to clearness of discussion, or the art with which it unfolds its successive points ? We cannot say that it is. It is true that the task is a difficult one. To treat such a question effectively for readers who, though generally educated, are ignorant of the researches of contemporary criticism, it is necessary at every moment to ask them to accept as proved, theses which present themselves to them as, if not paradoxical, yet quite capable of being discussed. M. Zeller has been very sensible of this. He has reduced to the lowest point his demands upon the confidence of his readers. Whenever it was possible, he has taken care that his conclusions should be as rigorous for those who entertain the ideas generally held as to the apostolic history and the writings of the New Testament, as for recent labourers on the ground of historical criticism. Nevertheless, it is plain that he is often embarrassed in his reasonings and expositions by this kind of difficulty, which weighs so heavily on the practical relations of scientific theology with the Church. Might I venture to add that in France we find that German scholars shew more learning than art in their way of expounding to the general public the results of scientific research ? There is always something strained and painful in their method of discussion. Their thought, clear enough in itself, puts on a cloudy veil, which too often obscures or absolutely conceals its outlines. This defect, however, is not marked enough to prevent an attentive reader from distinguishing the logical succession of ideas which form the thread of a work as substantial as this ; and if we have permitted ourselves to point it out, it is not with the

purpose of finding fault. It is far more worth while to take advantage of such a study, with a view of trying to throw some distinct light upon the chapter of Christian mythology known as the Legend of Peter.

II.

To understand thoroughly, both as a whole and in its details, the mass of mythological beliefs which have gathered themselves round the person of Simon Bar Jona, it is not enough to enumerate the assertions of the Roman tradition as to his Episcopate at Rome and his supremacy over the whole Church of his day. We must supplement this by all that this tradition, commented upon and amplified by ages, has added to the original data from which it took its rise. We find it, for example, in its complete form in the *Golden Legend* of Jacobus de Voragine, Archbishop of Genoa in 1292, and the very popular author of a collection of *Lives of the Saints*, the authority of which was immense, and for a long time undisputed. With this good prelate we embark on the deep seas of mythology. Never was historian more completely at enmity with the elementary conditions of history. He believes everything, and visibly writes for readers like himself. It is precisely on this account that the reading of his book is so instructive, and we may well recommend it to those who do not yet understand how decidedly the modern has broken with the mediæval spirit: while from that marked severance it follows that attempts of theological and ecclesiastical rehabilitation may owe to circumstances, to fashion, to the deceptions of the age, to the weariness of men's minds, a noisy and passing success, although after the lapse of a certain time they are necessarily condemned to failure.

The Legend of St. Peter, according to Jacobus de Voragine, after having recounted all the miracles of which he was the hero or the object in the Old Testament, goes on to state that he wept incessantly, especially in the morning when the cock crew, and that he sustained himself solely upon bread and olives, with a rare change to vegetables. Never did a fisherman by profession make less use of the produce of his art.

When his wife was led out to martyrdom, he manifested extreme joy. Of two disciples whom he sent out to preach the gospel, one died; the other returned to tell the news to Peter, who gave him his staff; and the staff laid upon the body, forty days after death, restored it to life. It was at Jerusalem that he first had to contend with the magician Simon, who boasted that he was the Holy Spirit and the Soul of God. Simon gave life to brazen serpents: he made bronze and marble statues laugh and dogs sing. Conquered by the apostle at Jerusalem, he threw his books into the sea, for fear lest Peter should make use of them, and betook himself to Rome, where his object was to make himself adored as a god. Thither Peter followed him. He arrived in the capital of the empire in the fourth year of the reign of Claudius, and therefore in the year 45 A. D., and there remained twenty-five years—two years too long, according to the other tradition, which makes him put to death by order of Nero, that is to say, at latest in 68. He there established two bishops, Linus for the interior of the city, Cletus for the region *extra muros*. Among others, he converted four concubines of Agrippa's, who thenceforth broke off all relations with their master, a fact which greatly irritated him against Peter.

In the midst of these events, Paul also came to Rome, and began to preach with Peter. But the magician Simon had won the favour of Nero, and held it by the performance of every kind of marvel. For example, he promised the Emperor that, to prove that he was the Son of God, he would rise again three days after he had been decapitated. Nero took him at his word, and ordered that his head should be cut off. But by the virtue of his magic art, Simon substituted for himself a ram, which was beheaded by the executioner, and whose blood congealed upon the place of execution. Three days afterwards, Simon presented himself before Nero, telling him to order the bloody place to be cleansed. The Romans, under the power of the spell, erected a statue to him, with the inscription, *Simoni Deo Sancto*—a feature of the Legend which, as is well known, rests upon a misreading of *Semoni Sanco Deo*

Fidio, words actually inscribed upon the pedestal of the statue of an old Latin god, Semo, a divinity who presided over oaths. Then Peter and Paul went to the Emperor for the purpose of denouncing these impious sorceries. Among other things, Peter said to him, that as there were two natures in Jesus Christ, God and Man, there were also two natures in Simon, Man and Devil. Soon began a conflict between the apostle of Christ and this ambassador of Antichrist. Simon, conquered in discussion and foiled in his malice, betook himself to miracles. He succeeded in restoring some appearance of life to a corpse, but after all the corpse persisted in remaining motionless; while Peter, in the name of Christ, caused it to rise up and walk. It was to Peter that Simon owed it that he was not stoned by the enraged people, nor devoured by an enormous dog which Simon had intended should devour Peter. Abashed by these failures, he vanished for the space of a year, but then, armed with fresh Satanic powers, returned, regained the favour of Nero, and pledged himself to fly from the height of the Capitol towards heaven. And in very deed he began his flight in mid-air, in presence of the Emperor and the people. But Peter, in the name of Jesus Christ, commanded the angels of Satan who bore him up, to cease from so doing. At once Simon fell, his skull was dashed to pieces, and he died.

Nero, in a rage, then ordered the two apostles to be cast into the Mamertine prison. Peter converted his two gaolers and escaped. The Roman Christians then adjured him to leave the city, and he yielded to their entreaties. But when, in his flight, he had arrived at the spot where the church of Santa Maria *extra muros* now stands, Peter saw Jesus Christ coming to meet him. "Lord, whither goest thou?" said the apostle. "I go to Rome to be crucified once more." Peter began to weep, understanding that the Lord ordered him to meet his martyrdom boldly. He returned, therefore, to Rome, was arrested, and conducted before the governor, Agrippa, who, as we know, had an old grudge against him, and ordered him to be crucified, while Paul, as a Roman citizen, was beheaded. The two apostles, when they were separated to be led out to

execution, blessed one another. But Peter, deeming himself unworthy to be crucified like Christ, obtained from the executioners the favour of being attached to the cross head downwards. Then were seen angels, who hovered about the apostle on his cross, holding in their hands wreaths of roses and lilies. When he had given up the ghost, the disciples buried him with pious care.

Nero, very far from returning to truth and goodness, hardened himself the more and plunged into crime. He put to death his teacher, Seneca, allowing him to choose by what death he would die; and Seneca, fulfilling his name (*se necans!*) caused his veins to be opened in a bath. He inflicted the same fate on the poet Lucan, slew his own mother, set fire to Rome, married himself to a man, &c. &c. At last the Romans rose in revolt, and seeing that he could not escape them, he cut a stick with his teeth and plunged it into his own bowels. In the time of his folly he had wished to conceive and bring forth a child like a woman, and his physicians, to satisfy him, had made him swallow a little frog, which grew large in his stomach. But as he suffered horribly, they caused him to reject it by the mouth, and he ordered it to be fed and taken care of in the palace. After his fall, the Romans burned the frog outside the city, but the place where it had been kept received the name of Lateran (*latens rana!*). All this happened to Nero as a punishment of his crimes against the two apostles, Peter and Paul.

Afterwards, in the days of Pope Cornelius—the third century—the Greeks stole the bodies of the two apostles, and attempted to carry them off. But by a divine and irresistible impulse, the demons hidden in the statues of the false gods cried out that the gods of the Romans were being taken away. The Romans, therefore, set out in pursuit of the Greeks, who were afraid, and threw the precious relics into a well, whence they were rescued by the faithful. But the remains of Peter were no longer to be distinguished from those of Paul. Then the faithful fasted and prayed, and a voice from heaven announced to them that the greater bones were those of the

preacher, the smaller those of the fisherman. Others say that Pope Sylvester, wishing to consecrate two separate churches to the two saints, put the bones, large and small, upon the scales of a balance, and divided them fairly between the two sanctuaries. For the rest, the striking miracles which since that time have been worked on the tomb of the Prince of the Apostles, are ample proof that his relics really rest in the place assigned to them. The enumeration of these miracles we spare our readers.

III.

Here, then, we have the Petrine mythology expanded into full bloom! Even in the Roman Church, however, it is not necessary to believe in its entire truth. It is permitted to doubt the accuracy of many of its details. But of all these arabesques, designed by the artists in pious fiction, who took a pleasure in thus adorning the meagre outlines of tradition, the Roman Church has preserved, and converts into dogma, whatever is apt to support her claims to universal dominion. It is worth while to notice that feature of the Legend, according to which there existed at certain epochs some uncertainty as to the authenticity of the relics of St. Peter. This story of Greeks in the third century coming to carry them off, however apocryphal in character, has a practical object, which is plain upon the surface. It was evidently invented as an answer to the objections of those who declared that it was not at all sure that the true body of St. Peter was at Rome; nor is the various reading that Pope Sylvester invoked the aid of weights and measures for the exact division of the bones of the two saints between the two churches, at all adapted to dissipate the objections of sceptics. But let us leave on one side these accessory questions. To resume, the claims of the Papacy are founded upon the fact that, 1st, Peter was appointed by Jesus chief of the apostles and his lieutenant upon earth; 2nd, that he went to Rome, and there exercised his episcopal functions for a period of twenty-five years; 3rd, that, aided by the apostle Paul, who there joined him, in the work of preaching the gospel, he suffered martyrdom at the same time as

Paul, under Nero ; 4th, that he has transmitted all his prerogatives unimpaired to his successors, the Bishops of Rome. To which must be added one element inseparable from the whole of this tradition, namely, that his victorious combat with Simon Magus was the distinguishing feature of his apostleship at Rome and the determining cause of his death.

If, now, we return from the region of legend to that of history, we find that the latter is singularly less extensive, while it nevertheless contains more things than one which the Legend has completely let slip. On the other hand, the Legend preserves many features of the story of which history is wholly ignorant.

Our present task is to go back to the sources, and to give an account of the formation of this curious mythology.

The first point which it is necessary to bring into relief is, that during the first 150 years of the Church's existence, a Bishop had by no means the superior powers which were considered at a later period to be inherent in the Episcopal function. As far back as the second century it is possible to trace the historical evidence of the fact that the *episcopoi*, or bishops, were distinguished in nothing from the *presbyteres*, or elders, who, in conformity with an organization very similar to that of the Jewish synagogues, presided over the Christian communities. Therefore, even if it were firmly established that Peter had been at Rome, and *episcopus* there, the fact would prove nothing for the absolutist claims of those who pass for his successors. But we are far from admitting that any sound historical proof can be given that Peter ever was in Rome at all.

Let us take as our point of departure the end of the second century. We will not dispute the fact that the tradition which we are considering goes back to a high antiquity. But, as is the case with other traditions, the apocryphal character of which is clear to everybody, and which go back still further,—for example, the identity of Nero with Antichrist, the return before long of Christ to the earth, the speedy establishment of the millennial reign,—its antiquity cannot be alleged as a proof of its truth.

We lay it down, then, as a fact that about 180 to 190 A.D., Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, affirms that the Church of Rome was founded by the two apostles, Peter and Paul. A little later, Tertullian says that Peter was crucified at Rome, Paul beheaded, and John plunged into boiling oil. His contemporary, Clement of Alexandria, taught that the Gospel of Mark was based upon discourses delivered in Rome by the apostle Peter. Another contemporary of Tertullian's, the Roman proselyte, Caius, indicates the place in Rome where Peter and Paul were buried.

Let us go further back. About the year 170, Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, writes to Soter, Bishop of Rome, that Peter and Paul, after having together founded the church at Corinth, went to preach the gospel in Italy, and there suffered martyrdom at the same time. This is a sufficiently strange statement, for nothing in the New Testament is clearer than that Peter had no personal share in the foundation of the Corinthian church.

It is to about this date that criticism assigns two writings entitled respectively, the History of Peter and Paul, and the Preaching of Peter and Paul. The former has been amplified into a work entitled "*Acta Petri et Pauli*," and which certainly dates not earlier than the fifth century. It is probable that, in its first form, it told the tale of Paul's arrival at Rome, where he found Peter already engaged in the conflict with Simon Magus; next, of their discussions with the magician in the presence of Nero, of Simon's attempt to fly, and his fatal fall caused by Peter's prayer, of the fury of Nero, the decapitation of Paul, the flight of Peter, the appearance of Christ to his apostle; and, finally, of the latter's crucifixion with his head downwards.

We may then affirm that about the year 130 the essential features of the tradition were already framed and accepted. But a century had already rolled away since the events which it embodied were supposed to have taken place, a century during which a mass of misconceptions, of confusions, of compliances, of illusions, had in the highest degree facilitated the

growth of mythology in the Christian Church. We must then endeavour to track the stream of tradition to a point nearer its source.

Some confirmation of the tradition is supposed to be drawn from the alleged allusion of the Fourth Gospel (xxi. 18) to the crucifixion of Peter. But, in the first place, the passage says nothing of any stay of Peter's in Rome; next, it is well known that the Gospel ascribed to John contains many traces of composition at a date not earlier than the middle of the second century; finally, if even it were possible successfully to contest this result of contemporary research, it cannot be denied that in any case the twenty-first chapter of the Gospel is by another and more recent hand than the body of the work.*

The first canonical Epistle of Peter enables us to go further back. According to its own statement, it was written from Babylon, while it is admitted that after Nero's persecution the capital of the pagan world was, in apocalyptic language, often thus designated. But if Babylon here means Rome, it is one indication the more that the letter was not written by the apostle whose name it bears, for he died in the very perse-

* I am of opinion that the interpretation of this passage accepted by M. Zeller yields more than is necessary to the Roman tradition. These are the words. Jesus says to Peter: "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself and walkedst whither thou wouldest; but when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not. This spake he, signifying by what death he should glorify God." No doubt the mysterious words of this passage allude to some current tradition as to the old age and martyrdom of Peter. But is it the Roman tradition? Does it allude to the crucifixion of the apostle? This appears to me very improbable. The passage seems rather to presuppose some tradition, now forgotten, according to which Peter, when he became old, lost his eyesight, and was led to martyrdom in a condition of blindness. The phrase, "thou shalt stretch forth thy hands," is interpreted of his crucifixion; but in that case it ought to close, not to begin, the prediction. Again, the words, "whither thou wouldest not," are referred to Peter's attempt at flight, interrupted by the apparition of Jesus, and followed by his return into the city of martyrdom. But this return was voluntary, and martyrdom was accepted by him with the most complete submission. The allusion, then, to the Roman tradition, which is claimed to exist in this passage, appears to me to be forced, and all that in my opinion the passage can be cited to prove is, that there existed several traditions as to Peter's old age and death.

cution, the painful recollection of which induced the Christians to call the imperial city by this name. If we add that the letter is full of allusions to the Epistles of Paul, of James, the Epistle to the Hebrews, it will be seen why modern criticism, guided by internal evidence, fixes the date of its composition to the years between 130 and 140. In that case, the result would be, that at that time the Roman Church, or a part of it, believed that Peter had been at Rome, and might have written while there such a letter as this, but nothing more. The letter makes no allusion to what may be called the characteristic and elementary features of the legend. If, on the other hand, its authenticity is maintained, we must take Babylon in its literal meaning, and seek for its author on the banks, not of the Tiber, but of the Euphrates.

The further we go back, and the more we put aside documents now recognized by all as destitute of historical worth—documents to which we shall recur—the more this tradition of Peter's Episcopate at Rome becomes vague and uncertain, and ends by limiting itself to a simple and very brief stay of the apostle in that city, which, even were it proved, would no more justify the pretensions of the Popes than those of a Bishop of Antioch or of Cæsarea. That these pretensions should have an adequate foundation, it would be necessary that Peter should have been without question Bishop in the monarchical sense of the word, Bishop properly so called, and for a definite period, of the Christian Church of Rome. Now, if we go still further back, we come to a document which permits us to conclude that at the end of the first century it was not yet known at Rome that Peter had ever been there, still less that he had there ended his apostolic career by a martyr's death.

We allude to the letter addressed by the Church of Rome to that of Corinth, about the year 97, of which the authorship is generally assigned to that Clement who was, according to some, the second, according to others the third, Bishop of the imperial city, and who holds a prominent place in the mythical or historical memories of the primitive Church. This

letter was written on occasion of the dissensions which agitated the Corinthian community, and the author, to move the Corinthians to peace and concord, shewed them that divisions had always been fatal to the faithful. After having supported his thesis by many examples drawn from the Old Testament, he goes on (1 Cor. v. 3):

“Let us place before our eyes the good apostles: Peter, who through unrighteous persecution (διὰ ζῆλον ἄδικον) endured not one, nor two, but many labours; and thus, having suffered martyrdom (μαρτυρήσας), departed into the place of glory which was his due. Through persecution and strife, Paul won the prize of patience, being seven times in bonds, being a fugitive, being stoned, having become a herald both in the East and in the West, he obtained the noble report of his faith, having taught righteousness to the whole world, and having gone to the limit of the West, and having suffered martyrdom (μαρτυρήσας) before the rulers. Thus he was set free from the world, and departed unto the holy place, having become the greatest example of patience.”

This passage, precisely because it is written with a certain emphasis and with the object of exalting the two apostles, is eminently instructive in regard to our present question. The different ways in which Peter and Paul are characterized are plain to every eye. The well-known history of Paul is summed up in its chief features. His trials, his imprisonments, his sufferings, his glorious career in East and West, his not less glorious death at the limit of his Western travel, all that we know of Paul from other sources is indicated or taken for granted in this kind of panegyric. How is it, then, that the same author is so brief and so vague in speaking of Peter, whose trials he only mentions in general, without saying if his death was, properly speaking, the death of a martyr—for in its primitive sense the word martyr, or witness, designated also those who had remained faithful through trial—and above all, without adding anything that implies in any way a journey of Peter's to the West, much less an Episcopate at Rome? Nor are we here to be justly accused of abusing the *argumentum e silentio*. When an event which we have a right to

suppose to be well known is passed over in silence in a parallel, where not only it would be in its right place, but naturally introduced and logically required by the sequence of ideas and the necessities of the parallel itself, it may certainly be inferred that it was unknown to the author of the parallel.* Every impartial critic will agree, after having attentively weighed the words of this remarkable passage, that it could not have been written except by a man who was completely ignorant that Peter, like Paul, had been in the West; that there, like Paul, he had borne witness to his faith before the imperial authorities; and that, like Paul, he had found the end of his Western career in a Roman martyrdom. If, in truth, Clement of Rome knew all this to be true of Peter, the passage we have quoted is either without meaning, or a deviation from known truth for which we can imagine no motive.

By thus remounting the stream of time, we arrive at an epoch at which an eminent Christian, writing in the name of the Church of Rome, is absolutely ignorant of Peter's Roman Episcopate. But we are about to furnish a corresponding proof of this conclusion, by analyzing the two inseparable data of the tradition of Peter's Roman visit and bishopric, namely, the concurrence of Peter and of Paul in the work of evangelization at Rome, and the mortal struggle in which the two apostles, but especially Peter, engaged with Simon Magus.

IV.

One of the constant elements of the Roman legend is, that Peter and Paul were at Rome, and laboured together in the conversion of the heathen in the capital of the empire. The abode of Paul in Rome is certified by all possible documents both within and beyond the Canon of the New Testament. Relying upon these, M. Zeller is able to demonstrate that

* Do we not here find a confirmation of the hypothesis which we hazarded in a previous note, namely, that in the first ages traditions now lost as to the old age and death of Peter were current? To them Clement of Rome seems to allude in vague terms, while he more minutely develops the story of Paul, with the exact outline of which he is better acquainted.

Peter was not at Rome either (1) during, or (2) before, or (3) after Paul's stay in that city.

1. Peter did not preach the gospel at Rome at the same time as Paul. In fact, the book of Acts does not allow us to suppose that they were there in company. Chapters xxvii. and xxviii. are among the most ancient portions of the book; they are the work of an eye-witness; and it would be in the completest disaccord with the whole spirit of the book that the editor, if he had found it in the document, should have suppressed the mention of a journey made in company by the two apostles. Paul arrives in Rome; he is received with more curiosity than eagerness by the Jewish community; he makes proselytes among its members; he preaches the gospel to all for two years; but not a word of Peter.

We have in the New Testament a certain number of letters reported to have been written by Paul during his Roman captivity; that is to say, the letters to the Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, Philemon, and the second to Timothy. Almost all these letters contain salutations from the friends of Paul at Rome, as well as information as to the situation of the apostle, his surroundings, the companions of his work. The names of Epaphroditus, Timothy, Mark, Luke, Clement, Linus, Pudens, Crescens, Tychicus, Onesimus, Aristarchus, Eubulus, Demas, Jesus the Just, Euodias, Syntyche, Claudia, are mentioned, together with the circumstances that concern them, in more or less detail. Not a word of Peter.

Let us remark that the question of authenticity, started and discussed in regard to all these Epistles, and for some (especially for the second to Timothy) answered in the negative, does not at all affect the inference which we have a right to draw from this silence. Are they unauthentic? Then their authors knew nothing of a sojourn of Peter's at Rome parallel to that of Paul, or if they had heard it spoken of, they did not believe in it. Let us recal to mind that their tendency is to soften down the conflict of the first days between the partizans of Paul and those of Peter. It is for this object that these letters are particular in mentioning the friendly relations

with Paul of persons whom tradition assigns to the following of Peter, Mark, Jesus the Just, Linus, Clement, Pudens. With this tendency it is quite in harmony to count Peter also among the friends and companions of Paul. But if, on the contrary, these letters are authentic, our conclusion is all the more certain.

Peter, then, did not preach the gospel at Rome at the same time as Paul.

But, 2nd, was he there before Paul?

According to the Roman tradition, he was Bishop of that city for twenty-five years. He must therefore have come to Rome, at the latest, under Claudius, in the year 43. Now the Epistle to the Galatians (ch. ii.) and the book of Acts (ch. xv.) inform us that Peter was still at Jerusalem fourteen, if not seventeen, years after the conversion of Paul. Later still, we find him at Antioch at the same time as Paul and Barnabas. These indications certainly bring us to the last years of the reign of Claudius, who died in 54. But still more: we learn from the Epistle to the Galatians that a kind of convention was concluded between Paul and the Twelve, in virtue of which the latter were to preach the gospel to the Jews, the former to the Gentiles. Many years later, Paul writes to the Romans, and announces to them his intention to visit them. He thus reckons Rome among the cities to which it was his duty to repair as the special apostle of the pagan world. But how could these things have been in his mind if Peter at this moment, and for several years previously, had founded and administered the Roman Church? How can we conceive it possible that, under these circumstances, Paul should not make the slightest allusion to the presence and work of Peter? How could the name of Peter be absent from the list of twenty-eight Christians to whom Paul sends salutations? Shall we say that the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters, which contain these salutations, are a later addition to the Epistle? In that case the argument as to this is the same as in the case of the other Epistles. Whether these chapters are authentic or not, the conclusion is identical: Paul or his

continuator was ignorant of the presence of Peter at Rome at this particular time. And this conclusion is corroborated by the last chapter of the book of Acts, which tells us of Paul's arrival at Rome, of his negotiations with the Jews, of his two years' preaching in the imperial city, but which never appears to suspect that Peter either is or has been there.

We are, then, right in concluding that Peter had not been at Rome before the arrival of Paul.

3rd. Can we admit that he came there afterwards?

The tradition which we are discussing is, in all its forms, at variance with this supposition. In every one of its various phases, it sets forth that Peter went to Rome, either before Paul or in his company. Even if we admit the very improbable hypothesis of Paul's deliverance after two years of captivity, of his journey to Spain, of his return to Rome, and of his subsequent martyrdom there, we find no room for a residence of Peter at Rome by his side. The disputed Epistles of Paul, which, on this supposition, would belong to this second captivity, militate, as we have seen, against such a residence. Last of all, we are carried by such chronological considerations almost to the end of the reign of Nero. The persecution is about to break out, and according to the passage of Clement of Rome quoted above, it is Paul alone who will terminate his apostolical career in the city of the Cæsars.

To resume, Peter came to Rome neither before, nor during, nor after, Paul's residence in the city. And this is the same thing as to say that he never was at Rome.

V.

The second essential element of the Roman tradition as to the Episcopate of Peter at Rome, is that fantastic struggle with the magician Simon which, according to the most widely accepted version, must have been the determining motive of his arrival in the Queen-city and the occasion of his martyrdom. It is precisely this side of the tradition, so evidently fabulous, which will enable us to detect its first origin, and the very apocryphal source from which it proceeded.

Besides the *Acta Petri et Pauli*, of which we have spoken as telling the tale of this struggle in the latter half of the second century, we find that Justin Martyr in his Apology, about 150, speaks of a magician, Simon, who in the reign of Claudius obtained divine honours at Rome by his wonderful works. To him had been erected the statue with the inscription *Simoni Deo Sancto*, which we have corrected and explained above. In this narrative there is no mention of Peter. But we possess two writings which go back in a common source to the same, or even a greater antiquity, and which narrate at length the prolonged duel of Peter and the magician. These are the Clementine Homilies and the Recognitions of Clement.

The Homilies must have been written in the latter half of the second century by a Jewish Christian, an enemy of the doctrine of Paul. In truth, an attentive perusal of this book soon reveals to us that, under the form of the Magician, it is Paul himself who is combated and caricatured. Peter is here the real evangelizer of the heathen world; the name of Paul is not once mentioned. Paul is the "enemy," the intruder, the usurper of the apostolic title, pluming himself upon his visions, faithless to the law, insulting the true apostles, and Peter above all. The Recognitions treat the same subject, but with less harshness and under a more catholic form: they appear to have been written a little later. But a comparison of the two writings permits us to discern the original form of the legend which both have joined to develop.

We must seek its first source in the antipathy of the Ebionites, or obstinate Jewish Christians, against Paul, whom they accused of being a renegade, a Samaritan, a false doctor, the enemy of the apostles, who tried to seduce them by a bribe of money—an allusion to the collection which Paul made in the churches of Greece in aid of the Jewish Christians of Palestine. The object is to propagate the belief that the true founder of the great Church spread over all the pagan world was not the false doctor Paul, but the Jewish-Christian apostle Peter.

This indirect way of attacking Paul without naming him, leads to the supposition that the original narrative dates from a time when the authority of Paul was so far established as to make it impossible to attack him openly. On the other hand, the Acts of the Apostles, written about 120—125, also knew of a conflict of the apostles with the Samaritan Simon, but place the scene in Samaria, and before the conversion of Paul. It is, then, about this time that the legend of Simon the Magician must have had its commencement. Little by little, Simon is made to endorse all the Gnostic heresies. In the Homilies he teaches the Gnosis of Marcion. But always the analogy with Paul is preserved.

This Ebionitish legend, the secret tendency of which, in all probability, very rapidly became obscure, passed into the Church, and was catholicised, because, apart from its anti-Pauline venom, it was extremely flattering to the feelings of Christians engaged in their terrible struggle with the empire, and in particular to those of the Christians of Rome. Naturally, in becoming Catholic, it had to lose its heretical flavour, and to unite with itself elements drawn from Catholic tradition. In this way Paul returned to an honourable position in it—becoming the friend and work-fellow of Peter, and assisting him in his combat with the sinister wizard. Only Peter, in the Catholic tradition as in the Ebionite romance, remains in possession of the foremost place. The legend of Peter, then, consecrated by Roman tradition, goes back in its roots to a story deliberately invented for the purpose of lowering the Apostle of the Gentiles.

Nevertheless, it may be asked how this romantic and malicious invention so easily succeeded in insinuating itself into the imagination of the majority of Christians, and to become an integral part of Catholic tradition, especially at Rome, where in the second century it was still so easy to contest it. Here we think that we ought to notice a *lacuna* in the exposition of M. Zeller. There is much instruction to be drawn from that strange assertion of Dionysius of Corinth, in which he categorically affirms that Peter and Paul in conjunction founded

his church. What can such an affirmation mean, except that at an early period the habit began to prevail in the early Church of designating by the names of these two apostles the tendencies or the parties which attached themselves to their persons? Everybody now knows that primitive Christendom was divided into two parties, often very hostile—the anti-legalist party, or that of Paul; the Jewish Christian party, or that of Peter. We know, too, that at Corinth these two parties contended for pre-eminence under the very eyes of Paul (1 Cor. i. 12). It was the same at Rome; and proto-Catholicism was formed by the gradual approach of these parties, which deliberately, or impelled by force of circumstances, made mutual concessions. We may presume, nevertheless, that the more popular party of Peter acquired and preserved, especially at Rome, a certain superiority. We see by the passage quoted from Dionysius of Corinth that there, where the two parties were mingled, nothing more was wanted to produce the assertion that Peter and Paul had together founded the Church. It is thus that, at Rome as at Corinth, the tradition must have grown up that the Roman Church was founded by the apostle Peter conjointly with the apostle Paul.

Is not what we have said distinctly set forth in an old treatise, *De Rebaptismate*, commonly found annexed to the works of Cyprian, and which has preserved this fragment of a lost apocryphal writing, the *Prædicatio Pauli*? “Post tanta tempora, Petrum et Paulum, post conlationem evangelii in Jerusalem, et mutuam cognitionem et altercationem, et rerum agendarum dispositionem, postremo in Urbe, quasi tunc primum, invicem sibi cognitos.”

What we are able to infer from the impression made by the Church of Rome upon Hegesippus when he visited it, and upon Marcion, who went there to teach his ultra-Pauline ideas, confirms the supposition of a preponderance of the Petrine tendency in that community, even though it may have been moderate enough to keep Paul and his work in honourable recollection. It is, then, easy to understand how in such an atmosphere a legend which explained and glorified a long

residence of Peter's at Rome would be warmly welcomed. It was believed that there, as at Corinth, Peter and Paul had co-operated in the foundation of the Church : what more simple than to borrow from legend circumstances which filled up the void left by history ?

In this way was formed the mythological nucleus destined to play so great a part in the religious and political history of coming ages. From that time forth it was strengthened by whatever importance was added to the Episcopal see of Rome, by the prestige of the Imperial City, its character as the Christian capital of the West, the abasement of the Eastern Church, the disappearance of the Church of Africa. Its last development has been the solemn proclamation of the infallibility of the successors of Peter, which henceforward makes this absurd dogma an obligatory article of Catholic faith. It was reserved for the historical criticism of our days to reveal the feet of clay on which the Colossus rests, by brushing away the dust which more than eighteen centuries have heaped up around and above the pedestal. How much longer will it be ere this evidence becomes the common property of Christendom ? None can say : but we may affirm with confidence that in the eyes of free science the case is already decided, without possibility of appeal.

ALBERT REVILLE.

VIII.—MISCELLANEA THEOLOGICA.

I. OUR LORD'S INTERVIEW WITH THE WOMAN OF CANAAN.

Matt. xv. 21—28 : "Then Jesus went out thence, and passed through the region of Tyre and Sidon. And there came a woman of Canaan out of the same region, and cried unto him, saying, Have pity on me, O Lord, Son of David ; my daughter is grievously troubled with a demon. And he answered her not a word. And his disciples besought him, saying, Send her away, for she crieth after us. But he answered and said, I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel. Then came she and fell down before him, saying, Lord, help me. But he answered and said, It is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to dogs. And

she said, Truth, Lord: yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their masters' table. Then Jesus answered and said, O woman, great is thy faith; be it unto thee even as thou wilt. And her daughter was healed from that very hour."

THE dog was to the Jews, as it is to the Mahometans, the object of intense dislike and contempt. His habits (Prov. xxvi. 11) were disgusting, his disposition fierce and dangerous (Ps. xxii. 16). The price of a dog was not to be brought into the house of the Lord (Deut. xxiii. 18). They were nightly disturbers of the peace (Ps. lix. 6). Dogs were gross feeders. Carrion was to be given to them (Exod. xxii. 31). They lapped the blood of those who had been slain, and eat their flesh (1 Kings xxii. 38; 2 Kings ix. 10, 36). If they licked the sores of Lazarus, it was to gratify a depraved taste, not as an act of humanity. To ask, "Is thy servant a dog?" (2 Kings viii. 13), was to ask, Do you consider me as one of the basest of men? They were assailed with blows of staves (1 Sam. xvii. 43). The contempt in which they were held is expressed in Eccles. ix. 4, "A living dog is better than a dead lion."

The Greek language has three words for the dog, varying by slight shades of meaning: *κύων*, as the name of the species; *κυνίδιον*, as a simple diminutive; and *κυνάριον* (Lat. *catellus*), which is an affectionate diminutive such as we should apply to lapdogs, Italian greyhounds or spaniels. Both in v. 26 and 27 the Greek text has *κυναρίοις*. Yet the substitution of an epithet of affection for that which was offensive to the Jews hardly seems appropriate to the occasion and the relative position of the parties. It is evidently a quotation of a proverb; and proverbs, or the maxims of those who desire to give their sentiments the weight of proverbs, are usually couched in brief and uncompromising terms, without softening and without limitation. Their object is to hit the nail on the head and drive it home, leaving exceptions to be devised by those who have to apply them practically, for which object the *granum salis* will not be wanting. Our Lord's purpose was to discountenance the application of the Canaanitish woman, and cause her to cease from following him and his disciples. We are not informed what caused him to withdraw for a season from Judea into the district of Tyre and Sidon, and desire to pass *incognito* through it. He had strongly denounced (Matt. xv. 15—20) the vices of the Scribes and Pharisees from Jerusalem, and he might apprehend violence from them or their admirers if he remained longer within their reach. The ancient territory of Sidon and Tyre lay beyond their jurisdiction, was contiguous to the northern

part of Galilee, and its frontier could be readily crossed and re-crossed. To have excited attention, either by teaching or working miracles, would have defeated his object; and the inhabitants, chiefly descendants of the original Canaanites,* were Gentiles, to whom he had no commission to offer the gospel. We have elsewhere traces of a certain impatience with which he bore an interruption of his great design. He had a work to perform, and "he was straitened till it was accomplished." His ministry included probably little more than a year. One feels inclined, this feeling considered, to give to him the stern declaration, that "it was not right to take the children's bread and throw it (βαλεῖν) to the dogs." Certainly κύσιν would have been more appropriate than κυναρίους, and so perhaps it was once read in the Greek. In the Vulgate the two verses read: "Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus. At illa dixit, Etiam Domine; nam et catelli edunt de micis quæ cadunt de mensa dominorum suorum."† This is not a recent innovation. In the Antehieronymian Latin version (Itala), the Codex Vercellensis has *canes* in both verses; the Codex Veronensis, *canibus* in v. 26, *catelli* in v. 27. So also the Codex Forojuliensis. The fourth MS. of Blanchini's Evangeliarium Quadruplex is imperfect in this place. In the corresponding passage in Mark vii. 27, a less offensive turn is given to our Lord's refusal: "Suffer the children first to be filled, for it is not meet to take the children's bread and throw it τοῖς κυναρίοις. In this case I should be inclined to apply the maxim, "Præferatur lectio durior," in more than a critical sense.‡ The apparent harshness of κύσιν would naturally lead to the substitution of the milder phrase. We find in the second and third Gospels traces of a softened tone towards Gentiles, when compared with Matthew.

It is difficult to conceive that in a Jewish household even the progeny of a race so odious as the dogs should be admitted during the meal of the children, to pick up their crumbs. The Gospel of Mark

* Canaanite was the original, archaic name; Syro-Phœnician the modern one.

† The Roman Catholic versions of Douay and Rheims of course follow the Vulgate, and render v. 26, "It is not good to take the children's bread and cast it to dogs;" and v. 27, "The whelps under the table eat the crumbs that fall from the table of their masters."

‡ In John ii. 4, our Lord's reply to his mother, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ γύναι, might be more correctly translated, "What hast thou to do with me?" than "What have I to do with thee?" Compare Mark v. 7, where the same phrase used by the demoniac evidently means, "What claim hast thou to interfere with us? Art thou come to destroy us?" Matt. viii. 29, "to torment us before the time."

solves this difficulty by telling us (vii. 26) that the petitioner, though a Syro-Phœnician by birth (τῷ γένει), was really a Greek (γυνή Ἑλληνίς). The contrast between the feelings and habits of the Western nations, Greeks and Romans, and those of the Orientals, Jews and Arabians, is very marked. Instead of being an outlaw, the dog was the friend and companion of the Greeks and Romans: "Ex animalibus quæ nobiscum degunt, fidelissimum ante omnia canis atque equus." (Plin. N. H. viii. vi.) The Greek literature, even of the heroic times, shews the prevalence of this friendly relation between the two races. The devoted fidelity of the dog of Ulysses has been celebrated both by poetry and art. Telemachus walks to the council of Ithaca with two dogs* attending his steps.† It is fortunate that Mark has preserved for us the mention of the Greek extraction of the Syro-Phœnician woman, whom Matthew calls a Canaanite. Without adverting to the difference in feeling which I have pointed out, and some circumstances bearing upon it which have recently attracted the attention of archæologists, this passage cannot be perfectly understood.

It had long been remarked that in Roman funeral monuments articles of food were found, on which the souls of the defunct were supposed to feed.‡ They were of a very simple kind, the name *siliurnium* which was given to them being, according to Festus (*s. voc.*) the archaic equivalent of *jentaculum*, the slight forenoon meal of the Romans. Further research shewed this explanation to be untenable. The articles of food were found to be represented on the funeral monuments, the figures having all the characteristics of life; the viands were increased and diversified, and figures appeared which could have no place in connection with a funeral. The conclusion ultimately arrived at was, that we have here a representation

* Od. B. ii. 11, Οὐκ οἶος ἕμα τῷγε δύο κύνες ἀργοὶ ἔποντο. So Evander goes to visit Æneas:

Nec non et gemini custodes limine ab alto

Procedunt, gressumque canes comitantur.—Æn. viii. 461.

† I am inclined to attribute this marked difference of Western and Oriental feeling respecting the dog to the circumstance that hunting was not a pursuit practised by the Palestinians and Arabians, whereas among the Greeks it was held in high honour from the earliest times. (See Fucithius Antiq. Hom. iv. 2.) The partnership which it establishes between man and dog lays the foundation of friendship, and training gives the ascendancy to intelligence over brutal instinct. The Greeks (Xen. Econ. xiii. 8) trained smaller dogs to perform tricks.

‡ See Kirchmann de Funeribus Romanorum, iv. 5.

of a family meal, chosen as a simple memorial of the companionship once enjoyed, but now broken up by death. Such monuments are rare in Britain, ours being almost exclusively military, and they are in general simple both in the apparatus of the meal and the number of the persons. Such is the character of the monument of *Ælia Æliena* in the Museum of the Yorkshire Philosophical Society. The husband and wife are represented sitting together in a kind of alcove. He holds a scroll in his hand, which from a comparison with other monuments* is supposed to denote a civil occupation. She has a cup in her hand, and a loaf of bread is before her on a tripod table. A girl of about six or seven years old stands at her feet, and on the floor is a small hooped wine-cask. The monuments accord with the language of Matthew. The master and mistress (*κύριοι*) sit or recline at the table (*τῇ τραπέζῃ*). The children (*τὰ τέκνα*) sit or stand beside them to receive their bread (*τὸν ἄρτον*). The *κυνάρια* on the floor are ready to eat the crumbs.† As far as I know, the eminent French archæologist Letronne‡ first formally proposed the true solution. The monument on which his paper is founded is that of a Greek wrestler or pugilist of the name of Danaus, who had been victorious in nineteen contests. He and his wife are reclining on a couch, with a table and viands before them; a youth is seated in a chair near the head of the couch, and on the floor is a dog of small size (*κυνάριον*), who lifts his animated eye and stretches out his paw towards the table, in evident expectation of a share in the meal. On other monuments the resemblance is still more close to the description given by the Syro-Phœnician woman.§ The *κυνάρια* are diminutive in size as well as breed, and therefore well fitted to be the playmates of the children. They were not the children's only pets; the little partridges and the gosling, running on the floor in one monument, are not intruders from the aviary or the poultry-yard; they are there by prescriptive right, to be present at meal-

* See Gruter, *Inscriptiones*, p. *deccxxii*.

† Letronne enumerates as many as thirty monuments of this class, one of which is in the Museum at Oxford. See Chandler, *Mon. Oxon.*, No. 143.

‡ *Revue Archéologique*, and *Replies to Objections*, Vol. III. pp. 1—11.

§ In Gruter, *Inscriptiones*, p. *deccxlili*, there is a representation of a monument with a Greek inscription, with something more sumptuous than an ordinary meal. Here, too, the children and the *κυνάρια* are present. See also p. *decccliv*, where, however, only the dog is introduced. Other references are Montfaucon, *Antiquity Explained*, I. 71, V. 57; 67; *Suppl.* p. 499.

time and share in its superfluities. A serpent appears among the guests in one monument—no representative of mystic rites or doctrines, but simply the harmless *pet* snake of the children. The explanation of Letronne has been adopted and confirmed by Pervanoglu, Docent in the University of Athens, in two Dissertations.* To him we owe the explanation of the head of a horse which appears through an open window, as if forming by his position a part of the family group to which he could not be admitted in person.† The friendship which Pliny says exists between man and the horse is never stronger than between the boy and his pony. The Greek youths must have been practised riders, or they could not have had the firm and graceful seat which they exhibit on the frieze of the Parthenon, and it is on Greek monuments that the horse appears. The Roman youths, on the contrary, are reproached by Horace (Carm. iii. 24) with not being hardy riders. When first the presence of the horse was noticed, the idea of a funeral feast prevailed, and the horse was supposed to refer to the journey to be performed to the other world, and an analogy was sought in the spectre knight of Bürger's ballad, Lenore. But Pervanoglu has shewn that this myth belongs to the Slavonic nations, not to the Greeks and Romans. His and Letronne's explanation of a family meal is, I believe, generally adopted by continental archæologists, but, as far as I have observed, has not been noticed by English writers, nor applied by Biblical critics to the narrative of the woman of Canaan (Mark's *γυνή Ἑλληνίς*) and her intercession for her daughter. It was evidently unknown to Dr. Farrar when he introduced the incident into his Life of Christ. It seems to me, however, to add fresh interest to the Gospel narrative, and to afford a strong presumption of its truth. Matthew and Mark exhibit "substantial agreement with circumstantial variety." Mark drops a hint which enables us to understand the narrative of Matthew. They thus confirm each other, yet it is impossible to suspect any concert between them.

K.

* Das Familien-Mahl auf Altgriechischen Grabsteinern, Leipzig, 1872.

† See Smith's Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities, p. 438, in a woodcut in which both the horse and the serpent are introduced. The scene is there explained as the *περιδείπνον*, or Greek funeral meal.

II. THE CHURCH OF WÜRTTEMBERG.

(Communicated by the Hibbert Trustees.)

GENTLEMEN,—Having, during my residence in Württemberg, had frequent opportunities of gaining information as to the ecclesiastical condition of this little German state, it has occurred to me that the following sketch may be of interest to you.

The Protestant Church of Württemberg is a State Church. Although evangelical, it stands in no very close relationship with the other evangelical churches of Germany. This is accounted for by the fact that in the times of the Reformation the Duchy of Württemberg was by no means on good terms with its neighbours, a circumstance which has left unmistakable traces in the constitution of the Church. The introduction of the Reformation was effected by the Duke rather than by the people, and we accordingly find that the various changes which then took place all tend to lessen the influence of the clergy, and to increase the power and authority of the State government. The influence also which Zwingli exercised over the Reformation in Württemberg, which was by no means unimportant, must be ascribed to Duke Ulrich, who was a personal friend of the great Swiss Reformer, rather than to the geographical position of the country. Although Brenz, the most active preacher of the Reformation in Württemberg, was one of Luther's most trusty and important adherents, and although the Lutheran doctrines suited the genius of the people better than those of Zwingli (as even now mysticism is still strongly represented), yet in the external forms of worship, in the various rites and ceremonies of the Church, a nearer approach is made to the simple cultus of the Swiss Church than to the more ornate and elaborate ritual found in the properly Lutheran parts of Germany.

In accordance with the origin of the Reformation in Württemberg from above rather than from below, both churches and schools have since that time been looked upon simply as branches of the civil administration. The clergy themselves are merely State officials, and have no other *locus standi*. In many cases they are, in virtue of their office, united with other civil magistrates on boards for the discharge of purely civil duties. It is scarcely necessary to add that there is here, so far as I can learn, absolutely nothing corresponding to our own High-church party at home.

The position of the clergy themselves in regard to doctrine seems

to be much the same as in the Church of England. Practically they enjoy great freedom, although theoretically they are bound to teach and preach in accordance with the Augsburg Confession. The declaration which they must make on entering office runs as follows: "They bind themselves in their preaching and their religious teaching to follow the Holy Scriptures, and not to allow themselves to deviate from evangelical doctrine as contained especially in the Augsburg Confession."

The right of nomination is vested in the King, subject to certain conditions. He must select one of three candidates chosen and recommended by the consistorium, and the congregation has the right of rejecting any one of whom they may disapprove. Generally speaking, the choice of candidates is determined by seniority.

The incomes of the clergy are small, but we must remember that the value of money is considerably higher in Württemberg than in England. The income attached to curacies and poorer parishes varies from £110 to £120, together with free house; the average minister receives from £150 to £180; whilst the deaneries and best country places are worth from £250 to £300 a-year.

The very close connection which has prevailed between Church and State has, on the one hand, been productive of much good by enabling the State to require from all who desire to become ministers of religion, proofs of a thorough and scientific education; so that the clergy have maintained a high position with respect to learning and intellectual attainments. On the other hand, it has also caused some harm by exposing them to great temptations in times when all free and liberal thought was opposed by the absolute power of the State in combination with violent reaction amongst the people. It would seem that many then yielded to the temptation, and the worldly spirit displayed amongst the clergy greatly tended to diminish their influence with the laity.

Now, however, the first step has been taken towards loosening the bonds which have united the Church and the State of Württemberg so firmly together. At all events, the introduction of civil marriages and of Synodal regulations seems to tend in that direction. It cannot, however, be denied, that the hitherto existing relations have been decidedly popular, nor is change even now desired by any considerable party.

I may now briefly consider the state of theological thought here; and in doing so it may be well to deal with the subject somewhat historically. "Pietismus," i.e. extreme evangelical views, which

first gained ground in Germany through the influence of Spener and Franke, was already on the wane in the rest of Germany, when it was taken up by Württemberg theologians (Bengel, for example, and Oetinger), and by them extended and fashioned so as to admit a certain admixture of eschatological and mystical elements. These views in Württemberg took a very firm hold both of clergy and laity, and in accordance with them there arose in the Church a well-defined, well-organized *ecclesiola in ecclesiâ*. In connection with this movement, the distinction between clergyman and layman falls into the background, whilst that between "child of God" and "child of wrath" assumes a very prominent position. The whole section of the Church in which this tendency prevails is ruled with absolute authority and Papal infallibility by the more distinguished members belonging to it, whether lay or clerical. Twice has it succeeded in completely overthrowing the more liberal party opposed to it in the Church. It first effected this in the time of the old Rationalism and the so-called Tübingen school. From about 1790 to 1820, the prevailing spirit, both in the government of the Church from above and amongst the clergy themselves, had been liberal in the extreme; but this was entirely extinguished by the efforts of the Evangelical party. More recently, again, the philosophy of Hegel and the criticism of Strauss, both of which had almost without exception been embraced by the more talented of the younger clergy, had to yield to the storm which was raised against them. Strauss, as is well known, had to resign his position, and his adherents amongst the clergy were obliged either to give up their position, or at least to maintain silence as to their opinions. Baur alone stood too high even for the blind zeal of a religious party to venture to attack him. But this triumph of Evangelical principles made it long impossible even to attempt to liberalize the Church of Württemberg from within.

But now, again, the counter reaction seems to have set in. Moderate liberals are admitted to the higher posts of the Church, and amongst the younger clergy the principles maintained by the Protestant-Verein are steadily gaining ground. A theological society has been founded by those ministers who are in sympathy with the liberal movement, which already numbers more than thirty clerical members. This society has as yet pursued scientific ends alone, meeting to read papers on theological subjects, &c.; but doubtless will, if opportunity occurs, also take a more directly active and practical direction.

The University of Tübingen is undoubtedly the centre of the intellectual life of Württemberg, and indeed takes a high rank amongst the German Universities at present. Last session, there stood on its lists more than a thousand students, so that in numbers it only stands behind Leipzig and Berlin. If we hastily glance at the staff of professors there in the Theological Faculty, as an index to the state of religious thought in the country, we find that Professor Beck alone remains as the representative of extreme evangelical views. His ideas, I hear, appear original and new to foreigners alone, being "only too well known" to the natives of Württemberg. The other theological professors are more or less liberal, though none takes up a very decided position.

Amongst the people in the country, evangelical views are still predominant, but in the towns a general desire is manifested to see liberal men occupying the pulpits. Stuttgart, however, is an exception, being the stronghold of "Pietismus." The interest shewn by the people in religious services is far greater than seems to be the case in Northern Germany. But the attendances are more satisfactory in the country than in the towns. In the latter, indeed, the small number of men present at divine worship at once strikes an English eye. I hear that many only make their appearance two or three times a year, in deference to their wives' wishes. Above all, the cultivated class generally, and in manufacturing towns the working classes, are to a considerable extent estranged from the Church.

In the press, the Evangelical party is represented by numerous cheap and widely circulating weekly papers. In this respect the Liberals have had great difficulty in competing with it, but their representative organs are now by degrees making their way amongst the people. The political daily papers are very shy in handling questions which involve Church difficulties; but when they do so, their tone is thoroughly liberal.

On the whole, then, it would seem that the ideas on which "Pietismus" takes its stand have, in the lapse of time, lost the appropriateness to the spirit of the people which formed its justification and gave it its strength. The whole party has now become the representative of mere conservatism and spiritual inactivity, and reckons but few gifted men amongst its members. In particular, the rising generation seems to be departing further and further from its old traditions. The exhaustion of which this is partly the cause and partly the effect, has caused some of the people to betake them-

selves to the Methodists, who form here a growing sect, remarkable because they do not desire to form a party within the Church, but to separate from it altogether.

In conclusion, I may add, as a point not altogether without interest to Englishmen, that the relations which subsist between the Catholics and Protestants are, generally speaking, very quiet and peaceful. About a third of the population of the country is Catholic, so that this fact cannot be ascribed to any want of influence or importance in their case. Thirty years or so ago, Catholic priest and Protestant minister seem to have lived most amicably together, helping one another in all ways, and even extending their mutual tolerance so far as to exchange pulpits. The increasing fanaticism of the Catholics has, however, put an end to this happy state of things, and Catholic priests are now forbidden by their superiors to join in any social union with Protestant ministers. Of course, the course of political events from 1866—1870, and the various laws directed against the Catholics, have sharpened the contrast already existing between the two Churches. But the Bishop of Rottenberg and the majority of his clergy are far from displaying or feeling the fanatical zeal which has been manifested in Prussia, nor have occasions been wanting on which both faiths have harmoniously worked together, even within the last few years, for common Christian ends.

P. VANCESMITH.

III.—THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF ISAAC.

In Mr. Sayce's *Elementary Assyrian Grammar* (p. 121), and again by the same Assyriologist in the *Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archæology*, is given a translation of an Accado-Assyrian text which seems to me to throw some light on the tradition of the sacrifice of Isaac. The text runs thus :

“ may he extirpate, and
the offspring who raises the head among mankind,
the offspring for his life he gave ;
the head of the offspring for the head of the man he gave ;
the brow of the offspring for the brow of the man he gave ;
the breast of the offspring for the breast of the man he gave.”

As this tablet dates from Accadian, that is pre-Semitic times, it is evidence that the practice of vicarious human sacrifice was current in Chaldea at the time of the early Semite immigration.

My suggestion is, that the Abrahamic clan, along with the other Semites, adopted this practice during their stay in Chaldea; and that the tradition of the substitution of the ram for Isaac is a reminiscence of the fact that the substitution of vicarious animal sacrifice for vicarious human sacrifice was one distinguishing feature of the Abrahamic progress in religion.

In support of this view it may be urged that human sacrifice was in all probability once practised by the Jews. Sir John Lubbock, at least, believes that they once practised it,* and he adduces in proof the passage, Lev. xxvii. 28, 29, "None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death," which, taken in connection with such passages as Exod. xiii. 12, 13, xxii. 29, 30, seems to leave little doubt on the matter.

This fact, that they practised some sort of human sacrifice, combined with the other, that they were not averse to borrowing the practices of other nations,† renders it not improbable that they borrowed both the practice of human sacrifice and the accompanying doctrine from the Accadians.

This view gives also a continuity to the special Jewish doctrine of vicarious suffering.

The doctrine expressed in our tablet is one of very low religious standard, just such a materialistic idea as might arise among people who, like some modern South Africans, believed that their deities really ate the offerings. The substitution of animals for man is not a very startling advance, especially if accompanied, as we have every reason to suppose it was, by a general rise in religious thought.

And if Moses had before him this Abrahamic advance, it becomes not only explicable, but natural, that, dealing with the nation at a more advanced period, he should have kept upon the old lines, preserving the vicarious idea, but spiritualizing it, thus paving the way for the later supercession of the vicarious idea by the spiritual.

JOHN FENTON.

* *Origin of Civilization, &c.*, 3rd ed., 359.

† M. Lenormant, *La Magie chez les Chaldéens*, 41; and Messrs. Sayce and Fox Talbot, *Records of the Past*, I. 131, III. 131, all remark the influence which Chaldean ideas had upon the Jews.

IX.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. SOME GERMAN BOOKS.

George Smith's Chaldäische Genesis: autorisirte Uebersetzung von Hermann Delitzsch. Nebst Erläuterungen und fortgesetzten Forschungen von Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1876.

A melancholy interest attaches to the present volume. It appears that when Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch was last in London, he obtained for his brother Hermann permission to translate George Smith's Chaldaean Genesis, then in course of preparation; and the book before us is the result. As the work in its English form may be presumed to be familiar to our readers, there are only two points which here demand special notice; the German rendering of Hermann Delitzsch, and the Supplement of his brother Friedrich, the well-known author of the "Assyrische Studien" and "Assyrische Lesestücke."

With reference to the first, we must warn our German readers, if any such there be, not to be misled by the imposing words "Autorisirte Uebersetzung" on the title-page. Indeed, we are admonished by the preface to the German edition, from the pen of Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch, to expect considerably more, if not considerably less, than a merely faithful version of the English original. We are told to be prepared for extensive re-arrangement both of plates and paragraphs, as well as for a re-translation of the fragments of Berosus, &c., direct from the best critical editions of the Greek; instead of from Cory's English version; for the tacit rectification of numerous obvious oversights, and various additions taken in part from Smith's own *Discoveries*. No doubt the majority of these alterations enhance the value of the book, and would have been gratefully endorsed by the lamented author. But after reading Dr. Delitzsch's emphatic disclaimer of any share in the honour of authorship, and any responsibility whatsoever for the views maintained, vid. p. vii—"Diese Ehre verbleibt George Smith allein. Er allein hat auch alle etwa anfechtbaren Ansichten und Behauptungen zu verhuten"—we confess to some astonishment at observing the adroitness with which Dr. Delitzsch, or his brother (for the preface seems to indicate a divided responsibility), has converted George Smith from an impartial spectator of certain critical controversies with regard to

the Pentateuch, into a determined advocate of the joint Elohistie and Jehovistic authorship of this portion of the Bible. This, for instance, is the wary manner in which George Smith expressed himself upon this crucial question : "Biblical criticism is a subject on which I am not competent to pronounce an independent opinion, and the views of Biblical scholars on the matter are so widely at variance, and some of them so unmistakably coloured by prejudice, that I feel I could not take up any of the prevailing views without being a party to the controversy. There is only one point which I think *should not be avoided in the matter*. It is the view of a large section of scholars that the Book of Genesis contains, in some form, matter taken from two principal independent sources; one is termed the Jehovistic narrative, the other the Elohistie. The authorship and dates of the original documents, and the manner, date, and extent of their combination, are points which I shall not require to notice, and I must confess I do not think we are at present in a position to form a judgment upon them." And this is the German rendering, if rendering it can be called : "Biblische Kritik ist aber ein Gebiet auf welchem ich nicht heimisch genug bin, und die Resultate der Analyse dieses oder jenes Kritikers mir anzueignen bin ich auch ausser Stande : die Vertheilung des biblischen Fluthberichts an vorausgesetzte verschiedene Quellschriften, und die Ansichten über die Entstehungszeit dieser, ist [*sic* !] so buntscheckig und theilweise so wenig unbefangen, dass ich mich lieber diesem Streit der Meinungen fernhalte. *Eines* aber wird *festgehalten werden müssen* dass der biblische Fluthbericht, wie gegenwärtig *die ansehnlichsten Forscher übereinstimmend* annehmen, *mosaikartig* aus zwei selbständigen Werken, einem sog. elohistischen und jehovistischen, von *einem Redactor* zusammengearbeitet ist."* To say nothing of the complete inversion of the order of thought, the utter confusion of sense, and the strange chaos of logic and grammar, these words, so far as there is any meaning or coherence in them, most expressly commit George Smith to an opinion in regard to which he as evidently desired to be considered perfectly neutral. The same tactics are unblushingly repeated a few pages further on, p. 236, where in place of Smith's cautious observation, "Here it may be remarked that those scholars who believe in two distinct statements being included in Genesis, hold that in the Jehovistic narrative the statement is that the flood lasted forty days, which is certainly nearer

* The italics are ours.

the time specified in the cuneiform text,"—we read in the German : "So wenigstens rechnet der elohistische Erzähler. Nach den jehovistischen Bestandtheilen freilich, wenn man diese als Excerpte eines selbständigen Berichtes ausscheidet, währte die Fluth nur 40 Tage, was der in dem Keilschrifttexte angegebenen Dauer näher kommt." It may be satisfactory to know that the composite authorship of the Pentateuch is no longer an open question among Biblical scholars in Germany ; but that might, if necessary, have been stated in a note ; and at least the fact of George Smith's total suspension of judgment should not have been so completely concealed from German readers, a concealment which in a professedly "authorized translation" scarcely accords with our conceptions of literary conscientiousness, and certainly is not covered by the words of the prefatory notice. For the rest it may be remarked, though this is the very reverse of an exculpation, that wherever the translator intends to be accurate, he appears fully competent to his task.

Dr. Delitzsch's supplement opens with a very interesting account of cuneiform deciphering, which is very full and intelligible with regard to the Persian text of the inscriptions at Persepolis and Behistun, but is little more than a very meagre summary of the progress from the forty characters of the Persian alphabet to the reading of the complex syllabic and ideographic system of the Assyrian and Babylonian cuneiform. In fact, beyond the bare statement that the Persian was the key to the latter, and that many of the inscriptions were trilingual, the reader is left pretty much to his own imagination. The discoveries of remains, as such, apart from their interpretation, by Sir H. Rawlinson, Botta, Layard and others, are given, however, with a disproportionate fulness of detail. The remainder of the supplement consists for the most part of original and interesting matter, of which, perhaps, the most important points are the identification of the Hebrew *'ashte* and the Assyrian *istén* with the Accadian *as-tén* = *ein-zahl*, "number one ;" translations of Hymns to the gods Sin and Samas ; the identification of Sumer and Shinar, and a critique of several of George Smith's translations of particular words, especially of the word which Smith renders "language," in lines 6 and 8 of the fragment supposed by him to refer to the Tower of Babel ; and *tazimtu*, rendered by him "strong building," in lines 9 and 10 of the same. Delitzsch, however, still holds to the connection with Genesis, and suggests that *tazimtu* may be cognate with the Arabic *'azama*, and the Hebrew *zaman*, Gen. xi. 6, in the sense of "plan" or "design."

System der praktischen Theologie. Paragraphen für academische Vorlesungen von Dr. Carl Adolf Gerhard von Zetzschwitz. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1876. In Zwei Abtheilungen.

The author of these volumes is Ordinary Professor and University Preacher at Erlangen. The rest may be more easily imagined than described. The introduction defines Practical Theology in opposition to the popular conception of a loose and unscientific treatment of theology generally on the one hand, as well as to the view which regards it as a mere technical application of theology, or an official directory for the practical Churchman on the other, as the theory of the progressive self-realization of the Church in the world; of which the final goal is the establishment of the kingdom of God, in which the Church itself is ultimately to merge. The historical development of this idea, with all its alleged aberrations from apostolical times, is passed under review from the standpoint of Lutheran orthodoxy. Romanism and Calvinism are criticised with considerable skill as the necessary results of the failure to recognize the presumed essential difference between the symbolism of the Jewish theocracy and the sacramental reality of Christian institutions; but the tendency of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches alike to lapse into rationalism is passed over in silence, as though nothing of that sort had ever been heard at Erlangen. The interaction of Christianity and the general culture of the East and West, Roman, Gothic and Byzantine architecture, are instructively discussed; and the second volume passes on to the more technical and subordinate details of missions, catechumens, confirmation, liturgies, the reading of the Scripture, and the administration of the sacraments. To judge from the author's total omission of any of the stirring questions of the day, the treatment of infidels and sceptics has nothing in the world to do with the province of practical theology as the "self-realization of the Church in the world."

E. M. G.

Des Symbol des Kreuzes bei allen Nationen und die Entstehung des Kreuz-Symbols der Christlichen Kirche von Ernst von Bunsen. Berlin. 1876.

It is the design of Herr von Bunsen's monograph to shew that the Christian Cross is the symbol of Divine illumination and not of sacrifice, of life and not of death. With the author's design we sympathize to a considerable extent; and there is much that is inte-

resting and valuable in his work. But as an account of the origin of the Christian Cross and a description of this symbol amongst other nations, it seems to us that the book is a complete failure. A fundamental fault, not at all uncommon in writers upon symbolism, takes from its facts their value and from its arguments their force. Herr von Bunsen sees crosses where no one else can see them, and he makes them symbols of light and life when every one else must discern quite another significance in them. Not Philo or John Bunyan could surpass him in this respect. For instance, the brazen serpent set up by Moses in the wilderness was the symbol of fire and of God's presence. The cross on which Christ was lifted up has the same symbolical meaning. The golden candlesticks of the Tabernacle were tree-shaped, therefore symbols of the tree of life, that is of Christ. Christ was crucified, and thus the central lamp and the cross are connected, and both symbols of light. In other mythologies, the cross is represented; e.g. Thor's hammer, the headless cross of the Druids, &c. It is true the word *cross* does not occur in the Old Testament. But neither does the word *conscience*. Hence, argues our author, it is clear that both words were names of mysteries, which were only to be used by the initiated. Rash assertions as well as rash arguments characterize the book throughout. For instance, without any hesitancy it is said, Moses made the Aryan fire-symbolism current amongst the Hebrews. Or what can be said to such comparative philology as the following? The Hebrew word for Noah's ark is *tebah*, and means a chest. The Latin word *arca*, also = chest, may be derived from the Sanscrit *arkāh* = sun. Hence *arcanum*, the hidden mystery of the *symbolism of the sun*.—Without doubt, Herr von Bunsen is a man of considerable learning, and this his last book bears everywhere trace of wide research and of great powers of combination. But in the region of symbolism every fact and every interpretation must be produced and substantiated with an uncommon degree of caution and critical severity, and this he has unfortunately forgotten.

Die Ehe, ihr Ursprung, ihr Wesen und ihre Weihe, nach Gottes Wort und That dargestellt von Prof. Dr. Watterich, Pfarrer der alt-katholischen Gemeinde zu Basel. Zweite unveränderte Auflage. Nördlingen. 1876.

Old Catholic priests who have just escaped from the bondage of celibacy find it necessary to vindicate their right to their new liberty. As far as the book before us does this, it has our praise.

May it run through many more editions ! But we do not commend it to our Protestant readers. For the book has another side. It is much *too profound* in its investigations into the nature and mysteries of its subject. Church Fathers and Catholic moralists may have been called to look more deeply into such matters, and the Old Catholics may have inherited their unpleasant task. Happily we Protestants occupy a freer position, and can refuse to meddle with matters that are too deep for us—it may be, too distasteful.

J. F. S.

2. DR. PARKER'S PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST.

The Priesthood of Christ: a Re-statement of Vital Truth. By Joseph Parker, D.D. 8vo. London : Dickinson.

We are sorry that we cannot give any commendation to this book. It is altogether beneath the subject it professes to discuss. It throws no light whatever upon any one topic. It manifests the most thorough ignorance of the real difficulties of the questions with which it concerns itself. It is lamentably deficient in sound biblical criticism. Its philosophy is unworthy of serious consideration. We can imagine no reason why it was written beyond a desire to catch some part of the interest which the publication of Mr. Dale's work on the Atonement has excited. Mr. Dale's influence can indeed be traced throughout it, but the difference between the two men is very conspicuous. Dr. Parker rides an exceedingly high horse. What he calls the "Synoptical Contents" of his volume would by its formal arrangement lead us to expect great things ; and the manner in which seemingly important points are introduced and dismissed is emphatic in the extreme. But nothing comes of the method or the force. There is a prevalent air of importance to which no reality answers. Each position in its turn is talked about, without being fairly examined or met. There is a great cry, but no wool. The champion steps forth, of giant proportions, clothed in formidable armour, and with a spear like a weaver's beam, but his attack is a mere roar of defiance. We are amazed that a man of Dr. Parker's pretentiousness should have become the popular representative of Evangelical Dissent which we are told he is.

We will give a few specimens of the bold and reckless sentiments which the book contains.

"Put your hand upon one verse in the whole Bible that gives man the credit of having saved himself."—P. 5.

"Nowhere does Jesus Christ put himself on a level with other men. Nowhere does he say, 'I am as weak and as ignorant as you are; we must therefore help one another.' Nowhere does he say that his miracles were like other miracles not wrought by himself."—P. 8.

"I ask therefore sternly where you got the word 'repent' which you use with such easy familiarity? You say that you found it in the Bible. Where? Adam did not repent; nor did Cain. Who then did? You will be startled when you hear that it was *God* who repented. You may be still more startled when you hear that it never occurred to *man* to repent."—P. 19.

"If God had said, 'In the day thou eatest thereof I will surely *pity* thee,' the word 'pity' would have had no meaning to Adam. It would have been a mystery: it might have been hell itself! Pity was unknown."—P. 29.

"The only person who could have had absolutely no doubt as to his heavenly origin was his mother: she alone, of all humanity, knew this as an indisputable and awful fact: it will be most interesting, therefore, to get some hint of her estimate of Jesus Christ: if she would speak but one word it might help us like a revelation. Happily she did speak that word, and she spoke it so incidentally as to add much to its pertinence and value in this discussion. At the marriage feast in Cana of Galilee, she and her son had a brief conversation upon a point which she herself had raised, and in the result she said to the servants, '*Whatsoever he saith unto you, do it.*'"—P. 53.

"We hold, as Christian teachers, that *forgiveness* is an idea which never occurred to the uninspired mind: that it is a *revelation*: and that to the man who exercises it it may be said, Flesh and blood hath not revealed this unto thee, but the Father who is in heaven."—P. 213.

Extracts of a similar character might be indefinitely multiplied. The only use of this book which we know of is, that it will serve as a fresh illustration of the shifting nature of the doctrine of the Atonement as held by the professedly orthodox of the day. Mr. Dale threw a haze round that doctrine. The haze has been considerably thickened by Dr. Parker. T.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Mr. Conway* identifies Christianity with the most irrational and corrupted form of orthodoxy (p. 47), yet describes Unitarianism as its "After-glow" (p. 111), destined to share its inevitable doom. He thinks that the "morrow" to Christianity will not take away our

* Christianity. By Moncure D. Conway, M.A. London: Trübner and Co. 1876.

Bible (p. 136), which readers of his Anthology will readily believe; nor will it take away Christ (pp. 136, 137), to which dictum all who have living sympathy with his spirit will also agree. He holds that we can "get but little that is descriptive of the real Christ from such a work as that called the Gospel of John" (p. 6); yet when opportunity offers to have a fling at Christ, or at the "After-glow" or "Socinian" (p. 92), he quotes the fourth Gospel as if it were authentic (p. 111). He believes it to be his duty to estimate Christ at his highest, and not at his lowest (p. 27); yet quotes against him certain sayings belonging to his early career (p. 119), and adds an utterly untrue version of what the After-glow says thereon. We protest against his hideous version of Christ's words (p. 45): "But when he sees and tastes the red wine, that too suggests death: he recoils, and cries, 'It is my blood! Drink it yourselves; I'll never taste it again!'" We more than doubt the possibility of such a case as that supposed on p. 117. Mr. Conway shews in his little book so much undoubted intellectual force, that we regret he shews so little of the spirit of Christ or even of the "After-glow"!

A reverse comment is suggested by the next book upon our list. "The Supremacy of Man"* is an attempt to re-state orthodox dogmas in philosophical forms, somewhat after the Swedenborgian fashion. There are three "Distinctions" in the Godhead, Ground, Form, and Spirit, with which we may compare Heat, the Sun, and its life-giving influence. The second Distinction, "the Man, Jehovah" (p. 17), reveals to us that humanity is divine. The first creation, divine men or angels, not having, through free-will, kept their first estate, our present type of man was created half divine and half earthy, and the second "Distinction's" work is to help man to work back to the original state of divineness. We have tried to give fairly the leading ideas of this strange book, of which the loving spirit is beyond praise. We wish we could speak of the critical powers of our author in the same terms. A curious instance of his tendency to be satisfied with any explanation will be found on p. 56, where it is deemed noteworthy that St. Paul does not say that the "Father may be all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 28), but that *God*, i.e. the "three Distinctions," &c. He seems to have quite forgotten verse 24, where the kingdom is to be delivered up unto God, even the Father.

* The Supremacy of Man. A suggestive Inquiry respecting the Philosophy and Theology of the Future. London: Hamilton, Adams and Co. Undated.

"Memo"* recognizes the two accounts of creation found in Genesis as being contradictory, but explains them as referring to two separate creations. The first was that of Adam, i.e. all the races except one. The second was that of The Adam ("Eth H Adam," or "H Adam") the ancestor of the Caucasian race. The former creation, he considers, took place in the Pliocene or post-Pliocene formations, amidst savage monsters and in a wintry clime; the latter, amidst tame domestic animals in a garden and under a genial sky. Much ingenuity is displayed in working out this theory, and great use is made of geological discoveries. The work is a curious admixture of bold reasonings and blind credulity in an infallible book.

Pastor Emeritus adds one more to the countless efforts to explain the Apocalypse.† Its essence, he says, is the Revelation of the last days (p. 94). He makes considerable use of Dr. Pusey's work on Daniel; speaks of the coming of the "Desire of all Nations" without misgivings as to the translation; recognizes in the Conqueror from Edom (Is. lxiii.) the Son of God, whom he calls "et calcatus et calcator," and described as "mingling his own blood with the blood of those he 'subdues'" (p. 33). On the other hand, he considers that the teaching of St. Paul as to the work of Christ needed to be supplemented by the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of St. John (p. 73). We cannot say that we think the writer more successful than his innumerable forerunners have been.

Dr. Hackett's "Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles"‡ will be found very useful by all who are content with an average standard of orthodoxy, and are intent upon solving difficulties with an "if" or a "may be." He considers that "the apostles were not infallible except in their sphere of religious teachers" (p. 318). When St. Paul withstood St. Peter to the face, were both infallible? or did, as Pastor Emeritus would perhaps say, St. Paul "supplement" St. Peter?

"The Teacher's Handbook of the Bible"§ is somewhat similar in

* Man, Palæolithic, Neolithic, and several other Races, not inconsistent with Scripture, By Memo. Dublin: Hodges, Foster and Co. 1876.

† An Essay on Apocalypse in the Bible, &c. By Pastor Emeritus. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co. London: G. Bell and Sons. 1876.

‡ A Commentary on the Original Text of the Acts of the Apostles. By Horatio B. Hackett, D.D. London: Hamilton, Adams and Co. 1877.

§ The Teacher's Handbook of the Bible, &c. By Joseph Pulliblank, M.A. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1876.

its type of orthodoxy, but is much fresher in style as well as in thought. We have been especially pleased with the practical illustrations taken from homely, every-day life, and quite believe that the book is well adapted "for use in schools and families."

In the next volume upon our list,* we thought we had got a Roman Catholic book, so ecclesiastically ornate was its "get-up;" but though the hands were the hands of Esau, the voice was the voice of (High-church) Jacob. The author denounces the Romish doctrine of the Sacrament, with all its accompaniments, as idolatrous, &c. In his view, the bread and wine are *signs* of the gift to believers of the benefits gained through the purchase of his (i.e. the Christ's) blood (p. 190); that "the sign *is*, in effectual representation, that very thing which it is called, for all the purposes of donation" (p. 181); and (he adds) "can the Christian's soul partake of this mystery—receiving the *res sacramenti* from the very present living Saviour—without adoring? (p. 184). Abundant learning is shewn in substituting this mystery for the other, and much appeal to carnal reason is made in establishing what the doctrine of the early Church was. We own that we cannot see much difference between the two.

"Modern Infidelity Disarmed"† is an attack, more Chadbandii, upon "sceptics." We need but give one specimen. "Ah, Renan, Renan, you are in a pitiable case indeed! Would that I could shake you up," &c. (p. 82). Infidelity, unfortunately, will not suffer much from this attack.

The Preacher's "Commentary on Job"‡ contains a dull and wordy series of notes on a book into which the author has but little insight. It is a depressing idea that such books can be written by "Doctors of Divinity," and that they find purchasers. Do they, we wonder, get read? R. P.

The story of Quakerism has never yet been told in its completeness, nor are the materials for the tale very accessible. A valuable contribution to the understanding of what may be called the romance of its modern position, is furnished by Mr. Hodgson's interesting

* On Eucharistic Worship in the English Church. By an English Presbyter. London: Haughton and Co. 1876.

† Modern Infidelity Disarmed, &c. By E. Stephens. London and Derby: Bemrose and Sons. 1876.

‡ Homiletical Commentary on the Book of Job. By Thomas Robinson, D.D. London: Richard D. Dickinson. 1876.

volumes.* For the facts of the various internal revolutions through which Quakerism has been passing in the course of the present century, Mr. Hodgson may be consulted, with the certainty of finding in his pages information both extensive and accurate. Except in regard to the abortive Manchester movement, in the direction of ultra-rationalism, a few years back, we have observed no important omission. The case of Hannah Barnard, which gave the Rathbones to Unitarianism, and formed in some sort the prelude to the great Hicksian schism, is here narrated with correctness and candour. The rise and spread of this schism, and of the Gurneyan heresy which followed on its heels, is ably and in the main fairly detailed. The author's position, as a representative of the genuine Barclay type of Quakerism, gives him advantages in the study of these seemingly opposite defections from the spirit of the original Society. We say, seemingly opposite; holding that the author's sagacity is nowhere more apparent than in the view, which he consistently presents, that Hicksism and Gurneyism, dissonant as their voices may appear, are in fact workings of one and the same spirit of rationalistic revolt from the right Quaker genius. Hicksism took away fully one-third of the entire strength of Quakerism; and being concentrated in special districts of the American Union, its influence was stronger and more consolidated than even the numbers of its adherents would indicate. Gurneyism swallowed up the English Society, and gained over the largest proportion of the American Yearly Meetings. A temporizing party, the weight of whose influence is at present thrown into the scale of Gurneyism, rules the Yearly Meeting of Philadelphia. Representing the ancient Quaker testimony in its purity, are certain "Smaller Bodies," faithful remnants, and clinging to each other, but without the kindling enthusiasm of Fox or Nayler. Their "General Meeting of Friends for England" is yearly held at Fritchley, in Derbyshire. Its first assembly, in January 1870, was attended only by some twenty-five persons. Rationalism, in one form or another, was an early, and has been a persistent, shadow on the path of Friends' spirituality. "The Deism of Penn" was the title of a work containing some of Keith's most relentless cuts at the system of his old associates. The

* The Society of Friends in the Nineteenth Century: a Historical View of the successive Convulsions and Schisms therein during that Period. By William Hodgson. 8vo. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co. Vol. I. 1875. Vol. II. 1876.

author of the "Age of Reason"—whose name, by the way, is etymologically identical with Penn, both being corrupted (like the French pékin) from Pagan—remained to his dying day a Quaker in grain. It is curious that Elias Hicks was close upon seventy years of age before his rationalism developed itself. The life of this remarkable man presents a legible parable of the unfailing drift of Quaker opinion, where the prime heat of the first creative love of Friends is grown cool. The subject deserves a fuller treatment than we can here bestow, and we may perhaps return to it.

Mr. Page Roberts, the vicar of Eye, and the author of a popular volume of sermons, "Law and God," has published another collection of pulpit addresses, entitled "Reasonable Service."* Both these volumes are characterized by the same merits, a clear style, great boldness and honesty in treating burning questions, and a real religious spirit. They are not orthodox; at the same time they are not startlingly heretical. If there are notorious difficulties which they freely handle, there are others again which they do not touch. We should predict for this volume the same kind of popularity which attended upon "Law and God,"—a popularity which proved that there was a large public eager for free and reverent speech upon matters of religion, yet in no way inclined to blank unbelief. We would only venture to hint to Mr. Page Roberts that he must be a very remarkable preacher indeed, all whose sermons were worth printing, and that it is possible to exhaust even a fertile soil by cropping it too often.

Under the title of the "Prophets of Christendom,"† Mr. Boyd Carpenter has republished a series of "Sketches of Eminent Preachers," originally printed in the "Clergyman's Magazine." Book and preface are alike so modest that it is hard to find fault with them. But the sketches, which were very well in their place in a magazine, give an impression of flimsiness when collected into a volume. Yet this is chiefly owing to their brevity, and the necessity of being pictorial within narrow limits; for Mr. Carpenter has evidently read much, and knows how to make use of his reading. If he would concentrate his attention upon any one of the men and periods over which he has so lightly passed, he would produce a book better

* Reasonable Service. By W. Page Roberts, M.A., Vicar of Eye. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1876.

† The Prophets of Christendom: Sketches of Eminent Preachers. By Rev. W. Boyd Carpenter, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

worth reading. But why has he included in his list of great preachers St. Jerome, of whom he himself says, "It has even been doubted whether he ever preached a single sermon"?

Mr. Scott Porter's discourse on the Fourth Gospel,* with its accompanying appendices, is a clear, elaborate and confident argument in favour of its Johannine authorship. It may strengthen the faith of those who are already convinced, but we are not sanguine as to its converting sceptics. Mr. Porter brings forward no new evidence to fill up the *lacuna* of testimony between Irenæus and the supposed date of the Gospel; he speaks much more confidently of the alleged quotations by Justin and Basilides than we should be inclined to do; and he altogether declines to investigate the question so far as the Apostolic Fathers are concerned. Two points, which in most minds we suspect weigh more against the authenticity of the Gospel than any other, he appears to pass by: the dissimilarity in style between the Gospel and the Apocalypse, and the difficulty of supposing that so philosophical a work can have proceeded from the pen of John, as we know him from the Synoptical Gospels. We can recommend Mr. Porter's pamphlet as a fair and able statement of the case from his own side. But he has not settled the question.

The "Expositor"† continues its course with unchanged characteristics. Upon all the great questions of Biblical criticism it takes a timid, conservative view. It vindicates the vindictive Psalms. It assigns Ecclesiastes to the Solomonic period. It defends the authenticity of 2 Peter. At the same time, in its verbal criticism and exposition it is thoughtful, suggestive, often ingenious. It probably furnishes matter for many sermons, and so fulfils its *raison d'être*.

The second volume of Keim's "Jesus of Nazareth,"‡ as issued by the Theological Translation Fund, answers to the second and third parts of the first volume of the original. Mr. Geldart, the careful translator, says in his preface: "I have endeavoured to treat Keim as I would treat a classical author; to reproduce, as far as my mastery of idiom would allow, both the letter and the spirit of his

* The Fourth Gospel is the Gospel according to John: a Discourse, &c. With an Appendix. By Rev. J. Scott Porter. Belfast. 1876.

† The Expositor. Edited by Rev. Samuel Cox. Vol. IV. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

‡ The History of Jesus of Nazara, &c. By Dr. Th. Keim. Translated from the German by the Rev. E. M. Geldart. Vol. II. London: Williams and Norgate. 1876.

writing. I have seldom considered myself at liberty to suppress a particle or to re-cast a sentence. I have endeavoured to give the swing and rhythm of his language, and have not even shrunk from imitating his mannerisms and the jingle of words in which he occasionally indulges." Judging Mr. Geldart by his own standard, he must be pronounced remarkably successful. We have compared his translation in many places with the original, and can vouch for its being a singularly exact reproduction of it. But it is a question which admits of argument, whether this is the best way of translating works, the chief merit of which lies in matter rather than in style. Dr. Keim, like most German theologians, is not a very elegant or forcible writer, and we are much more curious to know what he says than how he says it. Mr. Geldart's method would be very well if applied to the really admirable prose of Goethe or Heine, but for ordinary purposes of scientific translation we could conceive "a more excellent way." In this case, however, the reader may rest content in the conviction that he has Dr. Keim visibly before him.

The edition of Clement of Rome, by Gebhardt and Harnack, which Dr. Donaldson has placed at the head of his article in another part of this Review, belongs to a series of "*Patrum Apostolicorum Opera*,"* just commenced at Leipzig, in which Theodore Zahn is associated as editor with the two scholars already named. The second part contains the works of Ignatius and Polycarp, edited by Zahn. The too scanty works of these Fathers are of such immense importance to those who investigate the *origines* of Christianity, that they can hardly receive too much elucidation. We shall presently return to this interesting volume.

E.

* *Patrum Apostolicorum Opera*, &c. Recensuerunt Oscar de Gebhardt, Adolphus Harnack, Theodorus Zahn: editio post Dresselianam alteram tertia. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 1876.

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I.—JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL.—I.

THE solution of the question whether Justin Martyr made use of the fourth Gospel, must, in the absence of indisputable citations, depend to a large extent on his doctrine of the person of Christ. If it could be shewn that this was less developed than that of the Gospel, we should naturally assign it to an earlier stage in the formation of ecclesiastical dogma; but if it appear to be more developed, we shall as naturally assign the priority to the teaching of the evangelist. In comparing Justin's with the Johannine doctrine, we have to consider their relations in substance and in phraseology. The evidences on these points must, to a certain extent, be presented concurrently, though they may afterwards be made the subject of separate remark.

First, then, we must observe that Justin uses the word λόγος in its special theological sense. Here we may notice some curious facts, which, if they do not seem to have any immediate bearing upon our question, are useful as shewing how necessary it is, in judging of a writer's mode of expressing an opinion, to bear in mind the nature of the works in which that opinion is advocated. In the First Apology the word λόγος, in the singular or plural, is used altogether 67 times. It is employed 27 times, including two or three doubtful cases, in its peculiar theological acceptation. The other senses in which it occurs are: *reason, argument, doctrine, word, discourse, account*, and quasi-theologically as a designa-

tion of Hermes. Of 28 instances of its use in the short Second Apology, no fewer than 16, again including two or three uncertain cases, exhibit the theological meaning. Here its other significations are: *reason, argument, doctrine, method, word*. In the Dialogue with Tryphon it is found no less than 235 times; and yet its theological use is represented by only seven instances, of which two are doubtful. It is applied, in a sense unknown to the Apologies, 62 times to the Scriptures or Scriptural passages. It is most frequently employed simply in the meaning of *words*, passing off into that of *utterance* or *declaration, discussion, argument, doctrine, system*. In the signification of *reason*, where it most nearly approaches the theological use, it occurs only 13 times, against 16 in the Apologies. We thus learn that the term λόγος exhibits its theological colouring about once in 33 times in the Dialogue, against nearly once in every two instances of its use in the Apologies; or if we add the signification *reason*, the proportion is about 1 in 12 in the Dialogue against considerably more than 1 in 2 in the Apologies. On the other hand, in the Dialogue it is employed in more than a quarter of the instances in a meaning of which the Apologies furnish no example. The reason is sufficiently obvious. In addressing the cultured emperor or the Romans, Justin naturally resorted to a more philosophical phraseology, while in arguing with Jews he felt this to be less appropriate, and in citing the Scriptures adopted a description which expressed the reverence entertained towards them no less by his opponents than by himself. We may learn from these facts that Justin, whether consciously or unconsciously, largely modifies his language according to the object which he has in view and the persons whom he seeks to influence, and that therefore we must not attach any importance to the silence of apologetic writings upon points which would be more fitly discussed in works dealing with the internal controversies of Christians themselves.¹

¹ The above facts are gathered from a table which I have prepared of all the passages in Justin in which the word λόγος occurs.

We must now proceed to unfold the contents of Justin's doctrine, and compare it with the Johannine. In doing so we shall follow the order in which the several topics appear most logically to succeed one another.

According to the fourth Gospel, "the Logos was God," *θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*.¹ Now this statement, though apparently so clear, contains an ambiguity. Did the writer use *θεός* in its highest acceptation, and mean to assert that the Logos, which in one sense was an eternal attribute of God, was in another aspect God himself, regarded in his relation to the universe and to man? Or did he intend to affirm the distinct personality of the Logos, and in doing so to ascribe to him a divine nature? Both these views may be, and have been, maintained. If the second be accepted as correct, then the question arises, What is implied by *θεός*? Is it merely a figurative expression, designed to convey the idea of exalted dignity, as in the passage quoted by the author himself, "I said ye are gods"?² Or does it denote a special divine nature, such as could not be predicated of angels or of men? In Justin's doctrine there is none of this ambiguity. On each point he is perfectly explicit; and the whole subject seems to have passed through the furnace of controversy, and to have worked itself out into clear and formulated expression. Before citing the evidence in support of this statement, we must observe that we may fairly adduce passages in which the special term *λόγος* is not adopted, because Justin identifies the Logos with the Son of God and with Christ: *τοῦ λόγου . . . ὅς ἐστι Χριστός*,³ and *Χριστὸς . . . υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ . . . λόγος αὐτοῦ*.⁴

Justin applies the word *θεός* to the Logos or Christ once in the Apologies, and a great number of times (I have counted upwards of thirty-four) in the Dialogue. The term, not very distinctive in its use by heathens, became important in controversy with Jews. The following may serve as examples of the mode in which it is introduced: "For Christ has been preached as king and priest, and God and Lord, and angel

¹ i. 1.² x. 34.³ Ap. II. c. 10.⁴ Ap. I. c. 23.

and man . . . as I demonstrate from all the Scriptures.”¹ “I am now going to prove that the revelation in the time of Jesus, who was a priest among your people in Babylon, was a prediction of the things that were to be done by our priest and God and Christ, the Son of the Father of the universe.”² Having alluded to the history of Jacob, Justin concludes, Θεός καλεῖται καὶ θεός ἐστι καὶ ἔσται.³

How it is that the Logos comes to be θεός is very clearly explained. His divine nature depends on the peculiarity of his Sonship: “who, as being Logos and first-born of God, is also God.”⁴ “God, in consequence of his being [ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι] a child first-born of all created things.”⁵ From these passages it is evident that θεός is applied to Christ, not as a title of dignity, but as a description of his nature. This inference is confirmed by the different way in which Justin uses the term ἄγγελος in reference to Christ. He borrows this designation from certain passages in the Old Testament, in which he identifies “the angel of the Lord” with the Logos; but he uses it with an explanation, and always as a title, never as indicating the possession of an angelic nature. Thus we find in the First Apology,⁶ ἄγγελος δὲ καλεῖται . . . αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀπαγγέλλει ὅσα δεῖ γνωσθῆναι, and in the Dialogue,⁷ ὃς καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται, διὰ τὸ ἀγγέλλειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κ.τ.λ. In speaking of the three supernatural visitors to Abraham, he draws a clear distinction between the one whom he identifies with the Logos and the other two. First of all Tryphon admits, under pressure of Justin’s argument, that he had been mistaken in supposing that all three were angels. Justin, without remarking upon this admission, proceeds to emphasize his belief, ὅτι εἰς τῶν τριῶν ἐκείνων καὶ ὁ θεός ἐστι καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται, and says that he appeared in the form of a man, like the two angels who came with him.⁸ Farther on the objection is raised that these visitors ate what was set before them. In his reply, Justin

¹ Dial. c. 34.² Dial. c. 115.³ Dial. c. 58.⁴ Ὃς λόγος καὶ πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ θεὸς ὑπάρχει. Ap. I. c. 63.⁵ Dial. c. 125.⁶ c. 63.⁷ c. 56.⁸ Dial. c. 56.

makes use of these words: "If we heard that the three were said to have eaten, and not only the two who were really angels" (οἷτινες ἄγγελοι τῷ ὄντι ἦσαν).¹ Elsewhere he marks the difference between the angelic title and the divine nature of the Logos thus: ἄγγελος καλούμενος καὶ θεὸς ὑπάρχων.² It is, therefore, abundantly proved that the Logos is regarded as a super-angelic, and, in the strictest sense, a divine being.

Justin is no less explicit in insisting on his distinction from the Father, and his separate personality. One of the points (as stated by Tryphon) which he undertakes to prove is, that "there is another God besides the Creator of the universe."³ This proposition is more fully stated farther on: "There is a different [ἕτερος] God from the God who made all things, in number, I mean, but not in sentiment" [ἀριθμῷ λέγω ἀλλ' οὐ γνώμῃ].⁴ But more important is the fact that he expressly controverts the opinion of those who maintained that the Logos was an inseparable power of the Father's, which the latter put forth, like a ray of the sun, whenever he desired it, and again at his will withdrew into himself. In opposition to this view, Justin contends that the Logos does not mark a mere nominal distinction, but is numerically something different: οὐχ ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ὀνόματι μόνον ἀριθμεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕτερόν τί ἐστι;⁵ and that the thing begotten is numerically different from him who begets: τὸ γεννώμενον τοῦ γεννῶντος ἀριθμῷ ἕτερόν ἐστι.⁶

While assigning this distinct personality and exalted rank to the Logos, Justin is careful to insist on his subordination to the Father. In the fourth Gospel the subordination of the Son during his earthly existence is clearly asserted; but that of the pre-existent Logos can only be inferred from the use of the preposition διὰ in i. 3. This preposition may be made to appear consistent with the doctrine of the co-equality of the

¹ Dial. c. 57.² Dial. c. 60.³ Dial. c. 50: ἄλλος θεός. Elsewhere, ἕτερος θεός, c. 55. See also c. 56.⁴ c. 56. See also c. 62, ἀριθμῷ ὄντα ἕτερον.⁵ Dial. c. 128.⁶ c. 129.

Father and the Son ; but no ingenuity of interpretation can force this doctrine upon Justin. The purest monotheistic doctrine is asserted near the beginning of the Dialogue in terms to which a Jew could take no exception : "Neither will there ever be another God [ἄλλος θεός], Tryphon, nor was there from eternity (I thus said to him), except Him who made and ordered this universe. Nor do we suppose that there is one God of ours and another of yours, but [we esteem as God] that very one who led your fathers out of the land of Egypt with a mighty hand and a high arm ; nor have we hoped on some other (for there is not one), but on Him on whom you also [hoped], the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob."¹ This statement verbally contradicts passages already quoted, in which the existence of "another God" is asserted ; and we can find a reconciliation only in supposing that Justin regarded the Father and Creator of the universe as the sole fountain of divinity, self-existent and eternal, and that in rejecting the notion of "another God" he meant that no other could bear this title in the same supreme sense, or stand upon the same line of underived and independent being. This conclusion is amply confirmed by the most direct asseverations. Our apologist speaks of the Logos as ranked under the Father, and as serving His will : ὑπηρετοῦντα τῷ τῶν ὅλων πατρί,² and ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ τεταγμένος καὶ ὑπηρετῶν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοῦ.³ He says this in reference to Old Testament times, and therefore there can be no allusion to the human nature of Christ. He contrasts the Father and the Son by declaring that there is another God under the Creator, and that above the latter there is no other God : ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος ὑπὸ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, . . . ὑπὲρ ὃν ἄλλος θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι.⁴ Again, while insisting that the Logos appeared to Abraham and others, he considers it preposterous to suppose that the

¹ Dial. c. 11. In Ap. I. c. 13 : τοῦ ὄντως θεοῦ may stand in opposition to polytheism.

² Dial. c. 58.

³ Dial. c. 126.

⁴ Dial. c. 56, p. 180, Otto, 2nd ed. See also p. 184.

Father could have manifested himself in this way. He presses upon Tryphon's attention the fact that the angel who appeared to Moses in the bush called himself the God of Abraham; and hence he argues that this angel was God. Tryphon objects that there were really two persons, and that though an angel appeared, yet it was God himself (that is, the supreme God) who conversed with Moses. Justin, admitting for the sake of argument that there may have been two persons, proceeds: "Even if, as you say, it can be the case that there were two, both angel and God, yet no one whatsoever, if he have even a little sense, will dare to say that the Creator and Father of the universe, having left all the things above heaven, has appeared in a little particle of earth."¹ It would be difficult to mark more strongly the subordination of the Logos as the minister of the Highest. But still further, the Son is represented as dependent on the Father both for his being and his rank. He derives all his exalted appellations, ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γεγενῆσθαι,² and he received them from the Father [ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔλαβε], as all who were called kings and anointed derived their titles from himself.³ Justin speaks of him as τὸν κατὰ βουλήν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ θεὸν ὄντα, υἷὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄγγελον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ,⁴ and describes the Father as αἰτίος τε αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ δυνατῷ καὶ κυρίῳ καὶ θεῷ.⁵ But among subordinate beings the Logos takes the first place, another point not decided by, however it may be inferred from, the fourth Gospel. Justin's words are unequivocal: ἡ δὲ πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν πατέρα πάντων . . . ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.⁶

In place, then, of the simple proposition of the Gospel that "the Logos was God," we have in Justin a series of elaborate

¹ Dial. c. 60. See also c. 127.

² Dial. c. 61.

³ Dial. c. 86.

⁴ Dial. c. 127.

⁵ Dial. c. 129.

⁶ Ap. I. c. 32. Dörner endeavours to reduce the subordination to a minimum, but in doing so leaves unnoticed some of the most conclusive passages: *Entwicklungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi*, I. S. 425 sqq., 2nd ed. Dr. Donaldson frankly admits the subordination: *Crit. Hist. of Christian Literature and Doctrine*, 1866, Vol. II. pp. 218 and 229 sqq.

and clearly formulated doctrines, supported by argument and comment, and accompanied by a conscious rejection of an antagonistic view. In this point, accordingly, the Justinian doctrine is not only more copious than the Johannine, but presents the appearance of a true development, an unfolding of the implicit contents of the brief and pregnant statement of the Gospel. And if it be said that thus far Justin is indebted to Philo, still the incorporation of the Alexandrine theology with Christianity must itself have required time, and its more abundant admixture in the writings of the Apologist than in that of the Evangelist betrays, if not a later date, at least a more advanced post on the march of dogmatic formulation.

We arrive at a very similar result when we examine more fully the doctrine that the Logos is the Son of God. Here again the Christian faith is sketched in grand but dim outlines in the Gospel, admitting more or less of poetic or ideal interpretation; but in Justin it is sharply defined in unmistakable ecclesiastical prose. The Gospel nowhere asserts that the Logos is the Son of God. This title is always applied to Jesus; but Jesus is never called the Logos, and their identification, however certain it may appear to most people, is nevertheless the result of interpretation. Then in what sense is Jesus the Son of God? Is the relationship spiritual or essential, such as others may in their inferior degree enjoy, or grounded in the peculiarity of his being? Again the answer must be left to the interpreter. Further, did Christ pre-exist? A few intimations may seem to answer this question with sufficient distinctness in the affirmative; yet they are not such that it is impossible to explain them away. And, lastly, if the Logos was the Son of God, nothing whatever is said as to the mode and method of this Sonship, and its duration is indicated only by the obscure ἐν ἀρχῇ,¹ and perhaps by πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι.² On almost all these points Justin's language is full and explicit.

First of all he expressly asserts that "the Logos of God is his Son."³ The Logos, the Son, and Christ, are identified by

¹ i. 1.² xvii. 5.³ Ap. I. c. 63, ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ. See also c. 32, Ap. II. c. 6; Dial. c. 48, 100, and many other passages.

the statement, *νῖδς θεοῦ καὶ ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός ἐστι, πρότερον λόγος ὢν, . . . νῦν δὲ . . . ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος*.¹

The Sonship of Christ or of the Logos was peculiar in its kind. Justin recognizes the possibility, and indeed admits the existence, of two views on the subject. "Jesus," he says, "being called a Son of God, if even he be only a man in the common way [*κοινῶς μόνον ἄνθρωπος*], is on account of his wisdom worthy to be called a Son of God. . . . But if we say that in a peculiar way [*ιδίως*], contrary to the common birth, he was sprung from God as the Logos of God," &c.² He states elsewhere that some Christians believed Christ to be of purely human birth [*ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον*], but that he did not agree with them.³ He refers, in the former of these passages, not to the pre-mundane generation of the Logos, but to his miraculous birth into the world; but the rejection of the idea that Christ was a mere man is a necessary preparation for his own view of the divine Sonship. In unfolding this view, he maintains that Christ, "being God, pre-existed [*προϋπήρχεν*] as Son of the Creator of the universe."⁴ His Sonship was of a special kind, and limited to himself alone: *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς μόνος ιδίως νῖδς τῷ θεῷ γεγέννηται, λόγος αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχων*,⁵ and *ὁ δὲ νῖδς ἐκείνου, ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως νῖός, ὁ λόγος*.⁶ The peculiarity of his Sonship depends on the manner of his generation. Here it is curious to observe that Justin, though of course he does not use all the language of a later controversy, is clearly homoousian in his view. He maintains that "this power has been generated from the Father by his power and will, but not by way of amputation, as though the substance of the Father [*τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας*] were detached." He uses, to illustrate his meaning, the example of fire, which, without diminution to itself, kindles another fire, and also our production of speech [*λόγος*], which leaves unimpaired the reason

¹ Ap. I. c. 63. See also c. 23.

² Ap. I. c. 22.

³ Dial. c. 48.

⁴ Dial. c. 48. So earlier in the c., *προϋπάρχειν θεὸν ὄντα*, said by Tryphon; and again, *θεὸν αὐτὸν προϋπάρχοντα λέγεις*, said by Tryphon, c. 87.

⁵ Ap. I. c. 23.

⁶ Ap. II. c. 6.

[λόγος] within us.¹ Had he believed that the Logos was created out of nothing, or out of any pre-existent material different from God, he could not have used these comparisons, nor need he have sought to prove that his opinion did not imply any division or diminution in the substance of the Father. He must have held, therefore, that the Logos was not created, like the world, but generated out of the divine substance, or in the Nicene phraseology, *γεννηθέντα . . . ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*. Agreeably to this view we are told, *ὁ θεὸς γεγέννηκε δυνάμιν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικὴν*,² and the Son is called *μονογενὴς . . . τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ὄλων . . . ἰδίως ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος*.³ Though we do not find the express contrast of the Nicene Creed, *γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα*, Justin's own language is quite in harmony with this distinction. He does not speak of the Son as created, but as begotten [*γεννηθείς*],⁴ as an offspring [*γέννημα*],⁵ as projected [*προβληθέν*] from the Father,⁶ and as having come forth [*προελθόντα*] from the Father.⁷

Two passages are, however, adduced to shew that Justin regarded the Logos as a creature. Semisch asserts that he once calls him *ἐργασία*.⁸ He ought to have added that this statement is founded on a conjectural reading. In the place alluded to,⁹ our apologist has just pointed out that for the due comprehension of certain passages in the Old Testament, it is necessary to bear in mind the art [*τέχνην*] adopted by the Holy Spirit, according to which some incidents were typical, and sometimes future events were spoken of as though they were either present or past. Having quoted a few examples,

¹ Dial. c. 128. See also c. 61. In the above passage we have *ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς*, instead of the Nicene *ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς*, but the difference is unimportant, as in c. 61 we have *ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ*. In c. 129 we find *ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς*.

² Dial. c. 61.

³ Dial. c. 105. Again compare the Nicene *γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ*.

⁴ Dial. c. 61.

⁵ Dial. c. 62 and 129. Ap. I. c. 21.

⁶ Dial. c. 62.

⁷ Dial. c. 100.

⁸ Justin Martyr, his Life, &c.; translated by J. E. Ryland, 1843, Vol. II. p. 185.

⁹ Dial. c. 114.

he proceeds: "And again when he says, 'I will see the heavens, works of thy fingers,' if I do not hear the workmanship of his words [*ἐὰν μὴ ἀκούω τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐργασίαν*], I shall hear unintelligently, as your teachers require, supposing that God the Father of the universe and unbegotten has hands and feet and fingers and a soul, like a composite animal." I quite agree with Dr. Donaldson that the above, which is the reading of the manuscripts, furnishes a good sense, and that *ἐργασία* is equivalent to the previous *τέχνη*.¹ The meaning is, that if we do not attend to the figurative character of the words, we shall form a very absurd opinion. Otto's conjecture, *τοῦ λόγου*, does not appear so suitable to the context; for with this change the passage ceases to be an illustration of Justin's remark. The reading suggested by Maranus, *τὸν λόγον*, on which alone the statement of Semisch can be founded, seems utterly devoid of meaning; for how could it possibly be inferred from the verse in question that the Logos was the work of God? The *αὐτοῦ*, moreover, naturally refers, not to God, about whom Justin has not been speaking, but to *τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα*, a reference which is duly preserved by the reading of the manuscripts. The statement, therefore, that Justin calls the Logos *ἐργασία*, is, to say the least, extremely questionable, and cannot fairly be admitted in evidence. The other passage to which appeal is made is one in which Tryphon speaks of the Jews as worshipers, *τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον* (that is, Christ) *ποιήσαντος*.² This expression Justin allows to pass without remark; and therefore, it is said, he must have considered it unobjectionable. The idea, however, that Christ was created is not made the subject of a distinct proposition, but occurs incidentally, and accordingly does not demand a reply. The plea which Tryphon urges is, that the Jews, being worshipers of God, did not, like the Gentiles, require to acknowledge and worship Christ. It is to this plea that Justin addresses himself, and it may not have occurred to him to turn aside from his main

¹ Hist. of Christian Lit. and Doctrine, II. pp. 223-4.² Dial. c. 64.

purpose in order to correct a casual expression chosen by the Jew with the object of depreciating Jesus. He would naturally put into the mouth of Tryphon such language as a Jew was likely to employ; and this passage may, at the most, occasion some little surprise that he has nowhere taken the opportunity of formally objecting to the use of a phrase which he ascribes to an opponent. This omission, however, in a writer so little systematic may be accidental, and certainly cannot set aside the conclusion at which we have already arrived, founded as it is on his own positive and unambiguous assertions.¹

With this exalted view of his nature, it is not surprising that, as we have already observed, Justin assigns to the Logos the second place in the universe of being. He is the *πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ θεοῦ*,² the *πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ*,³ and *ἡ πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν πατέρα πάντων*.⁴ Agreeably to this belief, the Christians, in their religious services, assigned to him the second place, *ἐν δευτέρῳ χῶρᾳ ἔχοντες*.⁵

Whether the Logos was co-eternal with the Father, Justin nowhere expressly says, and very different opinions have been held as to the view which he entertained. The controversy turns upon the meaning of two passages, one of which is certainly open to the charge of obscurity. Before we refer to these, it will be advantageous to consider what we can learn from expressions used elsewhere. That Justin ascribed a beginning to the personal existence of the Logos may be inferred with some probability. He says that he came forth from the Father by the power and will of the latter (*δυνάμει*

¹ Is it not also possible that though Justin never employs the expression in his own person, he may have thought that it could be loosely applied to the fact of generation as well as to that of creation? The contrast, though, I think, evidently in his mind, is not yet clearly formulated.

² Ap. I. c. 21.

³ Ap. I. c. 53. *Πρωτότοκος* is applied to him ten times elsewhere: Ap. I. cc. 23, 33, 46, 63; Dial. cc. 84, 85, 100, 116, 125, 138. Once *πρωτόγονος* is used instead, Ap. I. 58.

⁴ Ap. I. c. 32.

⁵ Ap. I. c. 13. See also Ap. II. c. 13.

αὐτοῦ καὶ βουλῇ),¹ and represents his existence and divinity as dependent on the will of God: ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γενεῆσθαι,² and τὸν κατὰ βουλὴν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ θεὸν ὄντα.³ These expressions can hardly be reconciled with the idea of co-eternity. Nevertheless, since Justin nowhere asserts expressly, as Tertullian does,⁴ that there was a time when the Son did not exist, we may suppose that his thought upon this subject had not yet cleared itself into dogmatic distinctness. He was anxious rather, in opposition to the simple humanitarian view, to carry back the existence of the Son as far as possible, and represent him as the earliest of dependent beings. The Logos is, as we have seen, the πρώτη δύναμις, the πρῶτον γέννημα. He pre-existed as God before the ages: θεὸν ὄντα πρὸ αἰώνων.⁵ "God has begotten him as a beginning before all created things" [ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων].⁶ The Son of God existed before the morning-star and the moon: θεοῦ υἱόν, ὃς καὶ πρὸ ἑωσφόρου καὶ σελήνης ἦν.⁷ He was the "first-born of all creation" [πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως],⁸ an expression which must be explained by those already quoted. We learn from these citations that the Logos was regarded as having had a distinct personal existence, and as having been generated, *before* the creation.

Bearing in mind the result which we have thus reached, we may proceed to the examination of the two more ambiguous passages. The first is the following: "But his Son, who alone is called Son in the literal sense, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνὼν καὶ γεννώμενος, ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε, is called [λέγεται] Christ in relation to his having been anointed, and God's having ordered everything through him."⁹ The second is: τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ πατρί.¹⁰

¹ Dial. c. 100.² Dial. c. 61.³ Dial. c. 127.⁴ Adv. Hermog. c. 3.⁵ Dial. c. 48, quoted by Tryphon from Justin.⁶ Dial. c. 61. See also 100 and 129; and πρὸ πάντων ὄντα, c. 96.⁷ Dial. c. 45.⁸ Dial. cc. 85 and 138. Compare 84 and 125.⁹ Ap. II. c. 6.¹⁰ Dial. c. 62.

Semisch, who is followed by Otto, says that "in these two passages the words and ideas, *συνεῖναι* and *γεννᾶσθαι*, form a contrast. . . . The *συνεῖναι* is by the clause *πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων* placed beyond all time; the *γεννᾶσθαι*, on the contrary, although it has a share in this clause, is, by the additional indication of time, *ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε*, placed so nearly contemporary with the creation of the world, that it approaches time itself." Accordingly he thinks that *συνεῖναι* is applied to the Logos as an impersonal attribute of God, and that its coming forth as an hypostasis or person, described by *γεννώμενος*, is represented as taking place at the epoch of the creation.¹ To this interpretation there are several serious objections. The word "*συνών*," as Dr. Donaldson remarks,² "is not the proper word for an attribute, *ἐνών* or *προσών* being the words used for it; *σύνειμι* implies 'existence along with,' and therefore separate, distinct existence." Again, to make the generation of the Logos contemporaneous with the creation, is in complete contradiction of Justin's view. Semisch, being quite aware of this, has to regard the events as "nearly contemporary;" but the passage either makes them absolutely contemporary, or says nothing whatever on the subject. And lastly, there is nothing in the structure of the words to suggest the contrast on which Semisch dwells. In the Apology it is impossible to justify the division of the two expressions of time between the two participles; and in the Dialogue it seems perfectly clear that it was the *γέννημα*, and not the impersonal attribute, that was with the Father. Semisch, however, contends that on any other interpretation of the passage in the Apology, *γεννώμενος* ought to precede *συνών*. But, we may add, in that case we ought to have the perfect participle instead of the present. The word, as it stands, may be regarded as descriptive, not of the generation of the Logos once for all, but of his permanent nature; and therefore it is not necessary for it to be placed first. The subordinate difficulty which its use in this manner entails is

¹ Justin Martyr, &c., II. pp. 181 sqq.

² P. 222.

certainly not sufficient to outweigh the very grave objections to Semisch's view which have been already indicated. We must therefore seek for some other construction of the passage. Dorner wishes to escape the difficulty which it presents by substituting $\delta\tau\iota$ for $\delta\tau\epsilon$.¹ But besides the general objection against all needless resort to conjecture, this change would reduce the clause to mere tautology, the same reason for the name Christ being given in the very next line. Dr. Donaldson's suggestion that we should connect the clause introduced by $\delta\tau\epsilon$ with what follows instead of with what precedes, appears to me to afford the most reasonable solution of our problem. This clause would then no longer seem in contradiction to the previous statement, but would acquaint us with the time when the name of Christ was bestowed upon the Son. It would thus be brought into its natural relations with the context; and instead of appearing like a superfluity flung in without distinct purpose, would make an important addition to the sense of the passage. The only objection that occurs to me lies in the use of the present λέγεται after the aorists ἐκτίσε and ἐκόσμησε, but this may perhaps be sufficiently explained by the permanence of the title, and by the want of literary finish in Justin's style.

On the whole, then, the evidence before us warrants this conclusion: Justin believed that the Logos existed an indefinite time before the creation; but nevertheless, while avoiding dogmatic precision in his statements, he ascribed a commencement to his personal being.²

In concluding this survey of the doctrine of the divine Sonship of the Logos, we may notice the title which is applied to

¹ P. 424.

² It is instructive to compare the more explicit statement of Theophilus of Antioch: "Ἐχων οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίῳις σπλάγχνοις ἐγέννησεν αὐτὸν. . . . πρὸ τῶν ὅλων (Ad. Autol. II. 10); τὸν λόγον τὸν ὄντα διὰ παντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ θεοῦ. . . . ὁπότε ἐκ ἡθέλησεν ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν (ibid. c. 22). Here the separate existence of the Logos dates from the divine purpose of creation. With his view Justin's is not inconsistent.

him in conformity with it: *θεὸς θεοῦ υἱός*,¹ and more fully, *θεόν, τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀρρήτου θεοῦ υἱόν*.²

We come now to the work of the Logos previous to his incarnation. The Johannine doctrine may be stated as follows: The work of creation was effected through the Logos. He was in the world, giving light to all men; but the world did not know him or receive him. Some, however, did receive him, and to them he gave power to become children of God. All these points make their appearance in Justin, and the work of the Logos in the world is presented with elaborate explanation and with amplitude of detail.

The whole creation was made through the agency of the Logos: *ὥστε λόγῳ θεοῦ . . . γεγενῆσθαι τὸν πάντα κόσμον*,³ where *λόγος* is most probably used in its special sense; *τὸν θεὸν διὰ λόγου τὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι*,⁴ where the theological meaning is fixed by the context; and *δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε*.⁵ There is here no room for advance upon the view contained in the Gospel.

The work of the Logos in the world is described with greater fulness. All races of men partook of him: *οὗ πάν γένος ἀνθρώπων μετέσχε*,⁶ and he was in every one: *ὁ ἐν παντὶ ὄν*.⁷ A seed of the Logos was innate in every race: *τὸ ἐμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*.⁸ But even philosophers could attain to only a partial discovery and contemplation of him: *κατὰ λόγου μέρος εὐρέσεως καὶ θεωρίας*.⁹ They did not know everything of his [*πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου*],¹⁰ but saw only what was kindred to themselves: *ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικοῦ θείου λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ὁρῶν*.¹¹ Some men lived with the Logos [*οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες*], and were Christians, even though they were supposed by their contemporaries to be atheists. Such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus, and similar men, and among the barbarians Abraham and many

¹ Dial. c. 128.² Dial. c. 126.³ Ap. I. c. 59.⁴ Ap. I. c. 64.⁵ Ap. II. c. 6.⁶ Ap. I. c. 46.⁷ Ap. II. c. 10.⁸ Ap. II. c. 8. See also 13.⁹ Ap. II. c. 10.¹⁰ Ibid.¹¹ Ap. II. c. 13.

others. But those who lived without the Logos were enemies of Christ's, and murderers of those who lived with him.¹ Accordingly the Christians themselves were men "in whom the seed from God, the Logos, dwells."² We ought to observe that the liberal view of Gentile philosophy is not consistently held by Justin; for he elsewhere advocates the notion that the philosophers borrowed their "seeds of truth" from the Hebrew prophets.³

The Logos played an important part in the history of the Israelites. This subject is only once touched upon in the Gospel, in the obscure words, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it, and was glad."⁴ The appearance to Abraham is treated at great length by Justin,⁵ and is alluded to several times. He is also said to have appeared to Jacob,⁶ to Moses,⁷ to Joshua,⁸ to the other patriarchs,⁹ and to the prophets.¹⁰ He was the king and lord of Samuel and Aaron and Moses and of all the others.¹¹ It was he who shut up Noah in the ark, and came down to view the tower of Babel.¹² And finally it was he who led the Israelites out of Egypt.¹³

We see, then, that in regard to the work of the pre-existent Logos, both the clear doctrine and the obscure intimation of the fourth Gospel are unfolded with greater amplification and precision by Justin.

We have now reached the point where the Jewish-Alexandrine and the Christian doctrines of the Logos definitely part company, namely, the incarnation. The whole of the Johannine doctrine is contained in the few words, "The Logos became flesh, and tabernacled among us,"¹⁴ and we are not told how or when he became incarnate, or whether he dwelt in the human body as

¹ Ap. I. c. 46.

² Ap. I. c. 32, οἱκ' εἰ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ σπέρμα, ὁ λόγος. Compare with this 1 John iii. 9, σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μένει, in connection with John v. 38, τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε μένοντα ἐν ὑμῖν, from which I cannot help thinking that Justin's expression is derived.

³ Ap. I. c. 44.

⁴ viii. 56.

⁵ Dial. cc. 56, 57.

⁶ Dial. c. 58.

⁷ Dial. cc. 59, 60. Ap. I. 62 al.

⁸ Dial. c. 61.

⁹ Dial. c. 113.

¹⁰ Ap. I. c. 63.

¹¹ Dial. c. 37.

¹² Dial. c. 127.

¹³ Dial. c. 120.

¹⁴ i. 14.

its animating soul, or was in mysterious union with a complete man. Here again Justin, though not quite distinct in every particular, largely supplements the deficiencies of the Gospel.

Christ, in contradistinction from the philosophers, who had only a portion of the disseminated Logos, was himself the whole Logos:—τοῦ παντὸς λόγου, ὃ ἐστὶ Χριστοῦ.¹ The term Logos does not, however, describe his whole personality. This is completed only by the union of the divine and human natures. Christ is θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος.² The former of these terms has been already considered. That the latter implies a real humanity, exposed to the same kind of sufferings as all men have to endure, is unequivocally asserted:—ἄνθρωπος ὁμοιοπαθὴς πᾶσιν,³—ἀληθῶς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἀντιληπτικὸς παθῶν,⁴—ἀληθῶς παθητὸς ἄνθρωπος.⁵ The two natures were united into one person. This is not, indeed, categorically stated by Justin; but it is implied in his whole treatment of the subject, and the following passage, in which the agony in Gethsemane is ascribed to the Son of God, evidently in the highest sense of that term, appears conclusive:—this occurred “that we may know that the Father has wished his own Son to be truly involved even in such sufferings on our account, and that we may not say that he, as being the Son of God, did not feel the things that were done and occurred to him.”⁶ This sentence, though primarily intended to assert the reality of Christ’s human nature in opposition to the Docetæ, would entirely lose its force if Justin could have admitted the supposition that the sufferings of the body were felt only by the *man*, and did not extend themselves to the incarnate Logos. This complete incorporation of the divine Sonship with suffering humanity is well expressed in Justin’s two favourite phrases, ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος (or variations of these words)⁷ and σαρκοποιηθείς.⁸

¹ Ap. II. c. 8.

² Dial. c. 71.

³ Dial. c. 57, quoted by Tryphon from Justin.

⁴ Dial. c. 98.

⁵ Dial. c. 99.

⁶ Dial. c. 103.

⁷ Ap. I. cc. 5, 23 (twice), 32, 42, 50, 53, 63 (twice); Ap. II. c. 13; Dial. cc. 48, 57, 64, 67, 68 (twice), 76, 85, 100, 101, 125 (twice).

⁸ Ap. I. cc. 32, 66 (twice); Dial. cc. 45, 84, 87, 100. Compare τοῦ σωματοποιήσασθαι αὐτόν, Dial. c. 70.

Whether Justin believed that the humanity of Christ included the highest as well as the lowest elements of human nature has been disputed. In one passage he casually describes Christ as consisting of *καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν*.¹ According to one interpretation of these words, he here teaches the doctrine which in later times was maintained by Apollinaris, that in the triple division of human nature into *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*, the place of the last in Christ was supplied by the Logos. It is possible, however, that Justin uses *ψυχή* in a wider sense as comprehending the whole of the vital and mental principle in man, as in speaking of the future life he is content with a reference to *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*,² and as Apollinaris himself allows to the word this larger significance in one of the surviving fragments of his writings.³ We must not omit to notice that the fourth Gospel, though not in any doctrinal passage, ascribes both *πνεῦμα*⁴ and *ψυχή*⁵ to Christ. To this, however, no more dogmatic significance can be attached than to Justin's ascription of spirit [*πνεῦμα*] to him when he says that he gave up the spirit on the cross.⁶ On the whole, it appears to me most probable, in the absence of any indubitable statements to the contrary, that Justin quietly assumed the completeness of Christ's humanity, but that he did so without a conscious rejection of the particular form of doctrine which seated the Logos in the place of the human *νοῦς*.

On the question how and when the incarnation took place, the fourth Gospel not only, as I have said, maintains an absolute silence, but allows the objection of the Jews,—“Is not this Jesus the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?”—to pass without correction; and it gives no answer to their inquiry, “How then does he say, I have come down out of heaven?”⁷ If the writer had any answer except that this was a spiritual mystery, credible to those who had tasted the bread of life that came down from heaven, but incomprehensible to others, his silence is most difficult to explain. Justin,

¹ Ap. II. c. 10.² Ap. I. c. 8.³ Quoted by Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.*, § 83, note 30.⁴ xi. 33, xiii. 21, xix. 30.⁵ x. 15, 17.⁶ Dial. c. 105.⁷ vi. 42.

however, is not so reticent. The incarnation took place by means of the miraculous conception and the birth from a virgin. He refers to this subject upwards of thirty times; but it will be sufficient for our purpose to notice those passages in which the Logos doctrine and the birth from a virgin are brought into the closest connection. This is done in the very first allusion to the subject:—"When we say that the Logos, which is the first offspring of God, has been begotten without intercourse, namely, Jesus Christ our teacher," &c.¹ Again, "The first power after the Father . . . is the Logos; and in what way he being made flesh became man we shall tell in what follows. . . . He was born through a virgin, . . . through the power of God."² "... a Son to the Father of the universe, who being Logos and first-born of God is also God. . . . And now in the times of your empire having become man through a virgin according to the counsel of the Father," &c.³ So in the Dialogue:—"Through a virgin's womb the first-born of all created things being made flesh became truly a child."⁴ "This Son of God and first-born of all creation, born through a virgin, and become man," &c.⁵ "You say that he pre-existed as God, and that according to the counsel of God having been made flesh he was born as man through the virgin."⁶ "He was only-begotten to the Father of the universe, having sprung in a peculiar manner from him as Logos and power, and afterwards having become man through the virgin."⁷ In one passage Justin expresses himself differently, and says that Jesus was born "through the power of the Logos [διὰ δυνάμεως τοῦ λόγου], . . . through a virgin."⁸ But this simply implies that the Logos, as the agent through whom the Father carried on his operations, was himself active in the miraculous conception, and is therefore not inconsistent with the other statements.

We have thus compared the doctrines of the fourth Gospel and of Justin step by step, and it seems to me that the statement of the latter is, beyond all question, in a more developed

¹ Ap. I. c. 21.² Ap. I. c. 32.³ Ap. I. c. 63.⁴ c. 84.⁵ c. 85; see also 100.⁶ Said by Tryphon, c. 87.⁷ c. 105.⁸ Ap. I. c. 46.

form than that of the Gospel. Not only is every point in the Johannine doctrine contained in Justin's, but almost every portion of it is presented with amplifications, its ambiguous statements are resolved into the requisite number of definite propositions, and questions which it suggests, but does not answer, are dogmatically settled. It cannot well be maintained that the Gospel represents in a condensed form the same phase of ecclesiastical thought; for then it would not exhibit the ambiguities or raise the unanswered questions to which I have alluded, or omit altogether the method of the incarnation. In short, while Justin's doctrine may be used as a commentary on the Johannine, the latter cannot be regarded as a summary of the former. Whatever, therefore, may be the date of the Gospel, it represents an earlier stage of ecclesiastical dogma.

Most striking is the way in which Justin brings the synoptical tradition of the miraculous birth into connection with the Logos doctrine. Here the phenomena are precisely what we should expect if it was thought necessary to harmonize the fourth Gospel with the Synoptics; and if we arrange the three views, miraculous birth without Logos doctrine, Logos doctrine without miraculous birth, and Logos doctrine along with miraculous birth, and remember that the last is the permanent ecclesiastical dogma, I do not see how it is possible to believe that the middle one, the Johannine, is the latest of the three, or that a Gospel containing it was likely either to be written or to force its way into universal acceptance as an apostolic work at a time when the enduring dogma of the Church had been already formulated. All difficulty vanishes if we suppose that the beliefs exhibited respectively by the Synoptics and the fourth Gospel existed at first in their detached form, and then, on account of the authority of the writings in which they appeared, were held to be equally binding on the faith of Christendom, and were harmonized accordingly.

So far our examination has not furnished immediate evidence that Justin was acquainted with the fourth Gospel. Its value

in this direction has been chiefly negative. It has removed the objection that Justin's doctrine belongs to an earlier period than the Johannine, and shewn that it really represents a later phase of development; and to this extent it favours the hypothesis that the Gospel is the earlier composition. There are, however, certain features in Justin's way of unfolding his subject which afford some positive evidence,—evidence, indeed, of a delicate character, and not placed beyond the reach of doubt, but valuable to the really critical mind, which is content patiently to weigh probabilities, and does not impetuously thrust aside as worthless every argument which falls short of demonstration. To these we must now address ourselves.

It seems most probable that some evangelical document esteemed authoritative by Christians contained a doctrine of the Logos which Justin believed to be substantially identical with his own. In the absence of express quotation, and with our author's want of strictness and accuracy in the use of language, there is room for uncertainty; but the following indications point in this direction.

Justin apparently assumes throughout that he is defending, not some new opinions of his own, but the faith of the great body of Christian believers. He candidly admits that "some" did not entertain the same opinion as himself in regard to the divine nature of Christ; but this word "some" implies that the majority of Christians were on his side. He adds: "With these I do not agree; nor should I even if most who thought as I do [that is, most Christians] should affirm it [Christ's natural human descent], since we have been ordered by Christ himself not to believe human doctrines, but those which were preached through the blessed prophets and were taught through him."¹ Here again it is clearly implied that Justin, in his own conception, represented the opinion of "most."

Further, it is evident from the last quotation, unless its solemn appeal is quite irrelevant, that he supported his doctrine of the supernatural sonship of Jesus by the authority

¹ Dial. c. 48.

of the Master himself; and therefore there must have been some evangelical document which put into the mouth of Christ some statements in regard to his own divine and pre-existent nature. This document can hardly have been one of the Synoptics; for the simple title "Son of God" would not, according to Justin's own admission,¹ have been sufficient to establish his conclusion, and we cannot well suppose that this title was rejected by the party who maintained the simple humanity of Jesus. But discourses similar to some of those in the fourth Gospel would have supplied him with the needed element in Christ's teaching. This casual allusion is of considerable importance, because Justin nowhere quotes any words of Christ's in support of his position, and from this fact it has been inferred that he knew of none to quote. Here, however, unless his language is strangely irrelevant, he implies that he was ready on occasion to appeal to Christ's teaching in opposition to some of his fellow-christians; and the reasonable conclusion seems to be, that he fails to quote that teaching because it would not help an argument which was intended to establish the truth of Christianity against unbelievers, and not to maintain the correctness of a particular conception of Christianity against those who admitted the authority of the same Christian documents. In fact, critics expect from Justin's Apologies what they have no right to expect except from his lost works against heretics.

We are not, however, without direct evidence that Justin spoke as a representative of his fellow-christians. We find, for instance, the following passage:—"When we say [τῷ . . . φάσκειν ἡμῶς] that the Logos, which is the offspring of God, has been begotten without intercourse, Jesus Christ our teacher, and that he having been crucified, and having died and risen again, ascended into heaven," &c.² That this "we" is not the mere plural of authorship is evident from the previous chapter, where he obviously speaks in the name of Christians, asking,—
"If we say some things similarly to poets and philosophers, . . .

¹ Ap. I. c. 22.

² Ap. I. c. 21.

why are we unjustly hated beyond all men?" In another place he says,—“We have been taught [ἐδιδάχθημεν], and declared before, that Christ is the first-born of God, being the Logos, of which the whole race of men partook.”¹ Here the derivative character of his Logos doctrine is unequivocally asserted—asserted, too, in combination with one of the most remarkable ideas of the fourth Gospel.

In this connection we must notice the following passage:—“For that he was only-begotten [Μονογενῆς γὰρ ὅτι ἦν] to the Father of the universe, being sprung in a peculiar manner from him as Logos and power [δύναμις], and afterwards having become man through the virgin [ἄνθρωπος . . . γενόμενος], as we learned from the memoirs, I declared before.”² The natural inference from this passage, taken in connection with the previous probabilities, is, that Justin found the titles *μονογενῆς* and *λόγος* applied to Christ in one of his Gospels. The clause, “as we learned from the memoirs,” might possibly refer only to the birth from a virgin; but there is nothing in the structure of the passage to suggest such a limitation; and even if we admit it, still *ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος* points to the fourth Gospel rather than the Synoptics. We must, however, take a wider survey; and I think that a careful consideration of the context in the midst of which this sentence occurs, tends to prove that the word *μονογενῆς* was applied to Christ in the memoirs. The passage is part of a very long comparison which Justin institutes between the twenty-second Psalm and the recorded events of Christ's life. For the purposes of this comparison he refers to or quotes “the Gospel” once, and “the memoirs” ten times, and farther refers to the latter three times in the observations which immediately follow. This is the only place in the Dialogue where “the memoirs” are mentioned. They are appealed to here because they furnish the successive steps of the proof by which the Psalm is shewn to be prophetic. Though the argument occasionally rambles, its main purpose is never forgotten, and the proofs from the memoirs are all in point.

¹ Ap. I. c. 46.

² Dial. c. 105.

We are therefore furnished with a rule by which to judge of the passage before us. The memoirs must in this case also have contained something which indicated the prophetic character of the Psalm. What, then, are the words in the Psalm which have to be illustrated?—"But thou, O Lord, remove not thy help far from me; attend unto my succour. Deliver my soul from the sword, and my only-begotten [τὴν μονογενῆ μου] from the hand of the dog. Save me from the mouth of the lion, and my humiliation from the horns of unicorns." These words, it is added, "are again in a similar way a teaching and prophecy of the things that belong to him [τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ] and were going to happen. For that he was only-begotten," &c. There is here no ground of comparison whatever except in the word *μονογενής*. Whether we adopt or not the conjecture of Maranus¹ that Justin read in the Psalm, τὸν μονογενῆ σου, it is evident that he understood *μονογενῆ* as referring to Christ; and accordingly he places the same word emphatically at the beginning of the sentence in which he proves the reference of this part of the Psalm to Jesus. For the same reason he refers not only to events, but to τὰ ὄντα αὐτοῦ. These are taken up first in the nature and title of *μονογενής*, which immediately suggests *λόγος* and *δύναμις*, while the events are introduced and discussed afterwards. The allusion here to the birth through the virgin has nothing to do with the quotation from the Old Testament, and is probably introduced simply to shew how Christ, although the only-begotten and Logos, was nevertheless a man. If the argument were,—These words allude to Christ, because the memoirs tell us that he was born from a virgin,—it would be utterly incoherent. If it were,—These words allude to Christ, because the memoirs say that he was the only-begotten,—it would be perfectly valid from Justin's point of view. It would not, however, be suitable for a Jew, for whom the fact that Christ was *μονογενής*, not being an historical event, had to rest upon other authority, and therefore Justin, changing his usual form,

¹ See Otto's note.

says that he has already explained to him a doctrine which the Christians learned from the memoirs. It appears to me, then, most probable that the peculiar Johannine title *μονογενής* existed in the Gospels used by Justin.

It is alleged, however, that even if we grant that the clause about the memoirs applies to the whole sentence, and not merely to the words immediately preceding, still the previous statement in c. 100, to which Justin refers, completely disposes of the apparent allusion to the fourth Gospel. It is there asserted that on account of his exposure to dishonour and suffering, Christ called himself the Son of Man, and that he gave Simon the surname of Peter for having by the revelation of the Father recognized him as the Son of God. In evidence of the first statement a passage is quoted:—"The Son of Man must suffer many things," &c. The confession of Peter is mentioned, but not formally quoted; and Justin then proceeds:—"Having it written in the memoirs of his Apostles that he is the Son of God, and calling him Son, we have understood that he is so [*γενοίκαμεν ὄντα*], and that he came forth before all created things from the Father by his power and will, who also has been called in the words of the Prophets in various ways both wisdom and day and dawn and sword and stone and staff and Jacob and Israel, and [we have understood] that he became man through the virgin." On this passage Thoma remarks that Justin can allege only Matt. xvi. 16 from the memoirs in proof of the divine sonship of Christ.¹ Now Justin is not professing to give a list of passages where Jesus is called the Son of God. If so, he would have cited Luke i. 35, which he quotes for a different purpose a little farther on. For each of the titles which he mentions he selects but one illustrative statement. For the designation "Son of Man" he naturally chooses one connected with Christ's suffering and death. For the other he adopts one in which Christ's own approval of the title is most emphatically marked, and in which the recognition of his higher nature is

¹ Justins literarisches Verhältniss zu Paulus u. zum Johannes-Evang., II. p. 552, in the *Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol.*, 1875.

ascribed to a revelation from God; and I know not that one more suited to the purpose could be found even in the fourth Gospel. This argument from silence, therefore, has no weight. Thoma says further in relation to this passage, that that in which Justin agrees with John he has not found *written*, but has *understood*,¹ namely from the prophetical writings. But, in the first place, the Logos does not appear by name in this passage at all. In the second place, Justin does not say that he has understood anything from the Prophets. In the third place, Thoma's distinction is artificial, and in part founded on a mistranslation. He omits *ὅντα* in his rendering. If this be retained, the first thing which Justin says that he *understood* is the very thing that he has just said was *written*; and moreover the assertion about the birth through the virgin, which was contained in the memoirs, is also only *understood*. But, Thoma proceeds, *how* these things were understood is expressly declared, “‘for,’ says Justin immediately before, ‘as he promised in the Gospel (Matt. xi. 27) he has revealed to us everything which we have understood from the Scriptures (of the Old Testament) through his grace, while we recognize him as first-born of God before all creatures.’” Now here Thoma has conveniently omitted a *καί*. Justin really says, “He revealed to us therefore all things, as many as we have understood *also* from the Scriptures through his grace.” In other words, Justin believed that he had learned his doctrines on distinct Christian authority which went back to Christ himself, although he likewise found proofs of them in the Old Testament. Thoma also remarks upon the fact that in the later of the two passages (c. 105) the words are not, “as we *read* in the memoirs,” but, “as we *learned*” from them, as though what is learned were only a matter of inference. In reply to so strange a criticism we need only ask, Did Justin merely *infer* that Jesus uttered the words, “Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit,” since he only *learned* [*ἔμαθον*] the fact from the memoirs?² Or did he intend the emperor merely to infer

¹ Erkannt; but I retain my translation of *νενοήκαμεν*.

² Dial. c. 105.

[δύνασθε μαθεῖν] the events at the crucifixion from the Acts of Pilate,¹ or that the ruler of the demons was called Satan from the Christian writings?² We cannot, therefore, accept Thoma's conclusion that Justin's whole Christology is simply developed from the confession of Peter; for on examination it proves to be a groundless hypothesis. On the other hand, we have to remark, in comparing the earlier and later passages on which we have been commenting, that the former has an express reference to the Prophets as the warrant for a number of epithets which are not in the Gospels, and for nothing else; and that in the latter there is no reference to the Prophets, and there is no statement which is not contained either expressly or by evident implication in our present Gospels. It is also a mere assumption that Justin refers by his προεδήλωσα to the passage in chapter 100, in which the Logos is not mentioned, and in which there is nothing to imply the idea expressed here, and here only, by μονογενής. Why should we not rather have recourse to c. 61, in which the Logos, accompanied as here by the name δύναμις, is mentioned for the first time, and to other passages in which similar views are unfolded? I think, therefore, it is not wholly unreasonable to believe that Justin intended to assert the existence of his Logos doctrine in the memoirs, and that he did not consider it a mere inference from the confession of Peter, to which there is no allusion whatever in the sentence under examination.

From all these considerations I cannot but deem it highly probable that Justin had an authoritative Christian source for his doctrine of the Logos, and probable, though perhaps not in such a high degree, that this source was one of the memoirs.

There is one other point of some importance. The source from which the Logos doctrine was drawn did not contain an account of the miraculous birth. This is proved not only by the absence of all allusion to such an account, while the synoptic narrative is fully referred to and quoted, but from the

¹ Ap. I. cc. 35, 48.

² Ap. I. c. 28.

fact that the Logos is brought into this connection only by a process of inference, identifying him with the Spirit which overshadowed Mary. "The Spirit, then, and the Power from God," it is said, in reference to the narrative in Luke, "it is impious to suppose to be anything else but the Logos."¹ This is in significant agreement with our fourth Gospel, and betrays the process by which Justin harmonized its doctrine with that of the Synoptics.

Now when we remember that Justin's doctrine of the Logos is a developed form of the Johannine, that it harmonizes the Johannine doctrine with that of the Synoptics, that this harmonizing is the only feature which it adds to the Johannine, that probably it rested on the authority of some evangelical source, and that this source probably did not contain an account of the miraculous birth, and further that we have no reason to believe that such a source ever existed except the fourth Gospel, we can hardly help concluding that Justin must have been acquainted with that Gospel, and have relied upon it as a basis for Christian dogmatics.

We must next consider the language in which the doctrine of our apologist is expressed, and how far it coincides with that of the Gospel. As he nowhere quotes the proem of the Gospel, it might be supposed either that he has on independent grounds adapted the doctrine of Philo to Christianity, or that he has embraced ideas which were indeed current among Christians, but were not yet incorporated in any authoritative writing. If our previous judgment has been correct, neither of these suppositions can be accepted. We have seen reason to believe that he had a written Christian source; and whatever this may have been, he has nowhere professedly quoted it. This fact need occasion no difficulty; for though, for various purposes, he repeatedly quotes his Gospels, he is

¹ Ap. I. c. 33. It is significant also that in Dial. c. 100, where he draws a parallel between Eve and Mary, he says that Eve conceived the Logos from the serpent, and brought forth disobedience and death; but in the case of Mary he contents himself with referring to the narrative contained in Luke, and does not venture to say in express terms that she conceived the Logos of God.

also fond of employing his own language to describe the facts and doctrines recorded in them, and it is not his habit to state in the form of an evangelical quotation a doctrine which he wishes to prove, and then proceed to his demonstration. Rather is it his custom to present the Christian dogmas in his own style, or sometimes indeed in words which remind one of the consecutive clauses of a creed.¹ In regard to the proem of the fourth Gospel, supposing him to have had it before him, two causes may have operated to prevent him from quoting it. That proem, as we have seen, is not so explicit as to betray its full meaning to every casual reader. Justin's doctrine stands to it in the relation of a commentary, and nothing could be more natural than that in apologies addressed to persons who did not admit the authority of the Gospels he should present his commentary without the text. The proem, moreover, does not form a part of the evangelical history, and does not repeat the words of Christ himself; and as it is no part of Justin's plan to establish the dogmatic authority of the Apostles, he only follows his usual practice in failing to appeal to it. In one place he apologizes for citing even Christ's words:—"For since, Tryphon, you read, as you yourself acknowledged, the things taught by that Saviour of ours, I do not think that I have acted strangely in mentioning also brief oracles of his in addition to those of the Prophets."² One other consideration remains. We know that Justin made use of the Apocalypse, and ascribed it to the Apostle John.³ He expressly refers to this work as containing the doctrine of the millennium; yet he does not quote it, but immediately cites a saying of Christ's instead. Notwithstanding his belief

¹ Take as an example the following, which may have been a formula of exorcism: "For by the name of this very Son of God, both first-born of all creation, and born through a virgin, and become man liable to suffering, and crucified under Pontius Pilate by your people, and having died, and risen from the dead, and ascended into heaven, every demon being exorcised is overcome and brought into subjection" [Dial. c. 85]; or this: "Whom also we recognized as Christ the Son of God, crucified and risen and ascended into the heavens, and to come again as judge of all men without exception down to Adam himself" [Dial. c. 132].

² Dial. c. 18.

³ Dial. c. 81.

in its apostolical origin, and his acceptance of it as a real revelation, he nowhere else refers to it and never quotes it; and were it not for this one casual allusion, there would be nothing to shew that he had ever heard of it. From this example we may learn how very fallacious are arguments built upon the absence of evidence. But what I wish chiefly to notice is this: the Apocalypse contains the very title which Justin wanted as a basis for his dogma,—καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, 'Ο λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ.¹ Whatever may be the opinion of the modern interpreter, there can be little doubt that Justin would have explained this title in its metaphysical sense. We have, therefore, direct and positive proof that he had one Logos source, which he attributed to the Apostle John, and which nevertheless he neglects to quote. From the foregoing considerations we are justified in concluding that the argument against the use of the proem from the failure to cite it is destitute of force.

It remains, then, for us to inquire whether Justin's language is sufficiently near to that of the Gospel to be regarded as the language of a man who sought to express the doctrine of the proem in his own words, and in a way adapted to the requirements of his particular controversy. The answer to this question will be best given by exhibiting the language of the two writers side by side, so far as they can be brought into comparison.

JOHN.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, i. 1. Cf. εἶχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, and πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, xvii. 5, 24.

JUSTIN.

ὁ λόγος . . . συνὼν, . . . ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν . . . ἔκτισε [Ap. II. c. 6]. [Τὴν ἀρχὴν is in John viii. 25, and is often used by Justin instead of ἐν ἀρχῇ. In Ap. I. c. 59, he uses it to represent ἐν ἀρχῇ of Gen. i. 1.] συνῆν τῷ πατρί [Dial. c. 62. Justin may have preferred συνῆν as less suggestive of an attribute than ἦν πρὸς]. τὸν καὶ πρὸ ποιήσεως κόσμου ὄντα θεόν [Dial. c. 56, p. 276 D]. θεὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἔσται [Dial. c. 58. As we have seen, the title θεός is used repeatedly].

¹ xix. 13.

πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, i. 3. ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, i. 10.

δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε . . . κοσμήσαι τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ [Ap. II. c. 6]. ὥστε λόγῳ θεοῦ . . . γεγενῆσθαι τὸν πάντα κόσμον [Ap. I. c. 59]. τὸν θεὸν διὰ λόγου τὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι ἔγνωσαν [Ap. I. c. 64].

ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, i. 4.

πηγὴ ὕδατος ζῶντος . . . ἀνέβλυσεν οὗτος ὁ Χριστός [Dial. c. 69 ; cf. John vii. 38, 39].

ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, i. 9. τ. φ. τοῦ κόσμου, viii. 12, ix. 5.

τοῦ μόνου ἀμόμου καὶ δικαίου φωτός, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πεμφθέντος [Dial. c. 17]. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ αἰώνιον φῶς λάμπειν μέλλων [Dial. c. 113].

ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, i. 9.

ὁ φωτιζόμενος [Ap. I. c. 61, of one who is baptized]. λόγος γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ ὢν [Ap. II. c. 10]. τὸ ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου [Ap. II. c. 8]. οὗ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων μετέσχε [Ap. I. c. 46].

οἱ δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, i. 12.

οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες Χριστιανοί εἰσι [Ap. I. c. 46]. οἱ πιστεύοντες αὐτῷ . . . ἄνθρωποι, ἐν οἷς οἰκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρμα, ὁ λόγος [Ap. I. c. 32].

ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, i. 14.

ὁ λόγος . . . σαρκοποιηθεὶς ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν [Ap. I. c. 32. We have seen how often similar expressions occur. Compare the σαρκωθέντα, ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, of the Nicene and other Creeds]. σάρκα ἔχων [Dial. c. 48].

μονογενής, i. 18, &c.

μονογενής [Dial. c. 105].

Though this comparison cannot prove that Justin made use of the fourth Gospel, it cannot be denied that his language is sufficiently like the Johannine to be quite consistent with a relationship of dependence between them. We find in the Apologist four characteristic Johannine expressions, λόγος, φῶς, σὰρξ in σαρκοποιηθεὶς, and μονογενής. We have an almost iden-

tical statement of the creation of the κόσμος and πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ, the very similar συνῆν τῷ πατρὶ and τὴν ἀρχὴν used of the Logos, and one or two other less marked resemblances. The phraseology, then, in which Justin propounds his doctrine is not incompatible with our previous conclusion.

The consideration of other lines of evidence must be reserved for a future article.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

II.—TITIAN.

Titian, his Life and Times, with some Account of his Family, chiefly from new and unpublished Records. By J. A. Crowe and G. B. Cavalcaselle. 2 vols. 8vo. London: Murray. 1877.

THESE two splendid volumes are the instalment last published of Messrs. Crowe and Cavalcaselle's great work on the History of Painting in Italy. Why in the case of Titian they should have abandoned the historical for the biographical method, or whether in their account of the later masters of the Florentine and Umbrian schools they mean to return to the former, they do not explain. Perhaps Titian's long life, his position as the chief exponent of Venetian art and the world's greatest colourist, the abundance and variety of the materials for his life, may be the reason for the exceptionally minute treatment which our authors have given him. We cannot complain: bulky as these volumes are, they contain no surplusage, and their story is well told. And it is a story of singular interest. Titian's time was one of transition: he stood on the ridge dividing the pure religious art of Italy from the classical Renaissance, and felt the winds that blew from both. He was great in every department of art: Ruskin calls him "the master of heroic landscape:" no portrait-painter had ever such a choice of sitters or painted them so well: the "Assumption of the Virgin" and the "Bacchus and Ariadne" shew him equally at home in the illustration of Christian and

Pagan mythology. During a life that extended almost to the compass of a century, his industry never flagged; and men still praise as masterpieces works that in execution are separated from each other by an interval of seventy years. He was the court painter, in many cases the personal friend of all the ruling families of Italy in his day—D'Estes, Gonzagas, Della Roveres, Medicis, Farneses; he enjoyed something like the affection of Charles V.; and Philip II., the cold, the saturnine, the cruel, cared for him as much as he did for any one. All this makes his story an epitome of the artists' life of his time. We see how painters lived then; how they worked; in what coin they were paid; on what terms they stood with royal and noble patrons; what were their relations to politics, religion, literature. This—following humbly in our authors' footsteps—we now propose to try to tell; not attempting to soar into regions of high æsthetic criticism, for which we honestly confess that we have no wings, yet at the same time endeavouring to mingle with the information so amply given in these volumes, something drawn from the stores of our own recollection.

It is curious to note how many of the painters whose works make the glory of Venetian art, were natives, not of the islands in the lagoon, but of the mainland. Tintoretto and possibly Sebastian del Piombo were genuine Venetians. But Cima, Carpaccio, Basaiti and Giorgione, were all born at different points of the country to the north and north-east of Venice. Pordenone and Bonvicino—perhaps better known as Il Moretto—are claimed by Brescia. Palma Vecchio and Lorenzo Lotto were Bergamasques. The name of Paul Veronese sufficiently indicates the city of Romeo and Juliet as his birthplace. And the same is the case with the greatest of them all. Tiziano Vecelli, whom the world knows as Titian, was born, in 1477, at Pieve, a village in the Alpine district of Cadore, eighty-six miles northward from Venice. The Vecelli, among whom there was more than one Titian, were an ancient race, who had borne arms in the frequent struggles between Venice and the Empire for the possession of Cadore, but whose prevailing

inclination seemed to be towards the legal profession. How one of them came to bring up a son to the craft of painting, it is impossible to say ; but that there was a persistent artistic strain in the Vecelli blood is shewn by the fact that, besides Titian himself, at least seven of his kinsmen, near and remote, were painters of more or less merit. Titian quitted Cadore when he was only nine years old, to be apprenticed in Venice, but he left a large part of his affections behind him. We shall see presently how deep an influence the scenery of his native peaks and valleys exercised upon his art ; but apart from this he kept up the kindest relations with his Cadorine friends and kinsfolk, acted as their agent and patron in Venice, and almost always spent his autumn *villeggiatura* among them.

Of Titian's early life in Venice, and of the efforts by which he won his way first to employment and then to fame, very little is recorded. Sebastian Zuccato, who is known to posterity only as a mosaist, is reported to have been his first teacher. From him he is said to have found his way into the studios first of Gentile, then of Giovanni Bellini. Other stories connect him, not as pupil but as partner, with the great names of Palma and Giorgione. If it is true that the allegorical picture in the Borghese Palace at Rome, known as "Sacred and Profane Love" (but which our authors prefer to call "Artless and Sated Love"), belongs to as early a date as 1500, we must believe that Titian at twenty-three, if not already in possession of all the characteristic qualities of his style, had taken a place fully abreast of the great leaders of the Venetian school. From this time his progress may be traced without much interruption, partly by his acknowledged pictures, partly by his numerous letters on business which have been preserved to us. The first of his aristocratic patrons was Alfonso D'Este, Duke of Ferrara, known in Italian history not only for his own qualities, but as the husband of Lucrezia Borgia ; and as "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's," was the motto upon the gold coin of Ferrara, and the picture long hung in that city, we may plausibly conjecture that the "Christ and

the Tribute-money," which now adorns the Dresden Gallery, was the first fruits of a connection which was long and profitable to the painter.

In 1513, we find Titian petitioning the Council of Ten for employment by the Venetian State, and obtaining it. It is true that the appointment, met by violent opposition on the part of the Bellinis, was cancelled in the following year; but it was renewed in a slightly different shape after the lapse of a few months; and from this time forth it is his business not only to assist in the decoration of the Ducal Palace,—which he does after many excuses on his own part and some threats on the part of the State,—but to paint the portrait of each successive Doge. But he evidently cares more for the position and emoluments of State-painter than for the opportunity of thus exercising his art. Commissions flow in upon him both from Venice and Italy at large. Picture after picture goes to Ferrara, among them the "Bacchus and Ariadne" of our National Gallery. Whether Alfonso wants a portrait, a sacred piece, an illustration of Philostratus or Ovid, Titian's facile pencil executes every order with an equal and a consummate grace. This is the period, too, of the great "Assumption of the Virgin," once in the Church of the Frari, now in the Academy of Arts in Venice,—a picture which perhaps best represents, to all but the careful student, Titian's relation to sacred art. Presently we find him transferred by Alfonso D'Este to his nephew, Federigo Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, in whom he again finds a sitter and a patron. And it was only natural that when, in 1530, Charles V. came to Italy, these princes should send for their favourite painter to introduce him to the Emperor.

The first interview, which took place according to Vasari at Bologna in 1530, our authors, relying upon documentary evidence, postpone till 1532. In that year, the Emperor, coming to Mantua, was much struck with Titian's portrait of the Marquis, who immediately took the opportunity of summoning the painter from Ferrara, where he happened at the moment to be. Titian did not immediately obey; so that his

first portrait of Charles V., to be succeeded by so many others, was painted at Bologna. The result was a connection between him and the Imperial family which lasted during his whole lifetime. The occasion of his twice crossing the Alps was to attend upon Charles when he was holding high court at Augsburg; and to the last he continued to send to Philip II. pictures which now make Madrid richer in his works than any other city of Europe. There was something of a personal element in this connection: many current stories, which, if not literally true, have their origin in a general belief, testify to a certain confidential intimacy with the Emperor to which Titian was admitted. It is not easy to estimate the exact pecuniary fruits of this imperial patronage: we shall find Titian constantly applying for arrears of pensions, which, if his complaints were well founded, were very irregularly paid. But honours, which perhaps he valued more, were showered upon his head. He was made a Count of more kinds than one, and a Knight of the Golden Spur, a dignity which carried with it the right of access to court; while his children were "raised to the rank of Nobles of the Empire, with all the honours appertaining to families with four generations of ancestors." And he was with the Emperor, in a sense, to the last. The scanty inventory of the goods which Charles took with him to his monastic retreat at Yuste, includes eight pictures by Titian. One well known as the "Glory of Titian," representing Charles and his family kneeling before the Trinity and the Virgin in heaven, was placed over the high altar of the convent church, where, by means of a hole in the wall, the Emperor could see it, and follow the performance of mass from his bed-room. And on the day when his fatal illness declared itself,—the day after the fantastic obsequies of himself in which he bore a part,—his last act was to send for his Titians into the gallery where he was sitting in the sun, and to hang over them, and in especial over the portrait of his dead wife, abstracted and motionless, so long, that at last his physician deemed it necessary to rouse him from his day-dream. Then he awoke,

complained of feeling ill, and was carried to the bed from which he rose no more.

We need not follow Titian in detail through the remaining years of his life. They were of the same complexion as those which we have already related. His long life, his untiring industry, his intimate relations with the great, elevated him to a kind of primacy among Venetian, and indeed Italian painters,—a position which abundant means, a hospitable turn of mind, and a certain stateliness of character and bearing, helped him to fill with credit. He lost his wife, Cecilia, somewhat early in life, and never married again, but brought his sister Orsa from Cadore to keep his house and to bring up his children. Of these, Pomponio, the eldest, was an irreclaimable scapegrace, and the plague of his father's life. It is characteristic of the time that he should be in priest's orders, and that his father's influence should have been freely used to procure him preferment: characteristic, too, of Pomponio's absolute worthlessness that the father was compelled to divert to a nephew benefits which he had intended for his son. Orazio, the second son, was his capable and industrious assistant in the studio, a painter who, if he had the ability to make a reputation for himself, has merged his own fame in his father's. Titian's only daughter, Lavinia, whom he fondly loved and often painted, is the damsel, holding high above her head a basket of fruit, with whom every visitor to the Museum at Berlin is familiar. She was married, in June 1555, to Cornelio Sarcinelli, a gentleman of Serravalle, and we hear no more of her. Her father, though then almost seventy, had yet thirty years of uninterrupted industry still before him. It is hardly possible to say of the works of this period that they are equal to those of his most vigorous time; but his knowledge and mastery of the secrets of the brush were still unrivalled, even if the vivacity of his imagination was somewhat dulled; and one of the chief ornaments of the Ducal Palace at Venice, "The Doge Grimani kneeling before Faith," was still in his studio when he died. Even at the

last, when he was upon the very verge of his hundredth year, the end came suddenly. The great plague of 1576 was fatal both to him and his son Orazio. He had directed in his will that his body should be taken to Cadore, and there laid in the family chapel at Pieve; but the necessities of a time of pestilence prevailed, and he was buried in the church of Sta. Maria Gloriosa dei Frari, where a stately monument, erected by Canova within the memory of the present generation, records the fame which is best preserved by the marvels of his own pencil.

It is singular to note how, through the whole of his long career, Titian never ceased to be the mountaineer of the Dolomite Alps. It was not merely that, as we have seen, he never lost sight of his early home and often re-visited it, but that it impressed a distinct character upon his art. Although he is not recorded to have painted more than one landscape, a canvas which can no longer be identified, in most of his pictures landscape assumes a dignity and importance to which it had up to his time been strange. It is true that his landscape is still only an accessory, and one which he does not hesitate to treat with strict regard to the general necessities of the painting: however accurate its form, its colours are sometimes impossible, and its horizons are heightened to a deeper than a natural glow in order to reflect upon the living tenants of the scene. And, again, the landscape of the "Peter Martyr," in the recent destruction of which by fire Venetian art suffered an irreparable loss, was so elaborate and occupied so large a part of the canvas, as to suggest the idea whether for once the accessory had not overpowered the essential. Titian's landscape was all at Cadore. The weird peaks and shelves into which its Dolomitic Alps are broken, its narrow valleys, its foaming torrents, its groves of chestnut and of pine, its plentiful apple orchards, its steep meadows high hung on the mountain slope, furnished the backgrounds both for scriptural illustration and classical allegory, and did duty for Palestine and Hellas alike. What note-books Titian has left are full of sketches of his beloved Cadore, glimpses caught on his yearly

journeys up and down, or reminiscences of the fields and peaks round the home of his kinsmen. There is an accuracy about them which is characteristic both of the painter and of his art: the subjects of some can be identified even yet. And when in later life Titian was able to settle himself in a stately and hospitable Venetian home, he found it at Biri Grande, in a house still standing, though degraded to base uses, on the shore of the Venetian island, and looking with uninterrupted prospect northward over the lagoon. Thence in the clear light of morning or evening might sometimes be discerned, towering over a cleft in the lower hills of Ceneda, the snowy peak of the Antelao, the mountain giant which lifts himself above Pieve de Cadore to the height of nearly 11,000 feet, a constant memento to the painter of the valley where he was born and the streams by which he had played. Yet firm as was Titian's grasp upon such elements of landscape art as he needed for other purposes, and poetical as was the eye in which he read the secrets of Nature, it is curious to remark that none of her grander aspects, such as must have been often seen by him from Biri Grande—the line of snow-clad Alps, the glory of morning or evening flushing the mountains with rosy red, the splendour of a summer storm upon the sea—has been commemorated by him. With all the powers of a great landscape painter half awakened within him, he does not seem to have arrived at the conception that inanimate Nature is worth studying and painting for herself, no less than as the scene and accessory of human action.*

But is Titian a great religious painter? The question would probably have to be answered differently according to the side from which it was approached—that of religion itself, or that of artistic force and accomplishment. We well recollect that our own first impression of Titian in Venice was one of almost unmixed disappointment. Probably it would always be so to those who have made their first acquaintance

* For all that concerns Titian's relations to Cadore, we may recommend Mr. Josiah Gilbert's charming volume, published in 1869, entitled, "*Cadore, or Titian's Country.*"

with the sacred art of Italy through the medium of engraving, and have learned to rate at the highest value those qualities of purity of line and delicacy of expression which it is in the power of the burin to reproduce. At the same time, too, we first came under the spell of Giovanni Bellini, whose pictures, almost to the neglect of others not less famous, we industriously hunted up in every church and gallery of Venice. By the side of their profound religious earnestness, their simple spiritual beauty, their unpretending but most real depth and harmony of colouring, even Titian's Assumption seemed mannered and theatrical; and it was perhaps natural that, missing in his pictures qualities to which they make little pretension, we should fail for a while to discern the transcendent merits which they actually possess. It remains true that the severe earnestness of Giotto, the rapt devotion of Fra Angelico, will not be found in Titian. Not only did he belong to another age, an age of decaying faith and enlarged knowledge, but he was himself a different man. No doubt he accepted the religion of his time with calm and easy assent, and believed it as much as he believed anything. But his art was the chief thing to him. Ovid was becoming the fashion among his royal and princely patrons, and he would just as soon illustrate Ovid as the Gospels. If a customer wished it, he would paint his portrait kneeling before the Virgin; but we may conjecture that the living man interested him quite as much as the Queen of Heaven, and would hardly be made the lay figure of the piece. But, more than this, he was the greatest of Venetians, and the glory of Venice was not form, but—what is harder to analyze, and appeals to fewer perceptions—colour.

Whence the school of Florence received the gift of form, while it remained unable to conquer completely the secret of colour,—whence the school of Venice drank in the mystery of colour, though never rising to the purest apprehension of form,—is one of the strange problems of human faculty which we hardly think tables of averages will ever be able to solve. Yet Venetian colour, at least, is a fact which cannot

be gainsaid. The great fire at the Ducal Palace, which in 1577 destroyed so many of the elder marvels of Venetian art, necessitated its re-decoration by the painters of an inferior time. The greatest of the men whose works now adorn its walls is Tintoretto ; and in spite of Mr. Ruskin's uncompromising eulogy of that unequal painter, we may be permitted to think that he was very far indeed from realizing the vain-glorious motto which he inscribed upon the door of his studio :
• "The design of Michael Angelo and the colouring of Titian." Still, in spite of the fact that many of these pictures contain in themselves little that is interesting, notwithstanding that they are often vulgar in form and extravagant in conception, the power of the school makes itself manifest in the depth and brilliancy of the general decorative effect, which no other building in the world can equal. Venice at her weakest can defy competition here. But the same is the case throughout all her history. In Cima, in Carpaccio, in the Bellinis, we see the beginnings of the same power which was to ripen so brilliantly in Giorgione, in Titian, in Paul Veronese. To say that Venice herself was a picture,—that her palaces, bright with various marble, rose from clear depths of green sea into clearer heights of azure sky,—that her chief church is, from pavement to dome, the world's crowning marvel of deep rich hues,—and that the men who from every corner of north-eastern Italy set up their easels there, of necessity dipped their brushes into more brilliant colour, and learned the secret of blending them into a more harmonious depth,—may be only to confound cause with effect : if Venice made Venetians, Venetians had first made Venice. But however this may be, colour is the side from which to approach Titian's or any other supreme Venetian art, if we would make a just estimate of it. Severer forms of beauty may be found elsewhere, purer lines, deeper religious insight ; but nowhere life so vigorous, so stately, so serene, so full of sunshine. Perhaps the sunshine is too much of the earth, earthy : even to Giovanni Bellini, Angelico's Paradise would have been too ethereal by far : no impassable gulf separates Titian's Magdalen from his Venus : his Ariadne and his Virgin are cousins,

if not sisters, and both Venetians. But it would be as ungrateful to find fault with them on that account, as to complain that Paul Veronese's "Marriage of Cana" is manifestly being solemnized with all the pomp and parade proper in the house of a Venetian senator. Pure religious illustration is by no means the first thing in the mind of these later Venetian painters when they take a subject from the Bible or the Legends of the Saints. The story is only the pretext for filling the canvas with grandly-moulded forms, some of splendid dignity, some of a soft, voluptuous stateliness, but all animated by a full, ample, serene vitality, and suffused by one rich glow of harmonious colour.

We have said that the Assumption of the Virgin, once in the Church of the Frari, but now a chief ornament of the Academy of Arts at Venice, probably represents to most minds the culminating point of Titian's religious art. Not only is it undoubtedly a very great picture, but it lends itself easily to reproduction by engraving, and has been repeatedly engraved. It was painted too in 1516-18, when Titian was about thirty years of age. Perhaps the subject does not appeal very powerfully to Protestant sympathies: from the religious point of view, the figure of the Eternal fails to impress, as from the necessity of the case such representations always must fail: the Virgin, with her attendant choir of child angels, leaves us cold: while the attitudes of the wondering apostles in the lower part of the picture have something that is forced and exaggerated. But it is impossible not to marvel, and that with an ever-increasing wonder, at the *bravura* of the execution, and the spectator is apt to forget any falling short of the noblest expression of religious feeling, in remarking the splendid ease of the painter's executive power. The "Peter Martyr," once in the Chapel of the Rosary of SS. Giovanni e Paolo, but unhappily destroyed by fire in 1867, was a picture about ten years later in date than the "Assumption." But its subject also is one in which it is not possible to take much religious interest: neither Dominican Inquisitor and his murderer, nor the flying disciple, touch the spectator

otherwise than by the vigour of the design: and the chief beauty of the picture lies in the woody landscape which is the scene of action. On the whole, we should be inclined to assign the first place among Titian's religious pictures to "The Presentation in the Temple," painted about 1540, and now in the Academy of Arts at Venice. It is full of a stately architecture, which, if not Venetian, certainly is not Judean: the inevitable hills of Cadore are seen in the background; and the crowd of spectators who watch the child as she goes alone up the long flight of steps to meet the welcome of the high-priest, is composed of Venetian senators. But these accessories—even the old woman selling eggs, who sits in the foreground—do not detract from the simply human interest of the incident, but rather tend to give it a certain domestic intimacy and sweetness. The whole story is so completely legendary, that the painter is not felt to have taken an unwarrantable liberty in moulding it to his pleasure. And no eye which could feel the charm of suavity of line or harmony of colour would fail to linger long over this masterpiece.

Titian's religious art was no doubt greatly affected by his relations to the Renaissance. As we shall see presently, he lived on terms of the greatest intimacy with Sansovino and Aretine, who may be taken to represent the architecture and the literature of the new period. We need only compare the façade of the Library at Venice, Sansovino's work, with the long arcades and archaic sculptures of the Ducal Palace which it faces, to see how wide an interval, not of time only but of feeling, parts the two, and the states of mind from which they issued. Judging from Titian's pictures, the only direct evidence which remains to us, we should suppose that he estimated the old simple faith and the new classical enthusiasm from the impartial eminence of art, and that what he chiefly saw in both were abundant opportunities of pictorial illustration. But we cannot help thinking that, if he had lived a little later, his religious pictures would have been fewer than they are, and would have engaged less of his best skill. There was something in the essential quality of his art which

answered to the Greek conception of life. A pure naturalness the nakedness of which is without shame, the full vitality of the undraped form, the sunshine of unsolicited pleasure flooding the whole of existence, the rejection of the mysterious and the sorrowful into the background of life, a measured stateliness, a sweet serenity, were what Titian loved to paint or to suggest in painting; and these were easier to associate with the deep meadows of Arcadia or the mountain slopes of Hymettus, than with the shores of Gennesareth or the austere groves of the Mount of Olives. Naturally his representations of pagan mythology do not stop at this point. The interpretation of the legends of an unconscious age by a painter who belongs to one that is eminently self-conscious, can hardly escape a taint. The suggestion of the impure starts up when least intended or expected: mankind cannot strip itself of the gathered experience of centuries, and go back to the innocence of the Age of Gold. The "Bacchus and Ariadne" of the National Gallery, still more the "Danae" of the Hermitage, and the "Jupiter and Antiope" of the Louvre, are ambiguous pictures which may be read both ways: the rigid purist may shake his head over them; the true lover of art will say, "*Honi soit qui mal y pense.*" In our view, Titian may be described, in one phrase, as a consummate art-craftsman: he painted to please his patrons, without troubling himself with moral subtleties; and whatever he painted, he painted masterfully, nobly, serenely, as his nature was. He did not seek beneath the surface of pagan myths for depths of mystic feeling, as did some of the early Florentines; nor, on the other hand, did his pencil consciously prostitute itself to the service of the impure. Like all men in whom the simply æsthetic faculty is the strongest, he was a pure naturalist, and rested contentedly in the fulness and variety and majesty of nature.

But it is perhaps as a portrait-painter that Titian, if not absolutely greatest, has his chief hold upon posterity. The number of those who love and appreciate the highest achievements of ideal art will always be small; while to the many

who care more for the story of a painting than for the skill displayed in telling it, the monotony of subject in the sacred art of Italy soon becomes wearisome, and one Madonna is hardly worse or better than another. But who that has any imaginative hold at all upon the past, is not interested to see the "counterfeit presentment" of the great general, "in his armour as he lived;" the astute statesman, looking out of the canvas with the grave shrewdness which baffled intrigue and carried persistent purpose to its goal; the poet, with fancy throned upon his brow, and fire sleeping in his eye: the famous beauty, in all the plenitude of the charms which dazzled the coldest and led the wisest captive! Portrait-painting is at once the highest and the most unfairly depreciated form of pictorial art. No doubt its practical range is very wide, from the performance of a wandering Dick Tinto, executed to pay an ale-house scot, to the immortal loveliness of Gainsborough's Mrs. Graham, the stately melancholy of Vandyke's Charles I., the majestic age of Raphael's Julius II.; but it ought to be judged by its highest, not its lowest, achievements. Hardly any artist of supreme rank has scorned the portrait. Turner was a pure landscapist, whose magic forsook him when he touched human form; Michael Angelo preferred the chisel to the brush, and when his Papal patrons compelled him to paint, moved only in the highest regions of ideal art. But Fra Bartolommeo, Raphael, Leonardo, Giovanni Bellini, Titian, Sebastian del Piombo, Paul Veronese, Bonvicino, Rubens, Rembrandt, Velasquez, Holbein, Vandyke, Gainsborough, Reynolds, with many more of subtlest skill, living and dead, that might easily be enumerated, prove a wide-spread conviction among great painters that the spiritual interpretation of a noble human face is among the highest functions of their art. It is a marvel of intuitive discernment to read the secret of a character, the history of a life, in features that change their expression from moment to moment; a marvel of executive skill so to fix one aspect upon the canvas as to tell the tale for ever.

Human nature is pretty much the same at every epoch, and

the successful delineation of its essential qualities will always depend upon the genius of the painter. But generations vary greatly in external picturesqueness, and the men whom Sir Joshua Reynolds immortalized hardly made as good pictures as their great-grandfathers yielded to Vandyke. And Titian was fortunate in his sitters. The Italy of the sixteenth century—which it is hardly too much to say that we see chiefly through his eyes—was a land of stately men and beautiful women, who delighted themselves in rich ornaments and splendid apparel, and behind the self-restrained serenity of whose features hid itself a world of passionate vitality and undisciplined will. To both sides of the requirement Titian's genius completely answered. He could fill his picture with appropriate accessories, which at once threw face and figure into the desired relief, and charmed the eye with a glow of harmonious colour. He could read the secrets of the spirit, and commit to the tell-tale custody of the canvas facts of character which the sitter would never have consciously revealed. Then he lived and worked so long, his supremacy in Italian art was so undisputed, fortune brought him so closely into contact with those on whose craft or passion the fate of nations turned, that his pictures answer for the most part to the best known names in contemporary history and are its living illustration. No doubt, if we were to believe all that the catalogues of European galleries tell us, we should conclude that all men and women of name, and many nameless, at one time or other stood before Titian's easel: canvasses without number by Morone and Il Moretto, to say nothing of the productions of less notable men, are ascribed to the great Venetian. Still, the list of remarkable portraits which not only carry with them their own evidence of genuineness, but have a known history, is a long one. We must try to give our readers some imperfect idea of its extent, and of the brilliancy of the names which compose it.

One, and not the least remarkable, company of Titian's sitters groups itself round the central figure of Charles V. We have already seen that the Emperor and the painter met

in Italy; but Titian twice went to Augsburg, in 1548 and again in 1550, to attend the court in the capacity of portrait-painter, and his professional connection with Madrid ended only with his life. How often he painted Charles V. it is difficult to say: once, in full length, in armour; again, in splendid attire of peace, playing with a favourite hound; now, as he sat silent and morose in his chair of state, brooding over politics or perchance the gout; and once more, on horseback, armed cap-a-pied, and with lance in hand, as he triumphed over the Protestants on the field of Mülberg. The special object of Titian's second visit to Augsburg was to paint Philip II., and one of the pictures he then produced was sent to Mary Tudor three years afterwards to waken in her the fatal love for her cold and ungainly suitor.* Ferdinand of Austria, Charles' brother and successor in the empire, their sister Queen Mary of Hungary, the unhappy boy Don Carlos, and many other less known scions of the royal house, were also portrayed by Titian. A place in this gallery of family portraits must be reserved for Margaret of Parma, the Emperor's illegitimate daughter, the unhappy wife first of the infamous Alessandro de' Medici, next of Ottavio Farnese, but best known as the Regent of the Netherlands, whose milder sway was superseded by the sanguinary rule of Alva. Alva himself is here, as well as the two Granvelles; Nicholas, the elder, Charles' omnipotent Chancellor and "bed of rest;" and Anthony, Bishop of Arras and Cardinal, the minister of Philip. The line of statesmen is continued in Francesco Vargas, in Cardinal Madruzzi, Prince Bishop of Trent at the time of the famous Council, and last of all, in Titian's extreme old age, in Antonio Perez; while the soldiers of the court find a splendid representative in Davalos, Marquis del Vasto, one of Charles' most brilliant generals, whose parting from his wife, the lovely Mary of

* The Poet Laureate has made a slight but pardonable breach with history in representing Mary as retaining this portrait till near her death, and then in a fit of jealous anger cutting it out of its frame. (Queen Mary, Act v. Sc. 5.) The picture was sent back to Mary of Hungary in 1554, and by her taken to Spain in 1556. It is now No. 454 in the Museum at Madrid.

Arragon, depicted in the allegorical fashion of the age, is one of the treasures of the Louvre. And strangely mixing with these Catholic and Southern figures are one or two of a very different type, vividly illustrating in their contrast the perplexity of the age. For at the time of Titian's visit to Augsburg, he found there and painted John Frederick the Magnanimous, Elector of Saxony, who had perilled and lost his states for the Reformation's sake, and was now, after the battle of Mühlberg, the Emperor's prisoner, waiting the sentence of death which was passed, though never executed, upon him. His faithful friend and constant attendant in prison was Lucas Cranach, the Lutheran painter, who when his master sat to Titian, took his own opportunity of portraying his famous fellow-craftsman. Here, too, were Philip of Hesse, another steadfast patron of Luther and Melancthon, and Maurice of Saxony, who, though himself a Protestant, intrigued his cousin out of the Electorate, and founded a royal line, of which the potentate whom Carlyle calls "Augustus the Physically Strong" was the most disreputable, and his great-great-granddaughter, Georges Sand, the most distinguished representative.

It is a still harder task to enumerate the most memorable of Titian's Italian portraits. To any one acquainted with the politics and society of this time, the groups of names suggest his relations to a particular family or court, and, were all contemporary record lost, would go far to reconstruct his career. It was his official business at Venice to paint the portraits of all the Doges who successively rose to power through the greater part of his long life; but, in addition to the chiefs of the State, many of noblest name in Venice were commemorated by him. Passing these by, the student of literature will recognize the name of the Venetian statesman and connoisseur, Cardinal Bembo, and of Titian's own disreputable friend Pietro Aretino, who made the island city his home. Beyond the lagoon, Titian found his first royal patron in Alfonso D'Este, Duke of Ferrara. Him he painted; his wife Lucrezia Borgia, who, sprung from an

infamous race, is by alternate historians now compelled to share, now absolved from participation in their infamy; his son, Ercole II.; his mistress, or perhaps his second wife, Laura Dianti; and, for posterity at least by far the most notable member of the Ferrarese group, the poet Ariosto. Whether Titian had any other connection with the Borgias than this is hard to say; yet we know that among the pictures of our own Charles the First was one ascribed to him, representing Pope Alexander VI. and his son Cæsar. What is quite certain is, that from the court of Ferrara, Titian passed to that of Mantua, where he painted the Marquis, Federico Gonzaga, and his wife Isabella D'Este. A similar family connection may have had something to do with his friendly reception at the little court of Urbino, where Eleanora Gonzaga was the wife of the Duke, Francesco Maria della Rovere. The portraits of both now hang in the Uffizi at Florence: what is become of that of their successor, Guidobaldo II., we do not know. Of the Medici he painted, of the stock of Lorenzo the Magnificent, now almost extinct, the young Cardinal Ippolito, the illegitimate son of that Giuliano who sits in immortal marble in the Sacristy of San Lorenzo at Florence; and of the other line, soon to give a succession of dukes to the city on the Arno, Giovanni, known as Dei Bandi Neri, the father of the first Cosmo. There were two portraits of Cardinal Ippolito; nor can anything be more characteristic of the loose churchmanship of the times than that one should represent him in full armour, the other "in the red cap and variegated plume of a Magyar." Philibert Emmanuel of Savoy, Francesco Sforza of Milan, with his wife Christina of Denmark, swell the list of royal sitters. But among the most liberal patrons of Titian's later times were the Farneses, Paul III. and his brood. He painted them all: the old Pope; his nephew and minister, Cardinal Alessandro; his son, for whom he fought and intrigued so shamelessly, Pier Luigi; his grandson Ottavio, the husband of Margaret of Parma; even Clelia Farnese, the Cardinal's illegitimate daughter. They are single and grouped: in one picture, which represents the Pope,

eighty years of age, seated moodily and angrily in his chair, while Alessandro, clad in his official robes, stands behind him, and Ottavio comes in bare-headed and obsequiously bowing as if to make an explanation, a whole family history is indicated. Of the picture of Paul III., now in the Museum at Naples, the story is told that, when it was varnished and set to dry on the terrace before Titian's house, the passers-by took off their hats to the dumb effigy as they would have done to a living Pontiff. Did Titian, as he painted this magnificent work, think of Raphael's Julius II. and Leo X., and resolve to shew that he too could paint a Pope?

How the painter was remunerated for his long labours it is not easy to say in a few words. With private patrons we may suppose that he made his own bargains; while everything leads us to infer that, in spite of a certain stateliness of hospitality, which answered to the whole character of the man, and the prodigality of his son Pomponio, he amassed considerable wealth. His house at Biri Grande was his own; he had land near Cadore, two saw-mills and a meadow at Ansogne, eighteen fields at Milaré, other lands at Serravalle, and a cottage at Conegliano. He filled the granaries of Cadore in a time of scarcity, and took the bond of the community, bearing interest, in payment. When his daughter Lavinia was married, he gave her the large dowry of 1400 ducats. Of his relations to the Venetian State we can speak somewhat more in detail. He was retained, so to speak, in the service of the successive Doges by the receipt of a broker's patent, in the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, a kind of hostel provided for the German merchants, who were allowed to trade with Venetian citizens only through fixed channels of communication. A patent of this kind, which was also held by Giovanni Bellini, and the duties of which were discharged by deputy, was worth about 100 ducats a year, and the painter was paid in addition for whatever work he was called upon to execute. How Titian's first promise of a patent was revoked in consequence of the jealousy of the Bellinis; how, after a brief interval, it was again made good; how for twenty-three years he did *not*

execute the picture in the Ducal Palace which was to be the justification of his salary from the public funds; how his emolument being for a time taken away, he painted his famous "Battle of Cadore," which perished in the fire of 1577, —forms an interesting episode in his career which now we have not time to tell. With Royal and Papal patrons his dealings are somewhat more complicated. Vasari says that, whenever he painted the Emperor he received a fee of 1000 scudi in gold; but that this was paid in ready money we should be inclined to doubt. Judging from Titian's letters, a deferred liquidation in pensions, privileges and preferment, especially of the ecclesiastical kind, is much more likely. Ferdinand of Austria gives him a liberty of wood-cutting in the Tyrol, and we hear of some other privilege connected with the corn trade from Naples. He has pensions on the Treasuries of Milan and Naples which appear to have been very irregularly paid, and for arrears of which he perseveringly duns Philip II. to the last. Paul III. proposed to give him the office of Sealer of the Papal Bulls, from which Sebastian Luciani, who held it for some time, derived the surname *Del Piombo*, by which he is generally known. But this negotiation in some way fell through, and Titian contented himself with canonries and livings which were ostensibly intended for his scapegrace son Pomponio, but which he mostly held himself as lay impropiator. Into the petty details of these transactions as revealed in the numerous business letters of the great painter which are still extant, it is not necessary to go. Nothing is clearer throughout than that Titian had a keen eye to the main chance, and took care to be paid for his work in some way or other. Possessing no little of the frugality and astuteness which belongs to most mountaineers, he stood up persistently for his own before kings and emperors.

Combined, however, with his canny attention to his own interests was a strong liking for magnificence of living, and a generous hospitality eminently characteristic of so great a craftsman in colour. No one could look at Titian's works and dream that he had in him a single ascetic fibre. A

cheerful, joyous, natural life, alternating periods of rapid and successful toil with hours of easy enjoyment, seems to be the counterpart of his art. The house at Biri Grande, surrounded by a beautiful garden, looking northwards over the lagoon towards the hills of Cadore and the snowy peak of the Antelao, and full within of the painter's own works, was the scene of entertainments often alluded to in the contemporary annals of the time. Here Henry III. of France visited Titian: it was here that, when Cardinal Granvelle and Cardinal Pacheco invited themselves to dinner, the painter is said to have flung his purse to his servant, with the injunction to go and prepare a feast, for "all the world was dining with him." A charming description of one of these entertainments survives in a strange place. In 1540, a certain Priscianese came to Venice to print his Latin grammar, and in the preface to the first edition tells the story of Titian's supper-party:

"I was invited on the day of the calends of August to celebrate that sort of Bacchanalian feast which, I know not why, is called Ferrare Agosto—though there was much disputing about this in the evening—in a pleasant garden belonging to Messer Tiziano Vecellio, an excellent painter as every one knows, and a person really fitted to season by his courtesies any distinguished entertainment. There were assembled with the said M. Tiziano, as like desires like, some of the most celebrated characters that are now in this city, and of ours chiefly M. Pietro Aretino, a new miracle of nature, and next to him as great an imitator of nature with the chisel as the master of the feast is with his pencil, Messer Jacopo Tatti, called Il Sansovino, and M. Jacopo Nardi and I; so that I made the fourth amidst so much wisdom. Here, before the tables were set out, because the sun, in spite of the shade, still made his heat much felt, we spent the time in looking at the lively figures in the excellent pictures, of which the house was full, and in discussing the real beauty and charm of the garden with singular pleasure and note of admiration of all of us. It is situated in the extreme part of Venice, upon the sea, and from it one sees the pretty little island of Murano, and other beautiful places. This part of the sea, as soon as the sun went down, swarmed with gondolas, adorned with beautiful women, and resounded with the varied harmony and music

of voices and instruments, which till midnight accompanied our delightful supper.

"But to return to the garden. It was so well laid out and so beautiful, and consequently so much praised, that the resemblance which it offered to the delicious retreat of St. Agata, refreshed my memory and my wish to see you, and it was hard for me, dearest friends, during the greater part of the evening to realize whether I was at Rome or at Venice. In the meanwhile came the hour for supper, which was no less beautiful and well arranged than copious and well provided. Besides the most delicate viands and precious wines, there were all those pleasures and amusements that are suited to the season, the guests and the feast. Having just arrived at the fruit, your letters came, and because in praising the Latin language the Tuscan was reproved, Aretino became exceedingly angry, and, if he had not been prevented, he would have indited one of the most cruel invectives in the world, calling out furiously for paper and inkstand, though he did not fail to do a good deal in words. Finally the supper ended most gaily."*

The loose morality of painters has been the source of abundant scandal, nor is it to be expected that one who was so free in the display of female charms as Titian should escape. "*La Bella de Tiziano*" is an obvious title to attach to the portrait of a nameless Venetian beauty, if by any latitude of interpretation it can be supposed to have issued from the studio at Biri Grande. Yet beyond general surmise and the very negative evidence of his works, there is nothing against Titian's fair fame. Whatever scandal flies about is general, having neither name nor local habitation. It was hardly the act of a loose liver to fetch his sister Orsa from Cadore to bring up his motherless children; and some of the pictures of his supposed "*belle donne*" are undoubted portraits of his much-loved daughter Lavinia. The one fact of Titian's life which from a moral point of view most requires explanation is his long and uninterrupted friendship with Pietro Aretino. That cleverest of all blackguards was the literary disgrace of his age. Possessed of a sharp, sarcastic pen, and an impu-

* Crowe and Cavalcaselle, *Titian*, II. 40, 41.

dence without bound, he used both to levy universal blackmail. No imputation was too foully false for him to make if it would answer his purpose, no service too dirty to render if only it was sufficiently well paid. That this fellow should have aspired to a Cardinal's hat, and that no one seems to have thought his aspiration unreasonable, is the crowning satire upon the morality of the time. His intimacy with Titian, with whom and the famous architect Sansovino he made a well-known triumvirate, remains unexplained. His passion for meddling in all literary and artistic matters was notorious, his power throughout Italy of the kind now wielded by a great writer for the daily press; and Titian, living in the same city, may have thought it better to have him as a friend than an enemy. Or possibly the painter, not possessing a very refined moral sensitiveness, may have found the satirist a pleasant companion of his lighter hours. Still, if it is true, as Mr. Gilbert asserts,* that in all Aretino's correspondence with Titian, "consisting often of careless notes of the hour," "he never used any gross allusion," it seems to shew that it was some nobler element, unknown to posterity, in the character of the reckless poet which endeared him to the painter.

There is a quality of wholeness about Titian's life to which we can hardly find a parallel except in that of Goethe. Both were endowed with a stately presence and a superb vitality: both lived long and continued a life's toil without intermission to the end. They were alike in their exclusive devotion to art, although their sense of beauty was expressed by different organs. Politics stirred neither to the core: Goethe worked at "*Dichtung und Wahrheit*" during the War of Liberation: Titian painted Pope and Emperor with impartial brush. Each seems to have practically rejected the theory that true art, as such, has to justify itself at the bar of morality; and the ethical indifference of the "*Wahlverwandschaften*" may be paralleled with the existence side by side in Titian's gallery of a Christian and a Pagan part exe-

* Cadore, p. 15.

cuted with an equally conscientious skill. Goethe has a rare and pregnant depth of his own, combined with something of the German passion for profundity, while Titian is full of an Italian naturalness and directness: but the pen is a far more subtle instrument of expression than the pencil; and it is possible that, could they have exchanged places, Goethe might have painted like Titian, Titian have sung like Goethe. Both were consummate art-craftsmen, conscious of power, but relying far more upon steady industry than sudden flights of genius, cultivating skill to the utmost, and performing with workmanlike perfection every task that came to hand. Both were profoundly naturalistic in their way of looking at life, disposed to make the best of its enjoyments, not needlessly affronting its sorrows, more touched by its sunshine than saddened by its gloom, and not profoundly moved by contagious enthusiasm or sympathetic sorrow. Such lives are too completely and too consciously successful to win the highest meed of human affection: men admire and praise more than they love them. The brightness that surrounds them is felt to have little relation to "the light that never was on sea or shore:" an existence which no sense of spiritual helplessness ever darkens, which is never shaken to its base by any spiritual storm, lacks the most ennobling of all experiences. There is a region above the clouds which is one of pure self-forgetfulness; there is a place of chequered light and shade below, where toil and struggle may shake the soul out of self-regard; and between, one where a few strong spirits have dwelt, not breathing the purest air of heaven, not feeling the sorrow and the stress of earth, missing life's sharpest experiences, and therefore not teaching its highest lessons. Among the greatest there, are Goethe and Titian.

CHARLES BEARD.

III.—JONAH: A STUDY IN JEWISH FOLKLORE AND RELIGION.

THE history of the progress of Jewish religion after the exile has been too ably and too interestingly dealt with by Dr. Kuenen for me to think of telling it again. The reformation, or rather revolution, of Ezra is in its essential points well known to readers of "The Religion of Israel." In order to appreciate the bearing of the present paper, it will only be necessary to refer to pages 237—244 of Vol. II. of that work. It results from what is there said, that though the enterprize of Ezra was in the main successful, it yet encountered a powerful opposition, which contributed to modify the ultimate form of Jewish religion. The evidence of this opposition is supplied partly by the so-called books of Ezra and Nehemiah, and the prophecy of Malachi, partly by the two much-misapprehended books of Ruth and Jonah. From the two latter (whose post-exile date could be shewn without much difficulty) we see that the counter-revolution which began in the times of the reformers continued after they had been removed from the stage of history. The very form of these books reveals that they proceeded from a different circle and (probably) from a later age than the other three. Both are pervaded by a soft and ideal tone, which indicates a state of comparative prosperity, such as did not exist in the time of Malachi; both belong to a new style of literature—the novelistic; and both exhibit a tendency in the opposite direction to that of Ezra. In the case of Ruth, Dr. Kuenen (following the great Jewish scholar, Abraham Geiger) even thinks himself able to explain the occasion which led to the composition of that beautiful idyl. He regards the book as a protest of the Moderates against the indiscriminating hostility of the Ezraite party to marriages between Jews and foreigners.* I am not prepared to adopt this hypothesis, which appears to me to err from over-definiteness. We do not really know how long this particular

* Ezra ix. x.; Neh. xiii.; Mal. ii. 11—16.

form of exclusiveness continued to agitate the Judæan community. But the policies of isolation and of friendly communication with the Goyim or non-Jewish nations, stood face to face even at a much later period. And whatever be the historical occasion of Ruth, we may safely regard the book as an attempt to reconcile the necessities of a difficult religious position with the imperious demands of natural feeling. The particular trouble of the marriages may have passed away, but the general question of friendship or hostility to the Goyim was constantly debated, till settled once for all by the Roman legions.

With regard to the book of Jonah, Dr. Kuenen fully admits that the particular incident which suggested its composition cannot be positively determined. He thinks, however, that Jonah is not improbably a poetical type of those of the author's contemporaries, who took offence at the largeness of the Divine mercy, and more especially at the non-fulfilment of certain prophecies against the heathen. The leading thought of the work will thus be expressed in the words (iv. 2 b): "Thou (O Yahveh) art a gracious God and a merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil" (announced by the prophets).^{*} This hypothesis seems to me very precarious. It rests on a single passage, and is opposed by the words of the Ninevites (iii. 9), which presumably express the popular view among the Jewish readers of the book (cf. Joel ii. 14, where the *post-exile* prophet in like manner appeals to what was become the common popular belief with regard to prophecy). I venture to think it possible to approach nearer to the "leading thought" of the book by a closer inquiry into the earlier part of the narrative.

It would be both useless to the reader and unfair to the unknown author to attempt a dry analysis of this peculiarly Oriental story. Its general † psychological verisimilitude is

^{*} Kuenen, *Historisch-kritisch onderzoek*, II. 412; cf. *The Religion of Israel*, II. 243.

† This qualification seems called for by the circumstance of Jonah's inditing a psalm in the belly of the fish!

striking (see especially chap. iv.), and it is this no doubt which constitutes the real strength of the orthodox or conservative argument. Ordinary readers, especially when influenced by theological prejudice, are unable to realize the inveterate love of romance common to the ancient Jews with the other nations of the East. Yet surely the marks of a story are as patent in the book of Jonah as in any of the tales of the Thousand and One Nights. The hero, no doubt, acts most properly under the circumstances, but how grotesquely improbable those circumstances are! It is true, the orthodox critics have done their utmost to improve appearances. Dr. Pusey quotes from Eichhorn an account of a sailor's being swallowed by a shark (in 1758), and then vomited out again. But we ask in vain for a parallel to Jonah's sojourn of three days in the fish's belly, much less for a piece of imitative poetry composed under equally trying circumstances with Jonah's psalm. And even apart from this, there is the moral improbability of a whole city being converted by an obscure foreign prophet. To judge of the degree of this improbability, it is enough to read any inscription you please of an Assyrian king. Fancy Sargon or Sennacherib in the presence of Jonah! The case quoted by the "Speaker's Commentary" of a Christian priest frightening a Mohammedan town into repentance, is not to the point, for Christians and Moslems have a common basis in Theism. How could the Ninevites give credence to a man who was not a servant of Asshur? So highly improbable is it, that Jesus himself describes the successful preaching of Jonah as the essential wonder of the narrative (Luke xi. 29—even Olshausen admits this). There is also the inconsistency which meets us at the very outset of the story. Jonah believes that Yahveh is the creator of the world (i. 9), yet he imagines it possible to flee, like Cain, from the Divine presence. None of the real prophets, from the time when Yahveh began to be regarded as the God of the whole world, could have cherished such a delusion. "Though they break through into the underworld, yet thence shall my hand fetch

them," is a divine oracle in Amos (ix. 2). The very notion of resisting a prophetic impulse was inconceivable at Jonah's supposed date. "The Lord Yahveh hath spoken; who can but prophecy?" asks Amos (iii. 8).

The story of Jonah, then, is evidently not historical. It was not even put forward as a history, otherwise doubts would have been expressed in early times as to its truth and canonicity. Its incompleteness, the absence of any answer to the most obvious questions of a historical student—such, for instance, as, Where was Jonah vomited out? What was the offence of the Ninevites? What was the name of their king? What language was the medium of communication?—prove that it is a poetical fiction, and nothing more.

Granting that the book of Jonah is a fiction, how shall we account for its origin? The later literature of the Old Testament supplies us with an answer. We know how lovingly the Jews of the Captivity and the Restoration brooded over the thought of the nation; how, like Rome to the Romans, Israel became to them an almost divine being, towards whom they cherished the strongest personal attachment. Just as the Servant or Liegeman of Yahveh in the second Isaiah, and the sufferer who is the subject of so many of the Psalms, are symbolical of the suffering righteous or ideal Israel, and (probably) the "son of man" in Daniel (vii. 13) of triumphant Israel, so Jonah, the recalcitrant prophet, may well be a type of offending Israel. From an exile and post-exile point of view, it seemed as if the calamities of Israel had arisen from her hankering after political instead of spiritual supremacy; in short, from her abnegation of her prophetic mission. The belly of a sea-monster is actually used in Jeremiah (li. 34, 44) as a figure for the captivity of Israel. And the restoration of the captives was really so unexpected an event, that it might fairly be likened to Jonah's no less strange deliverance in the story. This view is to some extent confirmed by the fact that the psalm ascribed to Jonah when in the belly of the fish is mainly composed of metaphorical expressions. Thus the belly of Sheol

(or Hades), the seas, the floods and the waves, are clearly figures of speech, meaning "great affliction,"* which made it all the easier for the unknown writer to enclose it in his framework of romance.

The solution here offered removes the chief difficulties which encompass the narrative. But there is still an element of uncertainty about it, until we can shew the origin of the grotesque symbol of the "great fish" (Jon. i. 17). And happily we are able to do this. No practised eye can doubt that the symbol in question is a shrivelled-up myth, and that the story in its original form related to the favourite mythic subject of light and darkness. The name and character of Jonah are a later addition (see below). It would indeed be almost incredible if a story prevalent among so many various races, from New Zealand to India,† had left no vestige of itself among the Israelites, especially as not a few other stories occur in the Old Testament‡ which are merely imaginative versions of nature-myths. And the myth of the sea-monster in particular is preserved, not only in the story of Jonah, but in fragmentary allusions to the leviathan, Rahab, and the dragon, in the books (probably nearly contemporary) of Job and the second Isaiah (Job iii. 8, xxvi. 12, 13; Is. li. 9, cf. xxvii. 1). All these appellations are really synonymous,§ and refer to the great enemy of the sun, the dragon of cloud and darkness, whose existence

* I am indebted for this view of the book of Jonah to Herr Bloch's learned and ingenious "*Studien zur Geschichte der Sammlung der althebräischen Literatur*" (Breslau, 1876). But I have put the argument in my own way, and combined it with a mythological theory which Herr Bloch does not hold.

† Waitz, "*Anthropologie*," VI. 670; Tylor (who compares the story of Jonah), "*Early History of Mankind*," 336, 337; "*Primitive Culture*," I. 306; De Gubernatis, "*Zoological Mythology*," II. 390.

‡ This essay was in the main written before the appearance of Goldziher's "*Der Mythos bei den Hebräern*," a translation of which has just been published by Messrs. Longman and Co. The subject of Hebrew mythology has long been ripening.

§ The leviathan (*not* Leviathan) is clearly some large serpent-like water animal. Even in Job xli. 1, it is possibly a mythological creature (so M. Chabas). Rahab means "rage, defiance," i.e. the raging, defiant one, an appellation of the storm-dragon. The "dragon" is no doubt the storm-dragon, as commentators on Isaiah will some day have to admit.

in the early Babylonian mythology, under the name of the seven-headed serpent, has been proved by M. Lenormant and Mr. Sayce; and under the name of Tiamtu (i.e. the sea, especially the heavenly sea, like the Hebrew *t'hōm*), by Mr. George Smith.* Henceforth there can be no reasonable doubt that the cloud-dragon forms an essential part of Babylonio-Assyrian and (at least at one period) popular Jewish mythology.

The story of Jonah has sometimes been supposed to be an imitation of the Greek myths of Herakles and Hesione, and Perseus and Andromeda. This is, however, quite gratuitous. It is only in the narratives of later writers that these myths present any circumstantial resemblances to the Hebrew story (see Preller). Yet even these late narratives are of value, for they are probably derived from earlier sources, and at any rate they present us with remarkable specimens of the interpenetration of Hellenic by Semitic mythology. M. Lenormant has already paralleled the story of Perseus and Andromeda by the Babylonian myth of "Bul, a sea-monster, who demanded an annual tribute of young girls for its food, and was slain by Gisdhubar and his huntsman Tsaid" (I here adopt Mr. Sayce's transliteration). And M. Clermont-Ganneau has, in two most ingenious papers,† shewn the connection between the Hellenic representations of Perseus, the Phœnician of Respu (a deity corresponding to Apollo), and the Egyptian of Horus (= the rising sun). It is quite possible that even in their earliest forms these Hellenic stories were of Semitic origin, and that they subsequently received a fresh infusion from a Semitic source. At any rate, all these myths, as Mr. Tylor has already remarked, are descriptions of the Sun slaying the Darkness. For if Jonah is swallowed up by the fish, he is vomited out again safe and sound. In Mesopotamia, the story is naturally more original and more transparent. In Mr. George Smith's translation, Tiamtu the dragon opens its mouth to swallow Bel-Merodach, but in vain.‡ It may surprise us for a moment

* Chaldean Account of Genesis, p. 90.

† *Revue Archéologique*, Oct. et Dec., 1876.

‡ Chaldean Account of Genesis, p. 91.

that Jeremiah or his editor apparently identifies Bel and the dragon,* but this arises from the fact that the mythic dragon has to this writer passed into the stage of symbolism, and typifies the all-absorbing empire of Babylon. The substitution of Bel (Jer. li. 44) for Babylon is merely to produce a paronomasia (*Bel-bil'ō*). The passage in Jeremiah is important, too, for another reason. It supplies a missing link between the Jonah story and the original myth. Like the latter, it describes the destroyer as "the dragon;" like the former, it converts both destroyer and destroyed into symbols. And the same has occurred in many other passages of the Old Testament. What seems to us fine poetry is often really (as Dr. Steinthal has shewn) a more refined form of a myth.

It may be asked in conclusion, What induced the writer of Jonah to take the trouble to work up this myth or symbol into a popular tale? Certainly it was not an artistic impulse; he wrote it neither to please himself nor to amuse others, but to press certain home-truths upon his countrymen. These truths seem to be—1, the equality before God of Jews and heathen. The exclusiveness which shewed itself in the episode of the "mixed marriages" (Ez. ix. x.) was threatening to petrify the national character, and to hinder the accomplishment of God's large designs for Israel. In opposition to this, the writer shews us an Israelite wilfully rejecting God's immediate revelation, and heathen acting in the spirit of high morality. One may indeed fairly extend to this book the criticism which has been passed on Lessing's immortal "Nathan," that the lower religion shews better in its representatives than the higher. Very likely this was said at the time. For it was a new idea that the heathen could shew a good disposition, and even repent. We find even great reli-

* "Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, hath eaten and discomfited me;
He hath set me as an empty vessel;
He hath swallowed me up as *the Dragon*, filling his belly;
From my pleasures (Ps. xxxvi. 8) hath he cast me out. . . .
And I will punish Bel in Babylon,
And bring forth that which he hath swallowed out of his mouth."

gious writers describing the heathen as wicked because heathen; cf. Hab. i. 13, ii. 4, &c., iii. 13; Ps. lxxxiv. 10, lxxxix. 22; Isa. xxvi. 10; Ps. cxxv. 3. The scene of Jonah and the palmchrist (chap. iv.) was especially designed to check this feeling. 2. The prophetic or missionary character of Israel, the agent chosen of God for the fulfilment of his large designs for the world. It was the second Isaiah (xlii. 1—4) who first fully realized this prophetic character, though indeed it was only the corollary of the intense monotheism of the later Israelites. Jonah and Israel—type and antitype—had each to be brought to the consciousness of their mission by calamity.

It is a fortunate accident that the unknown writer was moved to insert the name of Jonah in preference to any more familiar but less venerable name. He thereby—unconsciously, no doubt—secured the ultimate admission of his book into the sacred canon, like the author of Daniel at a still later time. It was not my object to investigate the question of the date of Jonah, there being perfect unanimity among historical critics. But for those who desire some positive, palpable fact in evidence of a post-exile date, I may refer to the use of the uncommon phrase, *Yahveh Elohim* (iv. 6). This at once places the book subsequent to the redaction of Genesis ii. and iii. The editor of those chapters seems to have observed the anachronism involved (see Gen. iv. 26) in the use of the name *Yahveh* at so early a period, and therefore corrected it into *Elohim*. He did not like to scratch out *Yahveh*, and so the two names, *Yahveh* and *Elohim*, came to be combined. Now this intense veneration for the name of *Yahveh* (as a sort of sacrament of the personality and character of God) is specially characteristic of the post-exile period (see Dr. Kalisch on Levit. xxiv. 11). The author of Jonah, in spite of his freer views on some subjects, fully sympathizes with the Levitical legislators in their deep sense of the Divine holiness. It is fortunate that on such a point Broad-churchmen and High-churchmen, servants of the letter and priests of the spirit, can meet in harmony.

We are thus enabled to fill up with a little more positiveness than before, a vacant page in the literature of Israel. Imaginative moral teaching is found to be no invention of the nineteenth century, but a comparatively early product of Hebrew literature, and one at least of the methods of the artists—the unconscious artists—of the Israelites to be identical with that of Homer and of Shakespeare, the elevation and refinement of the crude but rich material supplied by popular tradition. Whether or not this was the only method of Hebrew novelists, could only be determined by a minute study of the other romances of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha,—Ruth, Esther and Tobit.

T. K. CHEYNE.

NOTE.—The substitution of Jonah, i.e. the symbol of the Jewish nation, for the sun, may be paralleled by the transformation of Samson (“the Sun-god,” as Dagon = the Fish-god) into an Israelite national hero, and possibly—if Goldziher’s hesitatingly suggested interpretation be correct—of Balaam (“the devourer,” viz. of the sun = the leviathan or dragon) into the tempter and destroyer of the Israelitish people. I may also add that Jonah’s psalm in the belly of the fish may be paralleled by the apocryphal “song of the three children” in the fire; and that I have altered Mr. G. Smith’s Tiamat into Tiamtu, and M. Ganneau’s Reseph into Respu, in order to bring out the case-endings, which are essential in Assyrian, and more common in Phœnician and in Hebrew, especially in proper names, than is generally supposed. See Sayce’s, Böttcher’s and Schröder’s Grammars, and the evidence supplied by Blau from king Shishak’s inscription in Merx’s “Archiv,” 1868, pp. 352, 353.

IV.—STRAUSS’S RELATIONS TO HEGEL AND TO THE CHURCH.

RATIONALISM, as the name of a principle or order of thought that has guided and characterized an important historical movement, may be described as the principle of squaring every-

thing with the dictates of the analytical judgment. Our modern Rationalism, though it may be said more truly to have had its origin in England and France, is very commonly associated in the popular mind with Germany, which, on the contrary, is more justly to be credited with having given birth to the only deep and comprehensive philosophical reaction and protest against it. What is more strange and more unjust is, that the two men who first and most effectually uttered this protest are often confounded with the party whose action they strove to stay and to redress.

Kant was so obnoxious to the unenlightened and bigoted Wöllner Ministry of Frederick William II., which succeeded that of Zedlitz in 1788, that an attempt was made to persuade the King to silence him. A letter from Kiesewetter, among Kant's papers, proves at least that such a proposal was laid before his Majesty by Woltersdorf, one of the three Supreme Consistorial Councillors appointed by the Ministry as censors of the pulpit and the press, and understood to be all very willing tools of Wöllner.* The same influence succeeded in obtaining, in 1794, the Royal authority for a Cabinet-Order, accusing Kant of "misusing his philosophy to deface and degrade many of the chief and fundamental doctrines of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity," and enjoining him, under pain of his Majesty's "highest displeasure, not to be guilty of the like in future." At the same time all the theological and philosophical teachers in the University of Königsberg were bound under oath by subscription not to lecture on the Kantian philosophy of religion. Even Herder, whose philosophical culture might have been expected to give him broader and more liberal sympathies, denounced Kant as a barbarian author, and his principles as dangerous to Church and State. Such was the way Kant was looked on by many of his contemporary fellow-countrymen.

In England, De Quincey, whose knowledge and understand-

* Schubert, S. 130. Kant's Leben und die Grundlagen seiner Lehre, von Kuno Fischer, S. 46—49.

ing of the *Kritiken*, it may be presumed, never equalled his professed familiarity with them, and who was always more rhetorical than careful or conscientious, has not only described Kant as of an "intellect essentially destructive," and with "no instincts of creation or restoration within his Apollyon mind," but in the strongest terms charges him with "exulting in the prospect of absolute and ultimate annihilation," and of an inclination to "have formally delivered atheism from the Professor's chair." Such is a specimen of the way he was regarded here.

Fortunately, neither the tyranny of the Minister Wöllner, nor the elegant opposition of Herder, was a check to the Kantian philosophy. Herder's *Metakritik*, as well as his *Kalligone*, had no other effect than to shew the importance of the new philosophy. Kant's distinguished successor, now in the chair at Königsberg, speaks of him as "the Restorer of Faith." Nor in this country are we any longer content to judge of Kant at second hand through such a medium as the English opium-eater. Kant's work was no doubt directly and formally critical, but its ultimate aim and tendency was something beyond that. Its end was to countermine the sapping criticism of Hume, and to find a deeper and firmer foundation on which to build. In the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason," in 1787, having found his aim to be misinterpreted, he himself carefully points out the positive intention and really constructive character of his enterprize. The teaching of Kant, so far as it is negative, may be regarded as but a propædæutic.

But if a more correct, because better informed, public opinion is now generally entertained of that great and good man, the same, so far as this country at least is concerned, can hardly be said of Hegel, who continued and developed the thought of Kant. In all his aims, Hegel was eminently positive, concrete, practical, and laboured in the interests of State authority in opposition to atomistic individualism, of objective reality in contrast to subjective caprice, of morality and religion against self-seeking and scepticism. Yet to many his

name is suggestive only of that vague thing (as if it were all of a piece), modern German Philosophy, and of rationalistic unbelief. It is even not uncommon to hear him—the *durchaus anti-kritischen*, as one of the ablest historians of Philosophy calls him—classed with Strauss, as representing the negative and merely critical side in matters of religion.

The association of these two names is not altogether without pretext—though in another sense and on other grounds than are generally meant. Strauss at one time did seem to be something of a Hegelian: Hegel never had the faintest tincture of Straussism. But viewing Strauss as a whole, and especially in his later, and therefore, it may be presumed, his more mature and characteristic aspects, he and Hegel are wide enough apart.

On Hegel's relations to Christianity, the limits of this article do not permit me now to enter into any detail. I can only state that from first to last he was a member of the Lutheran communion, and both by profession and practice conformed to the orthodox standard. *Wir Lutheraner*, he exclaims on one occasion, *ich bin es, und will es bleiben*.

Strauss, as already hinted, started with Hegelian prepossessions,—started, that is, so far as his public life is concerned; for he had already, in the development of his own mind, passed through several earlier stages—notably the romantic, with a certain admixture of the mystical, and more thoroughly that represented by Schleiermacher. But, with the exception of a short critique of a book by his friend Kerner, in which he renounced his former beliefs in “the old fairy-land of clairvoyance and magic,” and one or two papers of a literary character, his first public appearance was as a disciple and interpreter of Hegel, on whose Logic he lectured as a Repetent at Tübingen. His earlier theological writings, too, though differing from Hegel's own teaching in several most important respects, nevertheless really carried out what some may regard as a truer development of Hegelian principles than, in one point at least of greatest difference, Hegel himself did. Thus in the *Schluss-Abhandlung* to his original *Leben Jesu*, Strauss wrote:

"The infinite, according to the scientific view, has its existence in the alternate production and annulment (*Setzen und Wiederaufheben*) of the finite; the idea is realized only in the entire series of its manifestations."*

Again, in the next section, treating "of the Speculative Christology," he writes:

"The true and real existence (*Dasein*) of spirit is neither God for Himself, nor man for himself, but the God-man; neither his infinitude alone, nor his finitude alone, but the process of self-surrender and resumption (*Bewegung des Sichhingebens und Zurücknehmens*) between the two, which from the divine side is revelation, from the human, religion."†

And this statement he is apparently ready to adopt for himself, provided only that by the God-man is understood, not any single individual of history, but humanity as an ideal whole.

His first plan of the *Leben*, sketched during his short stay at Berlin (whither he went, as he himself told Schleiermacher, somewhat, it may have been, to the latter's mortification, for the sake of Hegel's teaching, who, however, survived his arrival only a week or two), exhibited, even in its form, unmistakable traces of Hegelian influence. The work was to consist of three parts, reflecting in their mutual relation the Hegelian movement of reciprocity. The first part was to be, (1) the life of Christ according to the Gospels, (2) the life of Christ as partially and diversely seen in believers, and (3) the reconciliation of these two in the second section of the Apostles' Creed; thus presenting a similar trichotomy as a subdivision. The second part was designed to be a critical analysis of the historical life of Christ. In the third part, the negations of the second were to be dogmatically re-established.

This design he never fully carried out. The *Life* as published contained only the critical part, and a short but very pregnant concluding treatise, which renewed rather than fulfilled the promise of a positive dogmatic reconstruction.

It is important, however, to observe that he had then no

* § 149.

† § 150.

intention of undermining or assailing Christianity. Nor, after his book was published, did he believe his critical work to be essentially destructive, or of other service than to clear the ground and purge the materials, preparatory to drawing out in purer form the spiritual truth which he regarded as the life and sole worth of Christianity. On the contrary, he resented the charge brought against him of hostility to the Christian faith, and maintained that he had not attacked its substance, but that, while subjecting the Gospel narrative to critical examination and analysis, he re-asserted, in the very explanation which he offered of its origin and growth, the truth and sacredness of the essential ideas it embodies. In the second of his *Zwei Friedliche Blätter*, on "the Transitory and the Permanent in Christianity," published in 1839, four years after the *Leben* first appeared, he asserts :

"As little as man will ever be without religion, will he be without Christ. . . . And this Christ, so far as he is inseparable from the highest form of religion, is a historical person, not a mythical—a real individual, not a mere symbol. There is no fear that he will be lost to us, even though we are forced to surrender much that has been hitherto named Christianity. He remains to us, and to all, the more secure and stable, the less we anxiously hold fast doctrines and opinions which may be thought an occasion of apostasy. But if Christ remains to us,—remains, too, as the highest we know and can conceive in things religious,—as he without whose presence in the heart no perfect piety is possible—then there also remains to us in him the essential truth of Christianity."

He did not even see that the views he had advocated were inconsistent with his position within the Church. The question presented itself to his mind in this light. When an evangelical preacher, after referring to the external facts of the portion of Scripture chosen for his theme, goes on to extract and apply their spiritual significance, is not this latter rightly judged to be the most important and precious part of his discourse? Nay, is not the narrative of facts deemed worthy of being made a topic of religious teaching only inasmuch as these contain and express a spiritual import? Can it then be so

heinous an offence, can it be really opposed to Christian spirit and truth, if the mythical preacher sink the facts in the interest of their spiritual meaning so far as to cease to regard them as historical facts at all, provided he otherwise see good reason to do so, and to treat them only as the imaginative incarnation of the spiritual ideas, which are by their means rendered more readily apprehensible and impressive to the ordinary consciousness of men? The mythical, equally with the evangelical, teacher holds by what is admitted to be alone vital and essential. The difference is, that he considers the spiritual ideas as primary and formative, not as merely reflected and shadowed forth; that the history springs from them, and not they from the history.

The practical difficulties, and even the moral risks, of such a position to the individual, on the one hand, and the evils to the Church in its absolute rejection, on the other, are explicitly recognized and discussed by Strauss in the last section of the *Leben*. But, insisting on the general truth of his view, he denied, or overlooked, what the Church asserted—that in the Christian faith some of the doctrines are so properly and peculiarly connected with the facts, that the one cannot be dissociated or held apart from the other; that the full truth exists only in the fact; that the fact is the sole appropriate and necessary externalization of the truth. It is important clearly to recognize this deep and essential connection in order properly to appreciate the Church's position, and to understand fully the supreme and vital sense in which its religion claims to be an historical religion.

The support and confirmation derived by Christian doctrine from its association with history, is urged by the late Bishop Hampden in the Introduction to the second edition of his Bampton Lectures. Using the term *facts* "to denote *whatever is*—universal, as well as particular, truths, whether founded on experience, or on the authority of Divine Revelation," and as "opposed to theory or hypothesis," he distinguishes "events,—facts in the popular, as well as the philosophical, sense of the term," from "doctrinal truths." The former, he says, "form an

historical basis to the other truths joined with them in the Christian scheme." "I have wished," he adds, "to point out strongly a great characteristic of our religion, by which it is distinguished from all other religions professing to have their sacred books. Our revelations, we may say, were not the literary work of some sage or legislator, or put forth as a mere writing or collection of writings : but they are a series of historical revelations given at different times, and in different manners, and by different messengers ; each for its special purpose, in connection with what was then passing in the world ; and yet all having reference to one great evangelical purpose. Not so, for example, the Korân. Here is the work of one man, dealt forth to the world by himself as so many divine communications to him, and having no connection in its parts with the history of the world." The connection of the doctrinal truth of Christianity with the historical—a connection which he asserts to be peculiar to the Christian religion—and the value and importance of that connection, are said to be these :—Of any revealed doctrinal truth "we might well have believed the same, had it been solely the assertion of the inspired writer. But that assertion is borne out and explained, and invested with a dramatic energy, by the real events to which it refers. Thus it may be truly said, that the truths of Scripture are not mere sayings or propositions, such as might be stated in a book totally unconnected with history, but are further connected with the real doings of God in the world."

But this connection of doctrinal truth with historical fact, on which the Bishop lays stress as a distinctive peculiarity of Christianity, must not be confounded with the more intimate and necessary connection I wish to signalize. That such a connection of spiritual truth with definite outward events exists as a characteristic of Christianity, distinguishing it from all other religions, is just what the mythicist undertakes to dispute ; and for the Church to have appealed to a feature of its religion which Strauss denied, would have been no argument against him, without an attempt to meet and disprove the grounds on which his denial rested. A connection between ideal truth and his-

torical narrative, and that of no accidental kind, is undoubtedly admitted by the mythicist—nay, required as the very ground on which philosophical myth can be explained. "It is only simultaneously with the narrative," says Strauss, "nay, in the very form of the narrative which he tells, that he [the promulgator] becomes conscious of the idea, which he is not yet able to apprehend purely as such."* And he cites these words of Welcker—"The Myth arises in the mind as seed springs up from the soil: substance and form identical; the history, a truth."† But this connection and its necessity is of a merely subjective nature, without a corresponding objective reality, and is only a temporary moment in the evolution of thought. The connection Bishop Hampden insists on is a contingent, or at least not inherently necessary one; for he admits it does not exist in the case of every doctrinal truth, and that even where it does exist, the truth might have been believed without it, on the authority of Scripture statement. Just as the connection recognized by the mythicist is purely subjective, so this, though objective, is wholly empirical and adventitious; whereas the connection to which I wish to draw attention, between certain truths and certain outward facts, is something far deeper, and springs from a necessity that is absolute, determining the objective and subjective alike. It is not, as in Myth, a relation of form as distinguished from matter; nor, as in the pragmatic sphere, a relation of particular exemplification and general truth; but it is the truth itself, the individual actualization of the idea. Deny the external manifestation to have been real and actual, and you deny the relative doctrine; if the one can be shewn to fail, the other goes with it; because the historical fact and the doctrinal truth are respectively but the outer and the inner sides of the same thing.

The weakness and untenableness of Strauss's position lay in this—that while calling in question the historical facts, and resolving the narrative into mythical representment of the

* Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet. Einleitung, S. 154.

† Griechische Götterlehre, I. S. 77.

spiritual truths evolving in human consciousness, he not only professed to retain these truths themselves, but even by means of them and their living and eternal verity sought to account for the mythical structure by which they were figured, but figured only ; whereas, supposing this were possible in the majority of cases, it was inconsistent and a self-delusion in the case of some of the Church's doctrines, which by their very nature involve the history, as the unique, proper, peculiar, and necessary embodiment and externalization of the truth,—its essential and single actualization. Thus the character of Christ as the Son of God belongs to the nature of God. This, as well as its relative position to the higher ideal truth, is expressly recognized by Hegel, as in the following passage in his "Philosophy of Religion :"

"The Christian religion, no doubt, on one side, begins with an external history, which is believed. But at the same time this history has the signification that it is the unfolding of God's nature. Thus arises forthwith a distinction, according to which Christ is not only a man whose fortunes are narrated in the history, but he is also the Son of God. And it is the explication of Christ's history that is the deeper ; it has taken place in thought, and has produced the Dogmatic, the doctrine of the Church."*

Even in the indications of a positive side, therefore, which accompanied Strauss's great achievement in criticism, he assumed a position not thoroughly consistent in itself, and which the Church could not tolerate—though he apparently did not see that—and carried out principles to an extreme, in a way that Hegel would have condemned as one-sided.

He was thus at the very outset in certain respects at variance with Hegel. Several of the points of difference were prominently recognized and defended by Strauss himself. In the third Part of his "Polemical Essays" in defence of the "Life," and published shortly before the third edition of that work, in 1838, there is a special reply, not only to the Evangelical party, and to the intermediate school represented by

* B. I. S. 220.

the *Studien und Kritiken*, but also to the more orthodox Hegelians. Of course there is the question how far Hegel was fairly and truly represented by these followers on the extreme right. But it may be safely affirmed that whatever divergence there might be from the master in their statements, there was a departure certainly not less in the opposite direction on the part of Strauss and other members of the extreme left.

His *Glaubenslehre*, which appeared in 1840-41, but was planned even before the *Leben*, seems still in its fundamental idea to exhibit a general Hegelian view, or something like it. It speaks of "God" as "the eternal movement of the universal substance, ever making itself subject, and thereby attaining objectivity and true reality." "God has eternally to cause the other of Himself—nature—to proceed from Himself, in order eternally to return into Himself, as self-conscious spirit." Even on the question of Personal Divinity, Strauss appears here on the positive, the Hegelian, the Christian side. "The Personality of God," it is said, must not be conceived as individual, but as universal Personality." Yet the Hegelianism of the *Glaubenslehre* is after all the pseudo-Hegelianism of a cross with Feuerbach rather than the Hegelianism of Hegel. In it Strauss dissents from Hegel's doctrine of the substantial identity of religion and philosophy, which, in the Introduction to the *Leben*, and also in the concluding Dissertation on the Dogmatic Import of the Life of Jesus, he had not only adopted, but had in it found the ground for asserting the essential and necessary presence of myth in all religions.

"If in relation to philosophy religion is defined as the consciousness of the same absolute content (*Inhalt*), only in the form of representation (*Vorstellung*), not in that of the notion (*Begriff*), it is easy to see that the mythical can be wanting only below and above the proper standpoint of religion, and that within the true religious sphere it is essentially and necessarily present."*

This material sameness of philosophy and religion, which was his strongest support in reason for the mythical theory,

* Einleitung, § 14.

he now abandons, and does so even inconsistently with the leading thought of the *Glaubenslehre* itself. That work is essentially monistic in principle; yet in divorcing philosophy from religion in their absolute import, he introduces an irresolvable dualism into human faculty. Led away by a somewhat superficial and verbal logic, he argues that the absolute matter must have absolute form, and cannot be held representatively; the *Begriff* cannot be in the *Vorstellung*. Consequently, if *Vorstellung* be the form of religion, the idea, or absolute truth, cannot belong to religion. The formal difference of religion and philosophy involves a material difference also. Strauss either did not see or disregarded the fact, that this reasoning would destroy the unity of knowledge, and establish in the mind of man a radical dualism contradictory of his fundamental principle of monism.

Differences, therefore, of the first importance existed from the beginning between Strauss and Hegel. But Strauss subsequently travelled far from the position represented by these earlier works. His first *Leben* represented his views as a very young man, before he had fully worked out his own independent position, and while he had scarcely had time to free himself from the dominating influence of teachers who first guided and captivated his awakening powers. He was only twenty-seven when it was first published. In his second *Leben Jesu*, which appeared twenty-nine years after the first, and twenty-four after the *Glaubenslehre*, he comes before us in quite another aspect.

By the second *Leben* is not meant the second edition, which was but a reprint of the first; nor even the third, in which he departed from some of his earlier conclusions, especially regarding St. John's Gospel; nor yet the fourth, in which he withdraws the alterations made in the third. But it is his People's edition that is meant, which is virtually a new work. It is not that in it he had modified many of the critical views on special questions which he had originally advanced. That to some extent he had already done in the second of his *Zwei Friedliche Blätter*, and also, as has been said, in the third

edition of the original *Life*, acknowledging, in deference to De Wette's and Ullmann's criticisms, and to the profound moral insight of Neander,* that he had declared too confidently against John's Gospel; and had again in the following edition retracted. But in the *Leben für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, his outlook both on philosophy and religion is essentially different.

Even before the issue of the fourth edition in 1840, he had, in the Preface to the collection of his early Essays, which he published in the autumn of 1839, under the title of *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*, expressly withdrawn all the concessions made either in his *Streitschriften* in 1837, in the third edition of the *Leben* in 1838, or in his *Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum* in the spring of 1839. I am thus particular in referring to these dates, because they appear highly significant. They argue, it seems to me, that Strauss, who is often considered the most cold, impassive, unsympathetic, and merely intellectual of mortals, was keenly alive to social influences, and sensitive to the opinion and conduct of his fellow-men, to a degree which, if it lowers our estimate of his calm, judicial, and purely intellectual faculty, makes him more living and real, and brings him nearer to us in the weakness as well as the strength of human feeling and temper. He was after all a man of like passions with ourselves, and not, as he has sometimes been pictured, a frigid, marble form, touched with dry light, but irresponsible to praise or blame, and indifferent to the kindly intercourse of his fellows, or to their aversion and ill-will.

After experiencing the storm and alienation excited by the

* "Ich habe von allen (Gegner) so viel möglich zu lernen gesucht. Wie viel ich in dieser Hinsicht de Wette'n verdanke, habe ich schon an einem andern Orte ausgesprochen. Nicht minder war mir Neander's tiefer Gemüthsblick oft behülflich, die Einheit aufzufinden, die sich mir unter Gegensätzen versteckt hatte. . . . Die Veränderungen, welche diese neue Auflage darbietet, hängen mehr oder weniger alle damit zusammen, dass ein erneuertes Studium des vierten Evangeliums an der Hand von de Wette's Commentar und Neander's Leben Jesu Christi mir die früheren Zweifel an der Aechtheit und Glaubwürdigkeit dieses Evangeliums selbst wieder zweifelhaft gemacht hat." — Vorrede zur dritten Auflage, S. iii.—v.

Leben, he had for three years been making repeated and increasing advances towards peace and reconciliation, at least with the larger-minded and more appreciative of his critics. The most pacific and concessive of his writings was the latter of the *Zwei Friedliche Blätter*, in March, 1839. Early in August of the same year, he revoked all his concessions, and receded, not only to his first position, but eventually, it is to be regretted, far beyond it. It is difficult to suppose that this sudden recoil was the result of unbiassed judgment. He had not been without time and opportunity to ponder and reconsider his positions. Four years had elapsed since his book had fallen like a bomb among his contemporaries. During the last three of these he had, in the re-issue of the "Life" and in other publications, become gradually more and more accommodating and pacific in tone. Within little more than four months after the last and the most yielding of these explanatory and apologetic publications, he cancelled all his concessions and stiffened himself in opposition.

In view of Strauss's whole life, it would, I think, be a hard and unsympathetic, if not a suspicious, mind, that would question his sincerity. But it is scarcely possible to doubt—however unconsciously it may have been to himself—*either* that his concessions and implied overtures for agreement were dictated more by the healthy desire to be at one with his generation on points of highest truth, than by a solemn conviction of error (and it is to be remarked that he himself afterwards spoke of his concessions as the weak and unsound result of "the horror of feeling himself alone in the world, which penetrated to every limb"); *or* that his abrupt revulsion was the expression less of deliberately poised judgment, than of wounded sentiment,—less the act of the stern devotee to truth, than the piqued and indignant revolt of the outcast. The fact is, public indignation and animosity against him had not abated, and in the short interval that marks the crisis of his course he had been driven from Zürich.

I would not be understood to suggest that Strauss was actuated by vulgar, petty, dishonourable motives: far other-

wise. But we all know how powerfully our vision is liable to be affected by the refracting medium of embittered feeling. The unmitigated distrust and alienation manifested on one side naturally engendered, or strengthened if it existed already, a feeling of estrangement and heartburning on the other. Strauss was irritated and chafed, and some resentment may have stirred his soul. But on the whole perhaps his recoil was but as the resurgence of the baffled wave.

A quarter of a century elapsed before the second *Leben* came out, and in it his philosophical point of view generally was wholly altered. He was unable to resist the masterly influence of Baur. "Am meisten Belehrung verdanke ich allerdings Baur und den Männern, die in seinem Sinne weiter geforscht haben; konnte ich auch nicht mit allen ihren Ergebnissen einverstanden sein, so war ich es doch um so mehr mit dem Geist und der Art ihrer Forschung."* The specifically mythical theory is now virtually superseded, and, under whatever name, is in the main transformed into that of the *Tendenz* principle. "Ich habe in dieser neuen Bearbeitung des Lebens Jesu, hauptsächlich in Folge von Baur's Nachweisungen, der Annahme bewusster und absichtlicher Dichtung weit mehr Raum als früher zugestanden; darum aber die Bezeichnung zu ändern, habe ich keine Ursache gefunden."† The *Geist* movement, in obedience to an inner and primarily unconscious impulse and guidance, has given place to the deliberate aims of individual human activity and purpose. His thought has also become more leavened by Comte and Feuerbach. He cannot get beyond nature, and of nature, man is the highest. Christ is but the projection of an ideal perfection. The religion of Christ has passed into the religion of humanity. Theology is only the highest anthropology. *Homo homini deus est.*

But what in the present connection I wish particularly to notice and to emphasize is, his altered attitude in relation to what may be said to be the major intellectual current of

* Vorrede, S. xvi.

† Einleitung, § 25. Der Begriff des Mythos, S. 159.

modern times. He no longer breasts the stream, but is carried along with it. In the first "Life," he is an *anti-rationalist*: he expressly condemns Rationalism.

"In proportion as he [the critic] is distinguished from the naturalistic theologian and the free-thinker—in proportion as his criticism is conceived in the spirit of the nineteenth century, he is filled with veneration for every religion, and especially for the substance of the sublimest of all religions, the Christian, which he believes to be identical with the deepest philosophical truth.* . . . Rationalism enters into open war with the Christian faith, for it seeks to thrust into the background, nay, to banish from the province of Dogma, that which is its essential point and corner-stone—Christology. But this very opposition is decisive of the insufficiency of the rationalistic system, proving that it does not perform what is demanded from every system of religious doctrine, viz. first to give adequate expression to the faith which is the object of the doctrine, and secondly to place this expression in a relation, whether positive or negative, to science. Now the Rationalists, in the effort to bring the faith into harmony with science, restrict its expression; for the Christ who is only a distinguished man, creates indeed no difficulty to the understanding, but is not the Christ in whom the Church believes."†

And in the section following the above, he says of Schleiermacher:

"On the one hand, he has adopted in its fullest extent the negative criticism directed by Rationalism against the doctrine of the Church; nay, he has rendered it even more searching; on the other hand, he has sought to retain what Rationalism had lost—the essential part of positive Christianity: and thus he has saved many in these days from the narrowness of Supernaturalism and the emptiness of Rationalism."

But this is all changed in his later works. If he began with Hegel in assailing Rationalism, and in maintaining a universal Personality, he ends with denying the Personality of God altogether, the truth of creation and personal immortality. In the *Leben* drawn up "for the German people," he falls back on

* Schlussabhandlung, § 144.

† Ibid. § 147.

Rationalism, and, if not by name maintaining it, in practice adopts it. His original *Leben* had dealt mostly with the Gospel narrative as a narrative, and with the determination of the non-historical elements; at the same time indicating, at least critically, a dogmatic development of Christian truth. He now omits all dogmatic discussion; and while working more on the lines of the Tübingen school in criticising not merely the narrative as such, but also the Gospel compositions as historical literary products—although he admits that in relation to the capital question, whether the history is true or not, *ist die Evangelienkritik während der letzten zwanzig Jahre unläugbar etwas in's Kraut geschossen*—he goes on to attempt what had just been the aim of Rationalism, and for which he had charged it with being empty and inadequate, viz. a re-construction of the historical Christ out of the Gospel narrative, minus the miraculous element. “In der Instruierung des kritischen Processes, war in meiner frühern Bearbeitung des Lebens Jesu der analytische Weg genommen. . . . aber es fand sich kein Ort, . . . in Einem Zuge zu entwickeln, was denn an der Person und Geschichte Christi, streng historisch genommen, gewesen sein möchte. Darum schien es zur Ergänzung des frühern Verfahrens dienlich, und zugleich der indess fortgeschrittenen Wissenschaft angemessen zu sein, diessmal den umgekehrten synthetischen Weg einzuschlagen. . . . Wir wissen jetzt wenigstens gewiss, was Jesus nicht war und nicht gethan hat, nämlich nichts Uebermenschliches und Uebernatürliches: so wird es uns eher möglich sein, den Andeutungen der Evangelien über das Natürliche und Menschliche in ihm soweit nachzugehen, um wenigstens in ungefähren Umrissen angeben zu können, was er war und was er wollte. Davon also, von dem muthmasslichen historischen Kern der Geschichte Jesu, der in dem früheren Werke gar nicht als Einheit zur Darstellung kam, werden wir diessmal ausgehen.”*

In fact, he adopts the rôle of the Rationalist with this distinction:—the Rationalist proper, the mere Rationalist, accepts

* Einleitung, § 26. Plan des Werkes, S. 159—161.

the Gospels as history, but history of natural events, however fancifully or erroneously understood or interpreted ; Strauss rejects much of the Gospels as not history, but tries to piece together the remainder, and of that to construct a history of natural events. The object of the second *Leben* is *nicht eine vergangene Geschichte zu ermitteln, vielmehr dem menschlichen Geiste zu künftiger Befreiung von einem druckenden Glaubens-joche behülflich zu sein*,*—or, as expressed in another place, *die Befreiung der Geister von dem religiösen Wahn*,†—by producing a modern history of an ancient time. When it is said he fell back on Rationalism, it is not meant that he had been rationalistic before, but that in relation to the progress and development of thought in his century, the adoption of such principles, as compared with his earlier more idealistic doctrine, was a reactionary movement.

From present consideration I may omit many works by Strauss of great excellence, and some of which may possibly be read when the *Leben Jesu* is laid aside ; because they are of a literary rather than a theological character. Some of these no doubt have a theological interest ; his “Life of Hütten,” for example ; but of it the main interest after all is literary and moral or political. In the present connection, next to the two Lives of Jesus, his third great work—great as marking the stages of his own mental progress—“The Old and the New Faith”—is still more reactionary and further—out of sight further—away from his original Hegelian affinities. Of this book it is unnecessary to speak at any length. Its appearance is so recent, that its purport and character must be fresh in every one’s memory ; and the English translation has rendered it accessible to whoever in this country is interested in such matters. It is scientific neither in form nor tone, and deals with results rather than inquiries. These results are a sort of mixture of science in a Darwinian direction, but accepted and stated without Darwin’s caution and scientific power—or rather perhaps in the direction and spirit, if not knowledge and tho-

* Vorrede, S. 14.

† Widmung.

roughness of Haeckel—and of modern materialism dashed with the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, though free from the former's cynicism.

This work, which he calls his "Confession," as summing up the thought and investigation of his life, is as far removed from anything of the nature of Hegelianism as it is from Christianity. Even to his warmest admirers it has been a disappointment, to some a grief. Yet even in it, as in most of his other productions, we see evidence of the fineness and dignity of Strauss's personal character. With all the cheerlessness of his outlook, he endured cheerful and serene, and never gave himself up to the sneer or the despair of the prevailing pessimism. Notwithstanding the blight of his professional life, and the social ostracism to which he was subjected; amid the wreck of his home and his domestic joys—"a convulsion," he himself says, "far more fatal than any of those theological persecutions" with which he had been assailed; even under the fearful malady from which he suffered and died,—he preserved, in an eminent degree, a gentle, refined, and kindly human spirit, manfully doing his duty, as he understood, to the last, and soothing his hours of loneliness and agony with music and poetry.

ROBERT BELL.

V.—CHARLES KINGSLEY.

Charles Kingsley: his Letters and Memories of his Life. Edited by his Wife. In Two Volumes. Henry S. King and Co. London. 1877.

THE interest of these volumes, "dedicated to the beloved memory of a righteous man," lies in the character of the man, and not in any striking incidents of his career. The story reads as a singularly uneventful one; although to Kingsley himself, with his ardent temperament, there were doubtless far more 'crowded hours of glorious life' than fall to most

men even of active, adventurous disposition. Part of the success which this book has already found is due perhaps merely to the curiosity widely felt to know something of the inner life of one who has held so conspicuous a place in the literature and action of the age; but much also is unquestionably due to the way in which that just curiosity has been met by Mrs. Kingsley. In performing her task, she has shewn not only the loving appreciation and partiality we might expect, but also ability of other kinds, and sometimes courage. We are not blind to the omissions of the book, nor do we relish much that is superfluous in it; still we have seldom seen a book more readable in parts, or more fairly planned to suit such readers as, not having to review, may conscientiously skip. We have here a selection of letters and memories of a life: the thing is incomplete, but we learn much which we wished to know. Not that we should have looked kindly on a third volume. Far from it. Less pages, fewer friendly testimonials, and something more on the critical points in Mr. Kingsley's character and career, would have met our wish.

One feels a little surprised at first that such a man, accomplishing something in his day, and making little whirlpools of commotion wherever he went, should after all have had so happy and even a life. We call his life happy, because every chapter of these volumes bears copious evidence, not only to the good reasons that he had from first to last for being happy, but also to the pleasant fact. Dark passages of doubt, despair and grief, we are told of here and there; and it is quite easy to conceive how one who lived his life with such intensity of feeling and purpose should have had such experiences, and still find himself recovered from them before ordinary men would have fairly made up their minds they were miserable. "He seemed to live," as his pupil and friend, Mr. John Martineau, says of him, "three days, as it were, while other men were living one." And we look to this characteristic of Kingsley's mind as fair explanation of some things in his life which would otherwise leave a suspicion of falseness or of affectation clinging to his memory. "Believe me," he said in a letter to

a young man going over to Rome, "I can sympathize with you; I have been through it; I have longed for Rome; and though I now have, thank God, cast all wish of change behind me years ago, as a great lying devil's temptation, yet I still long as ardently as ever to see in the Church of England much which only now exists, alas! in the Church of Rome. Can I not feel for you?"* In another letter on the same subject, he says, "For several years of my life, it was the question" ["that terrible question of Celibacy versus Marriage"†] "which I felt I must either conquer utterly, or turn papist and monk. If I give you some little light, I can assure you I bought it dear. I, too, have held, one by one, every doctrine of the extreme High Church party, and faced their consequences."‡ On the other hand, there are references of a similar kind to a period, "not one of months, but for years,"§ when he was involved in doubts of another order, and as narrowly escaped falling into an extreme rationalism. Were we dealing with the life of a man of the average rate of living, it would be difficult, we think, to find the time necessary for these long and varied experiences. For, as early as 1839, at the age of twenty, while on a visit in Oxfordshire, Kingsley came under a strong and healthy influence, which was to determine all the rest of his life for him; and he returned to Cambridge, promising to read again his neglected Bible, and certainly without any intention or temptation from that time to turn papist and monk. Two years later, he decided to enter the Church, instead of following the law as his profession. The following year he read for holy orders, and took the curacy of Eversley; and a year and a half after this, he was married and established finally at Eversley as Rector. The various phases of doubt and agony, therefore, ranging from Popery to Secularism, must have been with Charles Kingsley a very young man's experience. And we think it needs this clue, in the singular intensity of his character, to justify the claim he was so fond of making, of having himself already gone through everything that others

* I. 202.

† I. 255.

‡ I. 258.

§ I. 388.

who consulted him were going through. Though there is not, strictly considered, sufficient time for all these protracted experiences, there is clear evidence that young Kingsley thought with extreme vivacity, felt acutely, and, with a true poet's power of imagination, actually passed through many distinct phases of trial, bearing the semblance of years of endurance, while other men would have been plodding their way carefully through one clearly marked set of perplexities. He lived fast, in intellect and in fancy—'l'orage dans l'âme et le feu dans le sang.' "Your highly vital life," were Bishop Wilberforce's words to him when he was no longer a young man. For this characteristic of the young Kingsley remained throughout the life, not, later on, leading him so much to violent changes of feeling and mental experience, but forming the impulse which forced him to a strain of incessant and varied work. Even so late as 1865, however, he still confesses candidly, in writing to Mr. Maurice, "I feel a capacity of drifting to sea in me which makes me cling nervously to any little anchor like subscription."* One may easily infer, accordingly, that before any such little anchors were thrown out, the impetuous youth under twenty would drift about a good deal. Not a few pages of these volumes are taken up with letters from Kingsley in answer to writers, both known and unknown to him, and of all sorts and conditions, who consulted him in their dangers or perplexities. In the candour, and sometimes uncommon skill, of these answers, one sees that the writer really had a great power of directly entering into the feelings and wants of other minds, and that when he speaks confidently of his own similar experience in the past, it was an honest reference to what he was quite conscious of having lived through. We are not specially concerned to vindicate the simplicity and truth of Mr. Kingsley on this point; but it is of some interest, if we can get to see as a consistent whole a character which, as we must think, was singularly free from affectation or any shade of falseness.

One or two seeming inconsistencies in Kingsley might perhaps be similarly traced either to the intensity or to the many-sidedness of his character. It may well puzzle us, for instance, that the man whose feeling and fancy were so high-strung that he could not listen to Glück's song, "*Che faro senza Euridice*," should yet himself have been able to write the poem called "*Saint Maura*." As in all his imperfect poems, a preaching element runs through the "*Saint Maura*;" but even the high lesson he meant should be learnt does nothing to save this piece from being one of the most distressing and fraught with pain ever written. One is struck, too, by traces over and over again of some superstitious feeling in the very man who seems to have satisfied himself from the first that the ghost of his childhood "*was rats*," and at another period stalked down a ghost for the benefit of his parishioners. In more than one place, he freely confesses to such a feeling. When acknowledging a controversial blunder he had made, and a consequent rebuff he had met with, he said, "*My conclusion is, being on all points a 'superstitious man,' that God does not choose me to meddle in this matter, being not wise and good enough; that he has therefore allowed me to fall into a slight mistake of fact in order to cripple me; and that therefore I must mind other work for the present; whereof I have plenty.*"* We are not disposed to doubt the special providence: the superstition lies in the free and ready interpreting of providence. The belief in such power of interpretation Mr. Kingsley would have been the last man, we think, to be willing to push to its logical consequences; but the assumption, within limits of one's own choosing, is very dear to an active imagination, and sometimes, moreover, leads to excellent moralizing. As here:

"I had my usual luck yesterday evening,—killed a little fish, and lost a huge one Ask Hughes from me whether he had heard of that abject * * * killing *the* great pike, thirty pounds weight; and ask him if it don't give him strange thoughts about Providence. Seriously I feel about it that God is the Giver; and that to such

poor half brutes as * * * from whom you can expect nothing better, as Hughes knows, God gives those enjoyments which they are capable of thanking Him for, that even so He may lift their hearts to Him,—while to such as us He denies them, because we have been given other and higher things. I have not had a decent day's fishing for four years. My luck has been absurdly bad. I was allowed extraordinary success for three years, till I was acknowledged the best fisherman in the neighbourhood, and since then I can catch nothing. . . . All that stirs up thoughts in superstitious folk like us, who are fools enough to believe in a 'special providence!' ”*

This apt reading of special providences appears in other connections. “About the word Trinity,” he writes to Thomas Cooper, the author of *The Purgatory of Suicides*, “I feel much as you do . . . It has, I think, helped to make men forget that God is a spirit But, Cooper, I have that faith in Christ's right government of the human race, that I have good hope that He is keeping the word Trinity, only because it has not yet done its work; when it has, He will inspire men with some better one.”† Christ's right government of the human race we shall certainly not question; but this readiness to name the Divine reasons for the retention of theologic terms is of some interest to us, when we attempt to understand the character of a man who was at the same time a devotee to science, and gifted with a rare poetic temperament. We are sorry to find no evidence of what Mr. Kingsley thought the Divine reason for the barbarous nomenclature he was so familiar with in his scientific pursuits. We may, however, justly regard this tendency to off-hand interpretation of Providence as nothing in him, as in countless others, but an unsound excrescence from that profound persuasion which filled him, of the presence and working of the Divine hand in all things.

Near the end of this book, there is a letter, both touching and discriminating, from the American poet, Mr. Whittier, in which he speaks of Kingsley as “reformer, poet and theologian.” The words in a fashion sum up Kingsley's work in

* I. 346.

† I. 398.

life ; but he was, we think, poet first of all, and certainly theologian last. For in Kingsley as poet, small as is the amount of verse he has left behind, we cannot fail to observe the marks of true genius. "The echoes of his rare and beautiful lyrics never die out of my memory." Not only are they exquisite both in their conception and their finish, but this was the one chief power which lasted unimpaired to the end of his days. His last poem, written in Colorado only a few months before his death, "Lorraine, Lorraine, Lorree," is on the same high level, we think, both of conception and execution, as the better known lyrics and ballads in his published volume. Possibly, under a different stress of circumstances, Charles Kingsley might have become one of the great poets of England. Chevalier Bunsen thought the author of the "Saint's Tragedy" was the one man who had it in him to carry on the national historical drama, picking up the thread of English history where Shakspeare left it. Such an attempt will perhaps always be sufficiently forbidden by the single fact that the daring poet would be challenging a comparison which must nearly inevitably damn his work before judgment. But apart from this, Kingsley suffered from a weakness, which he probably would have gloried in as a strength,—the irrepressible impulse to push forward a moral, and make his verse subserve an obvious present purpose. This tendency ruled in all his longer, more sustained efforts, and confined his complete success as a poet to the shorter occasions when he could forget himself as moralist. We cannot persuade ourselves, for instance, that his "Saint's Tragedy," though it is really so noble a work, does not suffer as a poem exactly in proportion as it is fitted to be a weapon of controversy or a sermon of practical bearing. When preacher and poet are combined in one man, we fancy the preaching is likely to have most of the advantage. For a high strain of imagination can lift the sermon out of the commonplace of practical exhortation or dogmatic teaching to higher levels ; but we doubt whether the preaching office has any gift at all to bestow in aid of the poet's art.

If, accordingly, Bunsen's idea was out of the way, one thinks nevertheless with some regret of another possibility which might have befallen Kingsley with his diversity of gifts. For his love of science, and his natural powers of observation, and withal his faculty of reasoning from observed facts, were at least equal to his preaching power, perhaps were far greater; and so rare in one man is the combination of poetic and scientific gifts, each of a high order, that it is natural to wish Kingsley might have been the one to step first into that untrodden region, long ago sketched out in anticipation by Mr. Buckle, where the spirit of poetry is to be incorporated with the spirit of science, and a new world opened to "makers" and to the imagination. However, both poetry and science were but pastimes with Kingsley. The main purpose of his life removed him from a full devotion to either of these subjects. Yet in both he excelled. In science, besides being an accurate and patient student, he achieved the art of attractive presentation of his subject, so as to allure others to a further pursuit. In poetry, he achieved perfection, as we judge, in many of the shorter pieces lightly thrown from his pen; while in other pieces, involving greater labour and thought, the success is still only marred by the deliberate purpose of the poet himself.

The main devotion of Mr. Kingsley's life, withdrawing him from what might have proved a yet nobler path than that which fell to his lot, was to practical reforms of many kinds, and to theology. Sanitary reform and a religious care for the body formed with him no mere episode of his later years. They were the uniform teaching of the whole of his ministry, and seem to have sprung from an essential portion of his faith. As early as 1842, the year of his ordination, he writes in this healthy-minded fashion:

"The body the temple of the Living God There has always seemed to me something impious in the neglect of personal health, strength and beauty, which the religious, and sometimes clergymen of this day affect. It is very often a mere form of laziness and untidiness! I should be ashamed of being weak. I could not do

half the little good I do do here, if it were not for that strength and activity which some consider coarse and degrading. Many clergymen would half kill themselves if they did what I do. . . . How merciful God has been in turning all the strength and hardihood I gained in snipe-shooting and hunting, and rowing and jack-fishing in those magnificent fens to His work ! While I was following my own fancies, He was preparing me for His work. I could wish I were an Apollo for His sake ! Strange idea, yet it seems so harmonious to me !”*

This passage gives precisely the spirit in which we find him twenty-seven years later throwing himself heart and soul more definitely into the work of sanitary reform. This was, too, with Mr. Kingsley no mere hobby, leading him to love the sewers for the sake of the cleansing thereof, or to delight in preaching the morning tub as a leading feature of experimental religion. It was part and parcel of the fashion in which he carried on the whole of his work, both in his own parish as clergyman, and as speaker to a wider circle. In the steady maintenance of his duty and right to interfere to save bodies as well as souls, lies the centre of interest, we think, in his practical career. Of the way in which his ordinary parish work was done, the world had heard something long before this book was thought of ; and the reports are here amply confirmed. A clergyman’s daily work in his parish necessarily tends to a dull routine. Few men can save themselves so effectually as Kingsley did from the deadening effect of the pressure of constant duties which are only not low because their purpose is high. He clearly recognized as his own “ the work of preaching Christ’s gospel to the poor, awakening the souls of old women, and telling little children of their Father in heaven ;” but he was persistent at the same time in cultivating his own natural versatility, and in doing anything and everything of good that fell in his way. To this determination to be parish priest, plus a great deal more, we must attribute, not only the enormous amount of practical good which he accomplished, but also the very healthy influence

which passed beyond the limits of the actual task in hand. It was not simply that he did this and that which it was necessary or right some one should do, but that doing it he gave it the stamp of a religious deed, and persuaded other men of their neglected duty. We place no limit to our admiration of the way in which Mr. Kingsley thus set an example, not simply to the clergy, but to all who undertake practical reforms in the society about them. He abhorred all clerical officialism; rather delighted, we imagine and hope, to shock the proprieties of some of his brethren; and cared only to meet the evil thing which had to be met, whatever it was, face to face, and grapple with it. Courteous and loyal to his superiors in the Church, and "minding the law," as for instance in the matter of the eastward position after the Purchas judgment, he nevertheless picked resolutely a line of his own in all practical work, and upon his work fell back whenever he felt that "capacity of drifting to sea" within him beginning to be alarming.

In this last respect, however, it would not be exact to say that he only carried out his own advice to others, having taken the hint of that advice in the first place perhaps from Dr. Arnold. When, in 1861, his curate asked him whether he would advise his reading "*Essays and Reviews*,"—"By no means," said Mr. Kingsley; "they will disturb your mind with questions which you are too young to solve. Stick to the old truths and the old paths, and learn their divineness by sick beds and in every-day work, and do not darken your mind with intellectual puzzles, which may breed disbelief, but can never breed vital religion or practical usefulness."* This advice appears salutary enough; for doubtless a man, with a parish of souls already under his charge, who should care to ask for advice on such a point, were better sticking to his work and not reading. The shrewdness of the advice might well be considered in this way to be somewhat at the expense of the recipient's reputation; and at any rate, it is certain that

* II. 131.

not in this method are the Kingsleys of the parish and the pulpit fashioned. For if Mr. Kingsley himself, as we have said, was glad to seek in work release from controversy both without and within, that was not because he ever, young or old, feared to look doubt of all kinds in the face, but rather, we judge, because having looked well into it, and settling the question to his mind, or seeing it to be without to him a possible solution, he took the one or the other equally as a final answer, and thereafter proceeded to the more grateful work of practical usefulness. This unquestionably is a totally different procedure from that of refusing to think, and aiding the refusal by a fit of hard work.

In many ways one sees that Mr. Kingsley's own faith was founded on a strong root of naturalism, to which the theological system he confessed to was an accretion, more by circumstance than by genuine growth. It was his longing, ere he should grow old, to be able to throw away all pursuits save Natural History, and die with his mind "full of God's facts, instead of men's lies."* When explaining, in a letter to a friend, the great law of Christian self-sacrifice as the only law of a perfect family life, he justly says, "I am not talking mysticism; I am talking sound, plain, matter-of-fact Naturalism, as open and possible to the labouring man as to the sage."† And in another letter,—

"My theological creed has grown slowly and naturally out of my physical one, till I have seen, and do believe more and more utterly, that the peculiar doctrines of Christianity (as they are in the Bible, not as some preachers represent them from the pulpit) coincide with the loftiest and severest science. This blessed belief did not come to me at once, and therefore I complain of no man who arrives at it slowly, either from the scientific or religious side; nor have I yet spoken out all that is in me, much less all that I see coming; but I feel that I am on a right path, and please God, I will hold it to the end."‡

And it is in harmony with this position that we cannot help

* II. 246.

† I. 196.

‡ I. 380.

feeling there is some confusion, a very happy confusion, between Kingsley's churchism and his love for nature. Mrs. Kingsley says,

"Passion Week was to him a time of such real and terrible pain that he always thanked God when it was over; and on Easter Day he would burst forth into a song of praise once more, for the Blessed Resurrection, not only of Christ the Lord, but of man, and of the dear earth he loved so well,—spring after winter, birth after death."*

Some words, too, that Kingsley himself used in speaking of his friend, Charles Mansfield, have no impossible, though not a literal, application to the practical side of his own theology.

"He was what would be called a Materialist, and used to argue stoutly on it with me, who chose to be something of a dualist or gnostic. I forget my particular form of folly. But I felt all through that his Materialism was more spiritual than other men's spiritualism, because he had such an intense sense of the truly spiritual,—of right and wrong. He was just waiting for the kingdom of God."†

A materialism "more spiritual than other men's spiritualism" lay, we think, as the scarcely acknowledged basis of whatever was true and noble in Kingsley's theology.

It was, too, out of this side of his theology, and not from the other portion wherein he thought himself orthodox, that any power and originality which appeared in his preaching came. His printed sermons, it is true, do not fill us with a great admiration, or seem to us equal in any way to his other writings. To have heard them from the living voice, with all the aids of his passionate utterance and delivery, would doubtless have been a thing to rouse the attention and live in the memory; and we can easily understand that under such conditions the sermons would seem, compared at any rate with the infinite twaddle dealt out from most episcopal pulpits, marvels of thought and eloquence. As printed and carefully read, however, one wearies over them,—over the mannerism of the style,—over the vain repetitions,—over the long inter-

* I. 364.

† I. 442.

vals between the occasional gems of thought or fancy,—also over the uneasy straining, in some cases, after orthodox expression of scarcely orthodox views. Still, some exceptions we should have to make to this criticism, if we were now discussing the value of the printed sermons: here and there the better power of the man flashes forth, and seems to hint that a very noble gift is being somehow perverted from its free and highest use. Perhaps it is that Mr. Kingsley's sermons are fatally confused between the naturalistic side of his theology and the creeds to which he gave hearty and honest assent, yet without finding in them the real basis for the religious activity of his life. Like a host of others, he was driven to the Bible and the creeds, because in Nature, in spite of his intense love for the outer world and his confidence of God's revelation therein, he failed to find sufficient evidence of a God of love. To his "dear master," Mr. Maurice, he said in 1856,

"I have long ago found out how little I can discover about God's absolute love, or absolute righteousness, from a universe in which everything is eternally *eating* everything else,—infinite cunning and shift (in the good sense). Infinite creative fancy it does reveal; but nothing else, unless interpreted by moral laws which are in oneself already, and in which one has often to trust against all appearances, and cry out of the lowest deep (as I have had to do)—Thou art not Siva the destroyer. Thou art not even Ahriman and Ormuzd in one. And yet, if Thou art not, why does Thy universe seem to say that Thou art? Art Thou a 'Deus quidam Deceptor' after all? No. There is something in me—which not nature, but Thou must have taught me—which cries and will cry: Though Thou slay me, as Thou hast slain world on world already—though I and all this glorious race of men go down to Hades with the Ichthyosaurs and the mammoths, yet will I trust in Thee."*

Thus failing in the material universe to find the Christian's God, of whom he knew already in his heart, revelation seemed to become a matter of necessity to confirm the voice within, though not a self-evident fact, and all its attendant difficulties to the reason came simply as difficulties which were on the

* I. 486.

whole of less weight than those which would arise without a revelation. To such a frame of mind, accompanying unusual courage and honesty of thought, revelation and creed will inevitably interpret themselves with some freedom, adapting themselves as best they can to the requirements of a moral law already felt and loyally obeyed in the life.

It was, no doubt, this somewhat constrained position which made Mr. Maurice so welcome to Kingsley as a teacher, and brought home to his mind the value of "any little anchor like subscription." Partly for this reason, too, and partly from the natural chafing of the man under party fetters of all kinds, Mr. Kingsley gave cordial adhesion to no one section of the English Church. In early life he had happy dreams of "an Arnoldite spirit" arising, and longed to clinch the matter by the establishment of a periodical, "daring and earnest," in which the writers should sign their names, and the motto, a dangerous one, should be "Ne Sutor." But this was in 1846. Later on, he found Mr. Maurice representing most exactly the state of his own mind on the creeds and their interpretation; and in the main, the general bearing of his theology during the rest of his life seems to have been in harmony with Mr. Maurice's writings. Yet there are signs of a somewhat nearer approach during the latter half of his mature life, not to orthodox standards, for these he had always claimed to adhere to, but to a more strictly orthodox rendering of them. This change, which was not one, we think, signifying any great shifting of theological ground on Mr. Kingsley's part, seems to find a date in a letter to Bishop Sumner in 1861, and falls in, by no accident, with the rapid circulation of "Essays and Reviews." If, after this incident, we should call Kingsley a High-churchman, it is what, no doubt, would best have pleased himself. But, in truth, his theology was full of inconsistencies, as of one who, venturing to step outside the Bible and the creeds of his Church for some of the revelation of God, yet seeks with care to set his wider conceptions still to the old words. Disclaiming, and even denouncing, Rationalism, for instance, he yet could say in answer to a friend's doubt whether Mr. Darwin's explanation

of some natural phenomena were orthodox, "My friend, God's orthodoxy is truth; if Darwin speaks the truth, he is orthodox."* And another saying of his, in a letter to Mr. Llewellyn Davies, is welcome, and marks, we think, the general tenor of his mind, in spite of one or two anecdotes in these volumes which seem in glaring contradiction. "The older I grow, the more tolerant I get, and believe that Wisdom is justified of all her children, and poor dear old Folly of some of hers likewise."†

The evidence in these "Letters and Memories," with respect to Kingsley's theological position, bears out on the whole the justice of what one who knew him well says of him:

"None of the great parties of the Church could lay claim to him exclusively. . . . Unexpected points of sympathy with all the different sections of the Church; a certain ideal of his own, both with regard to personal holiness and Church regimen; these things" [amongst others] "always left him a free lance in the ecclesiastical field."‡

As a free lance, he is likely to suffer the general fate of those who fight under no recognized banner. His memory as theologian is built upon nothing which can be permanent, nothing even self-consistent. His theology served its purpose as the vehicle of his preaching, and as his passport to credit and influence; it was also the undoubtedly honest expression of the man's own judgment,—the careful balancing often of conflicting judgments. But there are no marks of greatness, and few of originality, about Kingsley in this capacity. It must be on other grounds that his life and character will be held in any lasting love or admiration.

It would be but too easy to pick out things from these large volumes which might seem to contradict the estimate we have given of this lovable man's character. That would be a work, however, as unfair as it would be ungracious. The book, though put together by a tender and generally competent hand, wanders sometimes into garrulous follies, which are both

* II. 417.

† II. 247.

‡ II. 284.

perplexing and wearisome. These, together with some singular omissions,—omissions so complete as to become conspicuous features,—form the drawback to the relish with which we have read the book. It serves its purpose, however, so far as it helps us to the understanding of a notable man. Professor Max Müller has justly summed up the character :

“As one looked at him for the last time on earth, one felt that greater than the curate, the poet, the professor, the canon, had been the man himself, with his warm heart, his honest purposes, his trust in his friends, his readiness to spend himself, his chivalry and humility worthy of a better age. Of all this the world knew little; yet few men excited wider and stronger sympathies.”*

EDWARD S. HOWSE.

VI.—CANON MOZLEY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, and their Relation to Old Testament Faith. Lectures delivered to Graduates of the University of Oxford. By J. B. Mozley, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity, and Canon of Christ Church. London: Rivingtons. 1877.

THE suggestive title of this book and the reputation of its author cause the reader to open it with the expectation of pleasure and instruction; the first result of its perusal is a feeling of unmitigated astonishment. Be it remembered that it consists of lectures delivered to a class of graduates at Oxford, most of them, it may be taken for granted, men preparing for ordination, and those who are ere long to be numbered among the National Church's instructors of the people. They are not popular addresses, but the teachings of a scholar to scholars, containing the materials that are to assist in preparing the students for the discharge of clerical functions. Yet we do not find one single allusion to the critical study of the

Old Testament, or any acquaintance manifested with the researches in reference to the literary history of the Hebrew Scriptures, which are the characteristic feature of the theological studies of the present generation. The lecturer and his audience might be supposed to be equally ignorant of every book on the subject that has been published during the last quarter of a century. The questions treated of are dealt with exactly as though no doubt had ever been expressed, by any author worthy of notice, about the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the historical value of the biographies of the Patriarchs, and the trustworthiness of the narratives in the books of Joshua and Judges. Even the book of Daniel is referred to as undoubted history. In fact, the Old Testament is treated throughout in exactly the same manner as it was by writers of the earlier part of the present century.

How are we to account for this systematic neglect of the researches and conclusions of recent critics? It cannot be accidental; not for a moment may we suppose that it is caused by ignorance of the works and arguments of such writers as Colenso, Ewald and Kuenen. It must be with design that they are ignored, and with a set purpose that all notice of them is avoided. The fact seems to indicate the conviction of the Professor, that it is the safest course to encourage theological students to close their eyes to the progress of thought, and, resting on the old ways, to refuse to examine the grounds on which conclusions formerly trusted in are now disturbed. It may also indicate his opinion that his hearers should pursue a similar course in their future instructions to their flocks. But in both cases the policy is short-sighted, and may prove disastrous. Whether the conclusions of modern critics are well-founded or not, they must be noticed, either to be disproved or to be acquiesced in, by every one who seeks to deal with the subjects to which they refer. It is far too late in the day for contemptuous silence concerning them. Their arguments must be met and their views must be carefully investigated by every theological student who would deserve the name. If the teachers at what should be the head-quarters

of English theological learning are unable or unwilling to meet the difficulties fairly, to look facts in the face, to weigh arguments freely and fearlessly in the balance of reason and scholarship, it is time for them to give place to others less hampered by prejudice and the prescriptive bonds of time-honoured opinions. It is only such teachers who can send forth clergymen well equipped with the mental and moral weapons which may enable them to deal with the doubts and difficulties, which are every day more and more pressing themselves on the attention of the people. It is a bad omen for a religious system if its clergy lag behind its laity in the course of theological progress, in the path of inquiry, which need be none the less reverent because it is entirely free.

But it may be said that the subject of the volume before us does not call for any reference to questions of criticism, that these are dealt with in other courses of lectures to the same students; and that the theories of recent writers having been satisfactorily answered and triumphantly disposed of elsewhere, the Professor is justified in taking for granted the view he here presupposes of the Old Testament books from which he quotes. Were it so, some reference to the fact might naturally be expected. If such reference were not needed by those who heard the lectures, it was surely desirable when the volume is presented to the general reader. And it may well be doubted if a scholarly investigation of the subject can result in such an entire acquiescence in the views of a by-gone generation as Dr. Mozley seems to rest in. But more than this, the question as to the authorship and date of the books of the Old Testament is a fundamental question in reference to the main subject of this course of lectures. If even a tithe of Dr. Colenso's conclusions concerning the Pentateuch be accepted, if the statements of very moderate and cautious writers of the present day be true, the whole argument here presented falls to the ground, the problem to solve which this volume is intended ceases to exist. It is only on the supposition that all the narratives of the early Hebrew books are literally and strictly true, that the difficulties which Dr. Mozley strives to

meet have any existence. His treatment of them takes for granted that all the conclusions of modern criticism are entirely baseless. Ought a Regius Professor to assume this without indicating why he does so? Ought he to speak and write as though this criticism were unknown to him? He even assumes a tone of certainty on points as to which it can hardly be that a man of his scholarship feels as little doubt or difficulty as is experienced by the most ignorant reader who rests in the mere letter of Scripture. This will be made plain by a brief statement of the scope and purpose of the lectures.

The general question to which an answer is sought in these lectures is this: How can we account for the fact that commands were given to the ancient Hebrews by express revelation from God, confirmed by undoubted miracles, to perform acts which our Christian conscience condemns as immoral? Such commands are considered in detail, in reference to the sacrifice of Isaac, the extermination of the Canaanites, the assassination of Sisera, the law of retaliation and the law of Goël. The solution offered is, that these deeds were not in opposition to the conscience of that age and people. The principle laid down as to the employment of miracles is as follows:

“When we go then to the Scripture doctrine of miracles and of the evidence rising from miracles, we find, in the first place, that the general rule laid down is, that miracles are evidence of the Divine will; and that a command which has the warrant of a miracle is to be regarded as coming from God. . . . But when we enter further into the teaching of Scripture on this subject, we discover that, together with this general rule respecting miracles, there is a collateral principle inculcated, viz., that a miracle may be permitted by God for the purpose of trial. Where, then, the authority of a miracle contradicts any clear knowledge we have of the Divine will, any instructions from antecedent sources, this is the interpretation of it which Scripture enjoins upon us. We are warned that the miracle does not in such cases bear its primary and more natural interpretation as an evidence of the Divine will, but the secondary interpretation of it as a trial of moral strength in resisting that apparent evidence—of the moment and from without—in favour of

a more real evidence of His will which we have from antecedent sources or from within.”*

“If a miracle was in a former age sufficient evidence of a Divine command to destroy life, and now it is not, it must be that we are now possessed with a principle in such strong disagreement with homicide, that the alternative of the miracle being only permitted as a *trial* necessarily becomes more reasonable now than of its being proof of a *command*; whereas this principle did not exist in equal force and strength in the mind of a former age, and therefore the miracle was taken in its more obvious meaning as proof of a Divine commandment.”†

The acknowledgment of a command from within—the verdict, that is, of the individual conscience—being more binding than any external law, even if sanctioned by miracle, is of great importance. But it sounds a strange assumption to take for granted that there can ever be a contradiction between the voice of God within and His command coming from without, and that He ever tries one of His children so severely as to tempt him with a mandate enforced by miracle which is in direct antagonism to the sense of right proceeding from antecedent sources and felt binding by the conscience. We do not know what instance can be adduced of such a “trial,” and the necessity of supposing its possibility is a serious flaw in the theory of which it forms a part. It is a much simpler explanation, and one more accordant with all Christian notions of the character of God, to say that wherever men have supposed this contradiction to exist, it has been because they have erroneously attributed to Him commandments which were not in truth Divine. It is the natural instinct which prompts the unavoidable conclusion, that as soon as any precept which has hitherto been looked on as part of the law of God is pronounced immoral by the conscience, it is also viewed as not coming from God, and a change takes place in the conception of what is really His will in the matter. Thus an early age may conceive that God sanctions, and even demands, such deeds as every modern Christian would at once pronounce to

be inconsistent with the Divine will; but this is only a change in man's conception of God's commandments, not a change in the fundamental character of those commandments themselves. An investigation into "ruling ideas in early ages" for the purpose of demonstrating how the ancient Hebrews could ascribe to Jehovah enactments which we shrink from ascribing to Him, is interesting and useful; but this is a very different thing from asserting that He specially revealed and miraculously enforced His will, that courses of conduct should be followed which were in themselves opposed to the precepts of pure morality. The supposition is in itself so monstrous, that the necessity for it to meet the exigencies of an incorrect system of biblical criticism and interpretation stamps that system as practically injurious.

The statements contained in these lectures as to the peculiar ideas which distinguish early ages, are worthy of notice:

"When we examine the ancient mind all the world over, one very remarkable want is apparent in it, viz., a true idea of the individuality of man; an adequate conception of him as an independent person—a substantial being in himself, whose life and existence was his own. Man always figures as an appendage to somebody—the subject to the monarch, the son to the father, the wife to the husband, the slave to the master."*

"We are struck immediately in the Scripture account of the sacrifice of Isaac with the habitual sense of ownership—as distinct from conferred momentary command—with the entire absence of all struggle in the mind of the Patriarch; how he simply regards his son as a treasure of his own which he has to give up, a treasure which is dearer to him than any other earthly thing, and which it is the greatest trial of his life to part with, but which is still his own, *belonging* to him and appropriate to him to surrender."†

It would demand too much space to give quotations shewing how this principle is applied to other instances. This is done with great ingenuity, with a skilful presentation of parallels from the history of other ancient nations besides the Hebrews, and with sufficient success to satisfy the reader that it is quite

* P. 37.

† P. 49.

possible for actions to be done without any protest arising against them in the conscience, in early ages, which would now be universally condemned as immoral. But, not satisfied with this, Dr. Mozley insists on the supposition that these actions were specially commanded by God. His language sometimes indeed might indicate that he only means this was the light in which the Old Testament writers themselves regard them. "The punishment of the children on account of the father's crime was prohibited in the Jewish code, and was, as a matter of human law, condemned. It was the special Divine command which alone was regarded as authorizing it in the Old Testament."* But in other passages he adopts and vindicates this Hebrew view. Speaking of exterminating wars as arising from an exaggerated passion for justice, he says :

"As a matter of fact, in the Jewish mind this peculiar principle of justice existed in a modified and limited form ; ready to be put in execution upon a special Divine call, but not before. . . . But such a Divine sanction implied miraculous evidence to support it. And thus it was an essential characteristic of this extraordinary justice under the old dispensation, that it was executed under such miraculous warrant ; this was a fundamental feature of it, which entered into the system, and furnished a moral condition of it."†

Thus God is represented as furnishing a special revelation and departing from the ordinary course of material causation by working miracles—for what purpose? To urge on the Hebrews to a greater amount of bloodshed and cruelty than they would have been moved to by the "ruling ideas in early ages,"—not merely suiting His revelation to their imperfect moral standard, but using His revelation to lower and debase that standard. If this is not confounding right and wrong, and setting revealed religion in antagonism to natural morality, we do not know what is. It at once throws into the shade the light which might be given by the considerations about differences between ancient and modern ideas, presenting as

* P. 55.

† Pp. 101, 102.

paramount above all other questions this tremendous one—
“Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?”

It is a relief to turn from the special-pleading which attempts, with ill-directed ingenuity, to bolster up the theological theories of the past, to the simple, straightforward explanation afforded by those who venture to treat the Old Testament writings like any other ancient documents, to bring to their investigation all the resources of scholarship, and to speak of them as simply what they can be proved to be. If some of the narratives are found to be legends rather than histories; if the legislation attributed to Moses be shewn to be the product of a later age; if the history of the Hebrews be, like the history of any other nation, providentially arranged and directed, but neither guided by any exceptional revelation nor adorned by any miraculous interposition; if the religious truths which found an early home among the Jewish people were tinctured and modified by the national characteristics of those who possessed them,—there still remains instruction enough to be gathered from an inquiry into the “ruling ideas in early ages,” but all the difficulties that seem to perplex and hamper the Regius Professor in his inquiry at once disappear. All the light he throws on those ideas then becomes valuable as helping us rightly to estimate the moral position of the men of the past; but there is no longer any necessity to present excuses for the representation of Divine justice as stooping to the level of those imperfect ideas, and Divine power as encouraging and enforcing conduct in direct opposition to eternal moral principles,—conduct which, as the author observes, is contrary not only to the gospel precept of love, but even to the natural human instinct of justice.

It is disheartening to find the literary ability and extensive scholarship which are manifest in every part of this book, occupied with an attempt to build up theology with the worn-out stones of former generations of critics, and neglecting the materials which are plentifully offered by more recent writers. Especially is this to be regretted when the position held by Dr. Mozley is remembered. The teaching in theology England

now needs must be up to the mark of the present day. Many are there who attempt to present such teaching to the people, while they have themselves only a smattering of the needed learning, and rash assertions, wholesale negations and attempts at iconoclastic destruction, are the result. These are great and crying evils, but they can only be met by the labours of true scholars, who unite with a reverence for the past, a candid and unprejudiced freedom in the present; who will take account of the best thought and the deepest learning of other critics; and will bring to bear on them the calm investigation of individual reasoning, not pledged to any system or committed to any previous conclusion, not speaking as an apologist, but as an inquirer after truth. What might not the powers displayed in these lectures accomplish, in ascertaining what historical certainties remain to us, what theological instruction is afforded us, in the Old Testament, if directed by such a spirit! As it is, the only result that will be produced by Dr. Mozley's lectures on any one who has his doubts and difficulties which he desires to have removed, will be to encourage the notion that the Old Testament needs an apology, but that the apology here presented for it is altogether insufficient and unsatisfactory.

JOHN WRIGHT.

VII.—SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS.

CHRISTMAS has passed, and spring is at the doors, and the Church of England is not rent in twain. One reason may be, that judgment in the Ridsdale case is not yet given, although it may be expected soon after Easter. It has been heard before a pompous array of judges—the Primate, the President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, an ex-Lord Chancellor, the Chief Baron, three Lords Justices, and four other Judges—all assisted, according to the last constitution of the Court, by four Episcopal assessors—in this case, Chichester, St. Asaph, Ely and St. David's. The arguments were so long and elaborate as to draw out a complaint from the Times that the whole

judicial business of the country was being inconvenienced for the sake of trying trivial matters of ritual. What the decision will be, it is not worth while attempting to foretell in this place ; it is enough to say that rumours are rife of a compromise which will probably satisfy neither party. In the mean time, strange to say, the nearer this decisive event approaches, the less decisive does it seem to be. The enforcement of the Public Worship Regulation Act by Lord Penzance's Court has roused among the clergy a spirit of resistance to all dealings with theological matters by lay judges, or any judges appointed by the State, which may yet lead to very serious consequences. It is obvious that the particular finding of the Court in the Ridsdale case becomes of comparative little importance, if the clergy are prepared beforehand to disregard it as of no authority.

We mentioned in our last that monitions to discontinue ritualistic practices had been issued against Mr. Pelham Dale, of St. Vedast's, in the City, and Mr. Tooth, of Hatcham, and that in each case they had been disregarded. Mr. Dale's case ended somewhat ignominiously. He was condemned in due course to three months' suspension. The Bishop came down to St. Vedast's, took possession of the church, conducted the service, and Mr. Dale yielded as to a canonical superior. Then, of course, the ritualistic papers raged, telling him that the Bishop had made himself in this case no more than the bailiff or beadle of Lord Penzance, and ought to have been treated with the contempt due to his superior. Mr. Tooth was made of sterner stuff, and was, besides, well backed up by his churchwardens. He took no notice of the decree of suspension, or of the Bishop's inhibition, but continued to officiate. When the Bishop sent down a clergyman, Canon Gee, to take his place, he met him at the door, supported by a considerable body of his adherents, and refused him admittance to the church. To such a course of conduct there could of course be only one issue. A fresh application was made to Lord Penzance, and the contumacious cleric was sentenced to imprisonment, and actually committed to Horsemonger-Lane Gaol until he purged himself of his contempt. In the mean time the Bishop of Rochester obtained an entrance into the church by breaking open the doors, and then installed Mr. Dale, a clergyman of tolerably High-church views and practices, who is now, after having experienced some opposition, quietly discharging the duties. No sooner was this happy consummation attained than Mr. Tooth, upon the application of the original prosecutors, was

released, more mercifully, perhaps, than logically; for his contempt of Lord Penzance and his Court, both in word and deed, remained precisely what it had been. But no doubt it was thought desirable, in the general interests of the Church, to remove him as soon as possible from the pedestal of martyrdom on which his own obstinacy, and the unreasoning sympathy of his friends, had placed him. He has since gone abroad, and we are sorry to be obliged to add, in shattered health. Should he not submit before three years are passed—a contingency which is not in the least likely to happen—he will be deprived of his benefice.

We have not attempted to chronicle the disgraceful riots which took place at St. James' while Mr. Tooth was still holding his ground there, and which shewed that if Anglo-Catholics can be fanatically obstinate, the palm of brutality and irreverence must certainly be awarded to Evangelical Protestants. A more important thing is the effect of this startling episode upon public opinion outside. This is not very easy to estimate. The suspense in which moderate High-churchmen are waiting for the decision in the Ridsdale case may have prevented a more decisive expression of opinion. Some meetings of Mr. Tooth's sympathizers have been held, numerous and enthusiastic enough; but the movement has been less wide-spread than we should have expected. A priest in prison for conscience' sake is an exciting spectacle; but it becomes less exciting if any general suspicion insinuates itself into men's minds that his real offence is contumacious resistance to the law. Perhaps the most significant fact in connection with the affair is the adoption of the following three resolutions by the Church Union:

I. "That the English Church Union, while it distinctly and expressly acknowledges the authority of all Courts legally constituted in regard to all matters temporal, denies that the secular power has authority in matters purely spiritual.

II. "That any court which is bound to frame its decisions in accordance with the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or any other secular court, does not possess any spiritual authority with respect to such decisions. That suspension *a sacris* being a purely spiritual act, the English Church Union is prepared to support any priest not guilty of a moral or canonical offence who refuses to recognize a suspension issued by such a court.

III. "That 'the Church' (not the State) having 'power to decree rites and ceremonies and authority in controversies of faith,' this Union submits itself to the duly constituted synods of the Church; and, in regard to the legality of matters now under dispute, appeals to the rubrics of

the Book of Common Prayer, and to the interpretation put upon those rubrics in 1875 by the resolutions of the Lower House of Convocation of Canterbury, in regard to the eucharistic vestments and the eastward position."

This is indeed a note of rebellion; a claim on the part of the Church of England of an independence of the State, which it has never enjoyed at any period of its history, and which assuredly will never be conceded to it. We forbear to speculate upon the future; it is better to wait for the orderly development of events. But it is curious to note in how many ruridecanal synods and clerical meetings clergymen are now discussing the possibility of disestablishment. Many of the ritualists openly announce their adhesion to the principle of Separation of Church and State, and it is reported that a "Church" Liberation Society is in process of formation. We shall see.

Hitherto, Convocation has not met this year. The Primate's excuse is that Easter is so early, and the duties of Lent so pressing upon the clergy, that it is not desirable to call them together till Parliament meets after the recess. Of course, the High-churchmen do not accept this natural explanation, and persist in attributing to Dr. Tait some deep-laid Erastian design.—The Bishopric of Truro has been finally constituted. The new see is filled by the appointment of Dr. Benson, once Head Master of Wellington College, and since the active and capable Chancellor of Lincoln. The new Bishop of St. Albans is also to be enthroned about the same time, namely, soon after Easter. Bishop Claughton, it is understood, takes the see, leaving Rochester to be filled up. Sodor and Man is also virtually, if not formally, vacant. The subscriptions to the new see of Liverpool appear to hang fire; the only thing certain about it is, that the present Bishop of Chester has emphatically and righteously refused his consent to the division of his diocese, if wealthy Liverpool is to lay hands on the ecclesiastical revenues of the Isle of Man. Another project for the enlargement of the Episcopate is to make the counties of Nottingham and Derby into a Bishopric, having for its cathedral the magnificent minster church of Southwell. But this scheme is at present only in embryo.

The Oxford and Cambridge Universities' Bill has been re-introduced, this time providing for the reform of both institutions under one statute. We shall defer giving an analysis of its provisions until they have received their final form, and content ourselves with saying that the constitution of the Oxford Commission (which

was the least satisfactory of the two) has been much improved by the substitution of Dr. Bellamy, the President of St. John's, for the Dean of Chichester, and the addition of the Savilian Professor of Geometry, Mr. H. J. S. Smith. On the other hand, it is a loss that the name of Sir Henry Maine should no longer appear.—The latest ecclesiastical event of the Session thus far has been the production in the House of Lords by the Duke of Richmond of a Burials' Bill. So far as we have learned, it consists of three main points—a consolidation of the law of burials, provision for the purchase and formation of cemeteries, and permission in certain cases for the silent burial of Dissenters in parish churchyards. The Archbishop of Canterbury, with much less than his usual good sense and good feeling, expressed his confidence that the last-named provision would satisfy "all sensible Dissenters." On the contrary, we feel persuaded that it will be received as a bitter and deliberate insult. As for the provision of cemeteries, it is beside the main question. The desire of all right-feeling men is not to perpetuate, but to obliterate, all sectarian distinctions in death. Lord Granville happily remarked, that there is probably no department of the law which would not be the better for consolidation. We may therefore accept the first part of the Duke of Richmond's Bill, as the satisfaction, not of a Nonconformist, but of a general grievance.

We owe the following interesting account of ecclesiastical affairs beyond the Tweed to the kindness of a Scottish correspondent.

"If Robert Burns were alive and in Scotland at the present moment, he might write again what he wrote nearly a century ago in the 'Kirk's Alarm' about the New-Light Moderates of Ayr :

Orthodox, Orthodox,
Wha believe in John Knox,
Let me sound an alarm to your conscience ;
There's a heretic blast
Has been blawn in the wast,
That what is not sense must be nonsense.

"At last there seems to be a stirring of thought, a *faint* dawning of light, in all the greater churches. It is not only that here and there a man, more courageous or more intelligent than his neighbours, has lifted up his voice. But signs are not wanting that the general body of church folk also feel a vague alarm, a sense of insecurity in the traditional, the first shock of timid doubt which may some time deliver the land from superstition. On the 8th of March,

Dr. Beith, an eminent minister of the Free Church, said in the Commission, that never in the history of that communion 'had there been greater agitation or more painful forecasting than at present.' This is caused by the Robertson Smith heresy case. Mr. Smith is one of the Professors of the Free Church at the Aberdeen Training College. He lately wrote for the new *Encyclopædia Britannica* three articles on Bible, Angel and Canticle. In the first of these he points out the familiar distinction of the Elohistic and the Jehovistic; the annalistic document which contains the liturgical and priestly elements, and the prophetic or ideal document which gives us the story of the Fall and the story of Abraham. He notices the duplicate accounts of the creation and the flood, and the occurrence of distinct groups of laws dealing with the same subject, as the Passover or the Feast of Unleavened Bread. He even distinguishes in the Pentateuch a third author belonging to northern Israel, who, using the name Elohim, but in a picturesque and popular style, tells the story of Joseph. Then, as regards the New Testament, he gives a very candid summary of the Tübingen results, and seems to admit the power of the Tübingen analysis, so far as internal evidence is concerned. But he disputes, or at least represents as extremely doubtful, the miracle test of a secondary narrative, the antagonism of Paul and the Jerusalem church, the late date of the Fourth Gospel; and he almost denies that the external facts afford sufficient time for the evolution of the Gospels on Tübingen principles. In the third article, Mr. Smith states that the Book of Canticles is obviously written in an Aramaic peasant dialect, and therefore not by Solomon. He avoids the old allegory which makes the Bride either the church of the faithful or the believing soul, and also the suggestion of Grotius which resolves the whole book into 'conjugal prattle.' He adopts the explanation of Ewald, according to which the Shulamite, the Narcissus of Sharon, is the wife or sweetheart of a northern shepherd. Solomon comes in as the tempter of her virtue, and the whole drama proceeds in an abrupt alternation of dialogue and monologue which is not unknown in the archaic literature of some other nations. But what has given greatest offence is Mr. Smith's somewhat nebulous theory of inspired personation, which his indignant critics declare to be much the same thing as 'inspired fraud or inspired forgery.' It seems at least to be an excellent example of that verbal accommodation by which men fit old phrases to new facts. When these articles were published, there was a *fama clamosa*, and the matter was

taken up by the College Committee, one of whose functions is to originate processes against Professors. That Committee expressed 'grave concern, uneasiness and anxiety,' but found no ground for libelling Mr. Smith as a heretic. Their report next came before the Commission, a body of ill-defined powers which sits during the vacation of the General Assembly. Here an interesting and important division of parties was made apparent. First, we have the old Die-hards, the immovable and impenetrable party, headed by Dr. Begg, who, since the death of the late Dr. Gibson, is probably the most orthodox theologian living. He is a shallow and ignorant man, who lives by flattering the ignorance of others. It is his party which resists every change; which rages against the 'Baird Perversion Fund,' and the 'Patronage Act Seduction Company,' and the 'carnal schemes of Erastian 'statesmen;'' which refuses hymns because God did not write a hymn-book; which takes a pious joy in calling organs 'hurdy-gurdies;'' which shudders in public when it is proposed to abolish the absurd form of Fast-days; which identifies irreligion with Disestablishment and University culture; and which with a painful effrontery is always proclaiming itself as the intellectual and spiritual heir of Knox. Now, the position of the Beggites on the Smith question is clear and simple. 'If Moses did not write the Pentateuch, while Christ and his apostles said he did, you destroy the foundation of truth in the Church.' 'Ignorant people are apt to be led away with the idea that learned men must necessarily know better than they themselves can. If I have no reliable Bible to preach from, I have no more right to go to the pulpit to give my own opinion, than any man in the pew has a right to give his opinion.' Nothing could be more hopelessly consistent. Then we have the young Liberal party, of which the culprit, Mr. Smith, is himself a prominent member, fifty-nine of whom recently published a manifesto, declaring their confidence in Mr. Smith's evangelical soundness, and deprecating any action against him. In this party are several of the younger Professors. They sometimes speak in the General Assembly, and are rewarded chiefly by applause from the students' gallery. Lastly, there is the working majority of the Church, whom Principal Rainy and others brought into a state of tolerable discipline during the recent discussions of the Union question, and who are now bringing the Disestablishment question steadily forward into the front rank of political questions. Their attitude depends very much on what the astute Principal says, and he says that no crisis has arisen, no

question affecting Inspiration or the Canon. But he read the articles "with the greatest possible apprehension and pain," and he expects they will fill the Church "with bewilderment, anxiety and apprehension." He denied that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was a confessional matter, but he did not agree with those who rejected the authorship. There was among them a consent of opinion and judgment upon many matters of date, authorship, &c., which Mr. Smith ought to have shewn more respect for. And so he goes on with the see-saw of a man who has a large majority and likes to keep it quiet; and the matter is sent down to a Presbytery at Aberdeen, that it may do what is required to bring it in proper shape before the Assembly. But the Presbytery can hardly be induced to move; and on the Aberdeen students making a demonstration in favour of the suspected Professor, the latter has come forward and declared his entire loyalty to the supreme authority and inspiration of the Bible, and to the dogmatic principles of the sixteenth century. He even goes out of his way to quarrel with Principal Tulloch, who in a sympathizing notice of the new heresy in the *Contemporary Review* had said, what seems plain enough to the unassisted lay reason, that this abandonment of the 'corporeal perfections' of the Bible must modify the doctrine of the Church regarding the authority of the Scriptures. Such is the position of parties. If Mr. Smith had been a nobody, he would probably have received much rougher treatment. But unfortunately he is one of the cleverest and most learned men in the Church, and the Church feels a carnal pride in him. But he can hardly, we should think, be so clever as to know all the critical wisdom of this generation, and yet remain in the dogmatic 'as you were' of the Reformers or of the Westminster divines.

"In the United Presbyterian Church, again, two young but popular ministers have vehemently demanded a complete revision of the Confession of Faith, which they denounce as inconsistent with the Bible, the only rule of faith and practice. At Greenock, Mr. Macrae vigorously denies the doctrines of reprobation, infant damnation, everlasting punishment, and, by a motion in his Presbytery calling for inquiry, accuses the Church of hypocrisy and imbecility in her present attitude towards the standards. One gospel is professed, another actually preached from the pulpits, and this young champion, who has come out of the West, says 'he will strike a blow for truth and freedom, though it should be his last.' At Glasgow, Mr. Ferguson points out that at the beginning the

creed was passed by a majority, and therefore could at no time be the unanimous creed of the Church. 'Truth is an eternal reality, and larger than the view of it which belonged to any particular age.' The Confession does injustice to the unity and goodness of God, and it is, moreover, illogical and unhappily expressed. At Paisley, Mr. Watson says his church are drifting away from the standards towards a higher faith; and at Crieff, Dr. Cunningham, the learned historian of the Church, has proposed that no attempt should be made to reconstruct a new creed, but that the formula of subscription should be relaxed into an expression of indefinite adhesion to the substance of the document, a process which vividly describes the limp and uncomfortable state of mind in which many clergymen find themselves on this subject. Of course, most of these gentlemen will be snubbed and scolded by their brethren in Christ; but there is in Messrs. Macrae and Ferguson a bold and uncompromising tone and a felicity and sincerity of language which will compel attention, and perhaps penetrate the general conscience of the Church.

"Even in the Establishment, as Principal Tulloch says, 'the current of free thought is running deep and sure.' Mr. Story, of Roseneath, has given a remarkable lecture, in which he emphasized the spiritual and depreciated the purely intellectual elements of religion. It has already appeared in England. Professor Flint, in his Baird Lectures on Theism, has introduced a robust and independent style of discussion, which ought to act like a tonic on the cerebral circulation of his fellow-ministers. Even in Edinburgh, where, since Home was suspended for publishing the tragedy of Douglas, there has been a traditional feud between Church and Stage, two ministers were lately got to attend a theatrical dinner, at which they were informed by Professor Blackie that 'the clergy had made a most unnatural and monstrous divorce between the holy and the beautiful, and that they were fighting against good and against God.'

"It is perhaps only a flattering dream if patriotic Scotchmen look forward to a free Church. The national mind is not really moved by a few noisy debates in a Church Court. But it is being profoundly moved by the teachings of science, and of the philosophy which is founded upon positive science."

VIII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. DR. DAVIDSON ON THE CANON.

The Canon of the Bible : its Formation, History and Fluctuations.

By Samuel Davidson, D.D., LL.D. London : H. S. King. 1877.

A history of the Canon in a single volume, of barely two hundred small pages, is manifestly deserving of praise for its brevity—provided always that this good quality has not been too dearly purchased by the sacrifice of other qualities of equal or of greater value. How far this is the case in the present work, different readers will no doubt judge differently. The intention of the author has evidently been to produce a work of very moderate size, and out of the stores of his learning to compress within his space as much substantial matter as he could. The origin of the book will in some degree account for the plan thus followed. The Preface informs us that the volume was composed for the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, to stand as an article in that too ambitious and voluminous work—a position which was likely to impose somewhat restricted limits. The editor of the *Encyclopædia* appears to have found the treatise, even in its original brevity, a little too much for him; and so, out of regard, we may understand, for the feelings of his “public,” thought it necessary to abridge and mutilate, “contrary to the author’s wishes.” Hence, very properly, the latter resolved to print the work entire, and with such revision and enlargement as seemed to be required to make it an independent volume.

In carrying out this design, Dr. Davidson has condensed a great deal of valuable matter into a small space, and has furnished his readers with an able and compendious summary of the results of much careful research. Details of evidence, it is scarcely necessary to add, are but sparingly included, being often only alluded to, with sufficient reference, however, to the original authorities. The reader who requires more cannot do better than consult other works of the author, in which many of the points belonging more or less to the history of the Canon are discussed at length. Those, however, who desire a comprehensive survey of the subject from the author’s point of view will find here all that they need, and will thank the author for the clear and definite way in which, for the most part, he has presented his conclusions.

It is not our purpose in this brief notice to follow Dr. Davidson into any close examination of his statements. It will be enough to indicate in a general way the leading contents of the volume. After a brief introduction, giving the usual account of the meaning of the term "Canon," we have a rapid narrative of the origin of the Old Testament collection, first, to the time of Ezra, by whom was fixed what may be termed the first Canon. A second and larger collection, the author shews, may be dated from the time of Nehemiah ; while the third or completed Old Testament Canon was not closed until the century before Christ, perhaps not even until the century following. In the course of this statement, which is fairly borne out by the evidence, the reader is strongly reminded how much of uncertainty attaches to the age and authorship of most of the books, and how little we really know of the grounds on which these books, and no others, were preserved and looked upon as the authoritative religious books of the Hebrew people. A similar rapid statement is given respecting the New Testament collection. At first, it is shewn, the Christians had no Scriptures except the older Testament, and it was many long years, far down in the second century after Christ, before they began to put together the New Testament writings in one collection, and to look upon them with something of the feeling with which they regarded the older Scriptures. In respect to authorship, doubt and uncertainty, to which we cannot reasonably close our eyes, attach to many of the individual works in the Christian Canon, as well as to those of the Old Testament. The "authority" of the "Church" (*pace* Mr. Gladstone) helps us very little indeed in the inquiry, for it is in truth only the authority of an age greatly more credulous and ignorant than our own, and of men with whom the belief in angels and devils, magicians and magic, the millennium and the end of the world, was a matter of course ; and so the conclusion of the author is well justified, that the books must be received each of them for itself alone, for what it really is as a work calculated for moral and religious instruction and edification, rather than for any attestation or credit which the fact of its reception into the "Canon" may be supposed to have conferred upon it.

It is a necessary corollary of this proposition that some of the excluded, or so-called apocryphal, books have at least as good a right to be received and used as any that are now considered canonical. This is a main positive conclusion to which Dr. Davidson is led by

his review of the subject, and it is abundantly warranted by his sketch of the evidence, brief as it is.

The following passage near the end of the work will illustrate what has just been said ; while it will shew, at the same time, the conservative and reverent spirit of the author, as well as the liberal and advanced position from which he speaks :

“A new arrangement is necessary now ; but where is the Church or ecclesiastical body bold enough to undertake it ? And if it were attempted or carried out by non-ecclesiastical parties, would the churches approve or adopt the proceeding ? Yet we venture to say, that if some books be separated from the collection and others put in their place—if the classification of some be altered and their authority raised or lowered—good will be done ; the Bible will have a fairer degree of normal power in doctrine and morals, and continue [to be] a medium of promoting spiritual life. Faith in Christ precedes faith in books. Unless criticism be needlessly negative, it cannot remove this time-honoured legacy from the position it is entitled to, else the spiritual consciousness of humanity will rebel. While the subject is treated reverently, the love of truth must be permanent, overriding dogmatic prejudices. Then shall the canon come forth in a different form from that which it has had for centuries—a form on which faith may rest without misgivings.”—Pp. 195—197. G. V. S.

2. KUENEN ON PROPHETS AND PROPHECY.

The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel. An Historical and Critical Inquiry. By Dr. A. Kuenen. With an Introduction by J. Muir, Esq., D.C.L. London : Longmans. 1877.

It is a little disappointing that Dr. Kuenen's “Religion of Israel” should have been received with such indifference by the old-fashioned orthodox. One had ventured to hope the startling novelty (to them novelty) of its contents, and the favour extended to it by intellectual nonconformists, would stimulate some of their leaders to a sense of their apologetic duties. But the book was perhaps too far above the theological prejudices of our day. It may have needed to be supplemented by a treatise, partly polemical, partly scientific, on that great phenomenon which gives such a special interest to Israel's religion. Such a treatise on the prophecy of the Israelites is now supplied to us, and in a masterly style. To its purely negative part there can be no reply. And the constructive portion is so cautiously critical, so capable of adjustment to the results of further investiga-

tion, that no convert from orthodoxy will feel impoverished by the change. Dr. Kuenen is well able to appreciate the poetic attractiveness of the old view of the development of prophecy (pp. 1—4), although, looking back on the results of investigation, he endorses the fervent exclamation of Renan, that "Jerusalem has come forth more dazzling and beautiful from the apparently destructive labour of modern science" (p. 549).

It would be impossible to give the reader any adequate idea of the manifold topics embraced in this inquiry. Even Dr. Muir's careful Introduction does but give a bird's-eye view of the complex and yet most lucid argument. The object proposed is to ascertain the true nature of prophecy from the utterances of the prophets themselves, interpreted grammatically, and not in accordance with theological prejudices. This, however, cannot be done without some provisional notions on the subject of prophecy, which have partly to be gained from late and doubtful reports in the "historical books." And in the subsequent examination of the prophetic writings, Dr. Kuenen thinks himself thoroughly entitled to make use of the generally admitted results of historical criticism. He is therefore not one of those who demand or claim a perfect freedom from assumptions; only his assumptions are based on the facts of the Old Testament and a cautious criticism, and he is always ready to correct or supplement them. Up to a certain extent, Dr. Kuenen may reckon upon the assent of moderate theologians of all but the Catholicizing school. But I apprehend that, while admitting the un-biblical character of the traditional view of prophecy, some will be found to object to the author's conclusions as equally un-biblical. The point of divergence appears as early as the fourth chapter, where the author distinctly declines to acquiesce without examination in the assurances of the prophets with regard to the origin and authority of their preaching. It is the misfortune of all criticism of received ideas that the positive part should seem inferior in cogency to the negative. The author's tone of mind is historical rather than speculative, and the phenomena of the prophetic consciousness can hardly be explained without some reference to philosophy. He shews his full strength, however, in the remarkable chapters on Fulfilled and Unfulfilled Predictions (perhaps an unscientific, but certainly a convenient distinction). These chapters will probably be those most appreciated by the many. Theologians of the Broad-church school will perhaps be more impressed by chap. ix., in which it is maintained that the statements

of the prophets regarding the future are merely the imaginative embodiment of their conceptions of the Divine attributes. Students of biblical criticism may be specially directed to the three chapters on "The Prophets and Prophecy in the Historical Narratives of the Old Testament." And readers, both "general" and "special," will naturally turn to the concluding chapter, where the abiding glory of the prophets is shewn to be in their creation or revelation of ethical monotheism.

On many points it is of course possible to disagree with our author without any appreciable effect upon the argument. For instance, I still adhere to a different view of the "Servant of Yahveh," and of the famous passage in Gen. xlix. 10 (for reasons urged in the "Theological Review" for 1875). On p. 168, Mr. George Smith's "Assurbanipal" would have enabled Dr. Kuenen to complete his statement. We now know that the author of the gloss alludes to the appointment of an Assyrian governor over Samaria, which took place between 673 and 646, and thus put an end to the political existence of Ephraim. If Pekah's invasion was in 736, the deposition of the last king of Samaria will, according to the gloss, have taken place in 671. On p. 117, the prophecy of Obadiah is ranged among the unfulfilled predictions, but, as I suspect, wrongly. We know that the Nabateans were already in possession of the ancient Idumæa in B.C. 310 (see Diodorus Siculus, xix. 94—99); and as Herodotus nowhere mentions their name, it is not improbable that their arrival took place subsequently (say) to the death of Xerxes in 465. For various reasons, it appears to me pretty certain that Obadiah and "Malachi" are contemporary. And if so, "Malachi," who describes the ruin of Edom as accomplished, must give us the fulfilment of Obadiah, who describes it as only imminent.

The book is primarily written for the English public, and I hope the English public will appreciate it. We have now three able works on Prophecy from various liberal points of view,—Ewald's Introduction to "The Prophets," Riehm's "Messianic Prophecy" (Clark, Edinburgh), and this masterly work of Dr. Kuenen's. The translation seems excellent; a misprint, "Kiel" for "Keil," on p. 83, and a Scotticism, "would" for "should," p. 475, are the only verbal errors, unless I may add "Jahveh" for "Yahveh," that have struck me. I will only add that Dr. Muir, to whose practical head the idea of the book was owing, deserves only less gratitude than the author.

T. K. CHEYNE.

3. MISS COOPER'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

The History of England from the Landing of Cæsar to the Reign of Victoria. By Emily Cooper. 2 vols. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. 1877.

The ideal history of England is not yet written, and the task is beyond the powers of any one person to compass. The wisest historians have, therefore, confined themselves either to special epochs or to special aspects of the development of the national life. Mr. Freeman and Sir Francis Palgrave have executed, with all the advantages of modern research, the work which in part Sharon Turner boldly but unsuccessfully attempted in the beginning of the century. Mr. Froude has reconstructed our ideas of the Tudor period. Macaulay has left nothing to be said concerning the later Stuarts and William of Orange. Carlyle has grouped the Puritan era and all its conflicting spirits around the majestic figure of Cromwell. And Professor Masson has been long engaged on another historical picture of the same era and the same spirits, with Milton in the foreground. The time for one author dreaming of writing the whole history as it ought to be written has gone by: Hume once had the fancy that it could be done. But that was in the eighteenth century, when it was the fashion to profess omniscience on the strength of scanty knowledge; and now we reverse many of Hume's judgments, while we attach no importance to his continuator, Smollett, and only smile with good-natured forbearance at the pleasantly gossiping Goldsmith, whose Vicar of Wakefield atones for a multitude of sins. The ideal history would require that preliminary survey of which we have a pregnant specimen in Taine's English Literature, but even wider in range and less arbitrary in principles. It would need an unattainable familiarity with the characteristics, religion and civilization of the various races who built up the composite English people anterior to the Norman Conquest. And then, finally, it would require the tracing of the streams of activity which broke out afresh from the fountain-head of the eleventh century, down through the revival of learning, the middle ages, the birth of science, the Reformation, the growth of literature, and the struggles for political and religious freedom, until they all run into the sea of modern English life, connected with the tidal ebb and flow of the life of the world. A philosophy of universal history is a possible achievement. With the enterprizes of Hegel and kindred speculators before us, with

the suggestive though often arbitrary theories of Comte, with the unfinished work of Buckle, and the daring encyclopædic labours of Mr. Herbert Spencer, the possibility at least of a philosophy of history must be granted. But, nevertheless, an adequate history of any one nation cannot be written by any one man. Stones for the temple he may bring, and a ground-plan perhaps he may sketch, but that is the limit Nature imposes upon him.

So, at first sight, Miss Cooper's *History of England* from the landing of Cæsar to the Reign of Victoria, seems ambition running wild. The impossibility of original research stares us in the face to start with. But on looking at what she really undertakes to do, and asking how she has done it, our impressions are modified. Instead of blaming her for underrating the importance of her subject, and rashly trying a 'prentice-hand on what the mightiest masters are at present fated to fail in, we can award honest praise for the results of honest literary toil. She has used the best accessible authorities. Freeman and Palgrave serve her largely in the Anglo-Saxon (or English) and Norman periods. Froude and Macaulay are equally useful for particular periods. Hallam is a standing and trustworthy appeal in all constitutional matters. Contemporary chroniclers furnish the basis for interesting details. Lingard is often serviceable for facts, and Hume for criticism and dissent. Relying mainly on these, occasionally referring to more recondite sources, and always displaying skill in the manipulation of her materials, she has constructed a narrative of permanent value. Indeed, when we call her book a well-printed historical narrative, written in a clear style, abounding with picturesque details, omitting, so far as we have noticed, few incidents of importance, and marked by sound judgment and a vivid perception of

"Freedom broadening slowly down
From precedent to precedent,"

we describe it as it deserves. We should have liked her to dwell longer on the nation-making times before the Conquest. We think too little space is devoted to literature, and too much to outward events, such as the numerous battles she tells the story of, and shows of pomp, such as the Field of the Cloth of Gold, which naturally captivate a feminine imagination. But writing as she does for the general reader, and bearing in mind how the first essential is to interest the individual, and how students can get the extra information they want from other quarters, we are not disinclined

to admit that she may have chosen wisely ; any way, it is plainly through no want of knowledge of the inner springs of the national life, and through no want of sympathy with them, that she has confined herself so much to a graphic account of what lies on the surface. Such glimpses into literary history as she does favour us with are admirable, and here we may mention as peculiarly good the accounts of Roger Bacon, Wyclif and Raleigh. But Chaucer is only incidentally alluded to, Milton only appears in political and ecclesiastical references, and Shakspeare does not appear at all. No doubt Miss Cooper's plan necessitated this course. Anything else would have involved far more even than her two bulky volumes. But still we could have spared much she has said, for the sake of a little she has not said, and evidently was quite competent to say. Fruitful too as she is in details, and well told as her details always are, she now and then unnecessarily disappoints us. Why, for instance, when speaking of the Birmingham riots, should she be satisfied with describing Dr. Priestley as "a dissenting minister," and leaving the ignorant general reader with the impression that that is an adequate description? The substitution of Unitarian for dissenting would have been an historical gain, as it certainly was a literary necessity. She also tells how "a late humorous writer contrasted the influence of Literature and War as that of Captain Sword and Captain Pen." Putting ourselves in the position again of the general reader, we inquire who this late humorous writer was? Why could she not at once say Leigh Hunt? Surely, if his poem be not beneath the dignity of history, his name is not.

However, we have no wish to dwell on small faults when the merits of the History as a whole are great and varied. Remembering how critics must

"In every work regard the author's end,
Since none can compass more than they intend,"

we can credit Miss Cooper with having done what she undertook to do, and giving large measure, pressed down and running over. Our complaint, which we feel it is a kind of injustice to prefer, is, that she did not intend something besides. As a narrative of events, the book is all that could be desired within the limits we have pointed out. The accounts of the Reformation and the contest between Charles and the Parliament are full and impartial. The estimates of character, which are numerous, are shrewd and sound, nothing extenuating nor setting aught down in malice. The con-

stitutional and social history is as thorough as the space would allow. The student may welcome the book as a useful repertory of facts, and it may be commended as a valuable addition to the family library.

W. B.

4. POSTHUMOUS SERMONS BY J. J. TAYLER.

Last Series of Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty. Discourses by John James Tayler, B.A., late Principal of Manchester New College. London: Williams and Norgate. 1877.

This volume will be a welcome treasure to all the surviving friends of the author, as a fresh memorial of one whom they so highly esteemed; but it is also deeply interesting from its intrinsic merits, and may most delightfully and profitably occupy many a quiet hour for readers who are precluded from taking part in the public services of the church. It is a beautiful reflection of Mr. Tayler's religious attitude of mind, conveying his favourite thoughts and cherished feelings in his graceful, flowing and finished language. It is a book, however, for cultivated rather than simple English readers, not being expressed in the homely, racy idioms or quaint, graphic metaphors which inseparably identify some original writers with their native tongue. The abstract and philosophical character of the leading ideas, and the smooth completeness and elegance of the diction, make it read like a good translation from eloquent French, and it would not be difficult to translate the whole into French without sacrificing any essential beauty of thought or expression. For the same reason an intelligent foreigner, with a good knowledge of literary English, would find little difficulty in mastering its contents. It is a volume which will be read with interest and pleasure by candid and thoughtful readers of every theological school. The earnest and emphatic recognition of the spiritual element in man, and the exalted appreciation of the character and spirit of Christ, will commend the volume to all devout readers, though some may perhaps feel it difficult to reconcile this with the author's well-known views as a theological critic, and be disposed to regard it as a *survival* from an older and more conservative form of belief, rather than a natural or legitimate accompaniment of the intellectual conclusions at which Mr. Tayler is known to have arrived. His remark, for example, that the spirit of Christ finds "its highest expression in the beautiful language of the Fourth Gospel," and the frequency with which he adopts that language as

texts and suggestions for his own thoughts, may perplex some readers who remember the author's matured conviction that the Fourth Gospel was not the work of "the beloved disciple" by whom it affects to have been written, but of some unknown writer in a later age. Mr. Tayler's repeated and vehement denunciation of theological definitions, also, as irrelevant and even destructive to the one thing needful, the spirit of religious faith, may provoke some readers to ask how there can be any intelligent or valuable religious faith without some intellectual belief; though the former may no doubt co-exist with various forms of the latter.

The Discourses are twenty-six in number. The dates of the original composition and last delivery are appended to each, and the general arrangement is chronological, so that the author's latest utterances are given towards the end. The first discourse, "Wisdom the Fruit of Experience," opens with a declaration which at least indicates a delightful conviction in the mind of the writer, whether the reader be able to confirm it from his own experience or not :

"There is a grand teaching in Providence which is worth all that books can give. The events which make up our lives, our intercourse with mankind, our observation of the world, yield lessons so clear, consistent and imperative, and indicate so distinctly a counsel and a plan pervading all things, that a thoughtful mind will gather from its own experience, enriched with the accumulated results of advancing years, a more convincing evidence of the being and government of an all-wise and righteous God, than can be furnished by the greatest miracles of the material creation."—P. 1.

No. II., on "The Divinity of Christ," from John x. 30, is an attempt to illustrate the spiritual truth of the Christian religion as distinguished from the logical perversions of Christian theology. No. III. is an admirable and truly practical discourse on the 'Serious Aggregate Result of Small Sins' (Luke xvi. 10), the wisdom of which must commend itself to every reader. No. IV., on "Quietness of Heart" (Psalm xlv. 10), is also thoroughly practical and beautiful. No. IX., a thoughtful and delightful discourse on "Compensations for the Sacrifice of the World to Principle and Conscience" (Matt. xix. 27), contains some touching references and illustrations. In No. XII., "Affliction, the Healer and Sanctifier of the Soul" (Jer. xvii. 14), written in 1860, there are appropriate references to the then recent deaths of Lord Macaulay, Mrs. Jameson and Theodore Parker. No. XIII., a beautiful and touching discourse on "The Dead Letter and the Living Spirit," is specially interesting

as having been delivered on occasion of the author's final retirement from the ministry in Little Portland-Street Chapel, and resigning it to the sole charge of his colleague, Mr. Martineau. No. XIV., "Eternal Life of Good Men in God" (1 John ii. 17), a striking and beautiful discourse, was preached on a funeral occasion at Nottingham in 1869, and must have been one of Mr. Tayler's latest utterances from the pulpit. In XVI., "Lessons of Time," there is a forcible statement of the indication of an immortal destiny in the building up of human character in this life. This subject is treated more specifically in XVII., "Evidence of Immortality from the Demand of our Moral Nature" (Heb. xiii. 14). No. XVIII., "Divine Treasure in Earthen Vessels," is a fine discrimination between the transient and the enduring elements in human nature and in the Scriptures. In XIX., the "Connection of Christ's Resurrection with Human Immortality" (for Easter Sunday), eloquently dwelling on the important fact of the faith of the first disciples in the resurrection of Jesus, there is one inference from the text (Mark xvi. 6) which loses its force when the corresponding passages in Matthew and Luke are compared :

"The words of the young man to the weeping women at the sepulchre are a complete interpretation of the voice of faith within us : 'He is risen ; he is not here.' The very order in which these words are given is significant ; the instinctive faith in immortality anticipates the sense of present loss."—P. 248.

In the other two Gospels the order is reversed. But this is a slight matter. The discourse worthily completes a group of beautiful discourses treating of the Christian's immortal hope. No. XX., "The Work of the Spirit Continuous and Progressive" (Acts ii. 4), is a striking and characteristic Pentecostal sermon. From XXI., an important discourse on "Spiritual Relationship with the Invisible Christ" (1 Peter i. 8, 9), we give a passage, following a reference to the idea of Christ as an Eternal Person, the Divine Word in the bosom of the Father,—with which we strongly sympathize :

"We must still, however, ask, what foundation there is in natural reason and in the plainest language of Scripture for the assumption of a second Deity, usurping the functions of the first, intercepting the love and homage which are immediately his due, and relegating him to an eternal inactivity in the boundless spaces beyond the phenomenal. Why should we not go at once to the Omnipotent Father, who is in us as He was in Christ, and cultivate day by day direct communion with the ultimate

Source of all that is Divine? I cannot discern one advantage obtained by this system for the formation of a religious character and the cherishing of a devout faith in Christ, which is not as effectually and more directly secured by resting in the grand and simple truth, that our humanity has in it an element of the Divine, and that Christ lived and died to draw closer the bonds which unite it with the Everlasting Father, and to shew us that they are not broken, but strengthened, by death."—Pp. 274, 275.

No. XXII., "The Reconciliation of the World to God in Christ" (2 Cor. v. 19), contains a statement, which we have not space to quote, of what we may regard as the author's deliberate and ultimate conviction as to the true relation of religion to philosophy. No. XXIII., "The Faithful Disciple, Performer of greater Works than the Master" (John xiv. 12), besides its speculative interest, conveys excellent practical lessons as to the application of true Christianity to the actual life and business of mankind. After a deeply philosophical and eloquent discourse (XXIV.) on "The Personality of God" (Gen. i. 27), and another (XXV.), touchingly thoughtful and devout, on "The Losses and Gains of Age" (Jeremiah vi. 4), the volume most appropriately closes with one (XXVI.) on "The Immortal Future mercifully veiled to us by God" (Psalm lxiii. 7), which, by a singular and affecting coincidence, was the preacher's latest utterance, having been delivered at Pendyffryn, North Wales, only the month preceding that of his death.

In looking through the Discourses we marked many passages for extract, if we had had space at our command, but even then there is a uniformity of excellence throughout which would have made it difficult to select, and we can only urge our readers to procure and read the whole volume for themselves. The title-page implies a reference to the previous volume of Discourses published by the author in 1851, to which this is a worthy companion and successor. Mr. Tayler's mind was one that was ever growing, and the later volume naturally exhibits his most matured thoughts and feelings, with certainly no falling off in literary excellence or mental power. We learn from the Preface that filial piety has selected the Discourses and arranged them for publication, and every intelligent and attentive reader will thankfully appreciate both the feeling and the judgment which have caused them to be given to the world.

J. R.

5. STRUTT'S INDUCTIVE METHOD OF CHRISTIAN INQUIRY.

The Inductive Method of Christian Inquiry. An Essay. By Percy Strutt. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1877.

This is an ambitious book; it is also a suggestive one to a thoughtful reader; but we are compelled to say that it is far from a satisfactory one, inasmuch as it does not fulfil the author's own intention as set forth in his Introduction. It employs the forms of logic, yet it is not logical; it professes to work out its conclusions on scientific principles, but the scientific spirit is absent. The scientist examines his facts closely, verifies them by experiment, and sifts them thoroughly before he uses them for inductive purposes. He makes sure that his facts are facts, both in the "particulars" and the "generals," before he yields to them any authority. The philosophical historian collates his materials and weighs their relative value in the scales of comparison and probability; nor does he make use of them until he has tested them by every fair means at his command. But Mr. Strutt makes no attempt to apply these principles; and so far as the after-part of his book is concerned, the greater portion of his elaborate discussion on method and principles contained in his first seven chapters (pp. 1—98) are superfluous, and might easily and usefully have been compressed into a dozen pages. At least we are convinced that a majority of his readers will think so. He takes for granted what the best thinkers of our time question, treating every book of Scripture as on an equal level of value, without any apparent consciousness of their relative importance. This is certainly not the method of modern science or of philosophical history. He accepts the statements of every book of Scripture to be facts as much as the well-ascertained laws and forces of the physical universe which the scientific man uses. What is legend and what is history, what is poetry and what is fact, he does not pause to inquire. He accepts the current orthodox notions of the Fall, the corruption of human nature as the consequence of the Fall, as the basis of his interpretation of Scripture; and the prophecies of the Old Testament generally and unscientifically applied to Christ he accepts without question, as laid down by conventional theologians, without any attempt at proof whatever. Now and then, it is true, a glimmer of consciousness seems to rise in his mind that he is indulging too freely in taking everything for granted, in such phrases as, "if the facts be accepted," "if the statements be received" (p. 128); but it is not strong enough to lead to an abandonment of

his habit. Perhaps the nearest approach to his applying his own test is found in his sections (pp. 207—217), under the heads of Inquiry before Belief, and Inquiry after Belief, but he only travels over the well-worn ground as to whether men have a right to inquire at all. The pivot-principle of our author is “faith *in* Jesus Christ as the sole Saviour of the world,” “faith *in* Jesus Christ as the one name given under heaven whereby we must be saved; Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day and for ever” (p. 103). “To acknowledge him as the holiest of men and the wisest of teachers, without receiving him as our Divine Lord and Saviour, is to fail in the special duty we owe him” (p. 190). Yet he acknowledges that by no method of reasoning can this be proved; “nor is proof obtained by natural intuition” (pp. 108—113); nor by induction (pp. 113—123); for “neither intuition nor induction is sufficient for the purpose of yielding a principle of so high a generality, and charged with such far-reaching issues” (p. 123). “That Jesus Christ is indeed the Saviour of the world is a matter of supernatural revelation” (p. 124), evidenced by miracle and received by faith (pp. 126, 127). With Mr. Strutt, “miracles carry with them a large burden of proof,” and he believes that “in presence of a thoughtful and scientific scepticism, miracles recover their argumentative value” (p. 128). And the miracles of chief importance in Christianity are the incarnation and resurrection of Christ. Faith is made the basis of his system, and faith is “the acceptance of Jesus Christ as the all-sufficient and unchangeable Saviour of the world” (p. 124). And the need of this is found in the corruption of man through the Fall. “When Christ undertook the work of redemption, he viewed us as sinners, responsible for our own condition, and not as victims of some dire calamity it was impossible to avoid” (p. 236); though he does not inform us how the countless generations from Adam to our own time could have avoided the corruption of the Fall. Our author seems oblivious of the distinction between faith *in* Christ and the faith *of* Christ, the one being submission to his personal authority, and the other sharing the same trusts, bowing with the same reverence and love before the Great Father, animated by the same spirit of obedience and resignation to His will. In the one case, Christ is made a supreme authority which supersedes the exercise of man’s own faculties; in the other, he is the greater brother who leads us upwards on the heavenly way, inspiring us by his example, and teaching us spiritual wisdom by his words. In Mr. Strutt’s system, Christ, instead of being the

way, the truth and life, is the centre and source of all faith; he supersedes the Father rather than leads to Him. His central error, as it seems to us, is, that he insists that man "is spiritually diseased; and the rules of conduct suited for a person in robust health would be death to a sick person" (p. 188); so that "he must be dealt with as nurses deal with feeble childhood and physicians with diseases" (p. 189). Consequently the distinctive power of Christianity "is to be found in the cross of Christ rather than in the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. The overlooking of this fact has led to profound misconceptions as to the special nature of Christian ethics" (p. 188). The doctrine of Christ may be called "Therapeutic Ethics, inasmuch as it bears an analogy to that branch of pathology which has for its object the treatment and cure of disease. The intellect has shared in the Fall, and needs to share in the salvation" (p. 189).

Our readers will see by these specimen passages that Mr. Strutt vitiates his own method by adopting as his basis of inquiry, not well sifted and settled facts, but a system which has grown out of past misconceptions, and which in our day is beginning to undergo rapid decay under the influence of increased light and activity of inquiry. Certainly the method of his book is far from scientific; it is not inductive, and to a seeker after light it is a disappointment. We say this with reluctance, for we believe that the first part of the book indicates the right method of inquiry. We have long held that theology needs Baconizing. But it will have to be the work of writers who have the ability to disentangle their minds from systems which are associated with Christianity, surveying them with impartial eyes, and at the same time having loving, tender and reverent piety, and being in full sympathy with the spirit of religion in all systems.

W. M.

6. LIPSIUS' LEHRBUCH DER DOGMATIK.

Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik von Dr. Richard Adelbert Lipsius, Professor der Theologie zu Jena. Braunschweig. 1876.

Since the appearance of Schleiermacher's *Christliche Glaube* in 1828, the charge against the free school of theology, that its labours have been purely destructive, has not been possible. The *magnum opus* of the great master has been followed by works of constructive merit second only to it. There was first from one of his immediate disciples, Alexander Schweizer, the *Glaubenslehre der reformirten*

Kirche (1844—1847), and then from the school of Hegel, though dependent of necessity to a great extent on Schleiermacher, the *Christliche Dogmatik* of Alois Emanuel Biedermann (1869). And now we have to welcome a third work, entitled to rank with the two preceding ones in point of massive learning, philosophical power and religious insight.

The work is divided into two parts, the first being introductory, and containing an exposition of the bases of Christian Protestant theology, handling, therefore, the primary matters of the nature and history of Religion, of Christianity, and of Protestantism. The second and chief part of the work deals with the doctrines of theology, under the three heads of Theology proper, Cosmology and Anthropology, and Soteriology. In treating each doctrine, the author endeavours to ascertain its religious meaning, to assign it its place in the Christian system, to trace historically its origin and its growth, to determine how far and in what form it must be considered a permanent element of religious faith. His book presents, therefore, a philosophy of religion and a history and a critique of Christian doctrines. Nor is it too much to say that, whether he is dealing with the metaphysical or the psychological analysis of a dogma, or with its historical growth and its permanent religious value, he everywhere shews a masterly hand.

Lipsius is distinguished by a fundamental difference of philosophical position from Biedermann, Heinrich Lang, and other prominent modern theologians. He is a Kantian, and carries out much more rigidly than did Schleiermacher the doctrine, that "knowledge is of things we see," and *faith* is the only basis upon which the unseen world of religion rests. He lets go the metaphysics of theology, and treats the demands and experiences of the religious heart as purely psychological revelations, containing no deliverance with regard to the metaphysical or physical bases of being. This we consider a very important feature of the book before us. Generally, Lipsius adheres rigidly to his principle, but at times he seems to us to abandon it. And when he abandons it, he appears to land us in the unavoidable contradictions and empty abstractions of the metaphysical theologians. In this brief notice we must not, however, enter upon so wide a subject. We can only most confidently recommend the careful study of this book as one of the most important works that have of late been added to the goodly stores of a thoroughly scientific but essentially religious theology.

J. F. S.

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

Bishop Frampton's *Life*, as now published by Mr. Simpson Evans,* is the work of an unknown author, who appears to have been an intimate friend of the subject of the memoir, and to have attended him in his last illness. That the book was written in the reign of George I. is indicated in the fact that Wake is spoken of as Primate. The account of the way in which the MS. came into the editor's possession is less full and satisfactory than might be desired. All he tells us is, that he bought it about fifty years ago "from Mr. George Counsell, a lawyer and antiquary of note, living in Gloucester;" and that before that time "the MS. had passed through the hands of Sir Charles Burrell, in a chest of drawers which had originally belonged to the Bishop." There is a slight mythical flavour about the chest of drawers, and the reader's confidence is not further conciliated by the fact that Mr. Evans confesses to some uncertainty as to the name and spelling of Burrell. We must confess, however, that the suspicions excited in our minds by this vague account were allayed by the reading of the book itself. Had it been the work of one of those ingenious artists who labour to confuse history and romance by the composition of supposititious memoirs and diaries, it would have been both worse and better than it is. It would have stuck more closely to grammatical rules, while it violated all historical proprieties. As it is, our anonymous author is like the Emperor Sigismund, "*supra grammaticam*." His constructions are Thucydidean in their clumsy perplexity. His sentences would defy the analysis of the most accomplished pupil-teacher. But he has given us a portrait of Bishop Frampton which is admirably life-like. Only a contemporary could so have preserved the image of a Caroline divine; loyal to his monarch, but still more loyal to his Church; of a genuine piety himself, yet utterly unwilling that any one should be pious in another way; accused of Roman Catholicism, while hating Popery only less than Dissent; courageously honest, and conscientiously narrow. Among the Non-juring Bishops, Frampton takes his place between Sancroft and Ken. If his was a harder nature than the latter's, he had something of the same quiet dignity, and he was quite without the irritable self-importance which induced the deprived Archbishop to perpetuate the schism.

* The *Life of Robert Frampton, Bishop of Gloucester, deprived as a Non-juror, 1689.* Edited by T. S. Evans, M.A., Vicar of Shoreditch. London: Longmans. 1876.

We refer our readers to the volume itself for the details of Frampton's life. He was a Dorsetshire man, born in 1622, the son of a farmer; educated first at Blandford school, next at Corpus Christi College, Oxford; then, in the time of the troubles, domestic chaplain to the Earl of Elgin at Amptill. Hence he was sent as chaplain to the factory of the Turkey Company at Aleppo, where he remained for many years, finally returning to England only in 1671. His reputation in the pulpit, which had always been great, and to which Evelyn and Pepys bear independent testimony, soon procured him the place of Preacher at the Rolls; to which preferment were afterwards added a Prebend at Gloucester and another at Salisbury. This rapid promotion was continued in 1673, when the King, before whom he had preached more than once, made him Dean of Gloucester, and the Bishopric of the same see followed in 1680. This he held till the Revolution. He was not among the Seven Bishops; for though he had signed the Petition to the King, he did not form one of the company which delivered it.

"He was absent, and the day of delivery being come, the Bishop of Ely pressed their going to the King without him, which the Archbishop opposed, as well to have him for whom the King had an affection and who was as hearty in the cause as any to be at the delivery of a petition to which he was a party, and shew'd them a letter that he would with God's leave be with them time enough that day to deliver it, and, says he, I am sure, our brother Robert of Gloster with his black Mare are on the gallop. But the Bishop of Ely prevailed with his Grace to go (providentially to keep the sacred number as 'tis called of Seven), and so they did, but half an hour before the Bishop of Gloster came who with greater regret went with them to the Tower than he would have had to have been sent with them, and there offer'd to go singly on the morrow with his own petition, which the good Primate dissuaded him from, saying, brother, there will come a time when your constancy and courage may do the Church more service. And by what spirit the good man then spake, the day of judgment will reveal: for it was not so long after, when he compleated another seven who dared to own and suffer for the same principles, from which two of them fell, as if repenting of the only good action of their lives."—Pp. 152, 153.

The chief interest of the book undeniably centres in the Revolution and Bishop Frampton's conduct at that crisis. The author's theory of the events of 1687-9 is a peculiar one. It was all a plot of the Pope's to avenge himself for James II.'s refusal to enter into an alliance with the Holy See against France, and was principally caused by certain ill advisers, who led the excellent and innocent

King into measures from which his own better nature would have recoiled. Thus when James visited Gloucester, and there made a Catholic priest say grace at table, the author's pious remark is, "Into such snares had designing men drawn their prince, to fill up the measure of their own iniquity." The Magdalen College business, in which the Bishop stood manfully by the ejected fellows, is called "another project, they which designed the ruin of their lawful sovereign drew him into." Whether this peculiar theory was held by the Bishop himself we are not told, but one not very unlike it evidently determined his action. He is recorded to have preached before the Prince and Princess of Orange a sermon, which drew from William the dry remark, "I perceive the Bishop of Gloster don't expect a translation;" and when in the Convention he and his wife were proclaimed King and Queen, the Bishop refused to take the oaths. Suspension and deprivation of course followed, and Fowler succeeded to the see. For one characteristic anecdote we must find room. Frampton was a man of undaunted speech. He got into trouble both with Charles II. and James II. because he would not be restrained from telling them the truth. Perhaps if he had not been a Bishop he would have been a brawler; as it was, there are instances in this volume of his effective recourse to the *argumentum baculinum*. So when Firmin, the Unitarian of Gloucester, remonstrated with him on his refusal to take the oaths, he rated the heretic after a fashion that was much more energetic than polite:

"Another that attacqu'd the Bishop was the famous Thomas Firmin, who introduced his poor argument thus: my Lord, I hope you will not be a nonconformist now in your old age, and would have no doubt said much more, had not the good Bishop stun'd him by answering his introduction thus, I am growing old, 'tis true, but did never think I should have been so old as to be upbraided with nonconformity by you that are a nonconformist to all Christendom besides a few lowsy sectarys in Poland, alluding to his Socinian tenets."—P. 187.

The Bishop's treatment of Dissenters, as well as the way in which he dealt with ecclesiastical patronage, both points of interest in relation to the time and the school of divines to which he belonged, we must pass over without comment. A very curious thing, at least to readers of Macaulay, is his apparent acquiescence in the arbitrary measures of the time. He is a true Caroline Churchman in this, but he believes the King can do no wrong so long as the rights and revenues of the Church are not attacked. Until

the struggle between Church and King actually breaks out in the petition of the Seven Bishops, no one would conjecture from this volume that Englishmen had anything to complain of. Gloucester is a city of the West, but no echo of the Bloody Assize seems to reach it. And the following account of a visit which the Bishop paid to Judge Jefferies in the Tower is very indicative of the acquiescence of the afterwards Non-juring clergy in the sharpest measures of James II. We cannot help thinking that Frampton would have applied the searing-iron in a very different fashion to the conscience of an obstinate Nonconformist :

“The Lord Chancellor Jefferys’ fate and usage at the Revolution is well known, who, making his escape in a sea-habit, was apprehended, and with much disgrace and insult committed to the Tower. And there he lay sick with the gout and disconsolate enough, not one soul of the many he had prefer’d and befriended when in power giving him a visit : when the Bishop of Gloster, scarcely acquainted with him and never obliged by him, gave him a friendly visit and found him sitting in a low chair, with a long beard on, and a small pot of water by him, and weeping with himself : his tears were, as the Bishop observed, very great ones, to which he was used to apply the old observation of *πολυδακρυον των Ηρωων γενος*. He accosts him as a Christian stile and says, my Lord, I see you are disconsolate, I find you weeping. If, my Lord, either of these be upon the score of the hardships you labour under at present, e’en cast away the one and dry up the other as unworthy either a man or a Christian. *But if they are from the reflection you make upon your past life, in which something must needs be done amiss, for no man liveth and sinneth not, weep on and spare not ;* these tears of yours are more precious than diamonds. There was then some part of his family with him, and to this his Lordship reply’d, my Lord, all the disgrace I have suffer’d hitherto I can bear, and by God’s grace will submit to whatever more shall befall me, since I see so much of the goodness of God in sending you to me, you that I never in the least deserved anything from : for you to visit me, when others who had their all from me desert me, it can be no other than the motion of God’s Spirit in you. I thank you for your fatherly advice and desire your prayers that I may be able to follow it, and beg that you would add to this the friendship of another visit : at what time I would, says he, receive the sacrament : which he did with great devotion with his wife and children at the Bishop’s hands, and in a few days dyed in peace of mind.”—Pp. 195, 196.

All this is very edifying ; but it makes it a little difficult to believe Mr. Evans’ assertion that Frampton was “animated by a hearty hatred of tyranny, and a genuine love of freedom.” That the Non-juring clergy had many virtues of their own we do not deny, but these particular virtues certainly belonged to the other side.

Bishop Frampton died and was buried at Standish, in Gloucestershire, whither he had retired at his deprivation, in the year 1708, being then 86 years of age. Like Bishop Ken, the best and noblest of the Non-jurors, he refused to do anything to continue the schism. We can cordially recommend this book as one of great and unique interest. In one sense, its faults only add to its merits, for they help to make it a more photographically exact reproduction of a peculiar type of English Churchmanship, now wholly passed away. No future historian of the Church of the Restoration can dispense with its aid.

We have so recently devoted considerable attention to Dr. Benrath's able monograph on Ochino,* that it is not needful for us to do more than welcome its appearance in an English dress. The translation makes a handsome volume, and has some improvements on the original issue, though on the whole the German edition is to be preferred. We do not know why it was thought necessary to re-engrave the profile likeness of Ochino, of which we much prize the bolder lithograph originally given. In Mr. Ridgway's reproduction there is a sleepy look about the eye, and a contraction of the nostril, which mar the impression of a very noble face. Except by way of a guarantee of respectability intended for the "evangelical" public, Mr. Arthur's preface is mere surplusage. It talks of Ochino's "gleaming like a meteor among summits," a phrase to which in all probability the fluent divine does not expect us to attach any definite meaning. Miss Zimmern's translation is clear and workman-like. Here and there it fails, through want of special knowledge, to give us all we desire. The "shell-shaped" description of the Piazza del Campo at Sienna is rather an evasion than an elucidation of the ambiguity presented by "*muschel-förmigen*," scallop-shaped. "*Generaldefinitor*," in the account of Ochino's gradations of office, is rendered simply "General," and hence arises a palpable confusion. For it is said of Lodovico di Fossombrone, that not only was he not elected "as Vicar-General," but "they did not even give him the post of General." In fact, the Capuchins at that time, being a subordinate or branch order, had no General, but beneath the Vicar-General there were four Definitors-general. It reads oddly to be told that the Capuchin rule "endeavoured to revive the *soul* of

* Bernardino Ochino, of Siena: a Contribution towards the History of the Reformation. By Karl Benrath. Translated from the German by Helen Zimmern. With an Introductory Preface by William Arthur, A.M. James Nisbet and Co. 1876.

St. Francis," where *geist* is straightforward enough. Sir Richard Morison (or Morisyne, according to Fuller) is given as Signor Riccardo Moricini, which looks as if pains had been taken, though in the wrong quarter, to arrive at the original of Benrath's amusing "Herr Ritter Riccardo Moricini." Aghilera, or Anguillara, in the (then) Papal States, has nothing to do with Angoulême, which we will fain hope is a misprint. Some other slips we have noted; but on the whole we are pleased with Miss Zimmern's rendering. One or two additions of new matter are introduced, e.g. the reference to Ochino's first convent, "the Osservanza, two miles outside the gates [of Sienna],—a convent especially favoured and richly endowed by Pandolfo Petrucci;" the important fact that Ochino's name cannot be found "in the matriculation list of the University of Perugia;" and the interesting statement that "he had, in 1524, filled the post of provincial in the Sienese convent." There are also omissions, especially of notes, and some of these containing valuable matter. The first Appendix does not appear at all as such. Though parts of it are introduced in the shape of foot-notes, others—and in particular the very curious contemporary account of the stir at Basle, owing to Ochino's Polygamy dialogue—are to seek. The second or bibliographical Appendix might just as well have been omitted too. Nearly all Dr. Benrath's errata, which were numerous, re-appear, and some fresh ones; though trouble has been taken to fill up certain blanks. But the additions are not always trustworthy. E.g., in the last item (where Garfeild was right and Gaifeild is wrong) it is added: "Bound up with this is: A Dialogue of Divorce, between Ochinus and Meschinus, which it is easy to see was not written by Ochino." By turning up the *XXX. Dialogi*, Vol. II. pp. 228—253, it would have been "easy to see" that this too came from what Lord Bacon's mother calls "the happy spirit of the sanctified Barnadyne." Both dialogues were reprinted 1732. The English reader who consults this Appendix may need to be told that "o. O." signifies *sine loco*, and that "o. T." is a constant misprint for o. J. or *sine anno*. Some other misprints his knowledge of his own language will readily enable him to detect.

Dr. Benrath's Introductory Address* forms a suitable addendum to his Ochino, and might well be bound up with it. He has evi-

* Ueber die Quellen der Italienischen Reformationsgeschichte. Antrittsrede gehalten am 1. Juli 1876 in der Aula der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität von Lic. Dr. Karl Benrath, Privatdocent der Theologie. Bonn: A. Marcus. 1876.

dently deepened in his study of those pioneers of faith and freedom, for whose history he indicates the sources. He now knows how to spell Valdés aright, thanks to good Benjamin Wiffen. What he says, in his preface, of the need for a "*Bibliotheca Wiffeniana*" of early Italian Reformers, is worth the consideration of Italian scholars and publishers. Why should the Reformation annals of backward Spain be more accessible than those of rising Italy? Already the materials for such a series, through the generosity of Count Piero Guicciardini, are deposited in the Public Library at Florence.

"The Vision of God,"* by Dr. Allon, of Islington, invites attention not only from the eminence of its author as a preacher amongst the Congregationalists, but from its own intrinsic worth. We are not surprised that a second edition has been demanded, inasmuch as the sermons are full of spiritual beauty and of sound moral teaching. That these are the utterances of an eminent preacher who frankly recognizes development in theology, makes us all the more regret and wonder at certain blemishes. Dr. Allon is so enslaved by the letter of the Authorized Version as to quote (*twice*, pp. 65, 254), "at the name of Jesus," &c., and the claim of Jesus of equality with God (p. 248), without apparent misgiving as to their correctness. He has not shaken off *all* his old prepossessions, for he quotes as Scripture such passages as "a just God, and *yet* the Justifier of the ungodly" (p. 69), and "every tongue shall confess that He is *God*, to the glory of God the Father" (p. 65). He speaks of Mary Magdalene, whom he identifies with the woman with the precious ointment, as worshiping in silence (p. 122) Christ by implication, as the context shews. He evidently deems it legitimate "development" to pass from prayer "in the name" of Christ, to prayer to Christ (p. 251). He does not disdain to call John Stuart Mill a prophet of "infidelity" (p. 64) and its "apostle" (p. 229). He speaks twice of the Master as "lifting up the woman" (pp. 12, 240). To these blemishes must be added, "whose (i. e. God the Father) sonship" for "sonship to whom;" and "lest our good custom," &c. (p. 180), which, however, is rightly quoted elsewhere (p. 302). The over-statements of his case on p. 229 are painfully contradictory of many notable passages of Scripture. These carelessnesses receive some light upon them from the impatient way in which he alludes to the microscope used to

* The Vision of God, and other Sermons. By Henry Allon, D.D. Second Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

detect a possible forgery which tells for the "orthodox" theory (p. 295). Dr. Allon retains much of the offensiveness of the old theories of the Atonement, whilst professing to have developed beyond them (p. 296). It is, in his eyes, a *vicarious* sacrifice (p. 69). "Whilst," he says, "Christ continues to plead, God can do nothing," and intimates that the Son cannot much longer hold the Father back (p. 162). Atonement, again, is "forgiveness through propitiatory sacrifice" (p. 134). Christ "died on the cross an expiation for human sin" (p. 235). The same views are repeated, p. 297. How Dr. Allon can reconcile these and similar passages with his noble picture of the Fatherhood of God in the first half of his opening discourse we cannot conceive.

If we wanted to shew in a striking manner the spiritually educative value of true liberty of thought for pulpit and pew alike, we could not take a better example than the next book upon our list.* Robert Collyer's sermons are well known amongst us as being full of "imagination, pathos and humour, mingled with the strongest common sense," and of the "overflowing of a true and loving heart" (vide p. viii). We rejoice greatly to know that these qualities of our friend have made themselves so felt by others "not of our fold," as to induce the republication of his sermons (on "Nature and Life and Life that Now is") in the handsome little volume to which we draw attention and bid God-speed.

Among the many attempts that have been made to explain and remove the supposed antagonism between Religion and Science, we have not met with one more worthy of careful study than that offered by Mr. Bixley, an American writer.† He aims at proving that, alike from the scientific and from the religious standpoint, there is no rightful quarrel between the two. The causes to which he attributes the notion that there is, are three, principally ignorance, existing on both sides, and, resulting from this ignorance, the habit of confounding both religion and science with other things, and the claiming by each of exclusive knowledge. These claims are investigated in detail, the writer dwelling on the fact that "science rests on the same grounds and employs the same methods which its champions have censured religion for using." The chapter on "the Faiths of

* The Life that Now is, and Nature and Life. By Robert Collyer, Pastor of Unity Church, Chicago. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. Leeds: H. W. Walker. 1877.

† Similarities of Physical and Religious Knowledge. By James Thompson Bixley. New York: Appleton. 1876.

Science" is very interesting, displaying—as indeed does the whole volume—wide reading and the power of rightly applying the stores thus acquired. The remarks on "the scientific basis of religion" appear to need expansion, in order to be thoroughly satisfactory. The whole work is characterized by clearness of statement, logical power, and some originality in the treatment and arrangement of materials not in themselves possessing any claim to novelty.

The Rev. J. J. Lias* seeks to settle the difficult question as to the authorship of the fourth Gospel, by shewing that the doctrinal teachings it contains are in complete accordance with those of the other books of the New Testament. In order to give force to his conclusions, he takes for granted that all the Epistles which are commonly attributed to Paul are certainly his work, and also that he is the author of the Hebrews; he likewise presupposes the authenticity of the Catholic Epistles. If a writer may be allowed thus to ignore the critical facts of the case, he may be permitted, without contradiction, to make what further assumptions he pleases. But as great part of his argument depends on similarities of theology in the fourth Gospel and the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians and those attributed to Peter, he would have acted more wisely in making sure of his foundation, before proceeding laboriously to construct his superstructure. It is rather startling to find the bold assertions—that St. Paul *quotes* St. John, that the Sermon on the Mount teaches the Deity of Christ, that the Christology of the Synoptics is substantially identical with that of the fourth Gospel, that the use of the name Emmanuel furnishes a sound argument, and that even the Epistle of James shews its writer's acquaintance with the teachings of St. John. But nothing need surprise us from a writer who introduces a treatise on such a question as this, by acknowledging that he has "judged it best" to assume the authenticity of the Epistles, and indulging in a sneer at "the Tübingen school" and "modern criticism."

"The Bible for Young People"† goes to the opposite extreme,

* The Doctrinal System of St. John, considered as Evidence for the Date of his Gospel. By the Rev. J. J. Lias, M.A., Professor of Modern Literature and Lecturer in Hebrew at St. David's College, Lampeter, &c. London: George Bell and Sons. 1875.

† The Bible for Young People. By Dr. H. Oort and Dr. I. Hooykaas, with the assistance of Dr. A. Kuenen. Vol. V. The Narratives of the New Testament, Part I., prepared by Dr. I. Hooykaas. Authorized Translation. Williams and Norgate. 1876.

and adopts to their full extent the negative conclusions of German criticism, treating all the Gospels as the productions of a post-apostolic age and abounding with errors, and stating that "the majority of the writings of the New Testament were not really written or published by those whose names they bear." Whatever good reason there may be for these assertions (and we are not prepared dogmatically to contradict them), it might be wished that they were presented to the "young people" who are to read this book, rather in the form of an opinion than in that of an undoubted fact, since, in some cases at least, the question is a much debated one, and may be fairly said to be still open. But if the materials contained in the New Testament are to be thus handled, the result obtained in this volume is a fairly satisfactory one. Much valuable information is given, and a harmonious picture is presented of Christ and his teachings. But this is the fruit of a criticism that is purely subjective. The writer having in his own mind a picture of what he believes Jesus to have been, selects those materials that enable him to paint this portrait, and leaves out all that does not suit him, explaining miracle as legend, and putting on one side, as "the evident addition of a later age," such phrases as are discordant with his own moral and religious instincts. We do not say that any other process is possible for the purpose of writing a modern "Life of Christ," but it is a process that does not produce a history. The symbolical interpretation of the parables is carried too far, and reaches its height when it explains the turning water into wine as a purely figurative teaching concerning the way in which the gospel supersedes the law. The parables are paraphrased, and most readers will probably feel that they prefer the simple words of the New Testament to this paraphrase. This is seen very forcibly in reference to the parable of the Prodigal Son, in which we do not find a single sentence of the paraphrase that seems an improvement on the original, and some of them are quite the reverse: for instance, in place of, "and they began to be merry," we have, "his commands were joyfully and quickly obeyed, and by evening the full tide of festivity had set in." There is so much that is excellent and useful in the volume, that we are thankful to the translator for giving it to the English reader; but it would be more useful if it contained fuller information on points of criticism, so as to enable the reader to judge for himself on disputed questions, instead of having to be content with the assertions of the author. There would have been room for this had the passages quoted from the

Gospels been simply referred to, or even given with an amended translation, instead of being paraphrased. The book is so good, that we wish it were better; and this it would be, had the point aimed at been the maximum of information and the minimum of innovation. It does not need to be a prejudiced conservative to shrink from altering the petition in the Lord's Prayer into, "give us to-day to-morrow's bread," however defensible the new rendering may be as a matter of scholarship.

All Godet's writings have the same characteristics,—a moderate orthodoxy, a clear good sense, and a strong practical tendency. His *New Testament Studies** contain interesting articles on the four Gospels, the person and the work of Christ and the apostles. Without agreeing with many of his conclusions in these essays, we find a pleasure in studying the grounds on which he bases them. The final essay on the Apocalypse strikes a different note. The attempt to explain that work seems to be fatal to the calm thought and good sense of commentators, and Godet, among the rest, here runs wild; he finds in it a prophecy of events soon to come to pass, and a warning that the Hebrew nation, gaining supreme power, are to prove the great final foe of the people of Christ. Already are the Hebrews, in various ways, secretly gathering their forces and manifesting their influence, and the end of it will be a Jewish monarch enthroned at Rome, with a complaisant high-priest exercising over men's minds the control of a supposed infallibility! Dr. Godet thinks the signs of the times confirm this interpretation of Apocalyptic prophecy.

Mr. Mullinger's very interesting volume on the Schools of Charlemagne† is a Cambridge Prize Essay, won in 1875, on the foundation in memory of the late Bishop Kaye, of Lincoln. The author's previous work on the history of his own University sufficiently shewed his ability to treat any question of mediæval learning, nor is its promise belied by the completeness of conception and the accuracy of execution manifested in the present volume. A peculiar interest for English readers is afforded by the connection of our countryman, Alcuin of York, with the great Frank emperor, as his chief agent in the revival of learning which he was in some degree

* *Studies on the New Testament.* By F. Godet, D.D. Edited by the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttelton, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

† *The Schools of Charles the Great, and the Restoration of Education in the Ninth Century.* By J. Bass Mullinger, M.A. London: Longmans. 1877.

able to effect. The metrical catalogue of the conventual library at York, by Alcuin, which Mr. Mullinger quotes and explains, is very curious, both in what it contains and what it omits. The volume helps us to form a vivid picture both of a prevailing ignorance for which the Church of the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries must, we fear, be held largely responsible, and of the Frank chief, who stood in native vigour of character and robustness of intellect so far above his contemporaries, and who in the plenitude of his power was not ashamed to take his place in the Palace school over which he had called Alcuin to preside. Mr. Mullinger's sketch of the period and the men is so well drawn, that we wish he could be persuaded to undertake a more elaborate picture of the general historical relations of Christianity to learning and science. What he has said here is sufficient to indicate that he would not be too tender to the obscurantism of the later Fathers. But so much nonsense has been talked lately by men who take their historical learning at third hand from compilers little better informed than themselves as to the hindrances placed by Christianity in the way of the intellectual development of humanity, that we should like to see the whole subject treated by one who, like Mr. Mullinger, would bring to the task both a well-filled mind and an impartial judgment.

From four well-known Oxford scholars we receive a new edition of the English Bible* of considerable critical importance. They reprint the Authorized Version with clear type and in a convenient form, somewhat too large indeed for manual use, but well adapted to lie on a scholar's desk. Below the text is a selection of various readings and renderings, with the authorities attached; the whole clearly expressed, yet by a careful system of abbreviation compressed into inconsiderable space. For the New Testament this has been already done by Tischendorf, in a small volume printed by Tauchnitz, in 1869, and in the "Critical English New Testament" published by Bagster, in 1870. But the present is, even in the New Testament, much more full in its adduction of authorities than either of these, while, so far as we know, it is the first attempt to exhibit the results of criticism to the reader of the Old Testament in En-

* The Holy Bible, &c. Edited, with various Renderings and Readings from the best Authorities, by Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A., Fellow of Balliol; S. R. Driver, M.A., Fellow of New; Rev. R. L. Clarke, M.A., Fellow of Queen's; Alfred Goodwin, M.A., Fellow of Balliol. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1876.

glish. While its plan is everywhere admirably carried out, it will perhaps be more distinctively useful in the Old Testament, in the proportion in which a working knowledge of Hebrew is rarer than that of Greek. To the very large and increasing class of readers, however, who, without the time or the ability for critical studies, desire to have access to the true text of the sacred books, and to become acquainted with the principles on which it is formed, this volume will be invaluable, and to their use we cordially commend it. We wish, however, that the editors had broken through what we believe is no more than a prescription of the trade, and printed, if not in place of, yet beside the fulsome "dedication" to James I., the excellent "Preface" prefixed by the Translators to the Bible of 1611.

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I.—HEINRICH LANG.

Predigten von Heinrich Lang, evangelischem Pfarrer in Wartau.
St. Gallen. 1853.

*Versuch einer christlichen Dogmatik allen denkenden Christen
dargeboten.* Berlin, 1858; 2nd Ed. 1868.

Gang durch die christliche Welt. 2nd Ed. Berlin. 1870.

Stunden der Andacht. 2 vols. Winterthur. 1862—1865.

Religiöse Charaktere. 2nd Ed. Winterthur. 1872.

Martin Luther, ein religiöses Charakterbild. Berlin. 1870.

*Das Leben Jesu und die Kirche der Zukunft (Deutsche Zeit- und
Streit-Fragen).* Berlin. 1872.

*Die Religion im Zeitalter Darwin's (Deutsche Zeit- und Streit-
Fragen).* Berlin. 1873.

Religiöse Reden. 2 vols. Zürich. 1873—1875.

Reform. Zeitstimmen aus der Schweizerischen Kirche. Bern.
1872—1876.

Heinrich Lang von A. E. Biedermann. Zürich. 1876.

THE nineteenth century may have to hand on to the twentieth the full solution of the great problem of reconciling faith and science, religion and knowledge. A greater than the greatest of modern theologians, Schleiermacher, may in the next century perform this grand service for our descendants. He may deliver them from the nightmare of pessimism and the orgies of materialism, and enable them once more to enjoy the

perfect peace of God and the joyful use of the understanding. But, happily, we are not meantime left without true helpers. In every Christian land there are found a few men who have at once all the best learning, the truest thought, and the newest science of their age, while they retain the indestructible elements of the faith, and cling to the immovable foundations of the church, of their fathers. In their own persons are harmonized, at least to a considerable extent, the contradictions which seem to exist between faith and reason, while no small degree of success attends their endeavour to lead men to positions where they may share the same blessing of inward peace. If none of these men is the prophet for whom the age waits, the final mediator between the old and the new, the unseen and the seen, faith and reason, they are still his heralds, and till he comes the services they render are precious beyond all price. Of these men, the late Heinrich Lang, pastor of the Reformed Church of St. Peter's, Zürich, was one of the most noteworthy. To all who are interested in the great problems of harmonizing religion and science, and of perpetuating under new forms what they believe are the hallowing influences of public worship and ecclesiastical association, the man and his work are worthy of study. For himself, Lang retained his faith in God, in Christianity, and in the Church, while he took up the most advanced positions of modern philosophy, criticism and science. In his public work as preacher, pastor and author, he proclaimed unreservedly and enthusiastically all the negative as well as the positive results of his thought and research, and people flocked to his church to hear him, and eagerly read the productions of his busy pen.

Heinrich Lang, the son of a Lutheran village pastor, was born at Frommern, in Würtemberg, on November 14, 1826. His father was a simple, upright, earnest, meditative man, a disciple of Kant, a hater of "Pietism," with a soul stirred by ideal longings. His mother, to whose care the retired and studious habits of the father left the children entirely, was a woman of great energy, cheerfulness and openness of nature.

The family removed from Frommern to Aldingen ten years after Heinrich's birth, and finally to Schweningen, on the Baden frontier. But these changes of abode still left the boy amidst the Swabian hills, and the rich, healthy influences of Swabian life and manners. He derived from his parents and his home the fundamental endowments and characteristics of his nature. From his father, simplicity, uprightness, meditativeness, ideal bent; from his mother, eloquence, openness, energy, courageous cheerfulness; from the hills and manners of Swabia, a love of nature and simple things, a democratic vein, and conservative individuality. At the early age of ten, Heinrich left home and the village school for the Grammar School of Sulz, on the Neckar. The first salutation the poor lad met as he entered the school was the inscription on the walls: *UT with the indicative costs six Taten*. Latin, Greek, Hebrew, constituted almost the entire curriculum. Four years at Sulz and another four at the seminary of Schöndal, where the classical languages were still the main subjects of study, brought him to the entrance of the Tübingen University as a student of theology. Meantime he had read much stray literature, Goethe, Lessing and Shakespeare being his chosen authors. He was in the habit of saying his prayers "in fine weather," and had devoted himself to the service of virtue, freedom and poetry. At Tübingen he came under the influence of the great art critic, Vischer, and acquired the mastery of literary form which distinguishes both his oratory and his writing. But other influences were still more profoundly affecting him. The philosophical, theological and critical works of Schleiermacher, Strauss, Baur, Zeller and Feuerbach, were mastered and made a part of his own thought and principles. He came also under the personal influence of some of these men. It is not surprising, therefore, that before the close of his university course it appeared to him very doubtful whether his views were not too heterodox to give him the chance of obtaining a church living. He accordingly resolved to pass his examination and then qualify himself for a chair of philosophy. Meantime the revolution of 1848

broke out, and, as might be expected, our radical and idealist found himself a revolutionary leader. The consequence was that he had to flee into Switzerland, where he arrived with two thalers in his pocket and his entire wardrobe in a botanical case. But he made friends on his journey, and those he had left behind him at Tübingen did not forget him. Through their good offices he soon obtained a small living at Wartau, in the canton of St. Gall, where he remained fifteen years, winning the unbounded confidence and warm affection of his flock. In 1863, he accepted the larger living of Meilen, on the Lake of Zürich, which he exchanged for that of St. Peter's, in Zürich itself, in 1868. Here he remained until his premature death in 1876. During his retired life as pastor of the mountain parish of Wartau, he published a small volume of sermons (1853) of very uncommon merit. But the book that first brought him into public notice was his *Versuch einer christlichen Dogmatik* (1858). It was distinguished by its theological radicalism, its freedom from technical terminology, the clearness of its thought, the force and eloquence of its language, and its rare combination of completeness with brevity. This work was followed by the *Gang durch die christliche Welt* (1859), a series of letters to a lay friend, presenting in plain and non-theological language a history of the development of the Christian life and theological thought. The same year he was appointed editor of the periodical of the rationalistic party of the Swiss Church, the *Zeitstimmen*, which made a great stir in Germany as well as in Switzerland. The design of this periodical was to advocate boldly and without reserve the new theology. Lang was in his element as its editor, and thereby the leader of the radical party of the Church. In 1862, appeared a volume of biographical essays, *Religiöse Charaktere*, being careful studies of the lives of four great representatives of religious freedom, namely, Paul, Zwingli, Lessing and Schleiermacher. This work was followed by the first volume of his *Stunden der Andacht*, an endeavour to provide for the religious edification of rationalistic Christians. Next came a Life of Luther (1870), an

interesting, appreciative, eloquent sketch of the great Reformer's struggles and work. Zwingli, as the rationalistic reformer, was Lang's hero, and Luther, as still in the bonds of the letter, though in many respects a greater man than Zwingli, receives from him very qualified admiration. In 1872, the *Zeitstimmen* was amalgamated with the *Reformblätter* of Bern, and appeared as the *Reform* under the joint editorship of Lang and Vizius. The *Reform* devoted itself to the same object of advocating, in an uncompromising and popular form, the principles of an absolutely free church. Between 1872 and 1874, Lang published some important essays and two volumes of sermons, or religious orations. Death overtook him in the midst of his labours, and was no doubt caused by overstrain. Had he been spared longer, it is probable that the religious side of his nature would have revealed more fully its wealth to the world. Circumstances had made him the apostle of a free theology in opposition to the authority of tradition. But latterly it became growingly evident that he was still more truly the apostle of religion in opposition to the authority of a boastful materialism. He fell in the thickest of the fight, on the one hand, against an irrational orthodoxy; on the other, against an irreverent scepticism.

We must now look at the faith and principles that were the soul of Lang's life and the inspiration of all his warfare.

Lang accepted fully and heartily the modern scientific conception of the universe, as exhaustive of existence and force and its phenomena throughout the result of uninterrupted order. He could not think of anything as new in the world, in the sense of being a fresh introduction of energy, or a fresh direction of old forces unprovided for by existing causes. All that is and happens must have its full explanation in foregoing conditions and causes, although human skill may be unable everywhere to detect the connection. No higher development of existence needs extraordinary or supernatural powers to provoke it, and the natural results of existing forces demand no corrective touch from without. Accordingly, Lang

could not accept the doctrines of the existence of a personal Deity residing somewhere outside the universe, of a supernatural and temporal creation of the world, of a providential interference at some points with the natural course of things, of a series of new insertions of creative energy into the eternal process of being.

The various discoveries of modern science were welcomed as enthusiastically by Lang as its fundamental conceptions. He applied the astronomical view of the cosmos to the dogmas of Hebrew, Christian and mediæval theology. He found no place for a local heaven or a local hell. He could not conceive the possibility of the orthodox pictures of the ascension of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the future life. He went still further, and trusted science as it traces back all so-called "visitations of God" to natural causes, and wholly disbelieved that evil was at first the result of sin.*

The main results of the most radical modern criticism of the Bible were accepted with even less reserve. As regards the origin and historical value of the New Testament writings, speaking generally, he was at one with Baur and Strauss. He considers that these critics did for the history of the origin of Christianity what Niebuhr, Schwegler and Mommsen had done for early Roman history. He accepts the results of Zeller's work on the Acts of the Apostles, places the fourth Gospel as low as A.D. 150, considers that it contributes nothing to our historical knowledge of the life of Christ, finds the Synoptists pervaded by the inventive and compromising "Tendenz" to which we owe the Acts of the Apostles, believes that when the early Christians began to write the life of Jesus they knew little about it beyond its leading features and a few particulars, and confesses that we, therefore, "know but little of the life of Jesus."†

Having gone thus far with science and destructive criticism, his bold and logical mind was not likely to shrink from a

* *Stunden der Andacht*, I. pp. 17, 281—290; *Dogmatik*, § 56, § 25; *Religion im Z. Darwin's*, p. 33.

† *Stunden der Andacht*, II. p. 257; *Das Leben Jesu*, pp. 36, 39.

decided rejection of the larger number of orthodox dogmas. The personality of the Deity, the Trinity, Angels, the Fall, the deity of Christ, even his sinlessness, are dogmas which he expressly or implicitly denies. Other doctrines receive a meaning entirely different from that they bear in the orthodox system. "Liberal Protestantism," he says, "has subjected the entire system of mediæval theology, from the Creation of the World to the Last Judgment, to a radical transformation."*

So far it looks as if Lang's tendencies were destructive only : but such was not the case. He was in truth a great believer, a devout worshiper, a sincere lover of the Bible, a zealous Christian, and an enthusiastic churchman.

If faith is the persuasion of things unseen, Lang had much of it. He was fully persuaded that the foundations of the universe rest upon things which do not appear. The conviction that pervades and shapes all his philosophy, religion and ethics, is, that the basis, the law and the destiny of all things is spirit. He believed that ideas preside over the history of humanity. He could more easily doubt the evidence of his senses than the assertions of his conscience and the aspirations of his soul. In philosophy, in politics, in education and in ecclesiastical matters, he was an idealist. He was as truly a religious man. That fine sentence of Augustine's was often on his tongue : "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart finds no rest until it rests in Thee." Though with the one hand he is using the keen sword of science and criticism against the enemies of his New Jerusalem, with the other he is laying the stones of a temple for spiritual worship. During the last years of his life, he came more and more to insist upon the necessity and eternity of religion.† The experience of Schleiermacher, to which he often referred, was very much his own :

"Piety was the maternal womb in the holy gloom of which my young life was nourished and prepared for the world that was yet

* *Reform*, 1875, p. 94 ; *Dogmatik*, *passim*.

† *Religiöse Reden*, II. 145 ; *Reform*, 1875, No. 6 ; *Die Religion im Z. Darwin's*, p. 19 sq.

unknown to it. It was in piety my spirit breathed, before it had found its proper sphere in the realms of knowledge and of life. It was my support when I began to sift the faith of my fathers, and to purify thought and feeling from the rubbish of earlier ages. It remained with me when the God and the Immortality of my earlier years vanished from my doubting gaze."*

Lang was no stranger to the sorrow of sin and the peace that visits the soul when it has returned to its true self. His idea of God was the foundation of his philosophy and the golden thread that ran through his science. The search for God, he said, was the profoundest inquiry of modern society.

"Religion," he writes, "will never perish. The longing for the Infinite will never be stilled; and the question, What is truth? will be for ever rising, and no soul will find rest in the world until it has found it in God, and no conscience will obtain peace until it has heard from the highest source the answer, 'Go in peace; thy sins are forgiven thee.' Neither can morality, as many now suppose, take the place of religion. The poet who cries his woe over the faith that lacks morality, had previously declared that morality can never supply the place of faith. All sound and true morals rest upon and issue in religion. And in our own time, is not the thought of religion the supreme thought? We shall soon find that the social question, the most burning and pressing of all questions, cannot be successfully solved without a return of our thought and feeling to the deep things of religion."†

Again, although Lang accepted the most unfavourable results of the Tübingen school of critics with regard to the age and historical value of the New Testament writings, and also evidently concurred in Schleiermacher's general depreciation of the Old Testament, he still assigned to the Bible the highest place amongst the sacred books of the world. He pointed to it as the fountain at which the modern preacher must feed the piety of his own soul. He borrows his prayers from it, as well as from such modern sources as the works of Theodore

* Schleiermacher's *Reden über die Religion*, 1st Oration.

† *Reform*, 1872, p. 5; *Rel. Reden*, II. 121.

Parker. He defends the custom of making passages from it the foundation of sermons.*

In the same way Lang's rejection of the miraculous element and sceptical view of the historical value of the New Testament did not hinder his returning an entirely different answer from Strauss to the question, Are we Christians? He held that Christ was by word and deed the preacher of the true God as the human heart needs to know Him, and that the way to God which Christ marked out is the true one, valid for all time and all men. He recognized in Christianity the highest stage of development to which mankind is by nature destined to attain.

"Let all merit wear its crown, and the picture-gallery of the race is not yet closed. But Christ has healed *the heart* of mankind, and the heart is the source of life. He has once for all found the central point from which the lines may be easily and infallibly drawn to all points of the circle, and the race that places his sacred image upon its banners will be able to spread over all regions of the world, and progress in endless directions, without straying or suffering harm."†

Nor had Lang any doubt with regard to the lasting necessity of the work of the church. From the first year of his public life to the last, he earnestly and consistently maintained that the individual and society stand in great need of the religious and moral aids that can be supplied only by some such institution as the Christian Church. In one of his earliest sermons‡ he makes an eloquent appeal to the educated classes to consider this, and twenty years later, in reply to Strauss, he drew a telling picture of what he deemed the essential elements of a modern church. He commenced the periodical *Reform* with the bold proclamation, "A new church is about to arise."§

It must, however, be expressly noted, that though Lang

* Rel. Reden, II. p. 51; Reform, 1875, p. 102; 1873, p. 470.

† Stunden der Andacht, II. p. 11; Comp. Reform, 1872, p. 6.

‡ Predigten, p. 98.

§ Reform, 1873, pp. 95 sq.; 1872, p. 1.

claimed to be a religious man, a Christian and a churchman, he never pretended that he was all this in the same manner as a Christian of the first or of the sixteenth century. It is a great point with him, in opposition to Schleiermacher and also to F. A. Lange, that there must be knowledge as well as feeling in religious acts.

"Dogmatic ideas must undergo a fundamental transformation under the influence of the modern conception of the universe. Nay more; religion itself, in its inmost nature, in the devout feelings and actions which spring therefrom, cannot remain uninfluenced."*

His action as a popular reformer of theology was based upon the strong conviction that the modern view of the world must purify religion itself, if once it is fearlessly and generally received. For instance, he writes:

"Since we know that God never makes himself known by extraordinary interference in the natural and orderly course of things, but manifests his eternal power and godhead in the unalterable execution of the arrangements and laws of the world, the false alloy which the carnal and selfish heart had put into its worship of God has been once for all rejected. When we appear in his sacred presence, we no longer desire that He, the eternal and unchangeable, should make himself an instrument of our small personal wishes, and alter anything that the natural course of things brings with it."†

At the same time, although he expressly rejected some of the dogmas of the church and modified others, he still claimed to be in the direct line of descent from St. Paul and Zwingli. Nor was this any inconsistency. For he received, at least partially, the doctrine of Schleiermacher, that the most essential elements of a religion lie in emotion, and that dogmas are but the variable expressions of the emotion in the thought and language of successive ages. As he held that the Reformers of the sixteenth century were true representatives of Christianity in their age, so he deemed that he was entitled to call himself and his fellow-reformers of the nineteenth century disciples of Christ and continuators of the church's divine work.‡

* Religion im Zeitalter Darwin's, pp. 15 sq.

† Ibid. p. 52.

‡ Gang durch die christliche Welt, pp. 37—44.

What the precise effect was which Lang's acceptance of the modern scientific view of the world and of the results of the most radical school of modern criticism produced upon the chief articles of his theology, we must now endeavour to ascertain. As we have already seen, he at once cast aside a number of dogmas that had held an important place in the traditional creed. Some of those to which he assigned a place in his system, though under altered forms, we must pass unnoticed, and confine ourselves to the fundamental articles of Religion and Revelation, God and the World, Christ and Christianity, Immortality and the Kingdom of Heaven.

First, Religion and Revelation. Lang accepted Schleiermacher's assignment of religion to the domain of the emotions. He earnestly combated the Hegelian view, which makes it nothing more than superior knowledge and inferior philosophy. But Lang departed from Schleiermacher by ascribing much more important functions to knowledge in modifying religious feeling than his great master had done. This was a vital point with Lang. He pronounced Strauss's religion of reverence for the universe defective in point of religion as well as of logic. Schleiermacher must have found the religion satisfactory, if he had been dissatisfied with the logic. Schleiermacher would also have recognized the same elements of religion in combination with the most opposite conceptions of the universe. Not so Lang. He held that "every religion presupposes and from the very first implies a theory of the universe." This conviction led him, in the service of religion, to attack what he deemed an erroneous cosmology, and to proclaim modern scientific views.

On the great question of Revelation, Lang is significantly silent. The question really ranks with that of Prayer as a test of a theologian's position, the one indicating his view of man's intercourse with God, the other his view of God's communications to man. In various places of his writings, Lang criticises and rejects the received doctrine of supernatural communications of truth. He accepts Lessing's position, that all the positive religions are simply the forms in which man's

religious consciousness and the love of truth express themselves, varying with time and circumstances, climate and country, national gifts and history. The different religions are only various stations on the course of unfolding reason, of the development of the religious consciousness, and all have their share of both truth and error.* His idea of revelation appears to be nothing more than Lessing's education of the human race. It was natural, therefore, that he should say nothing whatever about it in the second edition of his *Dogmatik*. In the first edition, under the head of Enlightenment, the Holy Ghost was spoken of as the source of truth—the source of truth, however, not by communication to man, but by means of the progress of the human spirit. In the second edition of the work, the reference to the Holy Ghost as the source of illumination is omitted, and there is no mention of revelation. Instead of referring to the antithesis of revelation and reason, as he had done in the first edition, he explains the unity of reason and faith, faith being simply the pathos which the heart gives to the discoveries of the reason. Faith is blind, is not an organ of perception, but must receive the matter upon which it is exercised from the reason.

As Lang's theology contains no article upon Revelation, he treats of the New Testament under the head of the means to be used by the Church in the promotion of its objects. Like Schleiermacher, he passes over the Old Testament in his *Dogmatik*, though elsewhere he ascribes to it great value as a help to godliness. The New Testament is to him the classical record and expression of man's religious life. It is in no sense a revelation. Even as a help in promoting the ends of the church, it has great drawbacks. It is a Semitic production, which it is hard to adapt to Japhetic wants. The words ascribed to Jesus in the Synoptists are of very unequal value. Ethical principles are often expressed with so much onesidedness and exaggeration, that our taste is offended. As a fact, the Bible is becoming less and less a people's book. By the

* Religiöse Charaktere, p. 276; Reform, 1876, p. 8.

bed of the sick and the dying it generally gives way to prayer-books, and the strong and healthy, as far as they cultivate their piety *privatim*, prefer modern devotional books. The beautiful and popularly attractive elements of the Bible belong to a past and strange world. That which edifies the simple and unlearned man has first to be selected from much that is less intelligible and less interesting.* Lang appears, therefore, to have shared Schleiermacher's conviction when he said, "It is not he who believes in sacred Scriptures that can claim to possess religion, but he who can dispense with them, or, in case of need, make them for himself."†

To every professed revelation Lang applied in a thorough-going manner Lessing's great principle, that incidental historical truths can never be made the matter of a binding revelation; and, on the other hand, that no truth of reason may be made to depend upon an incidental truth of history.

"To free religion," he says, "from history, to liberate its eternal nature from what has taken place but once, to make that which lies in the nature of the human spirit and constitutes the only foundation of salvation and blessedness, independent of all merely historical questions, which are always liable to be variously decided, which can never lay claim to be absolute but only historical truth, i.e., in the most favourable case, only highest probability—that is the problem the thorough and logical solution of which concerns religion itself no less than science."‡

We now approach the most perplexing portion of Lang's creed—*God and the World*. It may help to make an abstruse subject clearer if we begin with his conception of the universe. The universe is a cosmos, an orderly and reasonable whole. It is not a creation in time, but an eternal series of phenomena. Everywhere it bears the visible marks of order, law, beauty, truth, rationality—that is, it reveals spirit. Spirit is self-consciousness, clear knowledge of itself, and self-determination or freedom, intelligent power to direct its own actions. There are, however, two degrees of freedom, the

* Dogmatik, § 36.

† Reden über die Religion, 1st Oration.

‡ Dogmatik, p. 195.

lower merely natural, the higher moral. Thus everything in nature acts, and is not merely acted upon, the stone falling or resisting pressure by its own energy, but man knows, reflects upon, determines, the direction and character of his actions. Man's freedom is that of the spirit, and the goal of his progress is to become the perfect representative of spirit. His goal is also the destination of the universe, although as an infinite end it must always remain unattained. We can conceive the purpose of the universe as no other than to reveal spirit. And the fact that spirit appears everywhere in the course of the world's development, and is its infinite destination, proves that spirit is its eternal foundation. "If we find spirit as reason and freedom in the order of the universe, and as an essential form in which this order reveals itself, we cannot possibly rest in the conception of the universe as physical force (*Naturmacht*), but must go on to view it as spirit."*

Lang's God is not a supernatural person separate from this universe. He is not a being who thinks and feels in any way after the manner of men. As little is God the great First Cause or the constant Preserver of the world. He is not even an impersonal cause and sustainer of all things. The idea of causality must not be applied to him, otherwise the natural freedom of lower beings and the moral freedom of man are delusive. God is neither a person nor a cause, but he is the order of the universe (*Weltordnung*). This order, however, is by its very nature spirit, self-consciousness and self-determination. The spirit which we have found in Lang's conception of the world in the form of order, law, beauty, truth, reason, is therefore his God, always, however, inconceivable to him except as self-consciousness and capability of free action.

It follows from this idea of God, that he is inseparable from the universe, law being inconceivable apart from the things in which it appears, beauty having no existence outside things beautiful. The extent of the universe is also the extent of the sphere of divine activity, and God puts forth no

* *Dogmatik*, p. 55.

energies which are not included in the world's forces and causes. But Lang earnestly deprecates the idea that God is not *distinguishable* from the world. Though inseparable from the world, he is the eternal basis (*Grund*) of all existence, himself raised above the mutations of the world-process. Hegel's idea that spirit appears in man for the first time as self-consciousness and self-determination, is also energetically rejected.

Lang maintained that his idea of God met the essential requirement of the religious man—to feel himself in the presence of an infinite "Thou." At the same time, his language often shews that his *Gottesbegriff* stood the crucial test of prayer with difficulty.

"The modern will not merely refrain from all battering of Heaven's gates, but it is probable that he will not pray at all in the customary sense of the word, according to which prayer is an actual address to God in so many words accompanied by certain gestures. It will probably satisfy him to gain light, comfort and fortitude for the dark hour by raising the eye of the spirit to the one Foundation of all things."*

To us it seems that it would as poorly pass the trial of a critical examination. This cannot now be made, but one or two questions may be put: How does Lang get self-consciousness and self-determination, or spirit, into his abstract *Weltordnung*? Is not the only difference that distinguishes his God from the universe this—that the latter is the thing of which the former is a characteristic? As removed from the sphere of causation, what has his God to do? Mr. Matthew Arnold's God fails to satisfy the religious heart, but the modest claims he makes for it almost disarm the critic. Lang's *Weltordnung*, that "makes for" *Geist* and is itself *Geist*, is exposed to the attacks of the thinker and the condemnation of the saint.

Lang's position as regards Christianity and Christ is much easier to state than his view of God. As a religion, Chris-

* Religion im Z. Darwin's, p. 16, comp. p. 54.

tianity is independent of its first and greatest exponent, and is therefore treated in Lang's *Dogmatik* long before he comes to Christ. He distinguishes it from Heathenism, the religion of nature, and Judaism, the religion of law, as the religion of spirit and of sonship to God. As the religion of the spirit, it refers everything to the disposition, the heart, the moral character. While ancient religions value man by external standards, such as rank, birth, sex, nationality,—Christianity, the democratic and universal religion, attaches value to the soul, the real man, alone. But to the soul it gives an importance before never dreamed of. The soul's salvation is the highest concern; its transgressions have most terrible consequences. Heathenism lacked the idea of holiness, its gods following their natural propensities without sense of shame. Christianity is a terrible struggle against the flesh, the world and self. It is, therefore, the religion which declares the spiritual freedom and infinite elevation of the person beyond all that is called world and time. As the religion of sonship to God, it feels God immanent within the soul and the world, in opposition to the transcendentalism of the Hebrew religion. The Hebrew beheld in God the absolute cause, and looked on the world as a creature only. The Christian sees the barrier removed that separated man from God. All fear and servility are abolished, and the throne of the Deity is no longer in the clouds, but in the human will itself. Christianity is, therefore, the religion of reconciliation, joy and sonship. Its essential features appear in the Epistles of Paul no less than in the Gospels. But everywhere they are the same great characteristics of spirituality and sonship to God, and they constitute it the final and highest stage of religious development.

In his account of the work of Jesus, Lang carries out logically Lessing's exclusion of historical elements from religious faiths. He dissents, therefore, entirely from Schleiermacher when he makes the saving influence of Christianity depend on Christ's work and person. Salvation can never depend on this or that person, inasmuch as the eternal cannot depend on the temporal, nor the necessary upon the incidental. The import

of the historical is the part it plays in bringing the eternal, universal truth to bear upon the heart, to influence the will. Universal truths, religious ideas, form the substance and saving powers of a religion. They bear their own evidence in their very nature, and cannot be substantiated by external historical proofs. The work of a religious genius is to make them "current coin." "The truth is too severe and high for the weak heart of man, but having been once seized, felt, lived, presented before the eye in the form of a breathing, religious character, it sends its warm breath into the hearts of all whom the cry reaches, 'Come and see.' To the religious character the prerogative of Deity has been transferred: he constantly creates men after his own image."* This being the function of religious heroes, it matters not if their lives get adorned with anecdote and myth. If the poetic additions only faithfully preserve the fundamental character and import of the hero, we may be satisfied. For purposes of religious edification, poetry, ideal truth, is often as valuable as strict history.

The religious import of Jesus is that he was a religious character, or hero, in whom the eternally true revelations of man to God were embodied in such a way that he became the pioneer into a new religious world. He is not to be counted as merely one of the prophets, but as the fulfilment of the law and prophecy; and subsequent history will not be a series of new religious epochs, but only the development of the life which appeared in him. On the one hand, he was more than the religious sage of Strauss; on the other, less than the king in the clouds of heaven of the first Christians, or the God of the Church. He himself possessed a profound conviction of the import of his own person in promoting the progress of the kingdom of God, such as none before him had ever felt. This conviction was based upon the fact that he was possessor of religious endowments such as no one else had had. His belief that he was the Messiah, a title which alone explains his

* *Dogmatik*, p. 196.

success, was founded upon his religious consciousness, and its assumption was the result and not the cause of his religious elevation.

“One must ask : What an elevation of God-consciousness, how rich a religious genius, what a wealth of inner life, was requisite to enable a poor artisan of distant, despised Galilee, not to shrink from the daring act of calling himself the Messiah, and to believe that all that mankind had hitherto longed for and sought with regard to its highest concerns was fulfilled by his appearance ! And the question finds an answer in the Gospels. The most severe criticism of these writings will not touch the fact, that the Christian principle, i.e. the religion of the spirit, of sonship to God and of love, embodied itself in the person of Jesus in such a manner that a new epoch, a new world, was entered.”*

At the same time, the ideal of humanity which Jesus presented in his life and teaching was without doubt one-sided and imperfect. The family, the state, business, industry, art, legitimate enjoyment of the world, come short. Yet this one-sidedness constituted his greatness, and in his religious principles lies the corrective of all these defects.†

We now come to the last of the articles of Lang’s faith with which we can here deal. In the first edition of his *Dogmatik*, Lang summarized his position with regard to immortality thus :

“By faith to hold eternal life as an ever-present and secure possession, which in dying also makes us blessed, is the end of sanctification, and at the same time all that Dogmatic Theology can with certainty say regarding eschatology.”

In the second edition, the subject is treated at greater length, and the above paragraph becomes the following two :

“Eternal life is the conscious life of our spirits in God, and the complete satisfaction of our nature which, in the midst of the limitations and distresses of time, flows therefrom. The truth of this life and of this satisfaction does not depend on the question of individual existence after death. But that the human spirit continues to

* *Dogmatik*, p. 207.

† *Ibid.* 208 ; *Stunden der Andacht*, II. p. 11.

exist after death is as much a demand of the reason as a fact of experience. Ideas as to the manner of this existence are conditioned by the psychological and cosmological views of the particular ages.”*

Lang's commentary on these paragraphs informs us that reason deems it absurd to suppose that the human spirit is annihilated after death, while with the body even this is not the case, its elements only entering into other combinations. In fact, nothing ever perishes; the traces of nothing that has once existed are ever lost. He also informs us how experience shews the continued existence of the spirit: the instance of Jesus, as of every genius of our race, proves that there is a continuation of life and influence after death. And what is seen in the highest manner in the case of these greater spirits must be true in a lower manner of all spirits of a humble rank. Lang also describes how the present age pictures to itself existence after death. Certainly not as the Bible and the Church have done; not as a life of the disembodied spirit in a higher world. Copernicus shattered into fragments heaven and hell. Modern psychology asks, How can the individual consciousness continue when the brain, its organ, has been reduced to dust? We must conceive the future life of the spirit as corresponding to the immanent laws of the cosmos, as the perpetuation of a force which, having once entered into the unbroken chain of causes and effects called by us the world, must continue its effects (*Wirkungen*) *ad infinitum*, inasmuch as it is impossible that an existence should ever disappear and leave no trace behind.

It looks, therefore, as if the real future life of Lang were the Kingdom of God, which he, with Jesus and his first disciples, held must be revealed upon the earth. It was in his mind synonymous with the progress of the human race, including progress in the development of all man's powers, and not in religion only. From his student days as a revolutionist until the last, the miseries and evils of human life weighed heavily upon his spirit, and all the great promises of the Hebrew pro-

* Dogmatik, §§ 55, 56.

phets, and of Jesus and Paul, of a new earth, wherein should dwell righteousness, made the Bible and Christianity ever dearer to him. It is evident that Christ got ever a deeper and deeper hold of his heart and faith as the Founder of a kingdom of heaven for suffering men upon the earth. His *Dogmatik* closes with the words: "That Jesus planted in the heart of mankind, with an energy and fire that none besides commanded, the thought of this world-reform, is his greatest merit."

We have now reviewed some of the leading theological views of the most prominent representative of the modern school of Swiss reformers. But it must be always remembered that a great injustice would be done to Lang, should it be supposed that the views he held at any time of his life were deemed by him final. He was from first to last an inquirer, a searcher after the truth rather than the possessor of it. Lessing was in this, as in so many other respects, his master and hero.

Were this the fitting place to criticise Lang's theological position, we should have much to say of an unfavourable nature. We should say that he has suffered his cosmology to trespass too freely upon the domain of religion; that he has endeavoured to find God where He does not permit Himself to be found; that the God of his philosophy is not the God of the human soul, probably not of his own; that his attitude towards the New Testament records is unnecessarily, almost credulously, sceptical; and that his treatment of the great question of immortality lacks both depth and clearness. This is, however, not the place for such criticism. Our object is rather to describe Lang's position as an important representative of the union of freest thought and most earnest piety. Thus far our sketch has shewn us a man in whose life the two streams of religion and reason flowed peacefully together, quite distinguishable indeed, but not hostilely divided, and both onwards towards an infinite sea. His soul in her flight made for a celestial goal, and the two pinions that bore her upwards and onwards with a social and accordant beat were free thought and sincere godliness.

But Lang's import does not end here. The harmony he

felt within, he preached to others. He looked upon it as his mission to declare the glad tidings of the reconciliation of true culture and Christianity, true science and the true Church. With all the devotion and zeal of an apostle, he lived, laboured and died in this cause.

Lang possessed in a very unusual degree the qualifications and endowments of a popular teacher. If his intellect was not profound, it was strong and clear. His love of reality and inborn sagacity led him at once to the essential aspects of a matter. A plastic imagination enabled him to throw every subject into an artistic form, and present it as a living whole. Few men are endowed with finer gifts of speech. The correct, the telling and the beautifying word is always at his command. A strong mother-wit, a rich and true human heart, impart strength, depth and warmth to whatever subject he handles. He had pre-eminently that essential qualification—without which all others are, after all, useless—that his heart was full of the themes with which his mouth overflowed. He loved theology as the divine science, and his mental gifts, his educational advantages, and his untiring industry, gave him a complete mastery of its main branches. Never has he been surpassed, probably rarely equalled, in the art of presenting the most modern aspects of a theological or a critical question in the clearest, most concise and most attractive form, with an entire absence of technical language and a delightful concealment of learning. But it was especially as a speaker that he was *facile princeps*. His printed sermons and lectures are fine reading, but those who were privileged to hear the orator complain that the dead page is a poor representative of the inspired man. He was undoubtedly the first preacher in Switzerland, and probably had no rival in Germany.

But we must not venture upon a general estimate of Lang's place amongst the speakers and writers of the age. We can only bring out one or two important characteristics of his labours through the press and in the pulpit in the cause of rational religion.

As preacher, speaker, author and editor, it is characteristic

of Lang that he everywhere takes up the greatest and most serious questions. He will deal with no minor points, but precisely with those upon which modern theology in its opposition to traditional orthodoxy and vulgar materialism hinges. By nature he could never rest until he was at the heart of a matter, and his whole history was a fiery and eloquent protest against a theology that lacks the earnestness or the faith to look the highest truth in the face. He deals everywhere with such fundamental and decisive problems as the immanence or the transcendence of God, the existence of evil, the use of prayer, the historical worth of the Gospels, the place of Jesus in the history of religion. He brings forward questions of this magnitude and difficulty in his sermons and devotional books as much as in his controversial and scientific works. Even in the religious instruction of the young of his parish he appears to have observed equal directness.*

It lay as much in Lang's nature to deal uncompromisingly with a question, as never to rest satisfied with anything less than the greatest questions. He could not beat about the bush, and what he found he could not conceal. He deemed it the right of the "common man" to know the philosopher's last thoughts about God, the historian's final conclusion about Christ, and the critic's most negative results about the Bible. In his popular pamphlets and his lectures and sermons, no less than in his treatise on Dogmatic Theology, he states as clearly and forcibly as he can his arguments against such doctrines as the personality of the Deity, the possibility of miracles, the sinlessness of Jesus, the completeness and absolute perfection of New Testament morality, and the popular conception of immortality. He never softened his utterance for the sake of weak brethren. He held that weak brethren should not go to hear him or read his books. They might know beforehand what was to be expected from him.

Exception might perhaps be taken to the perfect accuracy of the statement that Lang always presented the negative

* See *Reform*, 1876, p. 281.

aspects of his convictions without any reserve or disguise. The excellent and sincere historian of Materialism, F. A. Lange, remarks that Lang is untrue to his principle that religious dogmas are true, and not poetic conceptions, when he claims his right to use the name of Father in his addresses to God.

“His God,” says Lange,* “is nothing more than ‘the basis of all being, eternally perfect in himself, raised beyond all the mutation of the process of the universe.’ He performs no miracles; he has no human feeling (*Gemüth*); he does not concern himself about the individual weal or woe of his creatures; he nowhere interferes with the course of nature’s laws; his existence rests solely upon the fact that, in opposition to materialism, a separate basis of all being is postulated in addition to the mere sum of it. And this basis of all being is made into a ‘Father.’”

However just Lange’s criticism of Lang’s use of the name Father as applied to God may be in the controversy between the two men, it would be quite unfounded if used as a proof of unfaithfulness to his principle of absolute truthfulness in religious teaching. He could be charged with the sin of compromise only in case he had allowed his hearers to suppose that he used the name as representing his idea of God. This he carefully guarded against. Again and again he declares in plainest language that he employs names of God that imply his personality simply in obedience to the necessities of religious emotion and of public worship.†

His language with regard to immortality might also appear to be exposed to similar criticism. But the approved honesty and utter fearlessness of the man are in favour of another explanation. In estimating the words of such men as Lang it is more likely to be a safe rule to suppose that their philosophical definitions say too little, than that their popular and emotional language says too much. There is reason to believe that Lang’s *Weltordnung* meant infinitely more to him than the precise force of the words indicates. It is probably equally true that his idea of the continued existence of the spirit after

* *Geschichte des Materialismus*, Vol. II. p. 503.

† *Stunden der Andacht*, II. p. 242; *Religiöse Reden*, II. p. 290.

death was a much richer one to him than his language and illustrations make it to us. Were this not so, he would probably have struck out the entire subject from his *Dogmatik*, as he had done in the case of Revelation, Angels, and the like.

Another characteristic of Lang's method of teaching was that he endeavoured to present positive truth when he removed error. Notwithstanding the wide sweep of his negations, he never lets his hearer feel that he is a man without a faith that satisfies his intellect and fires his soul. His sermons may at times be terribly rationalistic, unfeelingly destructive; but with all this there is ever present a hidden fire of aspiration, feeling, faith, that makes the listeners' hearts burn within them as he talks to them.

We had intended to add a brief consideration of the amount of success which seems to have attended Lang's public labours in the cause of religion. But already this paper is too long. It must suffice to say, that he found men everywhere prepared to hear him speak and to read his books. His church in Zürich was packed as regularly as the Sundays came. When he lectured, the room would be full from the floor to the ceiling. People that had cared nothing for religious services were found regularly attending his ministry. Now that he is gone, readers of the *Reform* cry out, Give us some of Lang's sermons to read instead of your dry articles! Most of his books soon reached a second edition. Some of them are now out of print, and the demand for them continues. At all events, his success was such that the friends of free thought in the pulpit may well be encouraged. It is not free thought that empties churches, if something more is required to fill them.

Neither can we deal with the still more important inquiry as to the precise amount of success that attended Lang's endeavour to mediate between faith and science, religion and reason. He never looked upon himself and his fellow-labourers in this great work as more than pioneers into a new world of emotional and mental harmony, of the peaceful co-operation of free thought and true religion. How much more he did

than clear the ground for others to build upon, the reader will be able to some extent to judge. This at least is certain, that if he did no more than run up a log-hut in the new world, it was for himself a temple in which his soul reverently and joyfully worshiped, while his intellect freely and fearlessly inquired.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

II.—JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL.—II.

IN a former article we compared Justin Martyr's doctrine of the Logos with that of our fourth evangelist, and endeavoured to ascertain the relation between them. We must now proceed to notice certain forms of expression and modes of thought of a more miscellaneous character, which remind one of the fourth Gospel. Some of these, it will be observed, are so similar to the Johannine language, that they might be treated as quotations; but I shall reserve for the latter head only those passages in which Justin is unquestionably borrowing from an earlier writer. The following apparent allusions have nothing in their context to indicate their dependent origin.

The first expression which demands our attention borders closely on exact quotation. It is found in the First Apology,¹ where it is said that the Christians "honour Jesus Christ, who both became our teacher of these things and *was born to this end* [*εἰς τοῦτο γεννηθέντα*], who was crucified under Pontius Pilate." Here not only do the words point to John xviii. 37, *εἰς τοῦτο γεγέννημαι*, but the perfectly needless reference to Pilate reminds us that it was before the Roman governor that this expression was used.

We may next observe a few phrases descriptive of Christ's

¹ c. 13.

coming into the world. Justin, like John, regards the elevation of the brazen serpent in the wilderness as typical of the crucifixion,¹ and in speaking of it he says that it denoted salvation to those προσφεύγουσι τῷ τὸν ἐσταυρωμένον υἱὸν αὐτοῦ πέμψαντι εἰς τὸν κόσμον.² Now this idea of God's sending his Son into the world occurs in the same connection in John iii. 17, and, strange as it may appear, it is an idea which, in the New Testament, is peculiar to John. Outside the Johannine writings, there are only two passages in which the expression εἰς τὸν κόσμον is used in relation to Christ,³ and there it is connected with his *coming*, not with his *being sent*; within these writings it occurs no fewer than eleven times. It is remarkable, however, that in the four instances⁴ in which John speaks of Christ's being sent into the world, he prefers the word ἀποστέλλω, so that Justin's phrase is not entirely coincident with the Johannine. But the use of πέμπω itself is curious. Except by John, it is applied to Christ in the New Testament only twice,⁵ whereas John uses it twenty-five times. Justin's language, therefore, in the thought which it expresses, in the selection of words, and in its connection, is closely related to John's, and has no other parallel in the New Testament. A similar remark will apply to another phrase used by Justin, τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα,⁶ which finds its parallel in John's ἐγὼ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον,⁷ and, as regards the παρά, in other parts of the Gospel, but nowhere else in the New Testament. Again, Justin speaks of Christ as θεὸν ἄνωθεν προελθόντα,⁸ and with this we may compare John's ὁ ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενος,⁹ an expression characteristic of himself.

One of the passages in which Justin uses the Johannine πέμπω forms a transition to another mode of thought which occurs with great frequency in the fourth Gospel. The words are, κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν πατρὸς καὶ δεσπότου κ. τ. λ.¹⁰

¹ Ap. I. c. 60. Dial. cc. 91, 94 and 131.

² Dial. c. 91.

³ 1 Tim. i. 15 and Heb. x. 5.

⁴ I include the First Epistle, iv. 9.

⁵ Luke xx. 13 and Rom. viii. 3.

⁶ Ap. II. c. 6.

⁷ xvi. 27; see also 28 and xvii. 8.

⁸ Dial. c. 64.

⁹ iii. 31.

¹⁰ Dial. c. 140.

Compare with this John's τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με,¹ and τοῦ πέμψαντός με πατρός,² expressions quite characteristic. Elsewhere Justin speaks of things as happening to Christ κατὰ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θέλημα,³ and of grace as coming from him κατὰ τὸ θέλ. τοῦ π.⁴ He repeatedly says that the incarnation took place according to the will of the Father, but generally uses, not the Johannine θέλημα, but βουλή or βούλησις. Once, however, he says, ὡς τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος γεγενημένου ἀλλ' ἐκ θελήματος θεοῦ.⁵ This may be a reminiscence of John i. 13, a text which, we know, was applied to Christ by Irenæus⁶ and Tertullian,⁷ who for the genuine reading substituted ὅς . . . ἐγεννήθη. The Johannine doctrine of Christ's dependence on the Father is clearly set forth, though without much similarity of language, in the statement,—“I affirm that he never did anything except those things which the Maker of the universe, above whom there is no other God, wished him both to do and to say.”⁸ With this we may compare John's statements,—“the Son can do nothing of himself,”⁹ and, “I speak not of myself, but the Father who sent me himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak.”¹⁰ More remarkable is an appended clause which occurs after a reference to Christ's resurrection, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ λαβὼν ἔχει.¹¹ On account of the present ἔχει, the ὁ apparently refers to the permanent risen state implied in the previous clause; but the thought may have been suggested by John's ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου,¹² which is introduced in a similar connection.

Justin's allusions to the brazen serpent as typical of the crucifixion constitute another parallel between him and the writer of the Gospel, but can hardly prove his dependence on the latter, as he seized with avidity every type which a torturing exegesis could extract from the Old Testament. We

¹ iv. 34, v. 30, vi. 38, 39, 40.

² xiv. 24; cf. v. 37, vi. 44, viii. 16, 18, xii. 49.

⁴ Dial. c. 116.

⁵ Dial. c. 63.

³ Dial. c. 102.

⁶ Haer. iii. 16, 2, and 19, 2.

⁷ De Carne Christi, cc. 19 and 24.

⁸ Dial. c. 56, p. 276 D.

⁹ v. 19.

¹⁰ xii. 49.

¹¹ Dial. c. 100.

¹² x. 18.

may, however, compare his statement that this particular type indicated σωτηρία τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦτον κ. τ. λ.,¹ with John's ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται κ. τ. λ.²

More important is his account of the significance of the elements in the Lord's Supper. He says, "We were taught that" the bread and wine "were the flesh [σάρκα] and blood of Jesus who was made flesh" [σαρκοποιηθέντος].³ Now, not only are we reminded of John by σαρκοποιηθέντος, but still more by the use of σάρκα to describe the bread. In the New Testament the word employed is invariably σῶμα. Justin had not forgotten this; for as soon as he quotes the account of the institution of the Eucharist, he cites this term correctly. Nor can we say that the adoption of σάρξ was forced on him by his reference to the incarnation; for elsewhere he allows his usual language respecting the incarnation to be modified by a reference to the Eucharist,—τοῦ ἄρτου, ὃν παρέδωκεν . . . εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ τε σωματοποιήσασθαι αὐτὸν κ. τ. λ.⁴ In John, however, the word σάρξ is used repeatedly, not indeed in connection with the last supper, but in a passage which was inevitably applied as a commentary on its meaning.⁵ Justin's use of the term, therefore, is distinctively Johannine.

There are a few other expressions of less moment which may be briefly referred to in the order in which they occur in Justin's writings. He says that Christians honour God and the Son and the Spirit λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ.⁶ Compare John's πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ.⁷ Justin might naturally substitute λόγῳ for πνεύματι, as he has a moment before included the πνεῦμα among the objects of worship. We may observe in passing that we have here another instance of doctrinal expansion; for the Gospel strictly confines to the Father the spiritual worship which it commends. Again, the statement that the prophets spoke only those things ἃ ἤκουσαν καὶ ἃ εἶδον,⁸ suggests ὃ ἐώρακε καὶ ἤκουσε, τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ.⁹ The reminder that "the elements

¹ Dial. c. 94.² iii. 15.³ Ap. I. c. 66.⁴ Dial. c. 70.⁵ vi. 51—56.⁶ Ap. I. c. 6.⁷ iv. 23.⁸ Dial. c. 7.⁹ John iii. 32.

do not idle or keep the sabbath,"¹ and that "God has instituted the same administration of the universe on this and on all other days,"² is a commentary on John's, "my Father worketh hitherto."³ The argument against the observance of the sabbath from the fact that circumcision was permitted on that day,⁴ is found, though with more point, in the Gospel.⁵ The declaration that "those who in circumcision come to him [*προσιόντας*], . . . he will receive and bless,"⁶ is similar in sentiment to the evangelist's, "him that cometh [*ἐρχόμενον*] to me I will not cast out."⁷ The expression *ζῶν ὕδωρ*, and the idea of this water's gushing up in the heart,⁸ recal the narrative in John iv. And, lastly, the assertion that "to us it was given . . . to know all the things of the Father,"⁹ reminds us of the Johannine, "all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known unto you."¹⁰

We have still to refer to three passages which appear to me to be quotations from the fourth Gospel. The most celebrated of these, that relating to the new birth, has already been made the subject of a separate article;¹¹ and if the reasoning there advanced be correct, it renders probable the use of the Gospel by Justin. The two remaining passages must be considered here. Referring to the testimony of John the Baptist, Justin says,—“Men supposed him to be the Christ; to whom even he himself cried, *οὐκ εἰμι ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ φωνῇ βοῶντος*, for there shall come he who is stronger than I, whose sandals I am not worthy to carry.”¹² The former part of this testimony is found only in John,¹³—*οὐκ εἰμι ἐγὼ ὁ Χριστός. . . . Ἐγὼ φωνῇ βοῶντος* κ. τ. λ. The entire passage as it stands does not occur in any of our existing Gospels, but is made up out of John, Luke and Matthew; and it may therefore be contended that it is borrowed from some unknown source. To those who are acquainted with the phenomena of Justin's quotations from the Old Testament, and who know how easily parallel passages become

¹ Dial. c. 23.² Dial. c. 29.³ v. 17.⁴ Dial. c. 27.⁵ vii. 22, 23.⁶ Dial. c. 33.⁷ vi. 37.⁸ Dial. c. 114.⁹ Dial. c. 121.¹⁰ xv. 15.¹¹ Theol. Rev., Oct. 1875.¹² Dial. c. 88.¹³ i. 20 and 23.

mixed together in memoriter citation (to say nothing of the fact that an author might intentionally combine the passages best suited to his purpose), this supposition will not appear necessary; and if it is not necessary, it is more critical to explain the facts by reference to known sources than to have recourse to purely imaginary documents. The third apparent quotation has not, so far as I am aware, been hitherto noticed, and indeed it is generally classed among the proofs that Justin made use of an apocryphal Gospel. In the larger Apology,¹ the following words are quoted from Isaiah,² αἰτοῦσι με νῦν κρίσιν; and in evidence that this prophecy was fulfilled in Christ, Justin asserts, διασύροντες αὐτὸν ἐκάθισαν ἐπὶ βήματος καὶ εἶπον· Κρῖνον ἡμῖν. Now this event is nowhere recorded in our Gospels; yet the most important of the words in which it is described occur, with the alteration of a single letter, in the fourth Gospel,³ ὁ οὖν Πιλάτος . . . ἤγαγεν ἔξω τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐπὶ βήματος. Ἐκάθισεν here is undoubtedly to be understood in its intransitive sense; but what more natural than that Justin, in his eagerness to find a fulfilment of the prophecy, should take it transitively? He might then add the statement that the people said κρῖνον ἡμῖν as an obvious inference from the fact of Christ's having been placed on the tribunal, and to bring the event into a closer verbal connection with the prophecy, just as in an earlier chapter⁴ he appends to the synoptic account the circumstance that the ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was bound to a vine, in order to bring the event into connection with Genesis xlix. 11.⁵ We have thus, as I conceive, an adequate explanation of the origin of this apocryphal narrative. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that the agreement between Justin and John is a

¹ c. 35. ² lviii. 2, which, by the way, is represented as belonging to lxxv. 2.

³ xix. 13.

⁴ c. 32.

⁵ It is conceded by Hilgenfeld [Die Evang. Justin's, p. 224] that this circumstance was drawn from Justin's own imagination under the influence of the prophecy. His notion that it is the mere inconsistency of an apologist to allow such influence in one instance, and yet not concede that the epithet *μονογενής* was borrowed from the 22nd Psalm, is sufficiently refuted by our previous investigation.

mere coincidence, though of course the *possibility* of this cannot be denied. It cannot in this instance be maintained that John borrowed from Justin, because the words of the latter are quite unambiguous, and could not have suggested the event related in the Gospel; and the supposition that they both used a common source is precluded by the different uses of the verb, and by the want of agreement in the general sense of the two passages.

By the foregoing investigation one point appears to me to be completely demonstrated, namely, that if Justin had the fourth Gospel, he did not treat it with entire neglect, but allowed it a very important place in the construction of his theology, and in the general colouring of his thought and language. More than this, however, may be reasonably inferred. Several separate lines of inquiry have, if my judgment be not at fault, established a probability that Justin was in possession of the Gospel. The probability may in each instance be slight, and it is always possible for a critic to object that the phenomena *may* be susceptible of some other explanation; but several weak probabilities, all converging on the same result, may constitute a very strong argument, and nothing can be more utterly uncritical than to reject a large mass of evidence because its details fall considerably short of demonstration. We must remember, moreover, that the evidence afforded by Justin's writings is not in favour of something quite unexpected, and opposed to our best historical information. On the contrary, it simply coincides with a legitimate historical presumption furnished by the writings of Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian and Theophilus, to say nothing of later authors; and it points to a plain matter of fact which in itself is entirely credible.

We must, however, notice an objection which is urged as fatal to the supposition that Justin was acquainted with the Gospel. It is said that he gives a particular description of the character of Christ's teaching, and that this is exactly suited to the style of the Synoptists, but wholly inapplicable to the protracted argumentation of the Johannine Gospel. Justin's

statement is the following: Βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν· οὐ γὰρ σοφιστὴς ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ δύναμις θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν.¹ Now there are several objections to the application which is sometimes made of this passage. In the first place, I do not think the Greek asserts what is ascribed to it. Mr. J. J. Tayler translates it as follows: "His words were brief and concise; for he was no sophist: but his word was a power of God."² I dissent with great diffidence from so high an authority; but surely the words παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι are not identical in meaning with οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ. Ought not the passage to be rendered, "Brief and concise sayings have proceeded from him"? If so, Justin is describing, not the universal, but only the prevailing and prominent character of Christ's teaching;³ and as it is his purpose to furnish some examples for the benefit of his readers, he very naturally and properly selects short passages which are intelligible without their context. He accordingly follows for the most part the Sermon on the Mount, but adds some other sayings which were easily suggested by the topics with which he was dealing. But again, the description is not really appropriate to all the teaching in the Synoptics. It excludes the longer parables; and if the latter part of the Dialogue had been lost, it would probably have been used as a conclusive proof that Justin's failure to refer to the parables was due to their absence from his Memoirs. It is not till towards the close of the Dialogue⁴ that we at last meet with an abstract of the parable of the Sower. And lastly, the description is not so inapplicable to the fourth Gospel as is sometimes alleged. The book contains in reality very little connected argumentation; and even the longest

¹ Ap. I. c. 14.

² An Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel, 1867, p. 64.

³ Even if the article were used, it would surely be hypercritical to insist on the universality of the statement, which would be sufficiently accurate if it described the general impression of Christ's teaching derived from the four Gospels collectively. Certainly in none of them is found the connected and argumentative discourse of a σοφιστής, and we need not except the fourth Gospel if we say that Christ's teaching is not σοφία ἀνθρώπων, but δύναμις θεοῦ.

⁴ c. 125.

discourses consist rather of successive pearls of thought strung on a thread of association than of consecutive discussion and proof. In rapidly glancing over the first thirteen chapters, to which the objection would principally apply, I have noticed no fewer than fifty-three *βραχεῖς καὶ σύντομοι λόγοι*, sayings, that is, which, however closely some of them may be connected with their context, contain in themselves complete and satisfying thoughts. The objection, therefore, appears to me to rest on a misunderstanding of Justin's Greek and on erroneous criticism, and to be consequently destitute of force.

But why, then, it may be asked, has Justin not quoted the fourth Gospel at least as often as the other three? I cannot tell, any more than I can tell why he has never named the supposed authors of his Memoirs, or has mentioned only one of the parables, or made no reference to the apostle Paul, or nowhere quoted the Apocalypse, though he believed it to be an apostolic and prophetic work. His silence may be due to pure accident, or the book may have seemed less adapted to his apologetic purposes; but considering how many things there are about which he is silent, we cannot admit that the *argumentum a silentio* possesses in this case any validity. I think, therefore, that the evidence as a whole, though falling short of demonstration, is sufficient to authorize a reasonable confidence that Justin Martyr was acquainted with the fourth Gospel.

Three questions which still remain may be very briefly discussed. Did Justin include the fourth Gospel among his Memoirs? Thoma,¹ though admitting that our Apologist made ample use of the Gospel, yet for no very obvious reason pronounces in the negative. But if our examination of Justin's use of *μονογενής* be correct, and if the passages which we have regarded as quotations from the Gospel be really such, the question must be answered in the affirmative. The second question is, Did he regard the book as historical? This also is answered in the negative by Thoma,² who believes that the

¹ Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol. 1875, pp. 549—553.

² Pp. 553—560.

Gospel was employed as a doctrinal commentary on the historical tradition and ecclesiastical usages. If, however, the Gospel was one of the Memoirs, it must have been regarded as historical; and the three quotations from it prove that Justin was willing to use it as an authority for historical statements. Our last question is, Did Justin ascribe the Gospel to the apostle John as its author? To this question also Thoma¹ gives a negative reply. His arguments, however, are founded entirely on the silence of Justin. The Apologist, he thinks, could not have failed to name the author of such a work, had he supposed him to be one of the Twelve. But he has failed to name the authors of his Memoirs, though he attributed to them an apostolic authority. I must again repeat that it is only in the most casual way that he has named John as the author of the Apocalypse. So far from assuming that the celebrity of that apostle must have reached the ears of Tryphon, he introduces him as “a certain man [ἀνὴρ τις] among us whose name was John;”² and so far from insisting on his merits as author of the Apocalypse, he does not even say that such a book was in existence, but only that in a revelation made to him he prophesied. For whatever reason, Justin nowhere dwells upon the origin or authenticity of Christian writings, and the little that we can glean about them is brought in quite incidentally. We have, therefore, no ground whatever for assuming that if he regarded John as the author of the Gospel, he would have said so. On the other hand, there is nothing in his own writings to shew that he did so regard him. The most that can be alleged is, that his affirmation that the Memoirs “were composed by his [Christ’s] apostles and their followers,”³ quite coincides with the traditional view. I think, indeed, that Hilgenfeld’s criticism upon the use of the articles in this passage, τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων, is substantially correct.⁴ Justin refers to the apostles and their followers as two classes, each of whom had taken part in the production of the Gospels; but he does not say whether one

¹ Pp. 560—563.

² Dial. c. 81.

³ Dial. c. 103.

⁴ Die Evang. Justin’s, pp. 12 sqq.

or more from each class engaged in the labours of authorship, or whether the same Gospel was or was not composed partly by an apostle and partly by a follower. His object is not to describe the origin of the several Gospels, but to exhibit the kind of authority which he claimed for their narratives. His language, however, though inadequate to prove that he possessed at least four Gospels, two of them written by apostles and two by their followers, is precisely such as he might have used if he held the later traditional view; and as evidence in this direction, it is surely not without significance that he appeals to the authority of followers of the apostles precisely in a passage where he alludes to an event recorded only by Luke, and that he describes these followers precisely by the term which Luke applies to himself in the preface to his Gospel. We are, then, entitled to assert that as he claimed an apostolic origin for at least one of his Gospels, and as he uses language quite consistent with the traditional belief and curiously conforming to it in two particulars, it is not unlikely that he attributed to the fourth Gospel an authorship which was so confidently and generally ascribed to it some thirty years later. Thoma's supposition that the Gospel, though known to Justin and his church, was believed by them to be of other than apostolic origin,¹ presupposing as it does that in the next generation a vast revolution in opinion took place among Catholics and heretics alike, and proceeded so silently as to leave not a trace in history, appears to me in the highest degree improbable. I must conclude, therefore, as best satisfying on the whole the conditions of the case, not only that Justin regarded the fourth Gospel as one of the historical Memoirs of Christ, but that it is not improbable that he believed in its Johannine authorship. This is a very old-fashioned conclusion; but I have endeavoured simply to follow the evidence without any ulterior object, and I must leave the result to the judgment of the reader.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

¹ P. 563.

III.—MR. SPENCER'S SOCIOLOGY.

The Principles of Sociology. By Herbert Spencer. Vol. I.
London: Williams and Norgate. 1876.

MR. SPENCER is to be congratulated on having succeeded in overtaking another department of thought, and one which he may perhaps have scarcely hoped to be able to reach when he drew out his elaborate scheme of works on evolution some fifteen years ago. The last to hand of this series of synthetic volumes contains his views on "superorganic" evolution; and as the sociological subjects with which it deals have more interest for the general reader than disquisitions on Psychology and Biology, there can be little doubt that it will be read by many who scarcely profess to be acquainted with the works that have preceded it. For this, among other reasons, it is worth while to endeavour to estimate the value of the book without special reference to other parts of the doctrine; and we may thus be able to consider the *Principles of Sociology*, unprejudiced by the hatred of "evolutionary heresies," and unbiassed by the glamour of unity of treatment. One other reason for this lies in the fact that there is room for doubt, how far the views taken in the book before us are necessarily connected with the doctrines which Mr. Spencer has done so much to popularize. Dr. Strauss, whose opinions on inorganic and organic evolution were closely allied to those of our author, yet differed from him very widely both as to the forces which have been at work in the growth of society, and in the character of its highest form.* Leaving on one side, then, all discussion of the book as part of a series, we may regard it simply as offering an interpretation of the growth of civilization.

In this view the book before us presents an interesting contribution to the literature of the day. Mr. Spencer's investigation goes, on the whole, to confirm the views which have been

* *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 7th ed., pp. 233, 282.

put forward by Mr. Tylor, Sir John Lubbock, and others, on the progress of the human race ; while it presents such minor differences as are likely to arise from the researches of an independent student. In one respect, however, Mr. Spencer's attempt is more ambitious than those of the authors named above ; they have for the most part contented themselves with insisting on the fact of man's progress from a very low condition to the present advanced civilizations : the present volume is an attempt to interpret this fact, and the special value which is assigned to it must depend on our answer to the question whether the growth of society is explained by this particular theory or not. Mr. Spencer has certainly given us an instructive compilation of facts bearing on human progress ; but his principles claim to be something more than generalized statements—convenient summaries of many particulars. They are rather put forward as truths in regard to the connexion of events which shew that in "social phenomena there is a general order of co-existence and sequence" (p. 618); they are inductions from which truths may be deduced, and they serve to interpret, not merely to describe, the growth of society (p. 39).

We cannot be unfair, then, in attempting to try this theory by the ordinary canons of inductive reasoning. The steps which must be taken are—(1) the observation of the facts ; (2) the framing of a tentative hypothesis to explain what is noted ; and (3) the careful verification of this guess by a comparison with the facts. By considering each of these, we may best estimate the value of this special interpretation of the phenomena.

1. *Observation.* The difficulties attending this part of the process have been insisted upon by Mr. Spencer himself, and we have only to quote his own words to shew the nature of the foundation on which he is compelled to build. The facts have been for the most part brought together by the reports of travellers and missionaries, but the conduct of native races towards individual Europeans may differ so much within short periods, that it is hardly possible to trust to the accounts

of any one traveller. To arrive at the truth about even the most obvious characteristics of savages, we must "strike an average among manifestations naturally chaotic, which are farther distorted by the varying relations to those who witness them" (p. 74). This difficulty is immensely increased when we come to information which can only be elicited by means of inquiries instituted among the people themselves, or carried on through the agency of interpreters.* This is particularly the case with regard to their religious beliefs, and indeed any attempt at concentrated thought seems to weary the savage mind. "It is difficult to get at their (Brazilian Indians) notions on subjects that require a little abstract thought;" and again, "ten minutes seemed to weary out the most intellectual of them (Negroes) when questioned about their system of numbers" (p. 95). The possible desire on the part of the traveller to find evidence in favour of some pet theory, must of course be also taken into account as a hindrance in the way of arriving at undistorted and accurate statements of facts.

Apart from the difficulties of observation, there is a danger in regard to the description of alleged facts which Mr. Spencer has not wholly escaped, though evidently on his guard against it. Language which denotes the traits of civilized character is inaccurate when applied to the mind of a savage; just as the terms of modern philosophy are wholly unsuited for the expression of the thought that was current in ancient Greece. "Impulsiveness" is attributed to savages, and it is alleged in proof that they exhibit great fondness for their children, which is yet varied by marked cruelty towards them. Among civilized men, affection for and cruelty towards children are incompatible, so that the alternation of the two could only arise from strange caprice; but in the savage, affection for

* Of mal-observations due to this latter cause, we have a curious example in General Campbell's *Khondistan*, p. 160, where the untrustworthiness of Major Macpherson's elaborate account of the mythology of these hill tribes is exposed (*Royal Asiatic Society's Trans.* VII.) Curiously enough, Mr. Spencer refers indifferently to both authorities, without apparently being aware that they are diametrically opposed (pp. 307, 349).

children is little more than an instinct,—at best a moral disposition ; it is not a precept of morality such as arises under family institutions, and therefore has little tenacity after the earlier periods of childhood are past ; conduct at variance with it may be quite deliberate, like that of the Australian when fishing (p. 75). “Impulsiveness” hardly seems to be a word well suited to describe such conduct, nor is it easy to see how it can co-exist along with “fixity of habit,” which is also ascribed to the primitive savage (p. 78). This last is surely too much of a positive trait of formed character to be asserted of those who are in so undeveloped a condition. It doubtless is true that, owing to their moral dispositions being unformed, they are capable of conduct which seems to us grossly inconsistent with other tendencies they exhibit, and that, owing to limited experience and limited powers, their minds are unfitted for adopting new ideas ; but in both cases we must describe a negative, not a positive trait—a want of rational motives, not a readiness to be diverted by any slight influence ; a want of the power of forming rational habits, not mere inability to change them.

It seems unfortunate that Mr. Spencer should not have thought it worth while to provide his readers with a ready means of verifying statements of fact, so that they might at least have the opportunity of judging for themselves of the value of observations made and described under all these difficulties. References have been, however, entirely omitted—partly because readers can verify some of the facts with the help of the extensive tables entitled *Descriptive Sociology*, partly because of Mr. Spencer's “not liking to change the system” (p. vi). But the admission that the facts for this work have been so largely drawn from second-hand compilations rather than from the authorities themselves, makes it impossible to avoid regarding them with considerable distrust, as a new source of error is thus introduced. In the present volume there is only (I think) one reference to English institutions, and therefore only one statement which I am able, as I write, to verify by tracing it to its source through the tables

of *Descriptive Sociology*; but this one gives a curious light on the danger of relying on isolated sentences. While working out the analogy between a "kind of glandular organ, which consists of a number of adjacent cell-containing follicles having separate mouths," and one of the Craft Guilds (p. 499), Mr. Spencer explains how the latter originated in a family or group of families, how gradually an apprentice or two was added, "who became a member of the family of his master," while from this modified household group arose the condition of affairs when the father became the distributor of the products of the labour, "not of a few sons, but of many unrelated artisans." This is given us as a sketch of the development of manufacturing, from a supposed original condition when it was carried on by family groups, to the present giant-industry of factories; and Brentano is mentioned as an authority for part of this process. So far as the isolated quotations from his work in *Descriptive Sociology* go, there seems to be every reason for claiming his support; but the context of the passages thus selected gives a very different turn to the matter. We there learn that the Guilds "sprang up to replace the natural family compact" amongst free craftsmen who were "excluded from the fraternities which had taken the place of family unions, and later among bondsmen who had ceased to belong to the *familia* of their lord."* The Guilds thus originated outside, not in the family relation; apprentices were taken into families, not that they might share in the privileges of adopted sons, as Mr. Spencer explains (p. 500), but simply that some one might be responsible to the Guild for their good behaviour—such, at least, is Brentano's view in the passage† of which Mr. Spencer quotes a part. It was only in their last days that Guilds degenerated into that condition of family cliques‡ which is assumed in the book before us to have been their condition at first. Whether Mr. Spencer's misunderstanding of his authority, and consequent reversal of the truth

* L. Brentano, *On the History and Development of Guilds*, p. 60.

† P. 65.

‡ Ibid. p. 85.

about Guilds, makes any difference in the analogy which he finds with a kind of glandular organ, we cannot say ; but the confusion gives us a little insight both into the usefulness of extensive collections of isolated remarks, and into the accuracy of books which are based upon them.

It is on facts thus observed, thus described, and thus compiled, that the special theory before us is based.

2. *Tentative hypothesis.* The explanation of the connexion of these facts has been suggested to Mr. Spencer's mind by the analogy which he finds between an animal organism and a society ; and he wisely disclaims any intention of using this analogy except as giving a clue to the right way of approaching social phenomena. We are of course all aware that the resemblances between the life of an individual and of the state have been often noticed before, but there is much that is new in the way in which the comparison is here worked out. Plato traced a likeness between human character and political constitution ; our author finds one between animal organism and material condition. We should be inclined to suspect that the two aspects of individual and social life supplemented each other, and that we could not adhere to one alone without being in danger of suppressing some important side of truth.

The importance of framing a hypothesis which is not only true so far as it goes, but adequate to the nature of the facts before us, might be illustrated from any branch of science. We cannot explain chemical combination by mechanical laws, still less the phenomena of life ; and it was because their mechanical theories were inapplicable to chemical and physiological facts—because they used the idea of Force when they needed that of Affinity or of Vital Power—that the work of the mechanical chemists and mechanical physiologists produced so little result. They failed to approach the subject from the right aspect ; and we may fear that there is great inadequacy in a hypothesis with regard to human society which is suggested by the study of animal organism alone ; to approach superorganic evolution with a conception imported

from the organic world, is very much like studying organic development with ideas drawn from inorganic nature. But, leaving the analogy which suggested the theory, we may proceed to state what it is (pp. 613 ff.).

Very briefly, it is, that societies are determined in their growth, &c., by their environment, whether physical or human. In primitive society, its physical surroundings are the conditions which most powerfully affect it; in more advanced states these are less operative, though the system which sustains the life of a society is always determined by the nature of the material environment. As a society grows, however, it comes into contact with other societies, and there is consequently a social environment whose influence must be considered. The exertion of energy for purposes of defence and commerce leads to the formation of special classes in the state, and thus we find a *differentiation* of what was formerly a *homogeneous* whole,—a regulating class is separated from the rest of the community, which then attends solely to sustaining functions. As it grows still farther, either by increase of the numbers in a social group or by the combination of groups, there arises a necessity for means of communication; hence the origin of improved facilities of intercourse and the differentiation of a trading class—a distributing system. Societies which reach these higher stages have more *coherence* and *definiteness* than the wandering hordes from which they have developed. In some societies the regulating, in some the sustaining functions predominate; in the latter we may notice the existence of a representative, not despotic, central power, and the limited character of political power over personal conduct.

3. *Verification.* It will be felt at once that there are many facts which serve to confirm this theory; indeed, were this not the case, we should hardly expect it to be brought forward at all. All exploded scientific theories—the Ptolemaic system of the heavens and the suggestions of Descartes—have been supported by many facts. The true test is not applied by enumerating circumstances which appear to confirm a theory,

but by seeking for cases in which it does not hold ; only if none such are found, are we warranted in accepting it as true. It is, then, by searching for conflicting facts that we can most satisfactorily verify the main points of this hypothesis.

(a) "Every society (rudimentary or advanced) displays phenomena that are ascribable to the characters of its units and the conditions under which they exist" (p. 9). Before attempting to consider the truth of this statement, we must try to get at its meaning ; and this is somewhat hard, as in the "*Inductions of Sociology*" individual character is hardly mentioned : the function of the units is nowhere dealt with, and Mr. Spencer never seems to have thought of asking himself the question, which are the units and which is the environment ? It is not very easy to separate an individual from all his surroundings, and we are inclined to think that the individual is only worth considering in so far as he partakes and manifests the national character, which indeed, ultimately, determines that of the unit.

Mr. Spencer, in his treatment of the subject, seems to lay little stress on the potency of individuals. The reader might think that in a small group the character of each unit might tell directly on the nature of the bond between them ; but that in a society which is highly differentiated, and where the individuals occupy very different social positions, the play of individual character is much narrowed, and the amount of the influence of every unit depends greatly on the social position it occupies ; that is to say, in high societies social conditions greatly supersede the influence of individual character, so that in the portions of the work before us which allude to advanced societies, the characters of the units are left out of account. On the other hand, we are told that in primitive societies where man is in close contact with nature, his dispositions are due to his physical surroundings ; that sociality is to be traced to certain local conditions (p. 71), and sympathy to certain other circumstances (p. 73). So that for the character of the units in primitive societies we may surely write external conditions. Why should units be mentioned at all if both in

rudimentary and advanced societies the real explanation is found in conditions ?

Of these conditions, we believe that a most influential one is to be found in the mass of the existing principle and knowledge in any group,—in fact, that the character of the society is the chief power in determining that of the units ; and this character can be detected in many ways—in laws and customs and institutions which express it, so that we do not need to investigate the peculiarities of individuals ; unless, indeed, some individual be markedly distinguished from his contemporaries, though of such exceptional phenomena as “great men” our author does not here treat, possibly because he believes he has already disposed sufficiently of their claims to attention.* Yet Mr. Spencer’s neglect of individual influence cannot be due to his regarding tribal character as giving the ultimate explanation, for he resolves the character of the aggregate into the characters of the units ;† while these, on the other hand, appear, as we have just seen, to be primarily due to physical environment, and later to social condition. If this be so, it would seem that the characters of the units are only spoken of here as forming an intermediate link between the external conditions and the society which is due to them ; these latter are, however, the active forces at work in producing social changes.

If any doubt remained on this point, we might consider it as removed by a reference to Mr. Spencer’s general mode of thought. “Life,” we have been told, “is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,”‡ and the life of the social organism is doubtless no exception to the rule ; the motor power is throughout that of the conditions ; to these the structures are adapted ; these initiate and determine the changes.

If this be the meaning of the sentence we have quoted, we ask in vain for its proof ; and we do not need to look far before we find facts that conflict with it. We are told that among

* *Study of Sociology*, p. 34.

† *Ibid.* p. 50.

‡ *First Principles*, p. 84.

the Karens there exist many little independent states, but "now and then a little Napoleon arises, who subdues a kingdom to himself, and builds up an empire. The dynasties, however, last only with the controlling mind" (p. 485). Was the work of the little Napoleon prompted by external conditions? Surely not, for it does not appear to have been adapted to these conditions. We would be inclined to say that this is a case where mental energy began a social change, but that owing to the character of the conditions it was not perpetuated.

Indeed—omitting the influence of climate in producing such characteristics of race as the swarthy skins and lethargic habits of the Negro—may we not say that in cases of conflict between man and nature, it is man who directs, and that external relations are adapted to internal ones? This is most evident in the highest societies when roads and harbours are made, and the physical environment is altered so as to suit the needs of man—not human condition adapted to surrounding circumstances. Or would Mr. Spencer maintain that roads are social structures which may be put in the same category as merchant firms, and form part of the "distributing" system? (pp. 528 f.). This may save the theory, but only by introducing a hopeless confusion between society and its environment.

The generalization—so far as we have been able to attach a definite meaning to it—is at variance with one fact of rudimentary, and one of advanced civilization; we may therefore deny that it has been verified: it implies an over-statement of the influence of environment: doubtless this is very great, but we believe it is principally exerted in the way of perpetuating or destroying changes that have had their origin in internal activity.

(b) The next generalization is only a special application of the one we have already considered. "The material environment . . . determines the industrial differentiations" (p. 523). We may certainly grant that when a sustaining system is once "differentiated," it will be modified so as to suit the material environment,—some districts will be agricultural, some manu-

facturing, some mining ; but do the surroundings in any way explain the immense change from the nomadic to the settled condition with which all such industries commenced ? It is of course possible to beg the question by ascribing this internal change (from nomadic to settled life) to experience of various external conditions ; but is it possible to do this while we at the same time remember the inability to learn by experience, or to adopt new ideas which primitive societies exhibit ? We can certainly trace the influence of surroundings in modifying, but not in originating, a sustaining system ; for this we must look to an internal factor for which no definite external correlative can be assigned.

There is another attempt made to solve this difficulty. It is said that differentiation accompanies increase of size, and that as growth takes place, a separate sustaining system comes to be required. Such growth is ascribed principally to the coalescence of different groups (p. 484) : is then the coalescence of such groups (along with its consequent internal changes and the differentiation of a sustaining system) directly dependent on physical conditions ? We can only say that in the page where this process is described, there is no attempt to shew that the amalgamation of small hordes—which had been limited in their numbers by the difficulty of living—and formation of larger societies, has been in any way brought about by a change in material environment ; in fact, the passage referred to above is quoted without a sign of dissent, where the process is ascribed to “a controlling mind.” We thus see that Mr. Spencer wholly fails to establish the assertion that the commencement of industrial organization is either directly or indirectly due to material environment, though this undoubtedly modifies the ultimate shape of a “sustaining system.”

Were one inclined to carping criticism, one might ask whether, after all, the industrial organization is the sustaining system of any society ? We have heard that “man cannot live by bread alone ;” and perhaps there is such an analogy between the life of the individual and of a society, that this is

true of the latter too. There were times when men believed that the state rested on religion, and some treasure the opinion still; while others might say that the common life of English citizens was due to their common heritage in the privileges which were won for them by Stephen Langton and Simon de Montfort and Oliver Cromwell, and that the state was sustained by the spread of any culture which teaches men to value these privileges more highly and to exercise them more worthily. Such is not Mr. Spencer's view: for him the strength and support of English institutions are to be found in the coal and iron trades.

(c) "The regulating system is evolved by converse, offensive and defensive, with environing societies" (p. 616). It is pointed out that warfare or trading leads to a temporary subordination, the advantages of which are readily perceived, and which sooner or later becomes permanent. This has, at first sight, a good deal of probability; we recall at once the temporary subordination of the Israelites under Saul growing into one empire, which was never dissolved into the tiny fragments again. But though it may be true in many cases, it is almost certainly an inaccurate account of the commencement of settled government among the Aryan races.* Their tribes, whenever they settled, developed regulatory appliances for the purpose of conducting the internal affairs of each village, more especially its agriculture; in some cases the regulatory appliances thus originated came to be of use for purposes of war through commendation, or for purposes of trade, as guilds; in other instances they retain their primitive regulating functions to the present day—as parish vestries or town councils. Once more we find facts that conflict with Mr. Spencer's generalization.

We are now in a position to judge how far the special theory of the book before us is successful as an interpretation of the facts,—how far the inductions are so well grounded that we may venture to apply them deductively. We have found that the difficulties of observation are so great, that the facts have

* *Maine's Village Communities*, p. 10.

for the most part to be taken on an average ; and that even thus they are imperfectly described in language, and inaccurately employed. Further, the conception which is applied to the phenomena of superorganic evolution is drawn directly from one form of organic evolution, and may be suspected of inadequacy similar to that which characterized the abortive efforts of mechanical physiologists. Lastly, while admitting that the self-development of a society is limited by its environment, we maintain there are facts which conflict with the principal assertions of the theory, that the evolution of the structures of a society is determined by the matters and organisms with which it comes into contact. At every point, this particular attempt at an interpretation of the facts fails to satisfy the conditions of a valid induction.

It may of course be said that it is impossible, in the study of the very complicated phenomena of society, to arrive at as great accuracy as we do in physical researches ; and we are ready to accept this excuse in so far as it involves the admission that the methods of experimental science are inapplicable to the study of society, and fail to yield very valuable results. Perhaps, however, it may be fairer to contrast the present with another theory of sociological progress, and thus to endeavour to see how far either of them succeed in interpreting the facts. Mr. Spencer's inductions, though they shew badly when compared with those of chemists and physicists, may yet contrast favourably with the theories of other students of society. We have tried his work by an absolute standard, and found it wanting ; let us now measure it by a relative one. To do this satisfactorily we must somewhat limit the sphere, and confine our attention to that large portion of the book which deals with the origin and growth of "superstitions."

The theory with which we shall compare Mr. Spencer's has been before the world for many years ; its main outlines are traced in Hegel's *Encyklopädie*, and its details are filled in in several other works ; but the subject to which we shall limit ourselves is dealt with in the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie*

der Religion. In comparing these theories together, we must notice that they stand in a very different relation to the alleged facts of early civilization. Mr. Spencer's is based on these facts, and if it does not tally with them it is wholly worthless; Hegel's rests on an entirely different line of argument, and the alleged facts of primitive civilization may illustrate and exemplify it, or may fail to do so, but cannot prove or disprove it.

It will be asked, On what can a theory rest, unless on facts? Must it not be a mere metaphysical dream unsuited for this age of enlightenment, when we conjure with the name of Bacon, and replace the jargon of "philosophers of the Absolute" with sound sense and inductive science? But surely in cases where the inductive methods have failed to give us their wonted accurate results, the metaphysical dreamer may at least ask for a hearing, especially when he has been persistently ignored for some half-century or so. It is not our task at present to discuss Hegel's sociological theory, but only to compare it with Mr. Spencer's as regards its success in interpreting the facts of early religion; and a very brief account of its nature must here suffice. Hegel proceeded by exhibiting the conditions which are logically necessary for the development of a society—an attempt which may be illustrated from the physical sphere by the old argument, "where there's smoke, there's fire;" and we might say, wherever there is fire, there are oxygen and carbon or other material, and thus exhibit these as pre-requisites which still further explain the existence of smoke. Hegel attempts to shew the conditions which are logically necessary for the growth of religion, and to refute this theory we must shew that the logical connexion does not exist; but the theory will not necessarily tally with all the facts unless the order of events in time exactly corresponds to the logical order of development—a thing we have no right to assume, any more than we have reason to assume that because oxygen and carbon, e.g., are pre-requisites of combustion, we have pure carbon burning in pure oxygen every time we sit before a blazing fire. Indeed, we know of many reasons why the development of any one society should

not exactly tally with the logical order, as, for instance, when from contact with a higher society a tribe adopts its more highly-developed institutions. Still the facts of civilization may illustrate the theory, for we may here and there see tribes that exhibit a certain mode of thought and life, and so represent one stage of the logical development; on the other hand, we need not expect to get a complete illustration of the theory, since there may be stages of progress which are necessary in the development of the human race, even though no tribe of which we are aware is at present at that precise point of civilization. The question before us then comes to be this—Do we understand the facts of primitive religion best when we regard them as exemplifying Hegel's theory, or when we look on them as connected by Mr. Spencer's inductions?

Mr. Spencer's thesis is, that "using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense, as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion" (p. 440); and to this it is expressly stated there is no exception. He endeavours to establish this position by shewing how a belief in ghosts would naturally arise from an attempt to explain actual phenomena. The primitive man, struck by the apparent arbitrariness in nature and the transitoriness of many meteorological and physical appearances, can have no difficulty in attributing reality to his dreams of his own doings; and the disposition to do so is confirmed by the experience of swoons, apoplexy, and other observed cases of temporary insensibility. Thus arises the thought that the double of the man continues to exist after his body is dead; and in the attempt to propitiate this ghost or to secure its welfare, all religion, it is said, has originated. "Out of this motive and these observances come all forms of worship. The awe of the ghost makes sacred the sheltering place of the tomb, and this grows into the temple, while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary—daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave

pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. . . . Praises of the dead and prayers to them grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every religious rite is derived from a funeral rite" (p. 446). So, too, "from the worship of the dead every other kind of worship has probably arisen" (p. 447). The worship of remote ancestors is the link between reverence for the recently dead and the worship of deities. The worship of effigies of the dead naturally follows, and even of objects that are in any way connected with them, which thus gives rise to a fetichism where all sorts of articles and inhabiting spirits become objects of worship. Mistakes may also arise, partly from the belief in the possible resuscitation and transmigration of human ghosts into animal bodies, partly from a confusion in the case of ancestors who have borne the names of animals; thus ancestor-worship gives rise to animal-worship. So, too, with plant-worship, and so too—through the mistaking of names of ancestors for names of objects—with the worship of the sun and more conspicuous natural objects.

We may note in passing that, in spite of Mr. Spencer's explanation (§ 207), it is hard to see how this theory conforms to the "general formula of evolution." There may be "increase of mass" from "faint beliefs in the doubles of the dead" to the recognition of 2000 deities in ancient Mexico; but is there still "increase of mass" when we take in monotheistic religions? There may be a change from the indefiniteness of the ghost theory to developed mythologies where different kinds of supernatural beings are defined by attributes precisely stated; but we have found Mr. Spencer elsewhere arguing that "farther developments of theology, ending in such assertions as that a 'God understood would be no God at all,' and that 'to think that God is as we can think Him to be is blasphemy,' exhibit this recognition (of the unknowableness of God) still more distinctly."* If this account of the

* *First Principles*, p. 45.

"cultivated theology of the present day" is a true one, can we say it exhibits more "definiteness" than the earlier beliefs do? We feel ourselves in the dilemma of wondering whether this account of the growth of religion does not conform to the general formula of evolution, or whether the explanation of growth here given is inapplicable to monotheistic religions and so-called cultivated theology? But, after all, this question of consistency is one of subordinate importance, and one that we have already excused ourselves from discussing fully.

One other question presents itself before passing to the alleged facts: Does Mr. Spencer explain the existence of any religion, let alone the growth of all? If we admit, for the moment, that all religions are developments of ancestor-worship, the question remains, Why should a man reverence his dead father? The more one explains how perfectly natural it is that he should frame a ghost theory, the more difficult it is to understand why the primitive man should pay special respect to the ghost: the mental condition which is the logical pre-requisite of all worship is not discussed. It may be said that the habit arises from the sense of a moral duty of providing for parents and friends; but in societies where such moral duty is not recognized during life, one hardly sees why it should be so strongly felt in regard to the less obvious needs of the dead. Having tried to adopt the position of the primitive man who finds ghosts perfectly natural, we also try to adopt his feeling of reverence for the ghost; or we try to put ourselves in the place of the man who has no family institutions and yet reverences a remote ancestor, or an animal which he mistakes for one. On the whole, we are inclined to think Mr. Spencer's account of the very gradual growth of family institutions and ties, refutes his theory that all other worship is derived from ancestor-worship; just as his theory of the naturalness of ghosts renders the tendency to reverence them inexplicable. In both cases he neglects the mental conditions which are logically necessary to the existence of the worship he describes; and these are what

we find most carefully delineated when we turn to Hegel, whose account of the matter is briefly this:*

(a) There is first of all a consciousness of power on the part of human beings which may be readily developed by any of the little incidents of daily life, where human beings exercise, alter and apply physical objects for their own uses. As long as there is no recognition of cause and effect in nature, so long is there no perception of the limits to the possible exercise of human power; but so soon as an orderly sequence is noted in external nature, there arises a different feeling in regard to human power—which will now profess to work by physical means, not directly—and a different feeling in regard to Nature's power, which is now for the first time recognized, as set in opposition to man's. (b) Such is the transition from the mere belief in sorcery to the faint glimmerings of the mental predisposition which renders worship possible, when man comes to recognize (or has revealed to him) that there is a Power-not-himself, whether manifested in storms or floods, or streams or earthquakes. And with the recognition of such Power comes the inclination to influence it by such expedients as he finds avail in regard to human beings, either on the occasion of special manifestations of the Power,† or when specially at the mercy of the Power, as in crossing a river; but under the ordinary operations of nature and at ordinary times he feels no call to worship. (c) The next step is the recognition of a constant manifestation of this Power; and of this we find a typical case where the phenomena of life in the lower animals are held sacred. The mystery of animal life is more wondrous to man than the ways of his fellow-creatures; and he finds in it an embodiment of the Power he has learned to reverence. When the doctrine of metempsychosis is started, animal-worship attains to an entirely different significance; but in this early stage, any animal chosen and changed capri-

* Werke, XI. pp. 293 ff.

† In reference to this stage of religious development, compare Mr. Browning's "Caliban on Setebos."

ciously serves as an embodiment of the self-existent might; and indeed inanimate objects may be taken as exhibiting Power which is once perceived as all-pervading: this is the state of mind which we find in fetichism.

Such are the two theories of the relation of these early forms of religion to one another; we may proceed to test them by asking—1. Does sorcery originate in a belief in possession by the souls of the dead, or is it logically anterior to a doctrine of the human soul? 2. Is the worship of the powers of nature due to their being confused with human ancestors, or to their felt superiority to human efforts? 3. Are fetichism and animal-worship to be wholly derived from the worship of the dead or not? To each of these questions the two theories before us would return different answers, and we shall see which set of answers have most evidence in their favour.

1. "If a man's body may be entered by 'a wicked soul of the dead' enemy, may it not be entered by a friendly soul?" To this, the savage, according to Mr. Spencer, answers in the affirmative, with the belief in sorcery as a result (p. 253). But we have a good deal of evidence to shew that the belief in sorcery exists in quarters where the ghost theory, from which it is here derived, is unknown. We read that the Bechuanas have no worship, no reverence for spirits of the dead, and no theory of human souls, but still they have devil-dancers who profess to control the elements and cure diseases. Of course when the belief in human souls is once developed, the current explanation of sorcery may be somewhat like that mentioned above; but the state of things among the Bechuanas seems to conflict with Mr. Spencer's account of the nature of sorcery, while, on the other hand, it illustrates the condition which Hegel has described (*a* or *b*, above).

2. The habits of the same tribe have also a bearing on the proposed derivation of nature-worship from ancestor-worship; there are no traces of reverence for the dead except in the way of shrinking from what had belonged to or been associated

with them, as, e.g., a thong which had been used for dragging a corpse, or implements which had belonged to the dead. There is no reverence for the ghost as still existing; and one of their rain-doctors argued with Moffat (p. 307), "What is the difference between me and that animal? You say I am immortal, and why not my dog or my ox? They die, and do you see their souls? What is the difference between man and the beasts? None, except that man is the greater rogue of the two." Yet these same tribes are accustomed to repel the attacks of storms and lightning with their ordinary weapons, or to attempt to bring about a change of weather by the incantations of their rain-doctors.* There is here no trace of confusion between ancestors and the forces of nature; but we see the recognition of a Power-not-ourselves in the latter, and signs of an attempt to communicate therewith.

Similar evidence is furnished by the aboriginal tribes in India and Ceylon. Nature-worship exists among them, and in some cases ancestor-worship is added, but there is no trace of any confusion between the two. Among the Katkaris† there is no reverence for the recent dead, and no belief in metempsychosis, while still there is a developed nature-worship. So, too, among the Khonds‡ of Orissa, where the earth god is worshiped with cruel rites, ancestor-worship is either unknown or occupies a subordinate position. The Veddahs§ of Ceylon think of their dead parents as guardian spirits, but they do not in any way confuse them with the natural powers which they worship. In all these cases the modes of feeling towards natural power and towards the dead is so different, that it seems impossible that the first should be derived from the second; and Mr. Spencer's theory is as much in conflict with fact in this case as in regard to sorcery. One means of squaring the facts to the theory is still left: if the doctrine of possible degradation is introduced, these objections are cer-

* Moffat, p. 259.

† Royal Asiatic Soc. Trans. VII. 29.

‡ Campbell, *Khondistan*, p. 163.

§ Ethn. Soc. Lond. Trans. II. 301.

tainly disposed of, but only by asserting that the facts are so confused that no proof or disproof is possible.

3. Mr. Spencer considers that fetichism is derived from ancestor-worship: reverence for the dead would pass by easy transitions through reverence for the image of the dead and for the property of the dead, to reverence for almost any object, inasmuch as it may be associated with him. Much evidence which has a bearing on this matter is adduced by Mr. Spencer, but it hardly proves the precise theory for which he contends. We may readily admit that fetichism is a mode of religious thought which is too elevated to be compatible with the low condition of Fœgians (p. 342), while denying that it arises from a more definite doctrine of departed souls. We have already alluded to evidence which goes to shew that reverence for nature exists anteriorly to and develops side by side with reverence for the dead; and we believe that fetichism is rather due to the former than to the latter.

Fetichism may be described as due to the tendency in the savage mind to look for a definite embodiment of the Power he reverences: and it seems a little hard to distinguish it (as Mr. Spencer does) from the superstition of the Western Australian, who, whilst knowing of no power beyond that of the sorcerer, finds this power embodied in a certain stone, in a round ball, or a strange sea animal.* In this recognition of powers indwelling in objects—but powers which are certainly not human souls—among a people who are said to be too low for fetichism, we may at least find a hint as to the way in which it grows up. Among the Fiji islanders there is a very marked nature-worship which is clearly distinct from the reverence paid to ancestors; we have seen the entire separation of the two elsewhere, and have no reason to suppose any derivation of the one from the other here. Stones, scimitars, birds, plants and men, are all revered as the shrines of certain nature gods;† in Fiji there is certainly fetichism, but

* Grey, *Travels in Western Australia*, II. 341.

† Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, I. 216—219.

it seems to have no direct connexion with ancestor-worship. In Dahomey we find the same thing, that physical powers rather than ancestral ghosts are associated with fetichism. Burton regards it as a confusion to attribute to them ideas of metempsychosis;* ancestor-worship is not marked, while the recognition of the might of physical power is strongly so, and any plant or animal may be regarded as its embodiment and then worshipped. The young fetich-worshiper chooses such an object in a moment of ecstasy; others select a fetich almost arbitrarily, and if it fails to effect the purpose seek for "stronger medicine." The principal deities are the serpent, a particular tree, and the ocean; all of which are striking embodiments of physical power. We shall now merely recall the cumbrous hypotheses by which their place is accounted for as modifications of ancestor-worship: Mr. Spencer would doubtless explain that the sun-worship of the Kócc tribes and the earth-worship of the Khonds was derived in a similar way, and has in these cases survived, when the belief in the continued future existence of the soul, which they assumed, had passed away. This improbability must be added to the improbabilities that we find in the genesis of these beliefs in Africa.

(a) Many explanations of animal-worship have been given: the most popular is that which traces in it reverence for the emblem of some ideal; this has doubtless had much to do with the continuance of the cult at later times, but it does not seem a satisfactory account of the origin of the worship in a savage society where ideals are unknown. Mr. Spencer would equally reject the theory which ascribes it to reverence for the embodiment of physical power, and would derive the worship of the python in Dahomey from a belief in metempsychosis, on the supposition that a boa was recognized by some mark, or some habit, to be the embodiment of the recent dead; in process of time the animal-worship would remain when the memory of the ancestors was forgotten, and apparently, in Dahomey, when the belief in metempsychosis, on which the whole was based, had disappeared.

* Burton, *Mission to Gelele*, II. p. 158.

(b) Still greater difficulties stand in the way of the derivation of tree- from ancestor-worship ; but on these we shall not insist at length, as Mr. Spencer describes this cult as having various roots, among others the personifying of intoxicating power : in any case the connexion with a human personality which is put forward as the essential of worship is a somewhat remote one.

(c) Reverence for the ocean was, on the theory before us, due either to the adoration of an ancestor who rejoiced in that name while the worship of the conspicuous natural object arose from a confusion between the mythical hero and the actual sea, or else it is interesting as preserving the memory of the otherwise forgotten migration of negroes to Africa.

We thus note that in interpreting the three chief deities of the Dahomeyans on the ancestral hypothesis, we have to make three distinct explanations, none of which seem probable from the actual condition of the tribes, instead of accepting the one simple suggestion that in all these cases men worship different embodiments—animal, vegetable, or other—of physical power. When we tried Mr. Spencer's mode of operation by the principles of evidence, we found it miserably defective ; and now, when we test his chapters on the growth of religion, we find that they conflict with numerous facts both in regard to sorcery, nature-worship and fetichism, while the other theory is exemplified at every point.

Mr. Spencer has failed to establish his assertion that all religions are modified forms of ghost-worship ; it may quite possibly be true that all higher religions contain, along with many others, some elements which were contributed by this belief.* But even had he shewn that all objects of worship were remotely connected with the dead, we feel that he would have given us a very inadequate account of the many religions to which he alludes. Their real significance lies, not in the

* It seems to be for this that Mr. Tylor contends when he maintains that at a certain stage of culture "the general theory of spirits is modelled on the theory of souls."—*Primitive Culture*, II. 112.

objects worshiped, but in the way in which they are regarded—the supposed nature of the power which is manifested through them. He who worships a snake, in which, as he fancies from some mark, his parent's ghost is embodied, is on an entirely different plane of thought from those who worship it as the symbol of eternal creative wisdom: the superficial resemblance is hardly worth our attention; here, as everywhere, it is in the differences that the real import lies, and on these different modes of viewing our relation towards the Power- (or Powers) not-ourselves, Mr. Spencer gives no light. For him it suffices to assert that religion began with the fear of the dead, and to shew how, by a series of extraordinary misconceptions and blunders, it may have gradually developed into its present diverse forms. This involves too great a demand on our faith in human powers of blundering: mistakes may be made, but they are not made and perpetuated in all parts of the globe unless there be some reason for the blunder beyond mere accident; and the ultimate reason for the existence of and for each transition to new forms of worship is to be found in the inherited or developed or imparted disposition of a human being, and the way in which he conceives himself as related to the Power-not-himself, or rather the way in which that Power has revealed itself to him. It may be a crowd of genii around him, or a hierarchy of spirits above him, or a dim substantiality sustaining all, or a marked dualism dividing while pervading all, or a divine life manifested in all forms of life and not less truly embracing death; in each of these, whatever the object worshiped, there is a sense of self and of Power-not-ourselves; but in each as they advance there is a clearer sense of the relations in which that Power actually stands to us, not merely as many Powers existing beside us, but as One in whom we live and move and have our being. Higher religions are less "superstitious" than low ones, not because they are more confused ghost theories, but because they are truer views of the relation between man and the Power-not-himself. Monogamy is a truer expression of the relation between man and woman than polyandry, and mono-

theism gives a better expression of the relations between man and the Power-not-himself than fetichism does. Such was the view of a Lutheran who died at Berlin in 1831; who looked on the history of religion as shewing the successive and relatively true but imperfect attempts made by man to represent his relation to the Eternal (or rather, the successive and relatively true but inadequate self-manifestations of the Eternal to man); who saw in the Bible the story of the gradual evolution of the divine life in the world, and of the gradual deepening of divine likeness in the human heart; who held that the highest possible truth was reached in the Catholic Faith, when men, passing from the vague reverence for a Power-not-themselves, attained to a conscious response towards One who touches every side of human life and is related to it in all its aspects, as giving it at first, as manifesting its ideal, and as working in its progress.

WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM.

IV.—GOLDZIHHER'S HEBREW MYTHOLOGY.

Mythology among the Hebrews and its Historical Development.

By Ignaz Goldziher, Ph.D. Translated from the German, with Additions by the Author, by Russell Martineau, M.A., of the British Museum. London: Longmans. 1877.

FEW, probably, will be found to question the learning and ability by which this volume is marked; but not a few, perhaps, will be tempted to say that much learning has in this case made the author mad, and possibly the arrangement of the work may lend some faint colour to such a supposition. In spite of an elaborate Introduction, which asserts the universality of the myth-making stage among all nations, and argues that as there are Vedic, Teutonic, Greek and Celtic myths, so there must also be Semitic and Hebrew myths,—in spite of a minute analysis which

shows that the patriarchal names are all descriptive of natural phenomena, and that the incidents related of the patriarchs are events belonging to the daily, weekly, or yearly movements of the several bodies which make up the visible creation,—in spite of a careful and minute comparison of the myths of hunters and of nomads and of both of these with the myths of tribes which live by agriculture and in cities,—the retort is easy (and it will be made with something like indignation), that the form of the books of the Pentateuch as they have come down to us is manifestly historical, that the narratives give us no reason whatever for thinking that they are not what they seem to be, and that if the stories of Abraham and Jacob, of Samuel and David, are to be classed with the tales of Cinderella, the Master-Thief, and Jack the Giant-Killer, the same edifying process may be applied with equal fairness and not less successful results to the history of the Duke of Wellington and Napoleon Bonaparte. Behind this objection will lie in the minds of many the further rejoinder, that the narratives thus described are not merely historical but have a peculiar value beyond all other history, as forming part of the foundation on which rest the faith and the hope of Christians; and that the attempt to explain them away into clouds and wind, sunlight or moonshine, is really an effort to sap the religion and morality of the multitude, and to leave them adrift in a helmless vessel on an unknown sea.

This last objection will probably not be brought forward with the prominence which would assuredly have been assigned to it twenty years ago. But it must be dealt with first, and it may be dealt with fortunately in a few words. Whatever may be its value, it is clearly not more applicable to the comparative mythologist than to the historical critic; and at the least it may be said that the historical criticism of the last fifteen years has not left the historical books of the Old Testament precisely where they were before. The existence of insuperable difficulties in some of the narratives has been generally acknowledged; and many points, which in earlier days would have been regarded as beyond the reach of

doubt, are now treated as open questions. To the assertion that books which profess to be historical must submit to the scrutiny to which all history is amenable, it is obvious that no answer can be made. If of the narratives relating to the great Jewish lawgiver, to the Judges, the Prophets, or the Kings, some, few or many, be shown to be inconsistent, self-contradictory, or impossible, the historical critic is not responsible for the result ; and if this result shakes the faith of any in the Love and the Righteousness of God, the inference can only be that there must be something wrong in the mental attitude of the person who thus stumbles. He is, in fact, wrong in thinking that faith and religion cannot exist without historical props ; and it is enough to repeat here the emphatic judgment of Bishop Thirlwall, that questions relating to the history of the Pentateuch belong purely to the domain of history, and that Christianity is no more concerned with them than it is with the working of the rule-of-three or the problem of the squaring of the circle.

Whatever, then, be the verdict which may ultimately be passed on the work of Mr. Goldziher, it is clear that the primary conditions for forming an opinion are not possessed by those who insist on claiming for the historical books of the Old Testament a trustworthiness equal to that of Thucydides when he treats of events occurring in his own time. But it will be altogether better for the reader if he will first satisfy himself as to the real state of the case by confining himself strictly to the regions of historical criticism. The story of Romulus and Remus, of Coriolanus or the Decemvirs, may or may not be stories of the sun or the moon or the clouds ; but with any theory that they were, the method of the historical critic has nothing to do. By a strict examination of the narratives which make up the early records of Rome, and by comparing the several versions of these stories, Sir Cornewall Lewis shows that they are from beginning to end untrustworthy, and that tales which even Milton and Gibbon received as in the main true are a mass of violent and often of absolute contradictions. With the mythical character of the old Jewish history the

method of Bishop Colenso has, in like manner, nothing more to do than that of Sir Cornwall Lewis. It is purely from an examination of the books before him, regarded as records of facts, that he reaches the conclusion that these records down to the times of the Kings are for the most part not to be trusted. In truth, the idea that comparative mythology might have to deal with the materials which he was then handling was not, and indeed could not be, present to Dr. Colenso's mind; nor were any speculations as to the meaning and origin of the patriarchal names concerned with the investigations which in his judgment proved that the details given in the Pentateuch of the whole Levitical legislation were the creation of a later age, and that the code to which they are alleged to belong was never practically carried out; that the chronology of these books is self-contradictory and artificial; and that the two stories of the exodus and the sojourn in the wilderness must for these and other reasons, apart from the fact that they exclude each other, be rejected as unhistorical.

For all who accept these conclusions in the main, the field is cleared for any further researches which may determine the character of its products. To those who look upon it as an impiety to doubt that the ark carried specimens of all earthly living things over waters which rose above the highest mountains, the way is clearly barred; but the barrier which they thus raise shuts them off not merely from the work of the comparative mythologist, but from that also of the historical critic. If, however, we will acknowledge that there are two distinct stories of the introduction of David to Saul, and that these stories exclude each other, we must admit further that one only can be true, while both may be false. In either case, both the tales may be examined on their own merits, and we are at once justified in asking whether we meet either of them elsewhere. When we look into the story, we find that it tells us of a group of brothers who are presented by their father in turn, from the eldest downwards, to the prophet who has come to anoint one of his children to be king; that seven successively are rejected; and when no more appear, the prophet

asks if these are the whole family. The answer is, that there is one, but he is the youngest, not worth thinking of, and engaged in the task of keeping the sheep. When summoned, this boy appears in the radiance of youthful beauty, and is marked off for the regal dignity. He is despised and disliked by his brothers, who taunt him with leaving his menial work : but the boy has already done great things. He has slain, without any other weapons than his own hands, a lion and a bear ; and the simple integrity which made him victorious over these beasts will enable him to overcome the giant who insults the whole army of his nation. Wealth and honour and the hand of the king's daughter are the rewards promised to the champion who shall wipe away this disgrace ; and this high dignity the ruddy-faced youth attains when this great enemy of his people has fallen by a pebble hurled against him from a sling.

This, however, is simply the framework of the familiar tale which recounts the fortunes of the man who is born to be king. That tale has been told with exquisite grace by Mr. Morris in his *Earthly Paradise* ; but the well-known outlines cannot fail to recall the features of a hundred beings who, in spite of all that seems to oppress and crush them, are reserved for this high destiny. All are despised, jeered at and flouted, as poor weak fools whose hand has neither force nor cunning, while their elder brothers or sisters are honoured and wealthy. But the detested youth or maiden, out of sight and out of mind, can wait in patience till the event happens which is to call forth their strength or exhibit their unsurpassable beauty. It is thus with the youth who, in the one version, is brought before Saul for the first time with the head of his gigantic adversary in his hand ; and so it is also with Boots and Cinderella, with the Icelandic Grettir, the Hellenic Herakles and Odysseus, and with the host of heroes who fall under one or other of these great types. But without travelling so far a-field, we may ask whether the old Hebrew traditions furnish other stories of a like kind ? At once we must see that in all essential features the story of the youthful

David is the story of Joseph. He, too, is the youngest of many brethren, who look down upon him with mingled contempt and hatred, for he has told them of the high estate to which he will one day be raised, when the sheaves of his brethren shall do obeisance to his own, and the sun, moon and stars shall fall down to do him honour. They are resolved that his dreams shall remain dreams for ever; but their deadly treachery becomes the direct means of his exaltation, and when they meet again, the poor captive is the wise prince who has been made governor of all the land, and to whose prudence they all owe their lives. Having seen thus much, we cannot shut our eyes to other things which point in the same direction. What is Samson, the strange being whose hair no razor is ever to touch, and who so long as he retains his mysterious locks is to remain invincible, whose exploits are a long series of jests, and whose joyous nature seems so utterly unlike that of the personages by whom he is surrounded? Is he not in his strength and in his foibles, in his love of women and feasting, and in his fitful energy, the very counterpart of the Icelandic Grettir and the Greek Herakles? Do we not see the hero of the unshorn locks in the Phoibos Akersekomes of the Iliad, and is not the discomfiture which follows the shaving of his hair repeated in the disaster at Megara when Skylla cuts off the purple lock from the head of Nisos? What, again, is the final catastrophe when the blinded hero, whose hair has again grown, clasps the foundation pillars of the great temple in his arms, and buries his enemies with himself under its ruins? Have we not here another Atlas bearing up the pillars of the heaven on his shoulders, and bringing night upon the world when he bows himself down in the great convulsion which marks the death of Herakles? What, again, is the blinded Samson, who has put forth and answered riddles which none else can solve, but the blinded Oidipous who has read the enigma of the Sphinx, and dies amidst the crashing of the thunder in the sacred grove of the Eumenides? Is it only in the story of Elijah that we meet with the fiery horses which bear a gleaming chariot up

the heights of heaven? and is Jephthah's daughter the only maiden whose budding life is to be blighted in order to insure the victory of her sire?

These tales, it must be remembered, have come down to us in documents which, on grounds wholly unconnected with mythology, have already been proved to be unhistorical, and which may therefore be compared with the pre-historic traditions of all other tribes or nations. One step, however, remains; and if here any insurmountable barrier blocked our way, our previous search would perhaps be worth little. We have to examine the names of the actors in these tales, and see whether they betray their own meaning, and by so doing disclose the origin of the stories themselves, and also whether this explanation is furnished in the language in which these tales are narrated, or is to be sought in cognate forms of speech. No one will venture to deny that in the name of the hero Glaukos we have only another form of the word Leukos, the white or glistening, or that the Greek *ἔρπω* represents the Latin *serpo* and the Sanskrit *sarpa*. No one who has read the hymns of the Rig Veda will doubt that Sarama and Saranyû are names for the flush of dawn which creeps along the sky, and gives place in due time to the splendour of the broad day. What then are we to think when we read that from the far Eastern land of Lykia (*λευκός*), through which flows Xanthos, the golden stream, comes the brave and beautiful Sarpedon; that this Sarpedon is by an inexorable fate doomed to an early death; that the tears of Zeus, the Vedic Dyaus or gleaming heaven, fall in big drops from the sky when he falls by the spear of Patroklos; that he is avenged by his friend Glaukos, the splendour of the full light; that his body is washed in pure water, and, wrapped in a white robe, is borne by Hypnos and Thanatos, Sleep and Death, through the still hours of night, until just when the faint flush tinges the sky they place it on the threshold of his home by the banks of the golden Xanthos, where, according to one—and this, beyond doubt, the oldest form of the tale—the hero rises again to life, in a series of resurrections which knows no end? We may fairly say that

the whole story is transparent ; or we may even say that there is no story at all, but a mere myth of the moon and the setting sun, when we read of the fair Selênê, who comes forth to gaze on the beautiful Endymion, the plunger who is diving into the dreamless sleep which holds him in the cave of Latmos or forgetfulness. The earliest conception is scarcely more disguised in the exquisite legend of Prokris, whose name, although not explained by any Greek word, takes us to the Sanskrit prish, to sprinkle. But Prokris is the child of Hersê, which to the Athenian still denoted the Dew ; and Kephalos, her lover, was still for him the head of the Sun. Eos, again, her rival and her destroyer, was for him nothing but the Dawn. As, then, we read the story, what can the whole series of incidents bring before us but the life of the dew-drops which reflect each the same sun, though each reflexion may be complete in itself, and which are slain at last by his unerring spear in the thicket, where necessarily the last drops linger longest ? And how can we help comparing this exquisite creation of the Greek fancy, if indeed it be Greek, with the more cumbrous but still marvellously truthful conception of the Hindoo story, which relates how Krishna, having slain the giant Naraka (niger), the black or swarth night, set free and wedded at the same moment 16,100 maidens, multiplying himself into so many forms that each of these damsels thought that he had wedded her alone ? Any one who doubts the truth of this picture has never really seen the spectacle of exquisite beauty when, in the soft air of a spring or autumn morning, a thousand suns seem to flash from the green sward, the glory on the earth becoming more faint as the light becomes more dazzling in the heaven. When, again, the poets of the Vedic hymns dwell lovingly on the beauty and the tenderness of Saranyû as every morning she drives the herds of Indra to their pastures in the blue heaven, and when, moreover, they speak of her as bringing to light the hidden things of darkness, and thus punishing the sinner who had reckoned on impunity, how is it possible to forget that the Greek had his Erinyes, with their name unchanged and

with the same attribute of righteous judgment, although with him the avenger was clad in more awful garb? Yet even with him the beings whose countenance no mortal man might dare to look upon retained their ancient loveliness and grace for the blinded Oidipous, who after his weary toil finds his long home within their sanctuary. When we turn to the legend of Urvasî and Purûravas, we find the conditions somewhat modified, and are thus brought to new paths with new clues in our hands. In the hymns of the Rig Veda, her name is perfectly transparent. It is the golden dawn, or in the plural number that series of dawns which, each lovely and tender in itself, yet make men old, and finally bring them to their death. In fact, the dawn in these hymns has almost a hundred names. As she is Urûkî, the far-going, so she is also Urvasî, the wide-spreading, just as the Greek in Euryanassa, Euryphassa, and Eurydike, beheld the bright maidens who fill the heaven with their unspeakable brightness and beauty. But if Urvasî is the dawn, her lover is Purûravas, the fiery sun, with whom she can remain only on condition that she never sees him naked. Robbed of her darlings by the Gandharvas, Urvasî upbraids Purûravas for his cowardice in suffering the theft. Stung by her words, he asks how that can be a land without heroes where he is, and starts up unclothed. In an instant Urvasî vanishes: the dawn-light dies at the outburst of the full day. Purûravas is here the one who causes the disaster, but he is provoked to it by his wife. How can we fail to see that the picture, though another, is yet the same, when in the Vedic story we find that Bhekî, the frog, is a maiden who marries a king on condition that he never shews her a drop of water? This, however, he does one day at her own request, when she speaks of her thirst and weariness; and thus Bhekî becomes the counterpart of Urvasî, while their lovers re-appear in the Frog Prince of the popular German story. We see at once how vast a field is opened before us, and the connecting links which bind the Teutonic Frog Prince with the Sanskrit Bhekî enable us to trace the relations of countless stories which may be found among tribes of the

same stock, but of which the fundamental idea may be common to all mankind during the earliest ages.

Indeed, we learn not only that it may be so, but that it must be so; and having advanced thus far, we find that our work is practically done. We have not the faintest reason for supposing that the earliest phases in the growth of the Hebrew tribes differed essentially from those of any other peoples. It is absurd, therefore, to think that while every other people had its myths, the Semitic nations alone never possessed any. We might with equal reason, as Mr. Goldziher has most forcibly remarked, fancy that some one nation was destitute of digestive or generative powers (p. 7). Except for such as shut their eyes to the fact that mankind start on the great race of existence, for the most part, under like external conditions, and must therefore exhibit corresponding phases in their earliest mental developments, the conscientious pains bestowed by Mr. Goldziher at this threshold of his subject are virtually superfluous. Amongst Englishmen reluctance to admit this truth in the case of the Hebrews will probably be found in the last resort to resolve itself into the belief, that as myth-making is a great source of error and delusion, the Jews were miraculously preserved from the snare. With M. Ernest Renan this attitude was the result of a theory that monotheism is a peculiarly Semitic instinct; and happily this theory may be soon tested by an appeal to facts. Putting aside the condition of things in Arabia with which Mahomet had to deal, and which can scarcely be considered as the abnormal growth of generations then recent, it is little better than a truism to say that the Hebrew literature which has come down to us represents the people as habitually and persistently polytheistic, as not merely receiving slowly and unwillingly the higher teaching of their judges and their prophets, but as falling back into their old ways at every available opportunity. But in truth the same reasoning which justifies the inference that the Jews had no mythology, will further justify the assertion that they possessed from the first a divine revelation, and that this revelation involved the cardinal propositions of Catholic Chris-

tianity. In maintaining his hypothesis M. Renan is not more in accordance with facts than is Mr. Gladstone. Both alike must appeal to such records as we may be able to lay hands on; and these records are practically limited to the book of Genesis, and indeed to the first eleven chapters of that book, on which accordingly Mr. Gladstone rests his affirmation that our first parents and their children possessed the idea of an Infinite Being, whose perfect goodness arose, not from external restraints, but from an unchangeable internal determination of character, of a Trinity of co-equal Persons in the Divine Unity, of a Redeemer who should hereafter assume their nature and deliver from death and sin, of a Divine Wisdom which was with God from the beginning, and of an Evil One who, having fallen from his throne in heaven, had now become an antagonistic power, tempting men to their ruin.

The labyrinth of inconsistencies, contradictions, and, in all truthfulness it must be added, absurdities, into which if we follow this theory we must be plunged, is one which but for ancient prepossessions we need never enter. The several propositions into which Mr. Gladstone's hypothesis resolves itself are not to be found in the book of Genesis, and do not derive the faintest colour from anything contained in it. On the other hand, the strictest historical criticisms have proved that the so-called records of the Jewish people, down at least to the times of the Kings, are not genuine and trustworthy history, that very much of the narrative rests on no basis of facts, and that many traditions contained in it are not peculiar to the Jewish tribes or even to the Semitic race. Thus the narratives of the patriarchal age remain in our hands, to be dealt with as we should deal with the Athenian traditions relating to times preceding the dawn of contemporary history or with like traditions of other peoples; nor is there anything absurd or particularly startling if Jacob and his children should turn out to be personages more or less like the Theban Kadmos who comes from Kedem the East, the Phenician or purple land, and finds a home in the West. No *à-priori* argument can be urged against the conclusion, that in the story of Sam-

son we find features belonging also to the stories of Herakles, of Oidipous, and of Atlas; that the legend of Joseph and Zuleika may be seen in that of Anteia and Bellerophon, and in a hundred popular tales of Teutonic Europe. On the other hand, if there be any truth in the method of comparative mythology, we are vastly gainers in getting rid of some features of appalling and loathsome wickedness which make not a few of the traditions of the Pentateuch utterly unfit to be placed before the young. I take it as conclusively proved that all human tribes at starting reflected their own life on the outward world of which their senses made them conscious. The conditions of consciousness and memory, of joy and pain, of love and hatred, under which they found themselves, were common to them with the winds and the clouds, with the trees, fruits and flowers, with the lights of heaven which influenced their growth and their decay, as well as with the brute creatures which clearly had the like passions and were stirred by similar impulses. The struggle of the morning light with the failing darkness would be a battle in which the child doomed to slay its parent was fulfilling its destiny, or it might be the weary labour of the beneficent night in giving birth to the lord of day. So, again, the first flush which steals across the sky would be the beautiful messenger sent forth to announce the coming of the radiant king, and to drive away all ugly and noisome things from his path; or she might be the beautiful maiden for whom the day-god yearns with an overpowering love, whom with outstretched arms he strives to seize as she hurries away, and who dies just as he clasps her in his consuming embrace. So, yet again, as the great round globe reached the zenith, and then at once began its descent to the horizon, the phrase would go, that the stone which the toiling hero or the doomed captive had been compelled to roll to the top of the hill was now rolling down again; and other phrases, with an unbounded exuberance of wealth, would be ready to describe the rest of his journey, in calm or in storm, as a lonely wanderer or as a warrior surrounded by glittering hosts, as cheered in his last hour by the same beautiful maiden whom he had wooed

and lost long ago, or visited by the loving parent to whom he owed his birth. It is useless to go further. Here we have the skeleton of a thousand stories, all precisely true according to the impressions of sense, all exquisitely beautiful, and all perfectly harmless. But translated into the conditions of strictly human life, they become the stories of Tantalos, of Sisypchos, of Oidipous, and many more—stories which jar not unfrequently on our best feelings, and which shocked the moral sense of the Greek not less than they horrify ours. In the old mythical phrase, there was nothing harmful when people said that the sun-god of eventide was embracing the mother who bore him in the morning, or of the phenomena of dew, that he was wedding a million maidens in one and the same moment ; but it was otherwise when the dawn-maiden Iokaste became a Theban princess, when the child doomed to slay his sire was her son, when this child, having wrought the destined deed, returned to do battle with the demon Sphinx, and having won the victory became her husband. For the Greek, revolting from this unhallowed and unnatural union, there was no refuge except in the thought of an inexorable necessity or fate to which even Zeus himself must be subject ; and the story in itself was simply horrible, until lit by the genius of the great poet, who would bring before him the image of the wise and beneficent prince smitten by the burden of unutterable woe, yet going down blinded to his grave with incommunicable dignity and majesty. But there might be another side to the picture. The exquisite tints of evening twilight are seen to spread themselves languishingly across the blue heaven which, growing darker every moment, seem to be lulled in the profoundest slumber, while the bright hues repose on its swarthy breast. Here the sky is passive, the twilight with its lovely clouds is active ; but when we remember that the twilight is the daughter of the heaven, we have at once the framework of the story of Lot and his daughters—a story which seems to us to stand out from the records of Genesis with unparalleled hideousness, but which may be matched with a hundred others. When, in the Vedic hymn, Prajapati seeks to do violence to his

daughter Ushas, the myth is transparent, for Prajapati is literally the Lord of Light, and Ushas is the Dawn. It is less obvious in the great tradition of the Volsungs and the Nibelungs, when the daughter desires vengeance for the death of her father, and, deceiving her brother, becomes the mother of the destined hero. The fierce vehemence of the northern legend breaks out in her last words before she plunges into the fire: "I let slay both my children whom I deemed worthless for the avenging of our father, and I went into the wood to thee in a witch-wife's shape; and now behold Sinfjotli is the son of thee and of me both, and therefore has he this so great hardihood and fierceness, in that he is the son both of Volsung's son and Volsung's daughter; and for this, and for naught else, have I so wrought, that King Siggeir might get his bane at last." The words are strictly true. The hero who slays the slayer of the sun must himself be the offspring of his murdered father and of the beautiful maiden whom he loves in the morning and greets again at eventide. Signy's purpose is avowed: that of Lot's daughters is scarcely less clearly expressed. Besides themselves and their father, no human being is left, and the race must not be suffered to die out. In both stories, then, there is the same necessity. Etymologically, Lot is the coverer, from the root *lât*, to cover; and thus the name corresponds exactly to the Vedic Varuna and the Hellenic Ouranos, the veiling or darkened or clouded heaven of night, as opposed to Dyaus, Zeus, the gleaming sky of the day-time, and again to the female forms Kalyke, Kalypso, which denote the night-goddess who soothes the sun-god to rest in her starry home. What then would they behold who looked up to the sombre heaven and saw spread on its unbroken surface the tender light becoming gradually fainter and fainter in the west? Would not this bright flush be the glow on the cheeks of the dawn-maiden, now left in absolute solitude with its parent the darkness? and would not the next thought be that of the union from which must spring the days that were to come?

But the Lot story is made in the book of Genesis to serve a

further purpose. It marks off the Israelites from the Edomites, and places on the latter a stamp of peculiar infamy. Can this be accounted for? There can be little doubt that the inquiry to which this question leads should have been entered upon long ago in the wide field of Aryan mythology, where it would probably have solved many perplexing difficulties; and all that can be said by way of excuse is, that the need of it was not so obvious as it is in the case of the Semitic tribes. The treatment of this wide and most important subject constitutes the most interesting and valuable portion of Mr. Goldziher's volume, and establishes his title to the gratitude of all scholars. The Hebrews after their settlement on the western side of Jordan became an agricultural people and dwellers in cities; they had been previously nomadic, and this shepherd stage had been preceded by the still more erratic and hand-to-mouth life of the hunter. Here, then, we are confronted by two questions. In the first place, will the hunter regard the objects of the outward world from the same point of view and with the same feelings and wishes as the herdsman, and will there be the same agreement between the latter and the fixed dweller in cities and tiller of the soil? In the next place, if there were any points of difference, do the traditions of the Pentateuch and of the books which follow them furnish any evidence of these different modes of regarding phenomena? Both these are strictly questions of fact, and must be answered by comparison of the myths of nomadic tribes with those of nations who are advancing towards an organized polity; and they are answered by Mr. Goldziher with a fullness of learning and a judicious weighing of evidence which leave little or nothing to be desired. It is unnecessary here to say more than that the tiller of the earth must have his mind directed chiefly to the light and the warmth which is to nourish and ripen his crops, while the nomad, who cares only for pasture, will look with absorbing interest on the gathering clouds which are to send down the rain; that for the former the Sun-god will be the beneficent king, and that the latter will bestow his worship rather on the veiled or covering

heaven—in other words, on the darkened sky, the cause of the darkness being a matter of indifference. If, then, a nomadic race changes its mode of life, the result will be a change also in the treatment of the materials inherited from the myth-making ages, for these materials are ubiquitous. They cannot be put aside, but they may be invested with a different colouring. Following the fortunes of all myths, the names which had originally denoted phenomena will have become names of men and women; and the antipathy which sunders the nomad from the tiller of the soil will be made to express itself in their words and acts. With the growth of national feeling this hatred will be intensified, and everything will be treated so as to add to the narrator's glory and humiliate his neighbours. Thus, as Mr. Goldziher has well said :

“The nation of Edom receives Esau as ancestor; and the reminiscence of nomadic conceptions which draws their sympathy towards Jacob, the persecuted brother, and turns with antipathy away from the red solar hunter, is again revived in the service of the formation of a national myth, which paints Esau in the most repulsive colours. The old mythological incest of Lot's daughters is made the cause of the origin of two Canaanitish tribes, the Ammonites and the Moabites. The Philistines also are dragged through this story-making process of national antagonism. The primeval heavenly ‘Father-king,’ Abemelek, who conceives a warm love for the wife of the Morning-sky and thinks to carry her off, is made a king of the Philistines, and Schechem, the Early Morning, the seducer of Dinah, is converted into a prince of the Hivvites” (p. 254).

I have done little beyond breaking ground in a field towards which not a few may reproach themselves for feeling any attraction; nor have I attempted to do more than indicate the directions in which Mr. Goldziher has been working with a success which must be regarded as fairly proportioned to his learning, his earnestness, and his zeal. In one portion at least of the wide region which he has undertaken to explore he has done the highest service for the study of myths generally; and his labour cannot fail to lead to a more systematic analysis of the materials which have been embodied in the complicated

legends of the Aryan world. But in the natural course of his own special task he has had to deal with many points of history and criticism, the importance of which must be acknowledged by all impartial readers; and the result is a volume of permanent value, full of instruction and interest.

GEORGE W. COX.

V.—IN MEMORIAM: JOHN KENRICK.*

WHEN the Committees were about to be formed for revising the Translation of the Scriptures, and the most eminent available names were brought together for selection, the Dean of Westminster learned with surprise that a scholar whose repute had been familiar to him in his College days, and whom he had placed in the same line with Blomfield and Thirlwall, still lived to serve the interests of learning and religion. Seven years have since elapsed: and it is only now that we are called upon to add the name of John Kenrick to the honour-list of the past, and to sum up in memory his claims on our gratitude and veneration. To the Theological Review, which opened with one of his most interesting papers, and was often enriched by the contributions of his pen, it cannot be inappropriate to say a few words on his career and character. But it is the misfortune of the nonagenarian Professor that he leaves no worthy witness of his early labours and his growing power: and in the present instance the notice of his life devolves on one whose only title to speak of it is the accident of survivorship and perseverance of affection; who left his classes fifty years ago, and carried from them a standard of philological accuracy, of historical justice, of literary taste, which has directed his aspirations ever since.

If Mr. Kenrick was never engaged in the stated duties of the Christian ministry, it was not for want of early dedication

* Born, Feb. 4, 1788; died, May 7, 1877.

to them or of hereditary encouragement to assume them. Like his father, Rev. Timothy Kenrick, he was set apart, while yet a boy, for the Nonconformist pastorate; and the office was endeared to his family on both sides by examples, running back into the previous century, of "worthy and useful ministers whose names are yet precious in our churches." Nor in himself was there any failure of response to these influences. He had no leanings to conformity, no indifference to theology, no slight appreciation of the work of liberal Dissent: and the earnestness with which, from time to time, he took up problems of Biblical criticism, and applied his acute powers of combination to their solution, shews that it was circumstance only that prevented him from being a great divine. But his studies early set in the direction which was to become his path of eminence; and the natural deflecting influences were, one after another, turned aside. In 1793, the loss of his mother, when he was five years old, withdrew the religious pressure which most avails the growing boy and freshens his secret vows. In 1794, he came indeed into the charge of a new mother:* but that is a different thing. Meanwhile, and for six years after, he was surrendered to the drill of a smart grammar-school, beginning with tears and ending with distinction; conquering paradigms and syntax, and well-helped to the sense of what he read, but morally repelled by the Master's passionate and suspicious temper. On the opening of the Exeter Theological Academy under his father in 1799, he was enrolled among its students, though still a child, and seemed thus to be prematurely committed as a cadet of the Divinity school. Hebrew he did add to his list of attainments; and through the friendly help of Mr. Barham, then fresh from studies abroad, he gained considerable knowledge of German. But in 1804, his father, during a visit to Wrexham, was seized with apoplexy in the fields, and died in an instant. The Academy was broken up; and the orphaned boy of sixteen

* Elizabeth Belsham, born Dec. 7, 1743; died Jan. 10, 1819. She had lived with her brother Thomas at Daventry from 1781-9, and at Hackney from 1791-4.

was placed in 1805 under the care of Rev. John Kentish, of Birmingham, who for two years directed his reading and dealt with him as his son. Into this interval was compressed all his special preparation for the Christian ministry. He read portions of the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures, with suitable critical aids; studied prescribed theses in theology, and made abstracts of the authors consulted; and exercised himself in the writing of essays and schemes of sermons. The influence of his accomplished and conscientious guide was eminently favourable to habits of accuracy, thoroughness, and fairness of mind. But he naturally outgrew the resources of a private library and a busy pastor; and, on the advice of Dr. Lant Carpenter, became a Williams exhibitioner in 1807, and sought a wider field in Glasgow College.

The Scotch Universities, having in fact to do the work of Gymnasia, are not eminent as schools of philology, and would hardly offer a tempting place of study to one whose main object was high classical attainment. But where, as in Mr. Kenrick's case, the grammatical grounding is already thorough and secure and the range of reading considerable, it is no disadvantage that the work of memory and acquisition should rest for awhile, and allow the reflective powers, which the Glasgow methods successfully develop, to overtake and reduce the stored material. If he learned little else in the Private Greek class of Professor Young, he always attributed to it his first insight into the origin of inflexions from significant affixes and into the logical grounds of syntactical rules. He brought with him the habit of exactitude, and carried away with him that of philosophical analysis; and was thus prepared to become one of the first interpreters of the German methods of treating grammar and annotating classical texts.

The fruits indeed of his three sessions at Glasgow afford remarkable evidence of intellectual and moral strength of purpose. To one who abhorred metaphysics and had no aptitude for mathematics, pure or applied, nothing could seem less full of promise than a Trivium of Logic, Ethics, and Physics, each claiming its year, and all essential to the Academical Degree.

These names, it is true, were made to cover a good deal more than is included in their definition; and the Essays which were publicly read and criticized in the first class, the comparative reviews of philosophical theories which largely engaged the second, and the condescending resort to experimental methods which relieved the third, gave them a literary, historical, and scientific interest beyond the circle of technical proficient. With such energy did Mr. Kenrick apply himself to the work of every year, that, besides being first prizeman in his class, he bore away the Gold Medal for an Essay on the English Constitution during the Tudor period, and the Silver Medal for an Essay on the Aberration of Light. When in 1810 he took his M.A. degree and departed, he left behind him, in the memory of his friends, and especially of Professor Mylne, an image of purity, modesty, and strength, which was never lost in the retreating crowd, but followed with an eye of prophetic pride. The Professor himself, writing to Dr. Lant Carpenter, May 10th, 1810, speaks thus of his late pupil: "John Kenrick has, ever since he appeared amongst us, stood in a place to which no rival approached. His mind, from the very first outset, seemed to be already matured in its powers, and possessed of an extent of knowledge to which few inquirers at any time of life have been able to reach. He thought and examined and composed like a practical and experienced scholar and inquirer."

A College in which all the Professors were bound by the Westminster Confession of Faith would seem unlikely to play very happily the part of *Alma Mater* to a resolute young Unitarian. But in the previous century the broad theology of Leechman and the ethics of Hutcheson had relaxed the severe Calvinism of Glasgow, and given a liberal tone to a large intellectual minority both within and without the University. Hence the young English student suffered no ostracism, either social or academical, for his heresy. At the same time he had the sympathy of like-minded companions,—James Yates, John Wood, Benjamin Heywood, Henry Turner, Henry Crompton,—all of them studious and orderly, and looking up to him

as their senior and their model. So well did he stand with the orthodox candidates of the Divinity Class, that, in order to enrol him in their self-improvement society, they stretched their rules and made him an honorary member: and for them it was that he wrote the Sermon preached in 1817 at the Old-bury Double Lecture, and published with the title, "The Love of Truth a Branch of the Duty of Benevolence."

During the long Scotch vacation his frugal resources did not permit his return home; and he spent it, year by year, partly at the friendly house of Dr. Woodrow, of Stevenstown, partly in pedestrian excursions through the Western Highlands. Born in a country rich indeed and not absolutely level, but of low undulating lines, he had now the compensation of that glorious surprise with which real mountains, when first seen, fix the eye and fill the mind. Few perhaps of his pupils or later friends, on whom the singular balance of his mind left a feeling of excessive calm, would suspect in him the glow of enthusiasm with which, only six years ago, he remembers a winter view of Arran from the Ayrshire fields. "I was driven," he says, "in the Mail-cart from Irvine, where I had slept, to the Manse at Stevenstown, in a December morning, and saw the sun rise on the snowy top of Goatfell in Arran. The impression made upon me by the sight is vivid, even at the distance of more than sixty years." "I have since seen the Jungfrau with the rising sun upon it, and the evening-glow on Mont Blanc; but neither sight has given me such pleasure as the sunrise on Arran." That stately and lovely mountain, so attractive to the artist and the geologist, would seem to have some wayward humour for scholars. A few years ago, it caught Dr. William Smith in a rock-trap above Glen Rosa, and detained him all night on an impassable ledge. And in 1809, it tempted Mr. Kenrick down one of its inclines at a run which he could not arrest, and set a granite boulder in the way, which he was compelled to clear by a leap, at the cost of plunging headforemost on the ground. He was saved by alighting in a deep bush of heather. Of another expedition, to Oban and Mull, he speaks with delighted recollection in a letter written

three years ago to the writer of this notice, who was then living near the foot of Glen Croe, on the line of his route in 1808. He had walked with his companion by Loch Lomond and Loch Long, and returned alone by Loch Awe, paying in the interval a fortnight's visit to one of the Lairds of Mull. The rough hospitality of the place, the dilapidated nakedness of the house, its lonely and desolate position, the appearance of the lady every morning (her good manners and education notwithstanding) with bare feet, had evidently touched him with humorous surprise. An excursion to Fingal's Cave in Staffa had spoken to a deeper feeling, and given him one of those rare experiences in which expectation does not flatten the reality: and as he followed the sunlight diluting itself in the depths of the cave, and stepped from ridge to ridge amid the lessening murmur of the waves, and found all that was contained but hid in the first view of that wonderful arch, he "could understand," he says, "the feeling which prompted the French mineralogist Faujas de Saint Fond to fall down on his knees at the entrance."

During his last session at Glasgow, Mr. Kenrick had been asked to undertake a Junior Tutorship in Manchester New College, York; the classical department being reserved for him, while the mathematical and philosophical was assigned to Rev. William Turner, Jun. By the advice of Mr. Kentish and Mr. Belsham (whom he naturally consulted as his stepmother's brother), he closed with the proposal, without however intending that it should withhold him from the active ministry for more than a few years. After spending in his native city that richest of all vacations which lies between the University and the World, he went his way to York: in the autumn evening of his arrival, the minster, first seen low-lying in the distance, then looming large with the gradual approach, looked at him as if charged with the secret of his future, and fixed his questioning eye on those solemn towers beneath the shadow of which he has now fallen asleep. "I can never forget," he says, "the feeling which then came over me, and which recurs vividly whenever I happen to see them from the same point."

It was not entirely without reason that his heart sank within him at the prospect of his new responsibilities. With his high standard of teaching, the classical department gave work enough: but he found himself charged also with Ancient and Modern History. He was not much older than several of his pupils, and looked younger: and the prestige of his brilliant Glasgow career, though giving him authority with the studious, was unavailing with refractory folly. The arrangements of the College were not favourable to effective discipline or un-anxious study. After several years of struggle with discouragements, Mr. Kenrick was at last released from the obligation of residence within the College, now left to the administration of Mr. and Mrs. Turner, and was allowed a year's absence in Germany to enlarge and mature the materials of his work. The duties of his office were meanwhile entrusted to his accomplished pupil and friend, John James Tayler, then fresh from his graduation at Glasgow.

The German year which followed, from July 1819, was full of various interest. But, omitting such parts of the story as might have been true of any travelling scholar, we must restrict ourselves to a few characteristic features that may add a touch to our personal portraiture. On the first scene of Mr. Kenrick's foreign experience a tragic shadow fell. During a stay of some weeks at Homburg, to gain practice in the language before the term of study came, his companion, John Wellbeloved, a youth of the highest promise, was struck down with fever and died. It would not have been surprising if, under such a terrible collapse of his responsible cares, grief and loneliness had broken up his plans and sent him home. But the steadfastness of his nature prevailed; and he fixed himself for the winter semester at Göttingen, for the following summer semester at Berlin. Availing himself of the magnificent library at the former, he made it his chief object, with the aid of Heeren's references, to write a Course of Modern History Lectures, which should free him from unsatisfactory text-books and render his instructions systematic and compact. This object accomplished, he addressed himself at Berlin chiefly to classical

work under the great philologists ; Tacitus, with Wolf ; Demosthenes, with Boeckh ; and the practice of Latin composition and conversation, with Rector Zumpt. With the last the conversation cannot have been all in Latin ; for we well remember a remark of Zumpt's on Mr. Kenrick's German,—that it differed from a native's in one thing only, that it was *too* pure—correct literary speech without a trace of local colouring. No great scholar left upon him so strong an impression as Boeckh ; whose masterly insight into the public and private life of ancient Athens, the sources and distribution of its revenues, the forms of its courts and assemblies, the construction and usages of its theatres, the system of its music, the technicalities of its commerce and the prices of its goods, together with a singular ease and neatness in elucidating special obscurities of text, filled him with admiration, and made it usual with him to call the editor of Pindar the “Prince of critics.”

In the assiduous pursuit of his historical and classical studies, he did not miss the opportunity of hearing the most eminent lecturers on subjects less peculiarly his own. He had pleasant memories to produce of Eichhorn's vast erudition and dry rationalism, and fondness for English students and clay-pipes ; of Blumenbach's lectures revised well up to date, with nothing stereotyped except their droll anecdotes ; of the difficulty of addressing his wife as *Frau Obermedicinalrätthin* at the hospitable gatherings of her drawing-room ; of the negligent teaching and jealous temper of Wolf ; of the fluent subtleties of Schleiermacher, which only a metaphysical enthusiast could rush to hear at six in the morning. Though Hegel had already, for more than a year, succeeded to Fichte's chair, his influence had not yet seriously affected the ascendancy of Schleiermacher ; whose preaching drew greater crowds, Mr. Kenrick used to say, than in England could be drawn together by any such quiet presentation of liberal thought and refined feeling. Something was due, no doubt, to his open protest against the reactionary tendencies of the Court and the shameless breach of its promise to set up representative insti-

tutions. It was a time of great political excitement. In the previous year Kotzebue had fallen at Mannheim under the dagger of Carl Ludwig Sand. The heroism of the young assassin, and the lofty fanaticism with which he awaited the executioner's sword, had awakened a profound compassion for his fate. Yielding to this impulse, Professor De Wette had written a letter of condolence to Sand's mother, crediting the act with a patriotic and self-sacrificing motive, and so far allowing it to be a fine sign of the times, but declaring it nevertheless to be immoral, and laying down the principle that "Evil is not to be overcome by evil, but only by the good: no Right can be established by wrong, artifice, or violence, and the good end does not sanctify the unrighteous means." For writing this letter De Wette was deposed from his chair. Schleiermacher, his friend, regarded this act as not only a personal wrong, but an indignity to the University; and, at the very time of Mr. Kenrick's intercourse with him, he convened a meeting of De Wette's friends, to secure him an income under his deprivation, Buttman undertaking the collection of the fund, and Reimer acting as its treasurer.* Whilst keeping clear, as a foreign guest, of the political ferment of the hour, Mr. Kenrick made no secret of his sympathy with these men. Though he accepted attentions from some of the Court circle to whom he was recommended, there was a limit which his liberalism was averse to pass; and, being embarrassed by a letter of introduction to the Duke of Cumberland, of which he was bound to make use, he adroitly waited to present it till the newspapers announced that the Duke had quitted Berlin.

Rich in the fruits of his year's industry and opportunities, he set out on his homeward way early in July, 1820. Arranging a circuitous route to include as much as possible, he passed, by Saxony, Bohemia and Bavaria, into the Tyrol and Switzerland, forgetting neither person nor place that had any special interest for the scholar. Homeric sympathy gives him

* See a letter of Schleiermacher's to Lücke, dated June 20, 1820. Aus Schleiermacher's *Leben*, in *Briefen*, B. iv. pp. 263, 264.

the password to Thiersch in Munich, whose gentlemanly manners remind him of Oxford. Honour for his favourite Quincilian takes him to the Convent Library at St. Gall, where in the 15th century the MS. of the Institutes was found. Interest in methods of education draws him to Fellenberg at Hofwyl and Pestalozzi at Iverdun, with somewhat disappointing results. And so, gathering on the road a store of exact and well-compared impressions, he returns to the scene of his labours, with its difficulties left behind, and its harvest yet to reap. His marriage in the following year to Lætitia, eldest daughter of Rev. Charles Wellbeloved, completed his re-settlement at York, and opened that delightful home which, under different roofs, has for fifty-six years been unchanging in grace and brightness, and of which the visitors' book, had there been such a thing, would have contained a rare list of memorable names. The death of Mrs. Wellbeloved in the following year rendered his accession to the family circle a seasonable source of strength. Sharing their sorrow, he infused into it his own calmness; and gave it clear form in his funeral sermon, "The Blessings of Children on a virtuous Mother." To his excellent father-in-law, constitutionally variable in health and spirits, and now bereft of his chief light, he became more and more the essential moral support. Bound to him not by affection only, but by affinity of pursuits and agreement in tastes and principles, he could be his counsellor without a word of advice, and act for him by simply acting with him; and so sustain his strength by removing its misgivings and leaving it free and unembarrassed. In no relation did the singular tact which Mr. Kenrick possessed operate more beneficently than in his deferential friendship for his venerable colleague, whose labours it certainly lightened, whose powers it probably prolonged, and whose decline it cheered and tranquillized.

The even life of study and teaching in which he was now established was henceforth undisturbed, so far as we are aware, by any question of possible removal, except in the year 1825, when a last attempt was made to claim him for the active ministry. Mr. Belsham, burdened with increasing infirmities,

needed the assistance of a colleague qualified to become his successor in the pulpit of Essex-Street chapel, London ; and it was understood to be his strong desire that the appointment should be made acceptable to Mr. Kenrick. His great attainments and intellectual authority would doubtless have added fresh lustre to the traditional dignity of that position. But, in spite of the clearest and pleasantest enunciation, his voice had not the strength, or his temperament the physical energy, requisite for effective preaching : and he was probably unwilling to lay aside the fruits of historical and classical research, or to leave them immature, in order to take up theological and ecclesiastical studies which had hitherto occupied with him only a secondary place. Happily for his College, he was not tempted by the opportunity of change.

Of the mode in which for thirty years (1810—1840) the duties of the Classical department were performed at York, each full Divinity Student had a five years' sample. Yet in bearing his testimony he may well distrust its worth : for, while he was pupil, he had not earned the competency to judge ; and, since that time, no new experience perhaps has furnished him with points of comparison. With nothing but the German class-rooms to set beside our College recollections, we can only say that, in Mr. Kenrick's treatment of every subject, there seemed to be one constant characteristic,—a comprehensive grasp of its whole outline, with accurate scrutiny of its separate contents. Nothing fragmentary, nothing discursive, nothing speculative, broke the proportions or disturbed the steady march of his pre-arranged advance. His prolegomena to every classical text furnished a compendium of its literary history, and reproduced the conditions of ancient life, civic, legal, domestic, personal, under which it arose. The reading of it in class was marked by a similar completeness : nothing was allowed to slip by without coming into the full focus of elucidation : grammatical construction, textual criticism, archæology, dialect, geography, dates, graces or defects of style, all were brought into distinct view ; yet without inducing any tedious slowness in the progress, or killing out the

spirit of the piece. The books which it was the greatest treat to read with him were such as abounded in allusions to places, persons or events outside the page,—the speeches of Demosthenes, the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, above all perhaps, the letters of Cicero: the ease with which all light flowed in that was needful and all was kept out that was superfluous, evinced the skill of a master. The same finely balanced judgment was apparent in his treatment of translation and his choice of language. His literary taste inclined neither to the romantic, like the German, nor to the rhetorical, like the French, but rested in the manly English simplicity. Above all he disliked the sort of prudish finery by which underbred men of sentiment sometimes make themselves ridiculous. A student of this type, coming upon a passage of Tacitus in which some German tribe is said to have worn "*bracas*," stopped at that word, and, on being asked, "Well, Mr. B., what does *bracas* mean?" replied with a blush, "A species of habiliment for covering the lower part of the body;" and was relieved of his delicacy by Mr. Kenrick's comment, "Humph, Mr. B., commonly called *breeches*." Yet, with all his love of plainness in its proper place, he rose without effort to the poetic level of a Chorus of Sophocles or an Ode of Pindar, and, though still insisting on exactitude, would bear nothing that wronged the lyrical feeling of the passage. If there was any defective side to his Greek and Latin scholarship, it was in relation to the philosophical literature. Plato (except the *Apology* and the *Phædon*) and Aristotle were hardly noticed, so far as we know, and the speculative treatises of Cicero rarely read. This omission was wiser than the course which we have known to be followed by another Professor who also had a distaste for metaphysics, viz. that of reading the philosophers in order to turn them into ridicule. To inspire his pupils with zeal for their studies, the teacher does well to take up only such authors as kindle his own liveliest interest and draw out his richest resources.

In the present abundance of sensible elementary books for the teaching of Greek and Latin, it ought not to be forgotten

that Mr. Kenrick was in the front rank of the pioneers of improvement. His translation of Zumpt's Latin Grammar (1823) appeared within four years of Valentine Blomfield's edition of Matthiæ, and was quickly followed by his Exercises on Latin Syntax and Introduction to Greek Prose Composition, as well as by his abridged Grammars for the use of Schools. Nor can any of his pupils—least of all those who in public schools had learned to trip in sense or nonsense verses—ever forget the insight given them into idiomatic construction and the movement of style by the practice he gave them in writing Greek and Latin prose. Scholars have a quick scent for scholarship; and these publications so far made him known, that when the rapid growth of Matthiæ's Greek Grammar in successive German editions rendered it necessary to reconstruct the English translation on a larger scale, the Bishop of London, who had not leisure for the task, had recourse to him as best qualified to undertake it. The fifth edition, accordingly, in which the new matter was incorporated, came out under his editorial care. To those who remember its appearance in 1832, the title-page carries an invisible trait of character which deserves a record. The printer had set up the editor's name as the "Rev. John Kenrick, M.A.," and sent the proof in that form both to Fulham and to York. From the former it was returned with the "*Rev.*" erased: and from the *Right Reverend* a letter was addressed to the editor, explaining the impossibility of conceding the sacred prefix to a person not in Holy Orders. Dr. Blomfield the Grecian could look up to the Scholar; but Dr. Blomfield the Bishop must look down on the Nonconformist.

The whole method of Mr. Kenrick in the conduct of his department was marked by a paramount devotion to the requirements of his students, and a disinterested suppression of all erudition superfluous for them. Keeping pace himself with the newest learning, and familiar with all the debateable ground opened by modern philological and historical criticism, he was never diverted from the sober task of positive teaching to young men who had to learn, or tempted to use his class in subser-

vience to his private studies, by pouring into it his unfinished reading or displaying to it half a controversy. His Lectures on Ancient and on Modern History were models of selection, compression and proportion. They assumed the hearer to be a genuine historical student, whose wants would be met by faithful and lucid narrative, and well-weighed judgments on public events and characters; and, though full of the outline and movement inseparable from distinct conceptions, never deviated into the biographical, or stood still long enough to become the picturesque. They told the story of nations, as it happens, in the concrete play of incident and balance of passions; massing together persons and actions so far as they formed parties and were at disposal of a common cause, but never led, by any dazzling generalization, to weave the true events into a false drama of the past. Further than Guizot his admiration could not go with the French school; and even to him he preferred the political wisdom and judicial caution of Hallam.

In books of civil history, there are usually chapters devoted to the progress of science and literature. However valuable in themselves, they disagreeably interrupt the thread of the narrative; while, from their very constitution as an intrusive segment, they have no internal vital continuity. To avoid these disturbing patches of book-criticism, Mr. Kenrick reserved their materials, and constructed from them a separate course. Under the old title of "*Belles Lettres*," he gave, in these lectures, a comprehensive history of literature and the fine arts in Europe from the Homeric period to the French Revolution. So far as he treated the same subjects, and so long as he was upon the same period, his course resembled and anticipated, in its spirit as in its method, Hallam's "*Literature of Europe in the 15th, 16th and 17th Centuries*." But it did not embrace any survey of writers on science: and it ranged over thirty centuries instead of three. In this long journey there are of course vast barrens, over which the critic, who has always his wings, may be permitted to fly: and even in the well-watered lands he need not follow every stream. Certain it is, however, that under the lecturer's guidance, not

a fountain of true genius was left unvisited, and few untasted ; for, besides his terse descriptive sketches of great writers, he gave characteristic extracts and translations which fixed the features vividly in the mind. The lectures were a marvel of condensation : and the vigour which, nevertheless, breathed through them, was doubtless due to the author's personal familiarity with so large a proportion of the literature which he reviewed.

Though Mr. Kenrick's lectures were not published, the critical essays and historical works by which he is known as an author, grew naturally out of the studies connected with his Chair. It was impossible to take Grecian history out of its cradle and tell the incidents of its youth without inquiry into its parentage and the sources of its speech ; and more than fifty years ago he had not only accurately defined the conception of a Myth, but applied it in detail to the prehistoric period of Greece and Rome, within limits of good sense often transgressed by Müller and Niebuhr, yet now recognized as just. Several early Reviews of these writers shew that, while he appreciated their genius, his judgment could withstand the enthusiasm of the one, and his courage question the "divination" of the other. And his subsequent "Essay on Primeval History" (1846) is a carefully reasoned statement of the principles of criticism applicable to the earliest traditions of nations. In like manner it was impossible to read Herodotus in class without checking him by all that could be learned on the banks of the Nile, the coasts of Tyre, and by the rivers of Mesopotamia. Hence, he closely followed the labours of the Egyptologists from Young to Lepsius, and interpreted the results both in his "Egypt of Herodotus" (1841), and in his "Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs" (1850)—both of them masterly manuals of whatever is known on their subject, and containing models of sagacious criticism on points that are doubtful. As the last quarter of a century has already added something to our knowledge of ancient Egypt, and the sources of further light are not yet exhausted, it is possible that the history, so admirably secured up to the author's date,

may have to be re-written. With his volume on "Phoenicia" (1855), we think it is otherwise. Here there seems no room to hope for any discovery of fresh materials: and of those which are in our hands, no more exhaustive treatment, no more discriminating criticism, no more constructive use can be expected, than are combined in this thorough and highly-finished work.

Throughout his historical and philological writings may be observed a certain severe caution, a suspicious reception of brilliant ingenuities, which might easily be mistaken for mere old-fashioned conservatism. It was, however, the temper of a man, not who was unwilling to see as much as others could shew him, but who already saw more; who remained unconvinced by the clever advocate, because he was the competent judge. More than any one we have ever met in life, he surrendered himself unconditionally to objective evidence; would accept anything, where this was cogent; nothing, where it failed. Idle excuses for not producing it where it was needed, he could not endure; and still less, any tampering with it, or dressing of it up into imposing but empty forms. The honest genius of Young was more congenial to him than the semi-charlatanism of Champollion: and no sooner was the mythical theory, which he was one of the first to apply to stories accounting for names and customs and buildings, overstrained by the physical mythologists on the one hand and Strauss' *Leben Jesu* on the other, than he intellectually resented the attempt to make a true principle responsible for a false consequence. With a high appreciation of the cost of knowledge, he distrusted all proposals to seize it by intuition, or to construct it out of inadequate materials held together by ideal cement. Hence it was that he turned a sceptical side towards "*the higher criticism*," which, in determining the age and genuineness of writings, appeals to the "*aesthetic sense*," instead of to "the definite tests of history, chronology, and language;" and said that "to make a feeling so difficult of analysis, so various in individuals, and so variable in the same individual, so dependent on association and idiosyncrasy, a test of criticism, is worse than to take the

foot of the Chancellor, for the time being, as the standard of Long Measure.”* This distrust, however, was perfectly disinterested, felt alike towards those who thus built up history, and towards those who pulled it down. The point of his criticism pricked all bubbles impartially, and cleared away everything but the natural sunshine and the wholesome air. In his estimate of evidence it must not be supposed that he overlooked or depreciated the internal marks of feeling and character, in the right reading of which literary criticism must always be largely concerned. His quick rejection of forced and artificial combinations arose from a subtle sense of what is natural in thought; and some of his firmest judgments,—e.g. on the Homeric question and on the Protevangelion,—were derived, in no slight degree, from delicate traces of psychological and moral unity in the writings submitted to his scrutiny. But then, ere he would trust his own “æsthetic feeling,” he required that it should produce and define its grounds, so as to present itself with adequate justification before other minds. And the terms he exacted from himself he deemed obligatory upon every scholar: and if any man in the cloak of the schools assumed the air of a prophet or “diviner,” he promptly and profanely asked him for a “sign.”

It remains only to say a few words of Mr. Kenrick as a theologian. For two reasons, they cannot give any adequate representation of his matured thought on Divine things. The materials are too scanty: and they are separated by long intervals of time, and are not to be quoted together, as if his mind had been stationary through fifty years. That in that time his exegetical judgments and his whole attitude towards the Scriptures changed to an extent which he himself did not measure as it went on, was evidenced by one of his later experiences. Being urged to bring out a new edition of his father’s “Exposition of the Historical Writings of the New Testament,” he addressed himself with undoubting faith to the task of revision. He did not propose to touch the character-

* The Poetical Element of Roman History, Prospective Review, Vol. II. p. 334. 1846.

istics of the book, and make it a reflection of his own mind instead of his father's; but merely to remove whatever had been manifestly outgrown, and bring text and comment into such harmony as the author himself would desire with the present state of knowledge. At the very outset he was met by the uncritical excision of the introductory chapters of Matthew and Luke,—an excision to which no conscientious scholar could concede even the negative sanction of silence. In the reflections on the Pentecostal descent of the Spirit, he found the gift of tongues treated as the miraculous power, instantaneously conferred, of speaking and understanding several foreign languages,—an interpretation which he himself had unanswerably confuted. In the notes on the proem of John, the preference is given to the mode of explanation which he regarded as least tenable. On this point perhaps his scruple might have been removed by the consideration that he had nothing certain to substitute for the construction which he deemed inadmissible. For we remember his saying, with the playful seriousness which made his presence so winning, that, on entering the better world, his first quest would be for the Apostle John, and his first word to him, “Dear Apostle, what *did* you mean by your Proem?” In almost every section, however, of the “Exposition,” he encountered matter which he was equally unwilling to alter and to leave unaltered; and in the end he thought it best to abandon the republication, and let his father's volumes repose on their well-merited repute of usefulness to two generations.

The fact that this experience took Mr. Kenrick completely by surprise, shews, we have said, that he had gradually, but considerably, shifted his theological position. In him, both the large change, and the imperfect consciousness of it, were perfectly natural. He began life in the school of the elder,—the præ-Channing,—English Unitarianism, and apparently rested contentedly on its characteristic postulates and propositions;—its Natural Theology of the scientific type, in which God results as First Cause from the inadequacy of Second Causes, and a Future Life remains a dark precarious possi-

bility ; its Christian Revelation, as the disclosure, by a miraculously accredited messenger, of supplementary truth not otherwise accessible. Other theory of the world and of the Divine relation to Man than this doctrine involves, we see no reason to suppose that Mr. Kenrick ever deliberately adopted. His aversion to speculative systems indisposed him for beginning again from the beginning : nor did he feel drawn towards the pretensions of the *a-priori* schools of thought by the mystical phraseology of Schleiermacher and the indistinct propositions of Bunsen. Rather than commit himself to these hazy tracks, he preferred "*stare super antiquas vias.*" His Christianity therefore appeared to remain, in its essence, a Religion of *Authority*, depending for its weight on its credentials of miracle. Discipleship, in this view, consists in believing what the gospel says and doing what it bids, because its messengers held a commission to teach and to command ; the New Testament writings containing the record of their message. These lines of thought, which we still meet in later productions, are most distinct perhaps in his Sermon of 1813, "The Necessity of Revelation to teach the Doctrine of a Future Life," and in that of 1836, "The Authority of Jesus as a divinely-inspired Teacher, sufficient for the Evidence and the Efficacy of Christianity." And the vehemence with which Theodore Parker assailed this theory of Authority was the decisive reason, with Mr. Kenrick, for ranking him among the opponents of Christianity ; though he naturally dwelt, with more offended feeling, on the disparaging terms applied to the person of Jesus. There is no doubt then that, when challenged to take sides, he would have ranged himself still with the ranks of accredited religion, known to be true not by its contents but by its attested source.

Yet his critical acumen, directed upon the Scriptures, led him to inevitable concessions which, though inconsiderable when taken one by one, insensibly perforated and "honey-combed" the whole ground of that older theory. While repelling "Strauss's attack upon the evidences of Revelation," he admits the co-existence of myth and history, and the need of

discrimination to separate them.* While vindicating the historical fidelity of the synoptical Gospels, he establishes in them a scale of true and less true, not excluding the false and contradictory, and gives the highest credit to an evangelist who cannot be claimed as an eye-witness of what he relates.† He contends earnestly for the *genuineness* of the prophecies attributed to Christ respecting the approaching end of the world and his own coming on the clouds to judge mankind; yet relinquishes their *truth*, and admits that they were spoken under illusion.‡ He resolves the inspiration on the day of Pentecost into eager, fluent, even inarticulate speech, the utterance of intense emotion; and the gift of tongues at Corinth, into the outpouring of religious feeling in the Christian assembly by *foreigners* in their own language; on both occasions reducing to a human phenomenon a χάρισμα which certainly is represented as Divine.§ Whether history coloured by tradition and mixed with myths, Apostles whose access of enthusiasm is construed into a descent of the Spirit, and a Prophet subject to mistaken visions of his own functions and the world's future, leave standing ground for a dictatorial and oracular revelation, to be taken on trust of its credentials, appears to us more than doubtful. But if this is not the kind of Revelation which our nature needs, if the prior conditions of religious apprehension and spiritual conviction are already given in the constitution of our mind, and only require, for their awakening into explicit truth, the objective appeal of a life and soul given to God in free and filial sacrifice,—then do we carry, in our conscience, reason, and affections, a verifying power which supersedes dictation and renders the fallibilities of an inspired soul innocuous. We have little doubt that, with Mr. Kenrick, as with many of his contemporaries, an ever-deepening reverence for the inward spirit and personal attributes of Christ silently substituted itself for the subjection of intellect and

* Prospective Review, Vol. VI. p. 75.

† Biblical Essays. On the Gospel of Mark.

‡ Theological Review, Vol. II. p. 253.

§ Prospective Review, Vol. VIII. p. 303. Biblical Essays. The Gift of Tongues.

will to his dicta ; and rendered it possible, so long as that divine image remained clear, to admit without a shock some inaccurate reports of his words and some erroneous conceptions in his mind. But for this change, rendering his discipleship less an *obedience* to Christ than a *communion* with him, he could never have yielded so much to critical evidence with so calm a faith. Into what a flutter of "abhorrence" is Mr. Belsham thrown by an account (evidently from the Göttingen student himself of 1819) of the lectures of a rationalist classroom : "I love the critical, I abhor the theological works of the German writers. I am astonished that the absurd hypothesis of anti-supernaturalism should have prevailed to such a degree. Is it possible that those who hold such opinions should be serious? Must they not certainly know, that to deny the miracles of Christ is to deny his divine mission, which is itself a miracle ; and that, in fact, it is downright infidelity?"* Could any one whose religion was held fast by the screw of this logic have maintained "sweet counsel" and unconstrained affection with the ever-moving mind of John James Tayler? Could he have so felt the power of quite a different school of thought, as to pronounce the concluding treatise in "Essays and Reviews," "the *Novum Organum* of Biblical Interpretation"?†—a treatise the effect of which is to clear the spiritual aspects of Scripture from all dependence on disputable "evidences ;" and which speaks in this wise : "The life of Christ, regarded quite naturally as of one 'who was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin,' is also the life and centre of Christian teaching. There is no higher aim which the preacher can propose to himself than to awaken what may be termed the feeling of the presence of God and the mind of Christ in Scripture ; not to collect evidences about dates and books, or to familiarize metaphysical distinctions ; but to make the heart and conscience of his hearers bear him witness that the lessons which are contained in Scripture,—lessons of

* Williams's *Memoirs of Thomas Belsham*, p. 703.

† *Theological Review*, Vol. I. p. 49.

justice and truth,—lessons of mercy and peace,—of the need of man and the goodness of God to him,—are indeed not human but divine.”* Without attributing to Mr. Kenrick any conscious removal from his early theological position, we yet believe that his judgment had led him to conclusions, and the currents of life floated him into a climate of feeling, congenial only with a philosophy other than he had imbibed; and that, whether or not it found a place in his understanding, it had some secret harmony with the largeness of his later sympathy and serenity of his faith.

Never were great and various gifts held more modestly or used more disinterestedly than Mr. Kenrick's. Of his title to take his part in the foremost discussions of European learning he could not be ignorant; and the firmness of his judgments shews that his intellect was unembarrassed by enfeebling self-distrust. But this firmness, far from being a self-assertion, arose in fact from self-forgetfulness; the security which he felt came from his free surrender of personal prejudice and will to the truth of things as it traced itself before him. He was so far above the level of either vanity or dogmatism, that cynicism itself could not think of them in his presence. And how readily he placed his vast knowledge and wise counsels at the disposal of others, is privately known to many a struggling student and man of letters, and publicly attested by the admirable condition of the Museum at York in its department of Antiquities. So quickly, indeed, in his very manner, did his kindly nature come to the front and seize what was of interest to you, that you would hardly suspect the treasures of thought that lay behind, were it not for the fine sense and delicate light with which the commonest topics were touched, and the deliberate yet easy finish of his most colloquial speech. Precisely because he was absolutely simple and natural, he could never lay aside the ways of the scholar, and with his refined courtesy be mistaken for a mere man of the world: his very passages of wit were too far from nonsense, and too terse in

* *Essays and Reviews: Jowett on the Interpretation of Scripture*, p. 430.

form, to flow from less practised faculties: they were more like the well-aimed flash of some dramatic dialogue, than the random stroke of social repartee. Beyond the inner circle of his friends, he left so much the impression of dignity, if not of reserve, that this lighter play of his nature may seem hardly credible. But in truth he was susceptible through life of the most friendly alternations of gravity and laughter: on the first touch of sunshine the grey depths of his vast sense and knowledge leapt up and sparkled. Professor Mylne's account of him at College might be summed up in the proverbial expression, "an old head on young shoulders;" and this expression curiously gives his physical as well as his moral portraiture. Look at him in his lecture-chair, at the age of thirty, and cut off from view all below his face, and in the massive brow, the steady eyes, the full deliberate lips and measured frugality of words, you would take him for a veteran scholar who had taught so long as to have outgrown the use of books. Look at him at the age of sixty as he passes in the street, noticing him however only from behind, and in the springy step, the falling shoulders, the straight unburdened figure, you might suppose him a youth on some brisk errand. Within, as well as without, there was a blending in him of the young with the mature, of boyish humour and sensitive purity with intellectual strength and moral dignity. This delightful union endeared him all the more to his intimate friends, because inconspicuous to others: it was a kind of precious secret reserved for them. If you were a stranger, you were indeed still secure of the pleasantest courtesy from him, till you shewed yourself a fool or something worse. If *that* happened, you felt, you knew not whence, a sudden shock, as if you had sailed full speed upon a sunken reef. Without positive rebuke, he had a negative way of cutting short folly and shaming wrong, which had the effect of summary and unanswerable justice. But this administration of the cold bath to what he disapproved, though often best for quenching the ill, was not so much a purposed treatment of it as a mere arrest of his natural sympathy, and falling back into reserve. With all

his patience and geniality, there can be no doubt that a little sense and a good deal of character were essential to call forth his confidence and affection.

That such a man as we have described should be faithful to his convictions, and cheerfully accept the scale of duty which might be compatible with them, is so much a matter of course, that we will not dishonour him by suggesting how much greater a place he might have filled in the world had that place been determined by his powers alone without his conscience. He was above ambition, incapable of pretence, eager to see things as they are, and assured that, through the darkness that sometimes enfolds them, the only guide is the unswerving love of truth; and, accepting life for service, not for sway, he never measured his sphere to see whether it was small or great, but deemed it enough to bear his witness where he stood, and help, as he might, the companions of his way. He has lived long enough to gather in something of their gratitude and love. And now—to use his own last words—“comes at length the happy change,” through which he “knows even as he is known.”

JAMES MARTINEAU.

VI.—HUMAN AUTOMATISM.

Principles of Mental Physiology. By Dr. W. B. Carpenter, C.B., F.R.S., &c. Fourth Edition. London: King & Co. 1877.

The Physical Basis of Mind. By G. H. Lewes. London: Trübner & Co. 1877.

Body and Mind: a Lecture. By Prof. W. K. Clifford, F.R.S. Fortnightly Review, December, 1874.

ENGLAND has long been pre-eminently the land where the senses and the understanding receive supreme homage. Coleridge, and other distinguished writers of the same mental type,

have done their best to transplant from Continental into English soil a recognition of such supersensual sources of truth as the pure reason, the moral discernment, the spiritual insight of the affections. But though such doctrines, whether imported or indigenous, have doubtless produced and are producing most excellent and precious results in individual minds, and are keeping alive in our thought and literature an interest in all the diviner aspects of human life, it still remains true that the philosophical writings which command extensive circulation, and the philosophical lectures which are most largely attended and most loudly applauded, are those which seek to bring all truth and knowledge within the range of our sensational experience. Even in religion, the English mind finds it difficult to accept any evidence which does not finally come home to the criterion of the senses, and hence we may well look forward with some anxiety to the future in store for this country, when science and criticism shall have totally undermined that unintelligent but most potent reverence for a miraculously-attested Word of God which has long, we think, been one of the chief safeguards of our national morality and virtue. While some of the many inquiring minds who are now being led to distrust the so-called "Evidences of Religion," still find a secure basis for their fundamental theological beliefs in the indisputable facts furnished by consciousness, by nature, and by history, it can hardly be doubted that a large proportion of those who throw off the authority of an infallible book, throw off at the same time their interest in religious utterances and institutions, and betake themselves to the most popular philosophical writings of the day, or to some lecture-hall, where they learn that man is an automaton, and that a clear perception of the truth of Evolution renders all theological assumptions superfluous and impertinent. No doubt, much of the interest and enthusiasm which have recently attended these distinctly anti-theological expositions of human nature and the universe is due to inevitable reaction. The lecturer regards himself as the triumphant representative of that Physical Science which narrow-minded theologians have so long ill-

treated and repressed, and can hardly resist the temptation to carry his victory too far, and to attempt the forcible annexation of territory to which he has no rightful claim; while his hearers, glad to be freed from the tyranny of irrational and uncharitable creeds, eagerly follow in the footsteps of their fluent and confident leader, fail to discriminate between his facts and his theories, and in the excitement and novelty of the enterprise do not realize the unpleasant truth that this so-called science only achieves its pretended conquests at the expense of devastating that fertile region of moral and religious experience, whence their own higher life has drawn its most wholesome nourishment. If this anti-theological bias, however, were the only cause of the present alienation of much of our cultured as well as our uncultured thought from religious belief, we might well be content to let time and reflection restore the due balance between the spheres of Science and Theology. We should reasonably expect, in that case, that when religious teaching had learned to confine itself to its legitimate function, to declaring, that is, the existence and the character of an all-pervading Spirit, whose uniform mode of energizing in the external world it is for Physical Science to reveal, while Theology investigates His relations to the moral and spiritual nature of man, the antagonism between scientific and theological truth would happily terminate; that the *savant*, on the one hand, would busy himself with unravelling and utilizing the modes of energy manifested in the outer world; that the theologian, on the other hand, would gratefully receive this precious gift of increasing scientific insight, and would repay the benefit by vivifying man's consciousness of a Divine Presence in nature and humanity, and by disclosing the wondrous light and strength and comfort which miraculously visit the soul, when man dies to passion and selfishness, and freely surrenders himself to the guidance of the Living God within him. It is, however, evident that the present mood of scientific thought and sentiment all over the civilized world, and especially in this country, is not such as to encourage the expectation that Culture and Faith will speedily enter upon

amicable relations. Far more ambitious aims than were ever before cherished now occupy the minds of most of the intellectual leaders in the study of nature, and these aims must either be in great measure substantiated or else proved wholly chimerical, before the ground will be cleared for the establishment of a definite understanding between liberal theology and general knowledge and literature. Few thoughtful persons can avoid feeling in some degree the potent domination of that far-sweeping idea of Evolution to which convergent discoveries in dynamical and biological science have recently given birth. There is, beyond question, a powerful fascination in the conception that the present matter and energy in the universe exist in unchanged amount from eternity to eternity, and that all past, present and future modes of activity and collocation, whether mineral or organic, have been, and ever will be, the necessary outcome of the material or ethereal constitution of the cosmical elements. Many, indeed, and we among the number, believe that there are features in this doctrine which are at once new, true and important, but still maintain that what is scientifically tenable in it both harmonizes with, and indeed logically demands, the recognition of a Power behind phenomena, in whom have ever been potentially present all the marvels of beauty and wise arrangement, all the treasures of intelligence, love and genius, the successive manifestation of which Evolution discloses. The science of to-day, however, is by no means convinced of this, and will certainly not admit the necessity of postulating the existence of One in whose being all the life and consciousness that nature evolves is already involved, till it has exhausted every possible attempt to explain the existing universe of matter and of mind by the spontaneous combination and interaction of material units on the one hand, and of units of sentiency on the other. That these elementary units are of such a character and possessed of such principles of movement and association, that by their mutual play they do at length gradually eliminate undesirable collocations of matter and force, and give prevalence and persistency to those which are harmonious and beautiful, the

Evolutionist of course freely allows, and did this concession afford an adequate basis for theological ideas and beliefs, Mr. Spencer's claim to be considered the reconciler of Religion and Science would no doubt be well-founded. It is clear, however, that if Evolution is so interpreted as to furnish no other point of contact with the religious consciousness than the above, then must Theology either utterly succumb, or else find solid grounds for disputing and refuting this alleged explanation of the phenomena of nature and of human life.

It is not our purpose in this paper to attempt to justify our belief that the advocates of Evolution will ultimately feel themselves compelled to admit that there is no intelligible passage from the mineral to the organic realm save through the incoming and activity of a higher type of energy, which is not continuous with the lower forms of force, but rather overrules and controls them in obedience to formative ideas. We prefer at present to confront the current form of the Evolution theory at a later stage, to take our stand on the realities of consciousness (which of all realities are most directly accessible), and to contend that the efforts of Evolutionists to bring humanity within the range of their general principle, that all the higher forms of life have an adequate explanation in the lower forms which precede them, come, in the instance of human nature at all events, into fatal collision with immovable and indisputable facts. It is probably true, as some distinguished physiologists have maintained, that life is always prior to organism, and creates its own requisite organs in the apparently structureless protoplasm. As this, however, may be open to question, we will not here insist upon it, but will take as our thesis the proposition, that *there is an element in human nature which uses the brain as its instrument, and which stands therefore to cerebral molecular changes, not in the relation of an accompaniment or a consequent, but in that of an antecedent and true cause of the changes in question.* That control over lower forms of force by a new and higher power, which in the case of all organic life we are disposed to assume, can in the case of man, we think, be shewn to be an unmistakable reality.

If this be so, however, what becomes of "the principle of continuity," which is the very pith and marrow of the popular form of the Evolution doctrine? How can a power which exercises its causality over the fabric of the body, be itself but the subjective counterpart of those changes in the cerebrum which constitute the scientific aspect of our conscious existence? Our scientific expositors of this school seek to explain how, according to the laws of molecular physics, the atoms and the ether form themselves into the various modes of organic existence, and at length assume such complex relations, in the case of animal structures, that under certain circumstances of nervous arrangement and movement, a new phenomenon or attribute, that of sentiency, arises; and as the interactions of the animal and its surroundings become still more complicated, the cerebral structure acquires greater elaboration, and sentiency rises into the human consciousness; when lo! these modes of sentiency, which are but the subjective aspects of certain kinds of nervous change, start up now and assume the dignity of independent causes, and turning round upon the brain, of whose movements they are, on evolutionist principles, if not the products, at least the mere inoperative accompaniments, begin to use that elaborate organ as a machine at their disposal, and so modify its molecular arrangements as to set the laws of physics, and therefore all scientific exposition, at utter defiance. If this deliverance of consciousness, that we are the true cause of our muscular movements, be accepted, then the spheres of physics and psychology invade each other, and should it so happen, as consciousness also testifies is the case, that this disturber of molecular movements can exercise in some cases a free, that is an uncaused choice, then Evolution has, indeed, evolved a creature from whom she naturally shrinks, a creature with whom her science is unable in some measure to deal, and whose movements bid fair to interfere seriously with her boasted prevision of events. We will first discuss the devices whereby recent scientific teachers strive to explain away this mysterious presence, among the products of Evolution, of a volitional energy of which Evolution can

furnish no adequate account, and which appears to refute its pretensions, and then we will inquire of Dr. Carpenter and others what is the probable relation of this Will-power to the mechanism of body and mind.

About the year 1870, Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, in his "Theory of Practice," called the attention of Evolutionists to this question, and since then Mr. Douglas A. Spalding has never missed an opportunity of reminding them what a serious blunder they commit, if they venture to speak of our sentient or volitional states as being in any sense the causes of our bodily activity. Mr. Hodgson thus illustrates the doctrine to which, under the name of "Human Automatism," so much attention has been lately directed, especially since Professors Huxley and Clifford have lent their scientific reputation to its support :

"A burnt child dreads the fire : why ? Because the nerve-movements supporting the sensation are continued into the movements supporting the emotion. A burnt child avoids the fire : why ? Because the nerve-movements supporting the emotion are continued into the movements supporting the muscular action."*

Mr. Spalding expresses himself in a similar strain :

"Sitting in his easy chair, Mr. Brown debates with himself how much he will give to the Mill Memorial Fund. Greed, small vanity, respect for Mr. Mill, the fear of being thought shabby, and perhaps a score of other mental states come and go, and at last he writes a cheque for £5. Mr. Brown was aware of the mental side of his deliberations, while the corresponding physical changes in his nervous system were hidden from his observation. Hence the easy mistake of supposing that in signing the cheque, the fingers moved in obedience to the spiritual direction."†

This doctrine has undergone some extension since Mr. Hodgson first published it. He declares that there is evidence to shew that nerve currents are causes of states of consciousness, but there is no evidence to shew that states of consciousness are causes of nerve currents. It was in this form that Pro-

* Theory of Practice, Vol. I. 425.

† Nature, Jan. 8, 1874.

fessor Huxley and Lord Amberley adopted it, and the latter, strange to say, discovered in it a mighty bulwark "against the semi-scientific materialism of our time." It is somewhat curious that these writers should not have seen the inconsistency of allowing that motions in the sensory nerves can affect consciousness, while denying a converse power in mental states to produce nervous and muscular change. If matter can act on mind, why should not mind re-act on matter? Probably their acceptance of this inconsistency was partly due to their wish to carry scepticism no further than the necessities of their theory of the universe required. In admitting that the external world awakens our perceptive consciousness, no harm was done to the principles of Evolution, provided it was distinctly understood that the consciousness thus generated should go no further, should exercise no disturbing influence on those molecular movements in which alone physical science feels an interest. The theory of Automatism assumed, however, its complete development in Professor Clifford's Lecture on Body and Mind. This popular lecturer distinctly declines to admit a causal relation either way; and if we ask the grounds of this refusal, we must be content with his positive assertion that "the only thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter, or the motion of surrounding matter."* This Lecture on "Body and Mind" is a conspicuous instance of that indiscriminate confounding of scientific truths with mere speculative dogmas which too many of our *savans* now affect, and which can have no other results than those of degrading science and of seriously misleading public opinion. The doctrine of Human Automatism, he assures us, is "a result to which all the greatest minds that have studied this question in the right way have gradually been approximating for a long

* In reference to Professor Clifford's method of deciding the question by an assertion of his inability to conceive how molecules can be moved, save by neighbouring molecules, the following remark by Dr. Carpenter is worth noting: "I am yet to learn that either in this or any other case our deductions from experience are to be limited by our ability to supply their *rationale*."—Contemporary Review, February, 1875, p. 416.

time." Mark the expression, "in the right way"—in other words, in Professor Clifford's way. Is not this the quintessence of "orthodoxy"? Surely there is some reason to fear lest in escaping from the dogmatism of theology our free-thinkers may encounter a scarcely less virulent and noxious dogmatism on the part of certain one-sided physicists.* And what is somewhat grotesque is, that within a page or two of this bold assertion, that among competent men there is a rapidly approaching *consensus* on this question, Professor Clifford actually overlooks his own theory, and slips unconsciously into the ordinary belief in the interaction of body and mind.

On page 21 of the reprint of the Lecture by the Sunday Lecture Society, we read :

"It is not a right thing to say, for example, that the mind is a force, because if the mind were a force, we should be able to perceive it. I should be able to perceive your mind and to measure it, but I cannot ; I have absolutely no means of perceiving your mind. I judge by analogy that it exists, and the instinct which leads me to come to that conclusion is the social instinct, as it has been formed in me by generations during which men have lived together, *and they could not have lived together unless they had gone upon that supposition.*"

Professor Clifford here forgets that a "supposition" is neither a molecule nor a motion of molecules, and therefore, on his theory, can in no way interfere with the activity of the human beings who thus group themselves in societies. Were they all unconscious automata, and Professor Clifford the one favoured mortal who had passed into the conscious stage, the molecules in the creatures around him, once set in motion,

* We are not disposed to exchange our Christian Theism for the principles of Positivism and the Religion of Humanity, but we do think that the following recent utterance by Mr. Frederic Harrison is as true as it is sad : "We live amidst a constant and growing usurpation of science in the province of philosophy, of biology in the province of sociology, of physics in that of religion. Nothing is more common than the use of the term science, when what is meant is merely physical and physiological science, not social and moral science. The arrogant attempts to dispose of the deepest moral truths of human nature on a bare physical or physiological basis is almost enough to justify the insurrection of some impatient theologians against science itself."—Nineteenth Century, June, 1877, p. 631.

would, if his view be the correct one, have played their merry game in the self-same way, and would afford our Professor no possible clue to the secret whether they were accompanied in their dances by a parallel series of states of consciousness, or were only in the position of the molecules of Professor Huxley's frog, who performed no contemptible achievements when its head was cut off. The logical outcome of this theory cannot be more accurately and forcibly expressed than in the words of Dr. Carpenter, who thus characterizes Professor Huxley's views :

"If his present doctrine be true, not only of particular cases, but of human life generally, it follows that its stream would flow on exactly as it does, if we had no consciousness at all of what we are about ; that the actions and reactions of the 'ideogenous molecules' would do the work of the philosopher, even if they never generated ideas in his mind ; that he would give forth its results in books or lectures, not from any desire that his books should be read and his lectures heard, so as to bring the thoughts of other minds into relation with his own, but simply because certain molecular motions in his brain call forth the movements of speech or writing ; and that, in like manner, the noblest works of genius—the master-pieces of the poet, the artist, and the musician—would none the less have been produced, if the 'symbols in consciousness' had never been evoked in their producers' nature, and would prove none the less attractive to other automata, if the molecular movements of their brains should be equally incapable of exciting either intellectual or emotional activity ; such activity being, to use a legal phrase, mere 'surplusage.' To me this seems like a *reductio ad absurdum* ; but that is, I have been publicly informed, because I am getting old and my brain is becoming ossified, so as no longer to be able to keep up with the advance of other brains."*

An avenging Nemesis seems to follow in the footsteps of our English devotees of mere sensuous knowledge, and to punish them for their one-sided rejection of some of the most important facts of consciousness by causing them to utter, in the very name of practical common sense, doctrines quite as

* Mental Physiology, Preface to Fourth Edition, p. xxix, and Contemporary Review, May, 1875.

preposterous as any of those to which the extravagance of German speculation has led its votaries. Scarcely, for instance, have the charms of Evolution drawn away public attention from Mr. J. S. Mill's account of matter as mere sensation and possibilities of sensation, and of man as a series of conscious states, strangely cognizant of itself as a series, than Evolution in turn generates another paradox equally unnatural, and Professor Clifford confidently proclaims his startling theory as one which is (a few individual thinkers excepted) "the doctrine of Science at the present day." A little further on, in the article from which we have quoted above, Dr. Carpenter, in reference to Professor Clifford's assertion that there is a parallelism between mental facts and physical facts, but no interference of one with the other, observes :

"I think most of the readers of this remarkable passage will agree with me, that the only justification of it which the writer could give would be his own proposition of a scientific *rationale* of the phenomena to be accounted for. But so far is he from attempting this, that he abandons the attempt as hopeless ; repudiating Professor Huxley's admission of a causal relation between *neuroses* and *psychoses*, as no less unscientific than the converse ; and reverting to what is really the Leibnitzian doctrine of 'pre-established harmonies' without its theology,—of which Professor Huxley remarks that those may accept it who choose to do so."

In the earlier part of his Lecture, Professor Clifford does, indeed, speak of this mysterious parallelism of perfectly independent trains of phenomena, as though it were a sort of pre-established harmony, which he would have been inclined to explain by the hypothesis of some superhuman causality, had it not been for the apparent absence in the universe of a cosmical *brain* competent for such vast and complex pre-arrangements. In the absence of such a resource, however, he appears to feel, as his Lecture draws to a close, that something must be done to link together by some community of substance or causality these otherwise quite astounding coincidences. He devotes a paragraph, accordingly, to an attempt to bridge over

the gulf between the two sets of phenomena ; and in this part of his Lecture, if we understand him aright, he virtually unsays much of what he had before insisted on. "The reality which underlies matter," he tells us, "the reality which we perceive as matter, is that same stuff which being compounded together in a particular way produces mind." Comparing this with another passage in which he declares "that in order to save continuity in our belief, we are obliged to assume that along with every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves," it would appear that he regards matter and mind as merely the two aspects of one substance, and that accordingly a special arrangement of the nervous system is but the objective phase of a particular form of consciousness ; the various molecular movements of the brain have each their own sentient side, and these form by their complex and varied combinations the ever-shifting scenery of our mental life.

This view is surely hardly consistent with the previous assertion, "that the physical facts go by themselves, and the mental facts by themselves;" for wherever a physical fact goes, it now appears that a corresponding mental fact of necessity accompanies it, so that the changes in brain-matter produced by influences from the outer world naturally present as their other face certain forms of sensational consciousness. We believe, however, that this is Professor Clifford's ultimate solution of his mystery, and, indeed, it seems to us the conclusion to which the present view of Evolution must inevitably tend. The "law of continuity" forbids that any perfectly novel element shall ever appear upon the stage of existence ; simple modes of sentiency, then, must have been present all through the process of development, and man's ripest consciousness is but a very elaborate compound of the same. That is to say, our conviction of the unity and abiding identity of our conscious life, as well as the conviction of our causal power over bodily movement, are both alike illusory. The elements of our consciousness are shewn to be in as perpetual a flux as are those of our body, if prevalent scientific speculation becomes established truth.

There has lately appeared, however, from the veteran pen of Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his work on "The Physical Basis of Mind," an attempt to preserve the spirit of the present Evolution scheme and yet do as little violence as possible to consciousness. In opposition to Professors Huxley and Clifford, he distinctly maintains that our subjective states do exert a causal influence over our bodily actions, and he appeals to consciousness as sufficient evidence of this position ; yet he still holds fast to Mr. Spencer's principle, that states of brain and states of consciousness are but the objective and subjective aspects of the same unknowable energy. The substance of his doctrine may be gathered from the following extract :

"If the hand be passing over a surface, there is accompanying this movement a succession of muscular and tactile feelings which may be said to be collateral products. But the feeling which *accompanies* one muscular contraction is *itself the stimulus* of the next contraction ; if anywhere during the passage the hand comes upon a spot in the surface which is wet or rough, the change in feeling thus produced, although a collateral product of the movement, instantly changes the direction of the hand, suspends or alters the course—that is to say, the *collateral product of one movement becomes a directing factor in the succeeding movement.*"*

Mr. Lewes' view is thus virtually identical with the views of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Bain. They all regard mind and body as constituting what the latter calls "a double-faced unity"—one substance with two sets of properties, the physical and the mental, all conscious states having their counterparts in corresponding arrangements of cerebral matter. But while the other exponents of this doctrine admit (in opposition to Professor Clifford) that these two sets of properties, inherent in one substance, do interact, they do not volunteer any explanation of how this interaction can take place. This omission Mr. Lewes seeks to supply, and in so doing, we think, exposes the untenable character of the whole theory. How is it conceivable that the present sensation, whose very existence

* P. 407.

(we are told) is necessarily bound up with a simultaneous cerebral state, should be competent to be the cause of a succeeding and different nervous condition? On Mr. Lewes' own theory, the sensation in question continues exactly so long as its cerebral aspect remains unchanged, so that in order that it may prove the cause of a change in this cerebral aspect, it must first clear the way by ceasing to exist. Nor, indeed, does the appeal to consciousness at all support the assertion that the sensation is the primary cause of the muscular movement. In all cases of true volition, it is not the passive sensation but the Self who feels the sensation that consciousness declares to be seat and source of man's causality; and by analogy we may well suppose that even in our own automatic movements (as in starting back from a sudden blow), or in the actions of the lower animals, it is not to the sensation that is felt, but to the vital organizing energy which feels the affection, that we must ascribe all bodily activity.

We believe, then, it is quite impossible to give any interpretation of man's nature, at once self-consistent and in harmony with the clear testimony of consciousness, which does not regard Spirit and Body as independent entities, most closely connected, indeed, and exerting vast influence on each other, yet mutually related, not as the two sides of a "double-faced unity," not as the music to the harp, but as the musician to the instrument, the rider to the horse. The fitness of the latter simile to indicate the relation of the soul to its nervous organs will be more clearly seen if we remember that the horse often journeys on by habit, and so relieves the rider from the necessity of attention, and at other times runs away with the rider against the will of the latter, and may become a source of serious injury instead of useful help. The precise nature of this connection between Mind and Brain has been admirably expounded and illustrated by Dr. Carpenter in his valuable treatise on "Mental Physiology," and it is noteworthy that this eminent Biologist, who has made the automatic mechanism of human and animal life a special study, and who, there is reason to believe, understands both

the great range of its operation and its rationale as well, at least, as any man, can after reflection thus sum up his conclusion :

“After an attentive re-examination of the whole question, I find nothing in the results of more recent researches to shake the conviction at which I arrived nearly forty years ago, of the existence of a fundamental distinction, not only between the Rational actions of sentient beings guided by experience, and the Automatic movements of creatures whose whole life is obviously but the working of a mechanism—but also between those actions (common to man and intelligent brutes) which are determined by a preponderating attraction towards an object present to the consciousness, and those (peculiar, as I believe, to man) in which there is, at one stage or another, that distinct purposive intervention of the self-conscious Ego which we designate Will, whereby the direction of the activity is modified.”*

Dr. Carpenter and Mr. G. H. Lewes both emphatically protest against the doctrine of Human Automatism, but the protest of the former reaches to a far more vital point than does that of the latter. Mr. Lewes thinks that Automatism vanishes if it can be shewn that Man's feelings exercise causal power over his actions ; but this alone is far from satisfying Dr. Carpenter. He would still continue to regard Man as an Automaton, unless there is ground for the assurance that Free-will is no illusion. To that same Consciousness, to which Mr. Lewes resorts as to an authority perfectly competent to decide the question whether actions are determined by feelings, Dr. Carpenter with at least equal justice appeals in support of the position that Man possesses genuine freedom of choice. After quoting with approval Mr. Sidgwick's remark—

“Nothing short of absolute proof that this consciousness (of freedom) is erroneous, could overcome the force with which it announces itself as certain ; and I cannot perceive that such proof has been given,”

Dr. Carpenter adds :

“It is alleged, indeed, that the belief entertained by all men—

* Mental Physiology. Preface to Fourth Edition, p. xiv.

except Philosophers—in their own freedom of choice (within certain limits) between different modes of action, is an illusion of ignorant ‘common sense,’ which, like the vulgar belief that the sun moves round the earth, is utterly dispelled by the light of Science. But the two beliefs rest upon an entirely different basis. The latter, like other erroneous beliefs which arise in the exercise of our senses, is an *inference* from the facts of Consciousness, which a more enlarged experience (such as that afforded by almost every railway journey) shews to be untenable; the former is the *immediate affirmation* of Consciousness itself, the assurance of which, its constant recurrence under a great variety of conditions only serves to confirm.”*

It is true that throughout this important volume there are occasional modes of expression, and here and there a line of argument pursued, which seem to us hardly to harmonize with the above clearly expressed and decisive judgment concerning the Ego and its freedom. To one or two of these real or seeming incongruities we shall refer presently; and we suppose that it is owing to them that in some few instances which have come under our notice, entirely erroneous opinions have been expressed concerning both the drift of the book, and Dr. Carpenter’s position in reference to the prevailingly unspiritual character of recent speculation. Only a few weeks ago, we saw in a religious journal a quotation from an imposing communication purporting to come from some high authority in the invisible world, in which Dr. Carpenter and Professors Huxley and Clifford were classed together as the *coryphæi* of English Materialism. In this case, however, we suppose we need not assume any misunderstanding of the book before us, as either the “unconscious cerebration” or the conscious spite of the Medium employed would furnish ample explanation.

The essential questions between the Materialists and the Spiritualists (I use this word in its philosophical sense), are—1. Is the Spirit, or Ego, to be regarded as an indivisible entity, which acts upon the body, or does it rather consist in a certain *consensus* of physiological and psycholo-

* Preface to Fourth Edition, p. 20.

gical functions? In other words, has it a conceivable existence apart from the cerebral instrument, or is it, as it were, a sort of tune which that instrument plays when in good working order, and which, therefore, ceases to exist the moment the brain dissolves? 2. Admitting that the Spirit is an Energy, or Substance, and not a mere group of relations, does it, under certain circumstances, possess and exercise a self-determining power, a free preferential choice between contending motives, or is its conduct on all occasions simply the resultant of the internal and external influences which act upon it? Now, in reply to both these basal questions, the volume before us gives no uncertain response. Distinctly and emphatically does the Author take his stand on the spiritualistic side. When we leave these fundamental truths, which rest on the irrefragable testimony of consciousness, we enter into a more or less speculative region, where spiritualists, at one upon essentials, may arrive at different conclusions. With respect to the nature of the Ego, for instance, we may, with Lotze and Leibnitz, regard it as a spiritual monad, or, with Ulrici, prefer to imagine it under the form of a non-atomic ethereal fluid. As to its functions, we may, with many of the schoolmen and with orthodox Roman Catholic writers, regard it as the Form of the body, and suppose that it unconsciously builds up and repairs the physical frame in which it consciously dwells, or we may be disposed to refer the bodily organization to a certain intermediate agency or Vital Principle, or again to consider that physical forces alone are under certain conditions competent for the construction of body and brain. The more important of these disputed matters we will presently briefly discuss, and may as well explain at the outset that, as our object is rather criticism than description, we shall have to pass over in great part the many valuable features in the book which we unreservedly accept and admire, and to dwell mainly on those which seem to us less satisfactory. Able summaries of the work have already appeared in some widely-circulated journals, but those who are interested in the topics to which the Theological Review is devoted will doubtless take care to

make first-hand acquaintance with a treatise of such great importance alike to the teacher, the moralist and the preacher. In advising those of our readers who have not yet done so, to give it a careful perusal, we are setting before them no irksome task. As the Times newspaper remarks, "the account of 'Memory,' of 'Common Sense,' of 'Unconscious Cerebration,' and of 'Reverie and Somnambulism,' will be absolute revelations to the great majority of readers." Along with it should be read Miss Cobbe's charming article in Macmillan's Magazine.* The view taken by Dr. Carpenter and Miss Cobbe as to the possible range of unconscious acts of judgment may prove to require some qualification,† and some of the instances adduced seem to transgress the limit which Dr. Carpenter himself fixes, i.e. that in all such unconscious ideomotor processes, "the action takes place only along the lines previously laid down by Volitional direction." Nor are we quite satisfied that some of the wonderful feats done by somnambulists are not to be attributed to conscious thinking which has left no trace of itself in the memory.‡ Still, when all needful deductions shall have been made, it remains certain that Unconscious Mental Automatism plays no inconsiderable part in our life. It is in Conscious Automatism, however, that the interest of Mental Physiology centres. The important fact so ably explained and illustrated by Dr. Carpenter, that this can be *acquired*, that by the exercise of our volitional freedom we are constantly fashioning for ourselves (not only a physiological, but) an emotional and intellectual mechanism, which, according to its character, will be either an abiding help and blessing, or a fearful impediment and curse to our future existence, must give to this treatise the highest possible value in rela-

* Nov. 1870.

† See article by Mr. R. H. Hutton on "Latent Thought," *Contemp. Review*, July, 1874.

‡ In the case of surgical operations performed under the influence of anæsthetics, it is not absolutely certain that no pain is felt. Mr. G. H. Lewes quotes a case (mentioned by M. Despine) of a patient who under chloroform struggled, swore, and cried out, "Mon Dieu ! que je souffre !" yet when the operation was over he remembered nothing of what he had felt. "The Physical Basis of Mind," p. 399.

tion to Education and Ethics. Dr. Carpenter also maintains, and we think justly, that in all our bodily activity, the Ego does not act directly upon the muscles, but rather sets in motion the previously fashioned mechanism. Referring to the Ego under the figure of the *âme*, and to the mechanism under that of the *bête*, he says:

"The will does not (as is commonly supposed) operate directly upon the nervo-muscular apparatus, singling out the muscles which are to be brought into play, and combining these into co-ordinate action, but simply commands the *bête* 'do this,' and the *bête*, if previously habituated to the performance of the action, forthwith executes it, just as

'Obedient Yamen
Answered 'Amen,'
And did
As he was bid.'"*

We have said that Dr. Carpenter now and then makes statements which seem to us hardly in harmony with the general drift of his teaching. As one instance, we may mention that he puts belief in the "Uniformity of Nature" on the same level of Intuitive certainty as our assurance of our Personal Identity and of our own Free-will.† This is liable, we think, to imperil the chief intuitions on which Spiritualism rests. Again, he speaks of "the unvarying Uniformity in the mode of operation of the Divine Mind,"‡ and appears to think that God's Foreknowledge would enable Him to provide for all the contingencies arising from our Free-will. We, however, have no experience of any faculty of prevision that could forecast the results of human freedom. Such a faculty, indeed, seems to us not only inconceivable, but even self-contradictory, and we see no reason why we should not suppose that the Deity is constantly adjusting His activity to the emergencies of human existence, as they severally arise, if not by ethereal action on the material universe, yet by freely influencing the spiritual life of his intelligent creatures. Freedom in man, and indeed all religious experience, seem to imply a reciprocal possibility of

* Contemp. Review, May, 1875, p. 941.

† P. 226.

‡ P. 700.

variation and adaptation in God's action upon the soul. It appears to us more philosophical to refer Uniformity of Sequence, in so far as it prevails, to God as its author, rather than to regard it as a Law binding on Him.

Passing now to that Speculative region to which we have before referred, we venture with some diffidence to express an opinion (which opinion, however, we have been in great part led to form through help from the book we are reviewing) at variance with Dr. Carpenter's on a very important point. We cannot but regard the power which builds up and sustains the bodily organism as of an entirely higher character than the forces of heat, electricity, &c., which it presses into its service, and therefore as by no means correlative or interchangeable with these. In short, we believe in a Vital Principle, a *vis vitæ*, and that, too, in full knowledge of the fact that we shall be regarded as retrograding into the "metaphysical" stage of mental development, and as deserving of being treated to the full pungency of Molière's oft quoted witticism about the *virtus dormitiva*. The *nerve-force*, indeed, we quite agree with Dr. Carpenter in regarding as correlative with other physical "modes of motion;" but it is not the nerve-force which builds up the body, nor is it the nerve-force which co-ordinates muscular movements, and constitutes the seat of all that conscious and unconscious, original and acquired, automatic direction, the character and laws of which Dr. Carpenter so admirably and fully elucidates. The *bête* which sometimes obeys and sometimes runs away with the *âme*, and which can be the seat of sensation as well as of the most complex activity, this, we are strongly inclined to believe, is far from being a mere aggregate of physical forces held together by their own interaction. It is rather a power which overrules, controls and combines—in short, organizes for an end—the physical forces which are its servants. As Dr. Lionel S. Beale well remarks: "The physical forces are actually opposed to construction, and before anything can be built up, the tendencies of force must be overcome by *formative agency* or power."* Notwithstanding all the

* Contemporary Review, April, 1871, p. 98.

efforts of Mr. Spencer and others to give the *rationale* of living organisms without assuming an organizing power, the old rhyme still remains as true as ever :

“You, nor I, nor nobody knows

How oats, peas, beans, and barley grows.”*

It is the assurance that there is some power here not correlative to the physical forces which makes Mr. Lewes, though he will not admit a Vital Principle, insist on the inappropriateness of the term *mechanism* to the actions of an organism. “The actions of the machine are *subordinated*; the actions of an organism are *coordinated*. . . . In the organism, all are parts of one sympathetic whole; each re-acts on each; each is altered by the other.”† We see no reason to accept Mr. Lewes’ paradoxical theory that in all organic activities there is sentiency, though that sentiency may be sub-conscious or altogether unconscious. Unconscious sentiency seems to us to be a *contradictio in adjecto*, an *Unding*, as a German critic, candidly cited by Mr. Lewes, calls it. But we do firmly hold that, in all true organic acts, there is operative in the nervous centres a power which, though at times unconscious, is never merely mechanical. Dr. Carpenter says: “That mental antecedents can call forth physical consequents is just as certain as that physical antecedents can call forth mental consequents; and thus the correlation between Mind-force and Nerve-force is shewn to be complete *both ways*, each being able to excite the other.”‡ That the physical forces affect the mind, and that the mind acts on the physical forces, we firmly believe, but the “correlation” we are quite unable to accept; they act on each other because there is a power present which has relations to both, and serves as the means of communication from one to the other. That power is the Vital Principle, the great agent alike in Organism

* See an excellent paper on “Life and Life-force, from a Physician’s Standpoint,” by Dr. G. M. Kellogg, in “Old and New,” July, 1870. In it he says: “In most mammals if a tube be inserted into the carotid artery, the blood sustained by the contractile power of the heart and arteries will rise to the height of six feet. Does this give the hydrostatic measure of the *vital power*? No; it only shews the immediate *mechanical force* of the heart obeying the vital stimulus.”

† Physical Basis of Life, p. 60.

‡ Mental Physiology, p. 14.

and in Automatism, the Psyche, if we may so call it, which mediates between the Body and the Pneuma,* being at once the Spirit of the former and the Body of the latter. It is, we think, from accepting too unreservedly Dr. Carpenter's view on this question that Miss Cobbe is led to think it possible that matter may think and feel.† The Psyche, not the material frame, taught either by the human Pneuma, in the case of acquired automatism, or by the Spirit of God, in the case of congenital automatism, may act intelligently, but can never originate intelligence; it may, and, we think, does, carry in itself the record of all the sensations we experience, and when stimulated may bring all forth again to clear consciousness. This Psyche it is, and not mere physiological mechanism, which pulls you back when an approaching carriage comes upon you suddenly, and which guides your footsteps for you when the Pneuma is otherwise engaged. And, as we have already said, Dr. Carpenter's idea seems to us profoundly true, that the Pneuma never acts directly upon the Body, but only on the Psyche, the mediator between Body and Spirit; yet the Pneuma feels the energizing of the Psyche as well as its own causal act. Hence the complex character of the consciousness of Effort, which always baffles the psychologist, till he sees that it is the blending of Psychological and Spiritual activity, the Spiritual activity giving the consciousness of Cause, the Psychological that of Force.‡ The theory we are maintaining seems to us also to clear up the difficulty as to whether the Ego creates physical force, Sir John Herschel§ distinctly declaring that it must originate some exceedingly minute quantity, Dr. Carpenter being just as positive as Professor Clifford is, that in the most powerful Muscular Effort "there is no

* We might use the terms "Body," "Soul," and "Spirit," but unfortunately "Soul" has with us an equivocal connotation.

† Macmillan's Magazine, Nov., 1870.

‡ Accordingly, though the Ego does not immediately move the muscles, yet it feels that it is acting on the external object, because it originates and is conscious of the energizing of the obedient vital principle.

§ Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects, p. 467.

more a *creation* of Energy than in an automatic convulsion.”* We feel little doubt that Dr. Carpenter’s position is the correct one. But why? Not because Mind-force and Nerve-force are correlate, but, on the contrary, because it is the characteristic of every higher type of Energy to control and co-ordinate the lower forms, Spiritual Energy being able to preside over the manifestations of the Psyche’s energy, the Psyche in its turn subjecting physical forces to its formative idea. Again, it is the Psyche’s common relation to the Body and to the Pneuma which explains how it is that alcohol on the one hand, and a grand idea or emotion on the other, may both exhilarate the Psyche, and produce somewhat similar effects on the motory system. Note, too, how some stimulants, or a fever, will call out the energy of the Psyche, and make her reveal her hidden memories, and how, on the other hand, a strong spiritual purpose or emotion will make the Psyche concentrate all the bodily energies, so that a feeble frame will for a brief period do wonderful works. We submit that all these phenomena, and hosts of others akin to these, of which Dr. Carpenter’s book contains a rich store of examples, require for their explanation an intermediate power or energy (such as we suppose the Psyche to be), and are not at all adequately accounted for by supposing human nature to consist merely of an Ego and an automatic mechanism. We cannot, at present, pause to apply our theory to cases of constitutional weakness of will, to the paralysis of will, and to idiocy and insanity, though we believe that (with Dr. Carpenter’s help) we could shew that all these phenomena grow out of imperfect or deranged relations between the Spirit and its Spiritual Body, that is, between the Pneuma and the Psyche. We can but glance also at the light it throws on Birth and Death. We inherit from our parents a Psyche in which are blended the constitutional affections of our ancestors, and which unconsciously builds up our bodies; the Pneuma (âme) is breathed into it from the Eternal; it (the Psyche) becomes our “spiritual body;” we

* Preface to Fourth Edition of *Mental Physiology*, p. xvi.

retain it after death, and with it we carry potentially into the unseen world the memories and the character we have formed in this. Hence is it that microscopic researches lend no countenance to the Darwinian doctrine of Pangenesis; the structureless bioplasm alone is seen, not the invisible Psyche that is setting it in motion, and by its own controlling power fashioning the needful organism.

To pass to another aspect of the subject. As we (taught by Dr. Carpenter) suppose the chief physiological seat of the Psyche to be the Sensori-motor centres, and believe the Psyche to communicate with the external world (or Body) on the one hand, and with the Pneuma (or Spirit) on the other, so do anatomical researches shew that while the nerves of the *external* senses communicate with the Sensorium, in like manner also by another set of nerves (which Dr. Carpenter calls the nerves of the *internal* senses*) is the Sensorium connected with the cortical surface of the cerebral hemispheres; and it will be noticed that at the extremities remote from the Sensorium of both sets of nerves there is an assemblage of nerve cells, numerous in the case of the cortical layer of the hemispheres, fewer in the case of the organs of external sense. Now this analogy of structure suggests that the extremities of the nerves both of the external and internal senses subserve a similar purpose; and Professor Draper, of New York,† argues, and we think with great cogency, that as the organs of the bodily sense connect the Sensorium (or the Psyche, to use our own nomenclature) with an external reality (namely, the physical forces which produce the sensations of touch, light, heat, sound, &c.), so the cortical layer of the cerebrum, the organ of the internal sense, connects the Sensorium with a spiritual reality outside the brain, i. e. with the soul. It seems, therefore, very probable that the cerebral hemispheres have as their function to subserve the complicated inter-relations of the Pneuma and the Psyche, and to furnish the needful conditions for the important play of the Laws of Association. The important question now

* Mental Physiology, p. 111.

† Human Physiology, p. 285.

arises, Has the Pneuma no relations with a Higher Energy? Connected in one direction through the cerebrum with the Psyche (its spiritual body), is it also, through some organism invisible to us, connected in another direction with the Eternal, the Infinite One? A study of our own inner life seems to shew beyond the possibility of doubt that it must be thus connected, and we have in favour of this hypothesis the high authority of so eminent a physiologist as Dr. W. Kirkes, who in the fifth edition* of his Handbook of Physiology, which has long been a favourite text-book with University students, thus writes :

“The cerebral hemispheres appear to be organs in and through which the mind acts in all its operations which have immediate relations to external and sensible things; and this view may be held without fear, while it is held, also, that the mind has other and higher faculties, by which it has or may attain to knowledge of things above the senses: namely, the Conscience and the Pure Reason, *which may be instructed otherwise than through the senses, and exercised independently of the Brain.*”

Our readers will readily complete the theory for themselves. The Pneuma in its organic relations with the Eternal possesses intuitions; it exercises the pure reason; it apprehends eternity and infinity; it recognizes the claims of immutable morality; it cherishes undying hope; it feels in higher moods inspiring contact with Him who is spiritual Light and Love. In its organic relations with the Psyche, on the other hand, it exercises understanding; deals with finite things, times and places; feels earthly desires and ambitions. Out of this twofold relation of the Ego, morality is born, and the *rationale* is furnished of the remarkable presence of two selves, or two natures in man, “the flesh lusting against the spirit, the spirit against the flesh.” Hence, too, the consciousness of the Indwelling God and Father, and the uniform testimony of the world’s greatest prophets and teachers that they are, in some moods, but the

* This is the last edition, edited by himself (1863). Afterwards the book got into other hands, and this passage, being obnoxious to the mere physiologist, was expunged.

mouthpiece of an authority and an illumination higher than their own.*

We said, at the opening of this paper, that Englishmen are prone to cherish too exclusively those activities of the *Pneuma* which look towards the *Psyche* (i. e. the Senses and the Understanding), and so we expect most of our readers will make short work with these speculations of ours. Whether, however, they look favourably or unfavourably on our ideas, they cannot do better than read carefully Dr. Carpenter's most suggestive and instructive book. To it we owe the stimulus which set us theorizing; and if our theories are unfounded, we have no doubt that the same book, more profoundly studied, will furnish their most conclusive refutation.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

VII.—SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS.

THE judgment in the Ridsdale case has at last been given, and without any apparent sign of difference of opinion on the part of the Judges. The questions in dispute were four: 1, the Eucharistic vestments; 2, the Eastward position; 3, the Wafer bread; 4, the Crucifix on the screen. In regard to the first, the Court decided that, so far as the use of the parochial clergy was concerned, the vestments were not lawful. In regard to the second, it took what may be looked upon as a new departure. It held that the main thing was, that the manual acts involved in the rite—the breaking of the bread, the taking of the cup into the hands—should be performed in the sight of the people. This is manifestly the case if the celebrant occupies the position at the end of the table. Whether it is so if he takes up the eastward position, the Court did not decide. All it decided was, that in Mr. Ridsdale's case there was no sufficient evidence that he actually stood in such a position as

* Compare the profound remark of a Master in the psychology of Ethics and Religion:—"The psychical (*ψυχικός*) man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually (*πνευματικῶς*) discerned."

to prevent the people from seeing him perform the manual acts. "Their Lordships," therefore, "were not prepared to hold that a penal charge had been established against the appellant merely by the proof that he stood, while saying the Prayer of Consecration, at the west side of the communion-table." A similar course was taken in regard to the wafer. The important words of the judgment are : "Their Lordships think that if it had been averred and proved that the wafer properly so called had been used by the appellant, it would have been illegal ; but as the averment and proof are insufficient, they will advise an alteration of the decree in this respect." The crucifix was unequivocally condemned. Not only had no faculty been obtained for its erection, but the Court thought that such a faculty, even if applied for, ought not to be granted. Looking, then, upon Mr. Ridsdale as a defendant, he was found guilty on the first and fourth counts of the indictment, and acquitted on the second and third.

This, however, is only an insufficient way of looking at the matter. As to the legality of the vestments and the crucifix, no room is left for doubt. The same seems to be the case with the wafer, although in this particular case the evidence that it was a genuine wafer, and not a piece of thin wheaten bread cut into the shape of one, was held to be insufficient. But how about the eastward position, which after all is the most important question as touching the usage, not of Ritualists only, but of the majority of the High-church clergy ? A general statement has been that the judgment practically allows it. But whether this is so or not, can only, we think, be determined when the subsequent practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts is seen. At present it would seem as if a priest standing with his back to the people, at the bottom of a probably deep chancel, must necessarily conceal from them the performance of the manual acts, and as if what aggrieved parishioners in future would have to do would be, not to prove that he stood with his face eastward, but that the congregation could not see what he was doing. But again, with what evidence of this fact will the Court be satisfied ? Will it do if one, two, or ten intending communicants swear that they could not see the manual acts, while, on the other hand, as many swear that they could ? In any case, it must be admitted that the eastward position is only legalized uncertainly and by a side wind, while on the other three points of the appeal the judgment is decisively anti-ritualistic. We cannot help thinking that the Evangelical party is victorious all along the line.

What will be the effect of this judgment it is as yet too soon to predict. The Church Association is of course jubilant. The opposite party is silent, either as if stunned, or as big with resolves which it has not made public. Mr. Ridsdale himself at first openly announced his intention of uncompromising resistance, and celebrated the Eucharist with all the forbidden ceremonial. Since that time, however, the Primate has not only granted him a dispensation from the law of the Church in regard to the vestments, the lighted candles and the mixed chalice, but has commanded him to accept it; thus at once virtually admitting that these things are the law of the Church, and assuming to himself a strange and unconstitutional power of setting it aside. Dr. Pusey, writing from his half-monastic seclusion at Christ Church, says that the first generation of High-churchmen were too busy with the restoration of dogma to think much of ritual, and that he himself has never worn the vestments. At the same time he counsels resistance to the judgment on the part of those who do, especially if they wear them with the expressed consent of their congregations. But when the Erastian Primate arms himself with the dispensing power, and the old High-church leader makes an appeal to the principles of congregationalism, are not things come to a strange pass? It is said that some 300 clergy have met in London and resolved to wear the vestments in spite of the Court; and a society for the disestablishment of the Church has been formed in connection with St. Alban's, Holborn. But we end this paragraph as we began it, with the statement that it is yet too soon to predict the course which things will take.

No doubt there exists a very deep and widespread dissatisfaction with the Court, a dissatisfaction which assumes two different forms. In one, it is a rebellion against the principle of any lay judgment in matters ecclesiastical. Even this, however, subdivides. There are many High-churchmen who take very high ground as to the spiritual independence of the Church, meaning by the Church the clergy, and who consider it a degradation and a slavery of the spirituality that it should in any way be subject to the laity, expressing its mind either by Act of Parliament or in the decisions of courts of law. Others again, looking at the matter from a point of view at once more practical and more truly religious, claim a right of audience for "the living voice of the Church." If the Church was competent to decide matters of vestments for herself in 1662, she is equally competent to do so in 1877; and it would be at once more dignified and more practical to discuss anew and settle these ques-

tions, than to wrangle in the courts about the meaning of obscure rubrics, which were designed to meet the wants of a very different age and state of things. On the other hand, men who have no very lively sympathy with these views are disturbed by the fact, that the Ridsdale judgment looks too much like a practical compromise, and too little like a judicial determination of a disputed point. The terms of the Ornaments' Rubric of 1662 are plain enough, and seem to the uninstructed mind to authorize the vestments. Indeed, it is only by a long course of historical argument, involving many delicate and even doubtful considerations, that the Judges are able to shew to their own satisfaction that its real and its apparent meaning are contradictory. So in regard to the eastward position, the decision of the Court reads more like an ingenious evasion of the point in dispute than a settlement of it. It is true that the Ritualists are the most ingenious and pertinacious of rebels against any legal enactment or decision which they do not like; but it is much to be regretted that in this case the Court has given them so plausible an occasion for the exercise of their peculiar talent.

Bishops are looking up. Bishop Benson has been enthroned at Truro; Bishop Claughton, formerly of Rochester, at St. Albans. The vacancy at Rochester is filled by the promotion of Mr. A. W. Thorold, Vicar of St. Pancras and Canon of York, an Evangelical of a good sort. In the mean time, Mr. Cross has introduced a Bill for the foundation of four new Bishoprics, so soon, that is, as the necessary funds are provided: Liverpool, Southwell, Newcastle, and one in Yorkshire, of which Halifax or Wakefield may be the seat.

The Universities' Bill has made its way through the House of Commons, and will probably become law before the session is over. The most remarkable fight in connection with it has been on Mr. Goschen's resolution for the abolition of clerical fellowships, which was rejected by the narrow majority of nine—147 against 138. But perhaps more singular than the closeness of the division was the poverty of argument on the side of the majority, which voted simply for the *status quo*. We shall give an analysis of the measure as soon as it has assumed its final form.

On the second reading of the Burials' Bill in the House of Lords, the following resolution, moved by Lord Granville, was rejected by 141 votes to 102:

"That no amendment of the law relating to the burial of the dead in England will be satisfactory which does not enable the relatives or friends having charge of the funeral of any deceased person to conduct such

funeral in any churchyard in which the deceased had a right of interment with such Christian and orderly religious observances as to them may seem fit."

But when the House went into Committee on the Bill on the 17th May, it was evident that a spirit of compromise had begun to prevail. Although the Bishop of Peterborough delivered a speech in which all the resources of his wit and eloquence were devoted to the defence of the no-surrender position unhappily taken up by the great majority of the parochial clergy, the tone of the two Archbishops was very different. The Primate moved the following amendment on clause 73 :

"In cases where the Burial Service of the Church of England cannot lawfully be used, but where it shall appear to the incumbent or curate-in-charge desirable to use some religious service, and the person having charge of the interment shall desire the same, it shall be lawful for the minister, if he shall think fit, to use any service authorised by the Bishop, provided that nothing except hymns shall be introduced into such service which does not form part of the Holy Scriptures or of the Book of Common Prayer, for such cases ; provided that notice shall be sent to the Bishop within seven days of any such use of the said service by the person using the same. In cases where the Burial Service of the Church of England might lawfully be used, but where the person having charge of the interment shall request that the said service authorised by the Bishop as aforesaid shall be used instead of the Burial Service of the Church of England, the minister shall not be subject to any penalty for omitting to use the service of the Church of England and for using the said authorised service in lieu thereof, provided that in every such case he shall report the facts of the case to the Bishop within seven days, and provided that the Bishop shall thereupon approve the said omission and substitution in writing under his hand."

The first part was agreed to without a division ; the second was rejected by 65 votes against 60, the two Archbishops voting in the minority, against seven Bishops in the majority. The Archbishop of York then moved another amendment, intended to meet the case of clergymen called upon to officiate at a funeral at which it might appear to them that scandal would be occasioned by the use of the usual service ; but this also was rejected, no division being taken. Lord Harrowby next moved the following clause :

"When the relative or other person having charge of the funeral of a person dying in any parish, or having had a right of interment in any parish, shall signify in writing to the incumbent of such parish, or to the curate-in-charge of the same, that it is his desire that the burial of the said person shall take place without the Burial Service of the Church of England,

the said relative or person shall thereupon be at liberty to inter the deceased with such Christian and orderly religious services at the grave as he may think fit, or without any religious service ; provided, that all regulations as to the position and making of the grave which would be in force in the case of a person interred with the service of the Church of England shall be in force as to such interment ; provided, further, that notice of the time when it is the wish of the relatives or other persons as aforesaid to conduct the said interment shall be given to the incumbent or curate-in-charge at latest some time the day before ; provided, further, that the said interment shall not take place at the time of or within half an hour before or after any service in the church, or of any funeral already appointed in the churchyard. If any person shall in any churchyard use any observance or ceremony or deliver any address not permitted by this Act, or otherwise, or by any lawful authority, or be guilty of any disorderly conduct, or conduct calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, or shall, under colour of any religious observance or otherwise, in any churchyard wilfully endeavour to bring into contempt or obloquy the Christian religion, or the belief or worship of any Church or denomination of Christians, or the ministers or any minister of any such Church or denomination, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour."

On this, the voting resulted in a tie, 102 peers on each side ; and the Lord Chancellor, in accordance with ancient custom in such a case, gave his vote in the negative. The Archbishop of Canterbury voted for Lord Harrowby, as did the Bishops of Exeter and Oxford. On the other side were the Bishops of Bath and Wells, Carlisle, Chichester, Ely, Hereford, Lichfield, Lincoln, Llandaff, Peterborough, Rochester, Salisbury. The Archbishop of York did not vote at all. When, on the 18th of June, the Committee brought up the report of the Bill, it was seen that the Government had made no preparation for the emergency. But the mind of the clergy was more than ever evident. A declaration, expressing uncompromising resistance to Lord Harrowby's clause, had been circulated, and in the course of a very few days had received the signatures of nearly 11,500 clergymen, including those of many dignitaries. Nevertheless the House of Lords had made up its mind that the hour of necessary concession had struck. When the Archbishop of York again proposed his clause, intended to remedy the favourite grievance of the clergy, that of being compelled to utter words of hope and faith over the body of a scandalous and presumably unrepentant sinner, it was rejected by 146 votes to 89. A contrary fate befel Lord Harrowby's clause, which he re-introduced without alteration. The tie of May 17th was converted into a majority of 16 in its favour, 127 votes to 111. The division list shews that the Primate, with the Bishops of Exeter, Oxford and St.

Asaph, voted with Lord Harrowby. Eight Bishops took the opposite side. The result is, that the Government have abandoned their Bill, while Mr. Osborne Morgan has announced his intention of moving his resolution, if he can find a day, in the House of Commons.

The Church of Ireland has passed by a larger than the requisite majority—two-thirds of both orders—the Bill providing for the use of the new Prayer-book after June, 1878, notwithstanding a very strong opposition on the part of some of the Bishops, led by the Archbishop of Dublin and the Bishop of Derry, both of whom in their day have had some reputation for liberality.—The Episcopal Church of Scotland, and with it the Church of England in its higher levels, have been sorely vexed by a somewhat absurd affair. There are, north of the Tweed, certain episcopal congregations of an Evangelical type which do not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Scottish hierarchy, preferring to maintain a connection with the Church of England. Not long ago, these congregations, moved by a desire to have a Bishop of their own, invited a returned Colonial, Bishop Beckles, late of Sierra Leone, but now incumbent of a London parish, to come and overlook them, which it was thought that he could do, by an occasional railway journey, without leaving his metropolitan cure. To this Bishop Beckles agreed. At once a storm arose. The Scottish Bishops protested. The Bishop of London remonstrated. The Convocations of Canterbury and York passed resolutions of disapproval. Still Bishop Beckles held on, and holds on still. Of course he can only make good his exceedingly non-episcopal position by maintaining that the Episcopal Church of Scotland is not a true Church of Christ. Unhappily for him, a letter has been produced and published, shewing that when the other day the Bishopric of Argyle and the Isles was vacant, he made urgent application for it. There does not seem to be the possibility of restraining a returned Colonial from playing any episcopal pranks he pleases, and if Bishop Beckles likes to shepherd a very few Evangelical congregations in Scotland, no one can prevent him. But the Scottish Bishops at all events have the laugh on their side.

For the very interesting and important events which have recently taken place in the Scottish Presbyterian churches, we gladly refer to the following letter of a correspondent :

“In Scotland the tide of free thought is steadily flowing, but what may be called the Assembly wave has not risen quite so high as some of us expected. Take, first, the United Presbyterian

Church. At their Glasgow Synod, the 'terrible child,' Mr. David Macrae, brought forward his motion, which affirmed an entire want of harmony between the Confession and the Bible, and called for a revision of the former, as not expressing the faith held and taught by the clergy. The venerable fathers of course flew unanimously into a violent rage. That very often happens when hypocrisy is detected. Instead of meeting the accusation with the serene strength of conscious purity, they began to sneer at the theological acquirements of the accuser, and to speak venomously of young men 'who sought notoriety by rash and irreverent utterances, and who would be compelled to eat their words.' It is always rash to question the orthodoxy of a Scotchman, and it is clearly irreverent to tread on the corns of an ordained minister. But after this hysterical explosion of offended propriety, the immaculate Synod immediately proceeded to confess its sins by appointing a committee to consider what alterations upon the Confession are required. This, then, is a moral victory for the reformers. Quite possibly, these gentlemen are more largely endowed with spiritual feeling than with exact scholarship. Mr. Ferguson, of Glasgow, says: 'Why should religion be doomed to wear the shackles of a grim and ungainly past, and to grind for ever in the prison-house of a gloomy and dead metaphysic?' This is picturesque, but it would not form an intelligible item of charge in a libel drawn up against the Confession. Then Mr. Gilfillan, of Dundee, that perennial source of fiery heresy, is more successful in irritating his orthodox brethren than in enlightening the lay mind with truth. But Mr. Mill, of Edinburgh, says distinctly enough, that the doctrines of reprobation, of the non-salvability of the heathen, and the damnation of infants, must be given up; and we are reminded that Dr. Twiss, the Moderator of the Westminster Assembly, gravely mentions in one of his works that 'all the infants of Turks and Saracens dying in original sin are tormented by God in hell.' The great merit of all these men is, that they feel earnestly and speak fearlessly on this subject of dogma, though one sometimes wishes that their language was both clearer and more temperate.

"A depressing gloom hung over the proceedings this year of the Assembly of the Established Kirk. It proceeded from the Moderator's chair. Dr. Phin, the well-known persecutor of Dr. Lee, is a well-meaning and industrious man. Many years ago he retired from the uncongenial atmosphere of the pulpit, and gave himself up body and soul to the schemes of the Church. He has not spared himself

in the promotion of the narrow-minded and short-sighted policy which, alas ! has so long animated that body, and by dint of imperturbable assurance and an unpleasant flow of words he has become one of the foremost of denominational warriors. But he is an unmitigated Philistine, unredeemed by the faintest dash of fanaticism. He is the chosen servant of the god of Dulness ; an awful example of darkness without heat ; a man of petty facts and figures presiding in the highest spiritual assembly in the country. And yet there is life in the old Church. They are planting and endowing new parishes *quoad sacra* at an average rate of twenty-two a year, which are being filled (many of them) by nondescript deserters from all kinds of Dissenting churches. Last year their capital expenditure on this account exceeded £150,000. The great work of territorial endowment, which successively absorbed the energies of Brunton, Chalmers and James Robertson, has now, of course, received an artificial stimulus from the Baird Fund. Church people, too, are perhaps better able to contribute, since they have handed over all their schools, except thirty or forty, to the school boards. This year they have further given up the attempt to organize an inspection in religious instruction of the rate-supported schools. In fact, the only link now remaining between the Kirk and the schools lies in the Normal Schools, where they have in training nearly 500 male and female teachers. But, as only *three per cent.* of that number pass an elementary examination in Latin, it is to be hoped that the school boards will be able to secure the services of a better class. Both this Assembly and the Assembly of the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Synod have by considerable majorities adopted resolutions in favour of the establishment of a permanent Board of Education in Scotland, which should administer and revise the Scotch Code, and should further possess an undefined jurisdiction over school boards, especially in their relations with teachers. In matters theological, only one blow was struck for freedom. Dr. Story, of Roseneath, the biographer of William Carstares and of Robert Lee, proposed that a homœopathic dose of reform should be given to elders ; that instead of declaring their personal belief in the Confession, they should ‘profess their approbation of it as the public and avowed Confession of the Church (containing the sum and substance of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches) to which I adhere.’ This was evidently meant for weak stomachs, and although it often occurs that men refuse to become elders on account of the present formula, we can hardly wonder that

the prescription was indignantly rejected, and indeed received more support from clerical than from lay members.

“But the interest of the season centred in the Free Church Assembly. That singular body has by an overwhelming majority (460 to 78) arrived at the conclusion that it can at one and the same time disestablish the Church and maintain the Headship of Christ, and the doctrine of the authority of the civil magistrate and the continued endowment of religion in the public schools. The process is a very simple one. The divine necessity of a national recognition of religion must be confined to the case of the true religion, viz., that of the Free Church. This is really a return to the view of Dr. Candlish, who said in 1841, in the midst of the fury of the impending ejection : ‘I say an Erastian Establishment is worse than none at all.’ He threatened the Government that if they would not admit the Veto principle, he would disestablish the Church. His successors will probably carry out the threat. But the great event of this Assembly was the Robertson Smith heresy case. The Presbytery of Aberdeen, in obedience to an order of the Commission, or Standing Committee of the whole Assembly, have been trying to discover, by interrogating the suspect Professor, whether or not they ought to bring a charge of heresy against him. Though this preliminary inquiry was not finished, the Assembly, on considering a report of their College Committee, which had previously been acted upon by their Commission, and which stated that there were no grounds for a libel of heresy, have now by a large majority (491 to 113) suspended Professor Smith from his office, and have practically told the Presbytery to give him short thrift and no grace. According to the common law of the Church, the service of a libel for heresy *eo ipso* suspends a Professor from his office. But this is a very different matter, for it is not certain whether after receiving explanations the Presbytery will be able to frame a libel. The drift and temper of the whole discussion may be gathered from the two additional questions which the Assembly have ordered the Presbytery to put to Professor Smith. These are (1st), whether the argument which Jesus draws against the Pharisees from the 110th Psalm (“the Lord said unto my Lord”), is not proof of the Davidic authorship of that Psalm, and that the Psalm refers to a personal Messiah; (2nd) a question which the Presbytery has not yet framed, but which is intended to bring out clearly whether the Professor believes in the personal existence and agency not only of angels, but also of angels who ‘kept not their first

estate' (see 2 Peter ii. 4 and Jude 6), and particularly of Satan. As regards the *first* question, it was pleaded that the Professor's statement in his article Bible (viz., that there was no doubt of the Davidic authorship of *two* of the Psalms, neither of them being the 110th), was made in answer to Kuenen, who would not have admitted the validity of the argument founded on the inspiration of either Christ or the Apostles speaking in the New Testament. But the Assembly seemed to think that the question bore closely on the Professor's theory of prophecy as 'never spoken directly to the future, but directly and primarily to his own time.' The second question is very important, for there is no doubt that the Devil is in the Confession of Faith, and Professor Smith in his article 'Angel' has not only ignored his Satanic majesty in the most disrespectful way, but has spoken of the superhuman reality of even good angels as a 'popular assumption.' The Assembly have shewn the true spirit of ecclesiastical tyranny, and have given expression to their general vague alarm. 'This is not criticism,' they say; 'it is false theology.' 'Many country ploughmen and shepherds,' said another, 'might teach their professors.' In vain did one Professor after another ask them to suspend their judgment and not their brother. In vain was it said that orthodox writers, such as Bleek, Stanley, Leathes, Sanday, Rhiem, Kalmis, Schultz, occupied practically the same position as Professor Smith. In vain was the parable told how in the seventeenth century Capellos was accused by Turretin and Heidegger of denying that the points were as much inspired as the consonants of the Hebrew text; the result being that all Geneva became Socinian. In vain were common-sense and fair-play appealed to. The soul of the Church was vexed, and her eyes were not clear. But the most remarkable exhibition was that by Principal Rainy, who has hitherto enjoyed some reputation for straightforwardness of character as well as intellectual accomplishments. He expressed his full confidence in Professor Smith and his agreement with him on most of the points mentioned, and his opinion that the matters generally were such as the Church should leave open. But 'there was a certain confidence in constructions of a critical kind, resting on speculative combinations and a certain decision or peremptoriness in building on them. He was not afraid to acknowledge ignorance on many things of which the Church had been sure, but he greatly feared the things of which the speculative critics were sure.' And accordingly he votes for the suspension of his own pupil as

a heretic. A truthful, chivalrous and consistent act! What is the difference between this popular leader and the rejected one? The latter knows more Biblical criticism and speaks his mind. Thus, amid a great throwing up of caps at the triumph of the faith, the culprit has been solemnly executed, and there is nothing according to the rules of Church law to prevent the trial beginning. But the minority of 113, including most of the Professors and many of the most promising young men of the Church, have not said their last word on this matter. Already they are beginning to speak of leaving the Church.

"They will not need to do so. By next Assembly the weather-cock will have turned, and the miraculous Principal will come forward with some string of ingenious compromises and misunderstandings, by which heresy will be gently reprov'd and schism entirely prevented. One thing is certain, that the Free Church have lost a great opportunity of taking a national lead in things ecclesiastical; for it is now fixed that in Scotland the National Church of the Future must be both enlightened and truly free."

E.

VIII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

A Discourse on Truth. By Richard Shute, M.A., Senior Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1877.

THIS is the essay of a clear and vigorous thinker, whose intellectual sympathies are mainly with Locke and Hume, though his expositions also shew that the Hegelian tendencies, so ably represented at Oxford by Mr. Green, have not been without influence on his thought. The differences of opinion in the present day as to what constitutes "Truth" can hardly fail to awaken in many minds some echo of that sad and half-sarcastic question of Pilate's, to which he thought it not worth his while to wait for a reply. Truth (says Sir William Hamilton) is the correspondence or agreement of Thought with its Object. Mr. G. H. Lewes objects to this definition, arguing that an idea is necessarily different from an object, and in its place he substitutes the following:—"Truth is the correspondence between the order of ideas and the order of phenomena, so that the one becomes a reflection of the other—the

movement of Thought following the movement of Things." Mr. Shute, however, if we understand him rightly, believes that *sensations* and *things* are identical. With him, accordingly, the antithesis between Thought and Nature altogether vanishes, and we are left with that absolute Idealism which Messrs. J. S. Mill and Bain have done their best to make acceptable to the English mind, though Mr. Bain now, under the potent influence of the theory of Evolution, seems to be inclining to the side of Spencer and Lewes, and speaks of matter and mind as the opposite aspects of a "double-faced" unity. The author of the treatise we are now noticing appears to remain stanch to the principle that the mind can in no possible way get beyond a knowledge of its own states to that of some objective realities which occasion these states. "A truth" (he tells us) "is a statement which will raise in the mind of the hearer thoughts or ideas like to those of the speaker, when those latter ideas exactly represent the past experience of himself or some one else" (p. 15). Is such Truth as this attainable? Not entirely (explains Mr. Shute), yet sufficiently so for our actual needs :

"No one statement can be precisely true, according to our most proper definition of the word Truth. But the sea of doubt into which this discovery seems to plunge us, is neither so wide nor so deep as it at first appears. We are often able to form fairly accurate guesses of the amount of experience on which any statement rests, by comparing one experience with another, and all with our own experience, to assimilate to ourselves the knowledge of others in such rough but sufficient fashion as shall render life possible."—P. 101.

So far he has been dealing with the Truth of ordinary discourse ; he now proceeds to discuss with considerable ability Truths in the scientific sense, those, to wit, "which are expressly intended as prophecies of coming events and phenomena." His searching criticism of Mr. Mill's account of Causation and of Induction shews that, though Mr. Shute is himself an Experientialist, he is no mere disciple of previous masters in that school, but rather a first-hand explorer in the field, who critically questions the accuracy of much that his predecessors have advanced, and suggests some new views which are well worth considering. On the important idea of Cause, he has some very suggestive remarks on the distinction between Causation and Attribution. "Any sensation," he says, "which we experience after the appearance of the thing is removed from our eyes, and which yet frequently or constantly follows the perception of that thing, we call not the Attribute but

the Effect of that thing" (p. 108). He holds, with Hume, "that a Causal connection is an arbitrary link, manufactured by the mind of man to connect phenomena;" yet appears to agree with Locke, that the popular notion of Cause or Power is derived from our own volitional and muscular experiences, and from observation of the similar movements of animals. This popular notion, however, has not, he thinks, any validity as applied to all the changes of Nature. Here we differ from him, as we do also in his basal idea that "things" mean only "our sensations." It seems to us that Self-consciousness and Perception admit us to a knowledge of internal and external Substance, while the feeling of our own faculty of origination, in the case of our volitions, admits us to such a knowledge of Cause and Power as furnishes a safe clue to the real connection between natural events. We have nevertheless to admit that Mr. Shute maintains the opposite thesis with great skill, and, as we cannot here reproduce his reasonings, we cordially recommend them to the attention of our readers. But in reference to his remark, "that language was formed when an extreme and now universally rejected version of the causal theory was universally held," we must note that, in our opinion, the causal theory that presided over the formation of language was in all essential respects the same as a theory now held by several distinguished philosophers. In regard to Mr. Mill's views, Mr. Shute clearly exposes the weakness of the position that while Scientific Induction rests on the assurance of the Uniformity of Nature, that assurance in its turn rests on the unsatisfactory Induction *per enumerationem simplicem*. His own account of Induction is well worth study; and in treating of Deduction he conclusively shews, in opposition to Mr. Mill, that the Syllogism is often a source of fresh knowledge to the individual thinker. The most attractive, and at the same time the soundest, chapter in the book, in our view, is that in which the author expounds the fact that in very much of our thinking we are dealing merely with verbal symbols or signs, which we do not generally translate into the reality of thoughts or things: "The mind, for the most part, is content with remembering the fact of past combination, assuming that that combination is justified by experience, and glides easily along accustomed strings of written words, only pausing to translate into terms of representative thought the conclusion of an argument, or perhaps the outward fact conveyed by a sentence." Most felicitously, too, does he compare this use of "Mental Algebra," in its advantages and its perils, to the use of the express-train as con-

trusted with that of the canal-boat; "the latter is undoubtedly safer, but, on the other hand, it is so much slower, that it is admittedly unfitted for the demands of civilized life" (p. 243).

A chapter follows on Necessary Truth. Our author's position here is virtually involved in what we have already said; his treatment of axiomatic truth is clever, though not, in our view, conclusive. The logical outcome of his doctrine is aptly expressed in the following comparison: "The laws of number will doubtless remain the same as long as man remains what he is, but so also will the laws of digestion" (p. 289). The Discourse closes with a short account of the relation in which the author's views stand to Theology; in which we are told that though his Scepticism undermines that form of religion which founds itself entirely upon Reason, yet there remains Faith, which may prove the evidence of things not seen. For ourselves, we hardly see what crumbs of Theology are left for Faith to gather up, after our author's Scepticism has made such a hearty meal off our primitive beliefs. As, however, he seems quite satisfied with what remains, we suppose he holds to his religious beliefs by some tenure we do not quite understand.

C. B. U.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Mr. Matthew Arnold's "Last Essays on Church and Religion"* contain nothing new except the Preface, and even that is chiefly a re-statement of an intellectual position with which the reading public are tolerably familiar. The Essays on Bishop Butler and the *Zeit Geist*, and those entitled respectively, "A Psychological Parallel," "The Church of England," and "A Last Word on the Burials' Bill," have already appeared in various periodicals, and no doubt found many readers, some of the appreciative, some of the recalcitrant kind. They are marked by all the author's well-known characteristics: a style of singular fascination, a keen critical faculty, a power of putting the results of his own insight with great force and vivacity and variety, and in regard to certain other matters an invincible prejudice and an absolute incapacity of seeing the truth. Above all other contemporary writers, Mr. Arnold needs to be read with a disengaged mind; and if so read, is always suggestive and interesting, sometimes even convincing. But there are other readers whom he

* Last Essays on Church and Religion. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1877.

repels with an almost ludicrous power of repulsion. He begins by treading on their very tenderest corns, and enforces every new view with a reiterated stamp. No wonder that they draw back in dislike and dismay from a teacher whose foot is so heavy.

We do not propose to enter at present upon any discussion of the matters contained in this little volume. They do not differ greatly in kind from the contents of Mr. Arnold's recently published *Theological Essays*. Possibly his own perception of this fact may be the reason why he announces his intention of finally quitting this region of thought. He has no more to say, and does not see why he should go on saying the old thing in new ways. There is the same firm and uncompromising assertion of the necessity of religion, and also of the necessity for reconstructing its popular forms. There is the same protest against a too great minuteness of dogma, and a theorizing not founded upon and regulated by facts. There is the same presentation—a singularly one-sided and imperfect one, as we think it—of the essential religious ideas of the Bible. There is the same curious incapacity to comprehend the value of the Nonconformist ideal of honesty of speech in public worship. There is the same disposition to fling sarcasms at Dissenters, whether they deserve them or not, and the same determination to uphold the Church of England, for reasons which almost every Churchman would indignantly repudiate. All these things, joined to Mr. Arnold's well-known charm of style, make the book very pleasant reading to all whose own withers he does not wring, or who can smile in his face as he tries to wring them. One very great merit it has, that it is an honest and vigorous attempt to unite a real religiousness with the utmost freedom of thought. We may not be in perfect accord with Mr. Arnold's view of religion, but it is impossible to doubt that it is a genuine thing to himself. It is possible that he may be destroying more than he thinks; but his conscious object is plainly to reconstruct. For the rest, we shall not be sorry to welcome Mr. Arnold back again to the more purely literary region, where we think he is happiest and most at home. His voice as a poet has been silent too long. No living Englishman possesses so much of the true critical faculty as he does. In these departments of literature he can do work that future generations will not willingly let die. He has had his theological say now; and while thanking him for it, with a real appreciation, we are not sorry to find that he is disposed to say no more.

The next book on our list, the "*Letters of Thomas Erskine of*

Linlathen,"* comes from a very different quarter of the theological world. Readers of this Review will recollect an article on Erskine which appeared in 1875 (*T. R.* Vol. XII. p. 353), giving an account of the singular position which he occupied in religious society both in England and Scotland, as well as furnishing an analysis of his principal works. The present volume, which is to be succeeded by another, is really in the nature of a biography of Erskine. It was felt that the charm of the man so largely rested in his personality, that the only way to preserve some fragrance of it for those who did not know him was to permit him to exhibit himself in his letters. These are connected by a thread of narrative, executed by Dr. Hanna with unobtrusive good taste, supplying all that was necessary for the elucidation of the letters, while for the most part leaving Erskine to speak for himself. The result is exceedingly pleasing. We have a delightful picture of a circle of friends, belonging chiefly to the untitled aristocracy of Scotland, bound together by ties of kindred and friendship as well as by those of strong religious sympathy. In the midst of these stands Erskine, like Agamemnon, taller by the head than any of his comrades, and to all, guide, teacher, friend. The book contains some curious information as to Church controversies in Scotland, by English students probably half-forgotten, or never more than imperfectly known—the ejection of Mr. Campbell of Row from the Kirk, the miracles of Port Glasgow, the story of A. J. Scott and Edward Irving. Theologically, its interest lies, not in the results at which Erskine arrived—results which from any but the orthodox point of view are already obsolete and insufficient—but in the manner in which, by help of a deep moral earnestness and a genuine spirituality, he gradually worked his way to holding ground of his own. But the real charm of the book lies in its exhibition of a Christian character. We must confess that, with a passion for religious biography, evangelical biographies are to us usually the least interesting, and evangelical letter-writing absolutely unreadable. Everybody seems to pour out the same phrases in the same disconnected way. No pious person's correspondence can be discerned, at least by the uninitiated eye, to differ from the correspondence of any other pious person. Without at all wishing to throw doubt on the sincerity of the gush of good words, they do not seem to pass through the mind of the

* Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, from 1800 till 1840. Edited by William Hanna, D.D. Edinburgh : D. Douglas. 1877.

writer, and to acquire any individual character in the passage. This is not the case with Erskine's letters. The stock phrases are there, it is true, and so far those who look for shibboleths will be satisfied. But there is much more: the transparent evidence of deep religious earnestness, and a faculty of insight, which not unfrequently expresses itself in simple though pregnant words. We have perused the book with great interest and pleasure, and cordially recommend it to our readers.

Mr. Macan's very interesting Essay* was written for presentation to the Hibbert Trustees, in accordance with the regulations under which the author held "a travelling scholarship under the Trust," and the Trustees have done good service to the public by causing it to be printed. It treats the important subject of the Resurrection of Christ with clearness of scientific thought united with candid examination of the arguments urged in relation to it by previous writers. The first chapter dwells on the significance of the alleged fact, leading up to the conclusion—"By his attitude towards the Resurrection, any one may decide for himself on which side he stands, for supernatural revelation and miracles, or for natural revelation and science; for a religion which flows from alleged historical events, or for a religion which bases itself on permanent veritable facts; for two sources of knowledge, otherwise to be called, the one Faith, Authority, Dogma; the other Experience, Reason, Verification; for the permanent intellectual confusion which must result from the inevitable and eternal conflict between two sources of knowledge different in kind and essence, the one from the other; or for the permanent intellectual progress which may be expected from the reciprocal play of doctrine and fact, of codified and fresh experience on each other—an expectation which may be expressed in the formula of a faith, as humane and devout as any of its rivals." (Pp. 26, 27.) This sentence indicates the position of the author and furnishes the key-note to the whole. The second chapter treats of the evidence and explanation of the resurrection. Its result is, "that there were visions among the friends of Jesus shortly after his death, which they explained from the idea of Resurrection. That they should do so was almost inevitable, for they were imbued with the current notions of their age and nation; and given their previous

* The Resurrection of Jesus Christ. An Essay, in Three Chapters. By Reginald W. Macan, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church, Oxford, &c. Published for the Hibbert Trustees. London: Williams and Norgate. 1877.

belief in Jesus as the Messiah, and the fact of his death, his re-appearance could only be his resurrection." (P. 108.) But it is urged that this method of accounting for their "visions," though in perfect keeping with their standpoint, is opposed to the view "of the whole universe, of all being and of all life, of man, and of the world, and of God," which commands the assent of the thoughtful in the present age, and which may be called critical philosophy. The third chapter is devoted to the elucidation and support of this position, in accordance with the assertion—"that the belief of the apostles in the resurrection was a purely natural product, but not due to the objective reality of the alleged fact." (P. 122.) This chapter touches on several important questions, more or less related to the main theme. The whole Essay is full of matter, and deserves careful reading and thoughtful consideration from every theological student.

The name of Dr. Marcus Dods has been made familiar to those who have taken an interest in recent theological movements in Scotland. He has published a volume,* consisting of lectures delivered at the English Presbyterian College, London, which fully sustains his reputation as a thinker and writer. There are indeed some signs of haste in matters of phraseology and composition; in the use, for instance, of the word "Unitarianism" for "Monotheism," as descriptive of the doctrine of Mohammed (p. 5), and in such a sentence as this—"He, as little as the great bulk of the Jews themselves, could not bring his mind to accept the Incarnation." (P. 10.) But the style is generally as clear as the thoughts, and the spirit shewn is always free and candid. Full justice is done to the character and work of Mohammed, and the bright and dark parts of his system are ably discriminated. The important flaw in that system—that it aims at being final and leaves no room for progress—is rightly dwelt on. But when the author says it contrasts in this with Mosaism, which has never claimed to be anything but "a temporary and local religion," we are compelled to ask whether the Hebrews themselves do not claim more than this for it? To substantiate his view of the Jewish religion, it becomes necessary to take for granted, in reference to the Old Testament writings, a whole body of conclusions which are matters of reasonable debate. The lecture on Buddha of course dwells on "Nirvana." It is not

* Mohammed, Buddha, and Christ. Four Lectures on Natural and Revealed Religion. By Marcus Dods, D.D. London: Hodder and Houghton. 1877.

observed how similar this seeking for the extinction of individual existence is to the attempt of Christian pietists to merge their own will (the essence of personality) in the Divine will. The lecture on "the Perfect Religion" would set up Christianity on a pedestal of superiority to all other faiths, on the ground that it is "revealed," while they are "natural," in accordance with the sub-title of the volume. This revelation the author finds in "the Incarnation." At the same time the claims of Christianity are based on the fact that it gives us the highest idea of God and the purest morality. But how are we to know that these are highest and purest, except by an appeal to our own moral and spiritual instincts? The "revealed" then appeals to the "natural" for its proof. At the same time, Dr. Dods fully recognizes the universality of the religious tendency in man, and the value of even inferior forms of religion. He does not unduly depreciate the systems which are superseded by Christianity, and says in noble words, with which we warmly sympathize, "Salvation is a resemblance to Christ; it is the possession of the spirit of Christ; and if the fruits of that spirit are found in the life of those who have known nothing of the historical Christ, we should welcome the idea thus suggested, that apart from this knowledge our Lord may have found means of communicating his spirit to some." (P. 227.)

Mr. Armstrong has provided a valuable help for students of the Old Testament by his translation of Knappert's handbook.* Conveying in a small compass the conclusions arrived at by Prof. Kuenen, it will serve as a trustworthy guide in the instruction of the young. The justification for such a use of it cannot be better stated than in the words of the translator.

"It appears to me to be profoundly important that the youthful English mind should be faithfully and accurately informed of the results of modern research into the early development of the Israelitish religion. Deplorable and irreparable mischief will be done to the generation now passing into manhood and womanhood, if their educators leave them ignorant or loosely informed on these topics; for they will then be rudely awakened by the enemies of Christianity from a blind and unreasoning faith in the supernatural inspiration of the Scriptures; and, being suddenly and bluntly made aware that Abraham, Moses, David and the rest did not say, do, or write what has been ascribed to them, they will fling away all care for the venerable religion of Israel, and all

* The Religion of Israel. A Manual; translated from the Dutch of J. Knappert, Pastor at Leiden; by Richard A. Armstrong, B.A. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

hope that it can nourish their own religious life. How much happier will those of our children and young people be who learn what is now known of the actual origin of the Pentateuch and the writings, from the same lips which have taught them that the Prophets indeed prepared the way for Jesus, and that God is indeed our Heavenly Father ! For these will without difficulty perceive that God's love is none the feebler, and that the Bible is no less precious, because Moses knew nothing of the Levitical legislation, or because it was not the warrior monarch on his semi-barbaric throne, but some far later son of Israel, who breathed forth the immortal hymn of faith, 'The Lord is my Shepherd ; I shall not want.'"—P. 5.

It would be well for the prospects of religion if all who undertake to teach it, whatever the age and position of their disciples, could discern and act on the principle here set forth.

A comparison of the teachings of Christ with modern Christianity has given rise to a goodly volume,* which goes over a wide extent of ground. The writer acknowledges in the preface that he has no acquaintance with Greek, but urges that since the Bible is so generally circulated in its English translation, it may be fairly judged of by the English reader, or those who indiscriminately distribute it are not justified in doing so. He gives a brief analysis of four books from which he has formed his conclusions as to what is believed by the learned, viz., "Tischendorf on the Gospels"—"Strange on the Bible"—"Greg's Creed of Christendom," and "Arnold's Literature and Dogma." He then quotes, in a classified list, the teachings of Christ and the Apostles—first the practical, next the doctrinal—and thence deduces what he regards as true Christianity. The second part depicts "the Christianity of to-day," first as found in the Common Prayer-book, and in sermons, tracts and hymns, then according to the Church of Rome, the Westminster Confession, and the teachings of various Nonconformist sects. A chapter is then given to the "Spiritualists," with whom the writer appears to have great sympathy, though he does not absolutely commit himself to a belief in the reality of the alleged manifestations. In considering "Modern Christianity in daily life," he comments on many passing events and utterances. The conclusions arrived at are quite opposed to those of orthodoxy, though also clashing with those of Mr. Greg in the Creed of Christendom, on the ground that that writer failed to see the light thrown on the

* The Religion of Jesus compared with the Christianity of To-day. By Fredk. A. Binney. London: E. W. Allen. 1877.

problems he discusses by the revelations and principles of "Spiritualism." There are some hasty conclusions and some crude ideas in the book, but these are far outweighed by its pleasant characteristics—a manly common sense, a natural tone of unpretending modesty, and an unfailing candour. The author can think for himself without blaming those who do not think as he does.

"Saul of Tarsus"* is entirely founded on the writings of Swedenborg. It is well known that he divided the Bible into two parts, only one of which he considered "the Word of God," on the ground that in it only could "an internal sense" be found. The Acts and the Epistles not belonging to this favoured portion, is the first reason why the present writer depreciates them. He proceeds to make use of the conclusions of modern criticism to discredit the writings which are the object of his attack, and directs all the weapons at his disposal against Paul and his teachings, coming to the conclusion that "the Pauline Epistles are not at all good reading for the Church of Christ." There is very little argument in the volume which can be appreciated by any one who does not bow to the dicta of Swedenborg, and the general tone is unpleasantly dogmatic. The author fails to see that a similar treatment to that which he applies to the Epistles might as fairly be directed against those portions of Scripture on which he relies. Beginning with the supposition that certain books are pronounced by authority the Word of God, he cannot be an impartial critic.

"A Layman's Legacy"† cannot be fitly characterized in a few lines, and we must be content with warmly recommending it to the notice of our readers. It will arouse interest and do a good work among persons of various positions, alike in the social and the theological world. Though part of it is especially fitted, as it was originally intended, for the working classes, it will none the less call forth the sympathy of the highly educated. So as to theology, Mr. Greg's sermons will be welcome both to the orthodox and to the heterodox, and will be treasured wherever they meet with warm hearts and devout souls. They are distinguished by tender feeling rather than by power of logic, but the feeling is never morbid or sentimental, and every page bears marks of calm thought. Con-

* Saul of Tarsus, or Paul and Swedenborg. By a Layman. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

† A Layman's Legacy in Prose and Verse. Selections from the Papers of Samuel Greg. With a Prefatory Letter by Arthur P. Stanley, Dean of Westminster, and a brief Memoir. London: Macmillan. 1877.

sisting of writings not prepared for publication by the author, both the prose and the poetry are to some extent fragmentary. They serve, however, together with the simple and touching memoir, to convey to those who were not personally acquainted with him, some notion of the feelings and aims of a man whose influence, though not widely extended while he lived, struck deep, wherever it fell, into the heart, and influenced many a life. The volume is a valuable addition to the class of works which may be termed, in the full sense of the words, religious literature.

"The Divine Order of the Universe"* is by another writer of the same school. It is primarily directed against certain comments made by Mr. Proctor on Swedenborg's visions of other worlds. The attempt to reconcile modern astronomical teachings with the theologico-physical utterances of the seer is anything but successful. Mr. Mocatta† is entitled to credit for the forbearance and temper with which he recalls the sufferings of his countrymen from the Inquisition. The lecture is interesting and deserves to be read. It may make us value the civil and religious liberty we enjoy more than we sometimes seem to do, if we can realize how the dominance of a persecuting priesthood turns one set of men into the worst of savages, and subjects another to the utmost miseries human beings can endure.—Dr. Kuenen's Lecture‡ will be acceptable to many readers, as conveying in a few pages his latest critical conclusions on the much vexed question of the authorship of the Pentateuch.—"The Realm of Religion"§ suffers from over-condensation. The author needs a volume rather than a pamphlet fully to unfold his meaning and enforce his argument. He finds true religion in the development of human nature. Appreciating the tendency to dwell on the known and refuse to meddle with the unknown, he urges that there may be much unknown to the individual, yet not to the race as a whole, and that we are not to ignore it because it belongs to the community and cannot be individually appropriated.

* The Divine Order of the Universe as interpreted by Emanuel Swedenborg, with especial relation to Modern Astronomy. By the Rev. Augustus Clissöld, M.A. London: Longmans. 1877.

† The Jews of Spain and Portugal and the Inquisition. By Frederic David Mocatta. London: Longmans. 1877.

‡ The Five Books of Moses. A Lecture, by Dr. A. Kuenen. Translated by John Muir, Esq., D.C.L. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

§ The Realm of Religion. By W. Roscoe Burgess, M.A., Vicar of Hollowell. Williams and Norgate. 1876.

Humanity as a whole, past, present and future, is set up as the tribunal by which everything is to be tested, and the religion that can best serve this humanity is the religion to be valued. Individuality is an evil to be escaped from. Such seems to be the writer's thesis, but want of distinctness of expression and excessive brevity of statement render it not easy to follow him.

After the publication of Mrs. Le Breton's little volume on Mrs. Barbauld, as well as the more elaborate Memoir of Mrs. Ellis, both of which were reviewed at length in these pages (T. R. Vol. XI. p. 388), we certainly did not expect to see a third work devoted to the memory of the Presbyterian poetess.* Yet so it is, and her admirers, which are neither few nor diminishing in number, will welcome the elegant little volume of Mr. Murch. Mr. Murch is the President of the Bath Literary and Philosophical Association, and the nucleus of this volume is a paper originally read before that body. Mr. Murch's account of Mrs. Barbauld does not contain much that is new, but it is very clearly and pleasantly given. The peculiarity of the volume consists rather in the brief memoirs of many of her female contemporaries, and the estimate of the position in which they stood to the literary women of our own day. These memoirs are exceedingly well compiled, and may be the means of reviving more than one somewhat faded reputation. Mr. Murch has made diligent and successful use of contemporary literature, adding here and there personal recollections which greatly increase the value of his book. Bath has always had a strong flavour of literature in its society; and this volume has, if we may say so, a local colouring which, while it reveals its origin, rather increases than detracts from its interest. Its author is to be congratulated on the successful performance of a task which he has evidently executed *con amore*.

Mr. Baxter's volume† contains some graceful verse, and tokens of a good deal of religious thoughtfulness. When a new poet would relate the story of the Temptation in the style of the "Legenda Aurea," or discuss "Law and Liberty" in the metre of In Memoriam, he must naturally challenge comparison with the splendid mediævalism of Mr. Swinburne, and the Laureate's matchless vindi-

* Mrs. Barbauld and her Contemporaries. Sketches of some eminent Literary and Scientific Englishwomen. By Jerom Murch, &c. London: Longmans. 1877.

† St. Christopher, with Psalm and Song. By Maurice Baxter. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

cation of human faith ; and it is no great discredit to Mr. Baxter to say that his efforts do not stand the test. Some of his shorter pieces, however, are more satisfactory, not only for the greater evenness of execution displayed in them, but as earnest endeavours to impart deep and catholic meaning to doctrines often regarded as either merely formal or rigidly sectarian.

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THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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I.—MAGNANIMOUS ATHEISM.

The Soul and the Future Life. By Frederick Harrison. Nineteenth Century, June and July, 1877.

Autobiography of Harriet Martineau. 3 vols. London : Smith and Elder. 1877.

“BE of good cheer, brother!” said John Bradford to his fellow-martyr while the faggots were kindling; “we shall have a brave supper in Heaven with the Lord to-night!” “Be of good cheer, everybody!” cry an army of modern confessors, seated in library chairs; “there is no Heaven and no Lord, and when we die there will be an end of us all, *in sæcula sæculorum*; but the generations who come after us will be greatly edified by our beautiful books and our instructive example.”

Perhaps the moral vitality of our age is in no way better exemplified than by the fact that certain doubts which seem to strike mortal blows at the head and heart of human virtue, yet leave it breathing, and even pulsating with aspirations after some yet loftier excellence than saints and heroes have hitherto attained. To look back to the “infidels” with whom Massillon and Jeremy Taylor had to do, and compare them with the Agnostics of our time, is indeed more encouraging than to compare the “faithful” of past centuries with those of the present age. While the old Atheist sheltered his vice behind a rampart of unbelief where no appeals could reach

him, the new Agnostic honestly maintains that his opinions are the very best foundations of virtue. No one can for a moment say of him that he chooses darkness rather than light *because* his deeds are evil. If it be (as we think) darkness which he has chosen, there can be no question that his deeds are good; and that his conceptions of Duty are truly elevated and far-reaching, and enforced by every argument which he has left himself at liberty to use. Renouncing faith in God and in the Life hereafter—that is to say, in *Goodness Infinite* and *Goodness Immortalized*—he retains the most fervent faith in Goodness as developed in human life—that is to say, in *Goodness Finite* in degree and in duration. If we are to accept his own statement of the case, the Agnostic has completely turned the front of the theological battle. It is now the Pagans who have seized and hold aloft the sacred Labarum of Duty and Self-sacrifice, and *in hoc signo* are destined to victory.

The claim is one of the gravest which can be put forth between man and man. It was not easy—it was, alas! often beyond our strength—to combat our doubts or those of others, while yet we fought against them as a sailor fights against enemies cutting his anchor cable on a stormy night. We stand amazed and disarmed by the strange intelligence that, when these doubts have done their work, and cast us adrift altogether from allegiance to God and hope of another life, *then*, when all seems lost, we shall suddenly discover that we have touched the Fortunate Isles of virtue and peace. Only the thorough sceptic, we are assured, can be the perfect saint. Nobody can disinterestedly serve his brother on earth till he is entirely persuaded he has no Father in heaven. The fruit of the Tree of Knowledge (of course it is always *sous-entendu* that it *is* a tree of genuine knowledge on which Atheism grows) is to be desired, not only because it will make us “wise,” but because it will make us *good*. Who will hesitate any more to pluck and eat?

To the consideration of this now common pretension of Agnosticism to be the true FRIEND OF VIRTUE, in the room

of the old delusion of Religion, the following pages will be devoted. For the purposes of our particular argument, and to avoid entangling ourselves with too many collateral questions, I shall treat it here as the *Assumption of the Moral Superiority of Atheism over Theism*. Is that assumption justifiable? I, for one, am entirely ready to admit that *if* there be anything in the faith in God and immortality which detracts from the highest conceivable perfection of human virtue—if, in short, Atheism have a better morality to teach than Theism—then the case of Theism must be abandoned. The religion which is *not* the holiest conceivable by the man who holds it is condemned *ipso facto*.

I presume that no dispute exists as to the practical Rules of morality. These, indeed, are accepted with an unanimity which speaks volumes for some occult constitutional tendency (I dare not say Intuition) among persons who hold such grotesquely opposite ideas as to the metaphysical basis of morals as the gentlemen who contributed to the first and second Symposium in the *Nineteenth Century*. It is the proper *motives* to a virtuous and self-sacrificing life which Agnostics claim to place on higher ground than that which has been hitherto given to them. They propose to tell us to “do justice and love mercy” both in a better and more disinterested way than while we added to those unquestionable duties the mistaken attempt to walk humbly with our God. The question lies in a nutshell—Can they do it? Is there anything in the true Theistic faith detracting from the disinterestedness of virtue, or calculated to rob it of a single ray of purity and glory? This must be our first contention, since Religion now stands on its defence as a basis of morality. When it is settled, it may perhaps appear that Religion may justly again assume the offensive, and challenge Atheism to prove its capacity for serving equally efficiently as a support for the virtue of humanity; and, if it appear that to such a challenge no satisfactory reply can be given, then it will be manifest that, in their expressions of satisfaction and joy* at the anticipated downfall

* Vide p. 468 of this article.

of religion, Atheists display disregard of the moral interests of their race.

Let the lists be cleared in the first place. A contributor to the *Theological Review* will not be expected to defend all the base and demoralizing things which, in the misused name of Christianity, have been inculcated concerning "Other-worldliness;" the doing good for the sake of getting to heaven, and avoiding evil from fear of hell. Since the day, recorded by Joinville, when the mysterious old woman carried her water-pot and torch before St. Louis, and told him she intended to put out the fires of hell and burn up heaven, so that men might learn to love God for his own sake, and not from fear or hope—since that distant time there have not been wanting righteous souls who have girded and spurned at the vile lessons current in the Churches, and asked with Kingsley :

Is Selfishness—for Time, a sin—stretched out into eternity,
Celestial Prudence ?

Beyond a doubt, one of the heaviest charges against the popular creed is, that while its ministers have raged against the smallest theological error, and convulsed the world by their ridiculous disputes concerning mysteries altogether beyond the reach of human comprehension, they have complacently endured and even fostered moral heresies which withered up the very roots of virtue. The whole tone of ordinary Romish exhortation to *faire son salut* is often base beyond expression,* and the teaching of the Church of England in the last century was no better. Here are some specimens of it. Rutherford says (*Nature and Obligations of Virtue*, 1744): "Every man's

* A friend of mine, nursed very indifferently by a Sœur de Charité through a fever in Paris, one day in her weakness rather superabundantly thanked the Sister for her care. "Do you think I do it for your sake, Madame? If so, you are much mistaken. I do it entirely *pour faire mon salut*." In comparison with this nun (whose sentiments, it is to be feared, are very general among such poor creatures, taught to renounce all natural sympathy and affection), I very much prefer the old Scotchwoman, mentioned by Dean Ramsay, who frankly avowed her intention of telling a tremendous lie. Somebody, remonstrating, asked her, Was she not afraid to do it for the sake of her soul? "My soul!" was the reply; "what signifies my silly soul compared to the honour of the family?"

happiness is the ultimate end which reason teaches him to pursue, and the constant and uniform practice of virtue becomes our duty *when* Revelation has informed us that God will make us finally happy in a life after this." Paley is no better. He says :* "Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and *for the sake of everlasting happiness*. According to which definition, the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and *everlasting happiness the motive of virtue*." Waterland, the great champion of Trinitarianism, went even further. He says, that "being just and grateful without future prospects, has as much of moral virtue in it *as folly or indiscretion has*." These are the kind of doctrines which have been placidly admitted among the recognized teachings of the great Christian Churches. Nor have some of the philosophers proved a whit more conscious of the meaning of the simple notion of Duty. Bentham, for example,† plainly lays it down that for a man to give up a larger pleasure of his own for a smaller one of his neighbour's, is an act, not of virtue, but of *folly*.

Certainly if the new Agnostics had no types of religion or morality save these thoroughly debased ones wherewith to compare their system, they might well claim to be the evangelists of a purer gospel. Better, assuredly better, would it be to believe in no God, than to pay homage to the all-adorable Author of Good for the sake of the payment we expect Him to give us. Better, assuredly better, to expect no life beyond the grave, than to poison every act of courage, justice or beneficence, by the vile notion of being rewarded for it in heaven ; or to refrain from treachery and cruelty and lies, merely, like a beaten hound, from dread of the bloody scourge of hell.

But it would be an insult to the well-informed and widely-read advocates of Agnosticism, if we were to assume for a moment that they are ignorant that this base alloy of religion has been almost universally repudiated by the higher class of English divines of the present day, even of the straitest sects

* Moral Phil., B. i. c. vii.

† Deontology, p. 191.

of orthodoxy ; and that there is not a Broad-churchman, an Unitarian or a Theist, who does not regard them with unmitigated disgust. The question really is, not whether religion *may* be made to corrupt morality with bribes and threats, but whether it properly does so ; whether a religious man *ought*, in accordance with his theology, to be less disinterested than an Atheist ? To reply to this question, it seems only necessary to recal what a Theist believes about God and Immortality as concerned with his own virtue.

A Theist believes, then, that the goodness and justice which the Agnostic recognizes and loves so well in their human manifestations, have existence beyond humanity, and are carried to ideal perfection in a Being who is, in some sense, the Soul and Ruler of the universe.

This belief, at all events (whether legitimately held or only a dream), cannot, I presume, so far as it goes, be charged with detracting from the purity of virtue. Goodness cannot be esteemed less good, or justice less just, because there exists One who is supremely good and just.

Further, as regards himself, the Theist believes that this supremely good and just Being so constituted his nature and the world around him, as that the law of goodness and justice should be *known* to him as the sacred rule whereby he is inwardly bound to determine his actions and sentiments. In other words, he believes that he has acquired his moral sense from God, and not from any undesigned, fortuitous order of things which may have impressed it as an hereditary idea on his brain.

I am at a loss to guess how *this* step further can be supposed to be hostile to the disinterestedness of virtue. It is easy to see how the opposite view of the origin of conscience, as exhibited in Mr. Darwin's "Descent of Man,"—whereby the authority of the human intuition, "Thou shalt do no murder," is traced to the same origin as the bees' intuition of the duty of killing their brothers the drones (namely, the hereditary transmission of ideas found conducive to the welfare of the tribe),—should dethrone Conscience from her assumed supremacy, and place

her among the crowd of other hereditary notions, neither more nor less deserving of honour. And, on the other hand, the attribution of our moral ideas more or less directly to the teaching of a Being immeasurably above us,—and thus representing Conscience as a ray shot downwards from a Sun, instead of a marsh-fire illumined under special conditions of social existence, and liable to blaze up, die down, or flit hither and thither as they may determine,—must inevitably elevate and sanctify the laws of morals to our apprehension. In truth, it is obvious that, had the first hypothesis (of the hereditary transmission of useful ideas) been heard of in the days of our ancestors, the “mystic extension” (as Mr. Mill calls it) of Utility into Morality could never have been accomplished, and Repentance and Remorse would have been unknown experiences. But all this refers to the practical *authority* of moral laws. It is with the *disinterestedness* of the man who obeys them that we are at present concerned; and this disinterestedness is not, that I perceive, influenced one way or the other by the theory he may hold of how he comes by his knowledge of them.

But now we reach the point where it is to be presumed the Atheist finds ground for his claim to superior disinterestedness. The Theist believes not only that Goodness and Justice are attributes of God, and that God has taught him to be good and just, but that God further holds what the old schoolmen called the *Justitia Rectoria* of the universe,—that He so ordains things as that, sooner or later, good will surely befall the good, and evil the evil. So much as this is included in the simplest elements of Theism. In its fuller development, Theism teaches more; namely, that God takes the interest of a Father in the moral welfare of His children; that He has created every human soul (and doubtless thousands of races of other intelligent beings) for the express purpose that each should attain, through the teaching and trials of existence, to virtue, and so enter into the supreme bliss of sympathy and communion with Himself. Theism, thus understood, teaches that God is perpetually training each soul for that sublime end, inspiring it

with light, answering its prayers for spiritual aid, punishing it for its errors, hedging up its way with thorns to prevent its wanderings, and, finally, certainly conducting it, through this life, and perhaps many lives to come, to the holiness and blessedness for which it was made.

The position of a Theist differs therefore essentially from that of an Atheist as regards the practice of virtue, inasmuch as the Atheist thinks he has no superhuman spectator or sympathizer; that the thoughts and feelings which awaken his conscience and move his heart do not originate in any mind out of his own; that the woes of his life bear with them no moral meaning of retribution or expiation; and, finally, that whether he be a hero or a coward, a saint or a sinner, it will be all one, so far as himself is concerned, when the hour of his death has sounded. His actions may and will have important consequences to other men, but as regards his own destiny they can have no consequences at all, for the grave will receive everything that remains of him. The virtues he may have acquired with unutterable struggles will die away into nothingness, like the sound of a broken harp-string. He will neither rejoin his dead friends, or come into any fresh consciousness of God. Neither dead friends nor God have any existence; and a little sooner or later, as he may chance to be a more or less important person, he will be altogether forgotten, and no being in the universe will ever more remember that he once *was*.

Now I think it would be idle to deny that it must be *far harder* to be virtuous under the shadow of this Atheism than in the sunshine of Theism. The tax and strain upon the moral nature of a man who holds the views just indicated of the emptiness of the universe of any One absolutely good and just—of the low and haphazard origin of conscience, and of the utter loneliness and unaided state wherewith man pursues his weary course from the cradle to the inevitable, eternal grave—must be simply enormous. All honour, sincere and hearty honour, and full recognition of their noble disinterestedness, be to those Atheists who under such strain yet struggle

successfully and incessantly to do good and not evil all their days, and to die bravely and calmly, letting go their grasp of life and joy and love, and sinking without a groan under the waters which are to cover them for evermore. There is something in the self-sustained, Promethean courage of such a man which commands our admiration ; and we can well imagine him looking round on his suffering fellows pitifully, as on his orphaned and disinherited brothers and sisters, with infinite compassion, as for beings destined like himself to perish, with all their aspirations and capacities disappointed and unfulfilled. For such a man to devote himself to the labours of practical benevolence, the relief of the woe which surrounds him, and from whence he usually draws his strongest arguments for his desolate creed, would seem to be the fittest, if not the only fit pursuit ; and when we behold him engaged in it (as in instances I could readily name), our whole hearts recognize his virtue as absolutely beautiful and disinterested. But because the Atheist's virtue, when he is virtuous, is without alloy, is there any just reason to hold that it is *more* pure than that of the Theist? His task is, as I have readily admitted, the *harder* of the two ; *so* hard indeed is it, that there seem the gravest reasons for fearing that, if a few noble spirits perform it, the mass of tried and tempted men who can scarcely lift themselves from their selfishness even with the two wings of Faith and Hope, will lie prone in the very mire of vice when those wings are broken. But because the Atheist's duty is harder to do, is it consequently better done? Is the music which he draws from that one string of philanthropy, sweeter than the full chord of all the religious and social affections together?

Let us revert to the points of difference between the two creeds as above enumerated. Is a man necessarily *self-interested* in doing the will of a Being whom he *loves*, and hopes by serving to approach and resemble? Of course if he is looking for payment,—for health, wealth, happiness on earth, or celestial glory,—for any adventitious reward outside of the fact of becoming better and nearer to God,—then indeed his service is

self-interested. He is a mercenary in the army of martyrs. In strict ethics, his conduct, however exactly legal, is not virtuous, for virtue can only be absolutely without side-looks to contingent profit, present or future. I presume that when Agnostics boast of the superior disinterestedness of the virtue they inculcate over that of religious men, they think (and cannot divest themselves of the early acquired habit of thinking) of religion as of this kind of labour-and-wages system—hard duty below, high glory above—with perhaps the additional complications of the orthodox notions of Imputed Righteousness. But it is time this confusion should cease. Love of goodness *impersonated in God* is not a less disinterested, though naturally a more fervent, sentiment than love of goodness in the abstract. The Theist, in his attempt to obey by good deeds the will of the Being he loves, acts as simply as the Atheist, who loves the good deed, thinking that no being higher in the scale of existence than himself has any appreciation of the difference between good and evil. The Theist indeed adds to his love of goodness *per se*, a love of goodness impersonated in God, who desires good actions to be done,* and possibly also a hope that, by doing good now, he may be given the power to do it again and again for ever; but it is all the same charmed circle of *doing good for goodness' sake*, out of which he never emerges into any such motive as doing good for the sake of honour, prosperity, or heavenly bliss in a golden city. The sole thing which the Theist asks of God as the reward of obedience is, the power to obey better in future, the privilege of obeying for ever. The payment of his virtue is, to be virtuous now and throughout eternity. Whether it be in this life or another, there is no difference; no new principle comes into play; no bribe unsought for here is hoped for there. He says to God:

* Miss Martineau says: "I saw with the pain of disgust how much lower a thing it is to lead even the loftiest life from a regard to the will or mind of any other being than from a natural working out of our own powers" (Autobiography, Vol. II.). I must humbly confess I have not come yet to see anything of the kind. Provided that the Being to whose Will we have regard is Supreme Goodness itself, it seems to me infinitely *higher* to strive to assimilate our will to His than to "work out our own powers."

"It is a joy to serve Thee, but infinitely greater is the joy to serve Thee with the assurance that the term of my service will never expire. Precious is the privilege of calling Thee Father. How glad then am I that I shall be a child at Thy feet for ever! Lord, I seek no heaven hereafter. I covet no abode of bliss, no outward reward above. To be with Thee is my heaven and my salvation, and the only reward I seek. As I abide in Thee now, may I continue to live in Thee, O Father; and to grow in wisdom and love and purity and joy in Thee, time without end."*

Surely it is altogether absurd to speak of this Religion as involving any, even the very slightest shade of interestedness, or detraction from the highest conceivable type of human virtue? If it deserve such a condemnation, then must likewise stand condemned the most pure and exalted human love which friend has ever felt for friend—for this also, by its very nature, seeks to serve for love's sake; to arrive at perfect harmony; to dwell with the beloved in unbroken and everlasting union.

Turn we now to the other side of the subject. Theism has been, I hope, vindicated from the charge of interestedness. What shall we say to the general ethical aspect of Agnosticism, which assumes to be the nobler system? Admitting cordially the blameless conduct and the high aspirations of its professors, what value shall we attach to their claim to be the heralds of a higher morality?

Let it be understood that the work of Theists has been to *purify* Religion to the best of their lights, and re-establish its relation with morals on (as they think) a better footing than that of orthodoxy. If they have attacked the popular creed, it has been in the best interests of Religion as they have understood them; and if they have disturbed any man's faith or hope, it has been for the purpose of immediately grounding them on a securer basis and lifting them to loftier love.

* Keshub Chunder Sen.

The work of Atheists differs essentially from theirs, inasmuch as they aim to do away with all which has hitherto passed under the name of Religion,—faith in a Moral Governor of the world and hope of a life beyond the grave; and it is their contention that by making a clean sweep of these fundamental beliefs as well as of all the superstructures of orthodoxy, they best prepare the way for the higher Morality which they propose to teach. If we may, without offence, condense their lessons in a very obvious parallel, they amount to this “symbol:”—“Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he cease to believe either in One God or in three; and that he be fully assured that those who have done good, and those who have done evil, shall alike go into everlasting nothingness.” This creed, piously accepted, he will advance to perfection, and altogether outrun any excellence which has been hitherto attained by Christian or Theist, in the two following ways:

1st. While recognizing that, so far as he himself is concerned, Death means the annihilation of consciousness, he will act throughout his life with a deep and conscientious concern for the consequences of his actions to those who come after him, or—as Mr. Frederick Harrison expresses it—to his own posthumous activity.

2nd. By welcoming the conclusions of Atheism, and especially the doctrine of the annihilation of consciousness at death, not as a sorrowful truth, but as the latest and brightest Gospel of good tidings; and proclaiming on all suitable occasions that they afford a better standpoint and outlook for humanity than any faith or hope which has been hitherto entertained.

The first of these doctrines has been this year set forth (as most of the readers of the *Theological Review* will be well aware) in two most eloquent and affecting papers by Mr. Frederick Harrison in the June and July Nos. of the *Nineteenth Century*. How much sympathy I feel with a great deal which is said in these papers,* how sincerely I respect Mr.

* *E. g.* the following passage, which deserves to be reprinted a hundred times, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1877, p. 832: “We entirely agree with the theologians

Harrison's noble conception of the aim of life, even where I most completely misdoubt the validity of the method he proposes for attaining it, there is scarcely need to say. It is precisely because such Positivists as he and Mr. Morley and George Eliot, and such Agnostics as many I could name, assume such really high ground in their teaching, and appeal (though, as I think, in a fallacious way) to our very noblest sympathies and aspirations, that I feel urged to raise my feeble voice and call in question their guidance. There, in truth, stand, as they point to them, the snowy summits of purity and goodness. But by what path would they guide us to ascend them? Even if their own strong souls may climb those giddy heights, can they be in any possible sense the better way than that by which millions of believers in God and Immortality have gone up on high?

Let us take Mr. Harrison's doctrine of the "Posthumous Activities" of the soul, and endeavour to estimate how far it is calculated to act as an efficient motive of virtue on ordinarily constituted, well-intentioned men and women. We must bear in mind that it is formally proposed as a substitute for the old belief in the immortality of the individual—that is (according to the Theist creed), in the immortality of the *virtue* of the

that our age is beset with a grievous danger of materialism. There is a school of teachers abroad, and they have found an echo here, who dream that victorious vivisection will ultimately win them anatomical solutions of man's moral and spiritual mysteries. Such unholy nightmares, it is true, are not likely to beguile many minds in a country like this, where social and moral problems are still in their natural ascendant. But there is a subtler kind of materialism of which the dangers are real. It does not indeed put forth the bestial sophism that the apex of philosophy is to be won by improved microscopes and new batteries. But then it has nothing to say about the spiritual life of men. It fills the air with pæans to science, but it always means physical, not moral science. It shirks the question of questions,—To what human end is this knowledge? How shall man thereby order his life as a whole? Where is he to find the object of the yearnings of his spirit?"

I am not concerned to defend the orthodox ideal of Heaven against Mr. Harrison's strictures, but I cannot help entering a protest against his sneer at the "eternity of the labor" as "so gross, so sensual a creed." It seems to me it errs by an excessive and unreal spirituality. It was certainly not a "gross" or "sensual" order of mind which deemed the act of *adoration* to be one wherein man could spend an eternity of ecstasy.

individual. While Theists believe that, having lighted that sacred torch, they shall be permitted to bear it onward, burning more purely and brightly for ever, the Comtist believes he must lay down his torch at the side of his grave, but that other men may ignite their own from it, and so carry on its light from age to age.

In the first place I must remark, that, like the promise on which such stress is laid in Dr. Bridge's *General View of Positivism*—that attached husbands and wives may be solemnly interred side by side—there is nothing *new* in these anticipations held out by Positivism. We have always known that we might be buried in the same vault with our next friend, as we have always known that our actions would continue to bear fruit after our departure. We entertained the first hope (so far as such a pitiful matter as the future position of our deaf and blind, decaying dust deserves to be considered a hope), and we were aware of the responsibility,—*plus* the belief that we ourselves should enjoy free converse with the spirit of our friend, and afford to smile together on our poor mouldering garments laid up side by side in the tomb,—and *plus* the belief that we might ourselves be cognizant of our posthumous activities. There is nothing in the fact that both the hope and the sense of responsibility must now stand by themselves for what they are worth, to give them (so far as I can see) any fresh leverage as motives of conduct. People who did not love each other better while they expected to be at liberty to spend eternity in conscious communion, as well as to be buried in the same grave, certainly will not love each other better when their future prospects are limited to the family vault. And people who have not regulated their conduct with a view to their post-mortem influence while they anticipated to be living somewhere to know, or, at all events, to be obliged to think, about it, are very little likely to regulate it the better when they are convinced that, if they leave the Deluge behind them, they will neither know nor care one iota. As to the good man, he will, under the old creed and under the new alike (and neither more nor less, so

far as I can perceive), entertain a solemn sense of a responsibility to do all the good and refrain from every evil in his power during his threescore years and ten, *not* first, or chiefly, for the sake of consequences near or remote to himself or other people in this world or another, but because goodness, truth, courage, justice and generosity, are good in themselves, loveable in his eyes and in the eyes of God, and falsehood, impurity, cruelty and treachery, are bad and despicable, hateful to him and to his Maker. Afterwards, and as a reinforcement of his choice of Scipio, he will reflect that every good act entails good consequences in widening circles of loving-kindness, honour and honesty, and every bad one the reverse; and he will hope in dying to reflect that the sum of the influence he leaves to work after him will be wholly on the side of truth, justice and love. It is monstrous for Mr. Harrison to say that "the difference between our (Positivist) faith and that of the orthodox is this. *We* look to the permanence of the activities which give others happiness. *They* look to the permanence of the consciousness which can enjoy happiness." Why should looking to the permanence of consciousness and happiness make a man care less for the activities "which give others happiness"? Does A care less for B's welfare because he would like to be alive to see it, or even alive at the Antipodes at the same time?

Mr. Harrison has indeed urged an important moral reflection, not altogether for the first time, for moralists and divines of all ages have not overlooked it in accumulating the motives in favour of virtue. But I venture to think his own generous and poetic temperament has made him attach a great deal more practical force to it than it possesses. In the first place, when such an observer of things as Shakespeare could say, that

"The evil which men do lives after them;
The good is oft interred with their bones;"

it is open to us all to doubt whether some of the very noblest achievements of human virtue have left any other mark than on the virtuous souls themselves, which (as we Theists think)

enjoy even now in a higher existence their blessed inward consequences. The martyrs who perished unseen and unknown in the hideous dungeons and amid the protracted tortures of the Inquisition in Spain, where the Reformation they would have established was absolutely extinguished and left no ray of light behind—could these men cheer themselves under the awful strain of their agonies by a motive of such tenuity as the prospect of their “posthumous activities”?

But admitting, for argument sake, that the motive would serve always to support the heroic order of virtues, would it likewise aid the still more important ones of every-day conduct? His own illustrations ought surely to have made Mr. Harrison pause before he assumed it. He speaks of Newton as “no longer destroying his great name by feeble theology or querulous pettiness”—of Shakespeare as “the boon companion and retired playwright of Stratford”—of Dante as the “querulous refugee from Florence”—and of Milton as “the blind and stern old malignant of Bunhill Fields.” Now these are his chosen exemplars of the enormous “posthumous activity” which a man may exert, and certainly nobody now living can hope that he shall ever exercise one-tenth as much. But *their* “pettiness” and “querulousness” and “boon companionship” and “sternness” in their lifetimes did not hinder, or even essentially detract from, their stupendous “posthumous activity.” Why, then, should lesser people have any scruple in being petty, querulous or stern, or indulging in pot-companionship, or any other faults of temper or habit, on account of their little posthumous activities, whatever they may hope that these may prove?

Obviously, Mr. Harrison has a misgiving as to the force which his argument can be expected to exert on ordinary mortals, or for the daily purposes of life. Though he says that the truth he teaches “is not confined to the great,” and adds the beautiful remark that “in some infinitesimal degree the humblest life that ever turned a sod sends a wave—no, more than a wave, a life—through the ever-growing harmony of human society;” yet even while he alleges that a concern for

such posthumous activity is "no doubt now in England the great motive of virtue and energy," and asks, "Can we conceive a more potent stimulus to daily and hourly striving after a true life?"*—he says in the next page, that "it would be an endless inquiry to trace the means whereby this sense of posthumous participation in the life of our fellows *can be extended to the mass*, as it certainly affects already the thoughtful and refined." Honestly he admits that it is "impossible it should become universal and capable of overcoming selfishness" "without an education, a new social opinion without a religion; I mean an organized religion, not a vague metaphysic." "Make it," he cries, with almost the enthusiasm of a discoverer, "at once the basis of philosophy, the standard of right and wrong, and the centre of a religion," and then it may perhaps be achieved.

But, in sober truth, what "education" or "organized religion" (i.e. of course, Comtism) can possibly transform this remote anticipation of the results of our actions after we are dead into a practical lever for daily duty for the great bulk of mankind? It is the speciality of all vice to be selfishly indifferent to the injurious consequences of our actions, even to their immediate and visible consequences, to those nearest to us. Is it not almost ludicrous to think of exhorting the drunkard who sees his wife and children starving round him to-day, or the ill-conducted girl who is breaking her mother's heart, or the hard task-master or landlord who is grinding the faces of the poor to fill his pocket—to refrain from their misdoings on account of the evil which they will cause fifty years hence to people unborn? Or let us try to apply the principle to that sound mass of every-day English virtue which is after all the very air we breathe, and which Mr. Harrison would be the last to undervalue—the daily dutifulness, the purity, the truthfulness, the loving-kindness of our homes, the beautiful patience to be witnessed beside a thousand sick beds. Were we to ask the simple-hearted men and

* Pp. 838, 839.

meek women who exemplify these virtues whether they ever think of the excellent "posthumous activities" which they will exert on their surviving acquaintances, would they not be utterly bewildered? The clergyman (or let us have the Comtist philosopher) who should go through a Workhouse ward, or round the cottages of a village, and offer such a suggestion as a topic of encouragement, would, we think, effect a very small measure of reformation. Nor do I think it is necessarily a low type of mind which does not project itself much into the future, whether in this world or the next; which is vividly affected by the idea of a *present* righteous law claiming immediate obedience, and a *present* adorable God watching whether that obedience be paid, but which takes in even the idea of Immortality more as adding an infinite dignity to moral things and human souls, than as a direct motive in any sense. To such persons, Mr. Harrison's promise of "posthumous activities" is as remote and inoperative a principle as it is possible to propose; and they can scarcely help smiling at it, as they do at the observation of Pliny, that the "happiest of all possible anticipations is the certain expectation of an honourable and undying renown." Posthumous Activity affords a far nobler motive than posthumous Fame, but they both appeal to sentiments which have little weight with the majority of minds, and no weight at all with a great number not undeserving of respect.

The truth is, that Mr. Harrison, like most Agnostics of the day, seems not only to belong to an exceptional type of human nature, little touched by grosser impulse, and highly sensitive to the most rarefied order of influences, but to be unable to descend from such altitude, and realize what ordinary flesh and blood men and women are made of. As Mr. Darwin unconsciously betrayed that he had never once had occasion to repent an act of unkindness, when he theorized about Repentance as *beginning* by a spontaneous reversion to sympathy and goodwill to the people we have injured (in bold contradiction to Tacitus' too true maxim, "*Humani generis proprium est odisse quem læseris*"), so Mr. Harrison unwittingly allows

us to perceive that he really considers an exalted and far-reaching interest in the welfare of our kind as the sort of motive which is already "now in England the great motive of virtue and energy."

Let me explain myself. I do not think there is any precept too high to be accepted by the mass of mankind; nay, I think that the higher, nobler, more self-sacrificing the lesson, the warmer response it will draw forth from the heart of humanity. But this is the *moral* excellence of the precept, the loftiness of the purity, the nobleness of the generosity, the courageousness of the self-devotion, which are demanded. It is quite another thing to choose to present, as the proper motive of daily virtue, an idea requiring a trained intellect to take it in, and a vivid imagination to realize it. Every argument for virtue, for sobriety, veracity and so on, drawn from considerations of future consequences, labours under this irremediable defect; that it appeals least to those whom it is most necessary to influence. When we go further, and place our fulcrum of moral leverage in the period after the death of the man to whom we appeal, and candidly tell him that he will neither enjoy the sight of any good he may have effected, nor suffer from the spectacle of the results of his wrong-doing, we have reached (as it seems to me) the *ne plus ultra* of impracticability. Woe to human virtue when its advocates are driven to attach primary importance to such an argument, and dream it can be made "the centre of a religion"!

To sum up this subject. To a man of high calibre and gifts, the consideration of "posthumous activities" may act as a spur to doing great actions, but scarcely as a motive to regulate his daily life and temper. He will perhaps under its influence reform the prisons of Europe, and at the same time break his wife's heart; write a great epic poem, and treat his daughters like slaves; paint splendid pictures, and remain a selfish and sordid miser; fight heroically his country's battles, and lead a life of persistent adultery; be at once a disinterested statesman in a corrupt age, and an habitual drunkard.

As to the mass of mankind, who are endowed neither with

any superior gifts to employ, nor vivid imagination to realize the results of their actions hereafter, an appeal to them to act virtuously in consideration of their posthumous activities would draw forth some such reply as this: "Our conduct can at most leave after our deaths only very small results on a very few people whom we shall never know. We find it hard enough to make sacrifices for those whom we do know and love, and whose happiness or misery we actually witness. It is asking too much of us that, for remote, contingent and evanescent benefits to our survivors, we should undergo any pain or labour, or renounce any of the pleasures which in our poor short lives (so soon to end for ever in darkness!) may fall within our grasp."

Thus in its capacity of the *Friend of Virtue*, it seems that Atheism begins by depriving Virtue of some of the strongest, if not the very strongest, motives by which it has hitherto been supported, and offers in their room, as the best substitute for them and the future "centre of religion," a consideration of Posthumous Activities whose force is of necessity both partial as to the virtues it inculcates, and extremely limited as to the persons over whom it can exercise any influence. And *that* force, such as it is, appears to be in no way specially connected with the Atheistic view of human destiny, but belongs to every moral system in the world!

Finally, as if to complete the nullity of the motive of Posthumous Activities, there comes a reflection which Mr. Harrison has strangely overlooked, but which must take ere long a prominent place in disquisitions of this kind. Mr. Harrison talks of the "immortality," the "eternity," of a dead man's influence. But if each individual human soul is destined to be extinguished at death, then there is *nothing* wherewith man is concerned which is immortal or eternal. Our race is destined irretrievably to perish *as a race*, if it perish piecemeal with every soul which drops into the grave. Miss Martineau's wild talk about "the special destination of my race" being "infinitely nobler than the highest proposed under a scheme

of Divine Moral Government"* (an assertion in itself simply absurd, since the believers in a scheme of Divine Government hold that whatever *is* noblest is *by the hypothesis* assuredly our destination), is rendered doubly preposterous when we bear in mind what Science teaches regarding the inevitable lapse of this planet within a limited epoch into a condition of uninhabitability. The following observations are made on this subject in a little *jeu d'esprit* which I may be pardoned for quoting. It assumes to be an extract from a newspaper of the next century, and the men of that period are supposed to look back upon the doctrine of "Posthumous Activities" with very little respect.

"It is needless to repeat that the delusive exhortations of some amiable but short-sighted philosophers of the last century to 'labour for the good of Humanity in future generations' (a motive which they supposed would prove a substitute for the old Historic Religions) have been once and for all answered by the grand discovery of astronomers that our planet cannot long remain the habitation of man (even if it escape any sidereal explosion), since the Solar heat is undergoing such rapid exhaustion. When the day comes—as come it must—when the fruits of the earth perish one by one, when the dead and silent woods petrify, and all the races of animals become extinct—when the icy seas flow no longer, and the pallid Sun shines dimly over the frozen world, locked, like the Moon, in eternal frost and lifelessness—what, in that day, predicted so surely by Science, will avail all the works, and hopes, and martyrdoms of man? All the stores of knowledge which we shall have accumulated will be for ever lost. Our discoveries, whereby we have become the lords of creation and wielded the great forces of Nature, will be useless and forgotten. The virtues which have been perfected, the genius which has glorified, the love which has blessed the human race, will all perish along with it. Our libraries of books, our galleries of pictures, our fleets, our railroads, our vast and busy cities, will be desolate and useless for evermore. No intelligent eye will ever behold them; and no mind in the universe will know or remember that there ever existed such a being as Man. *This* is what SCIENCE teaches us unerringly to expect—and in view of it, who shall talk to us of 'labouring for the sake of Humanity'? The

* Autobiography, Vol. II. p. 356.

enthusiasm which could work disinterestedly for a Progress destined inevitably to end in an eternal Glacial Period must be recognized as a dream, wherein no man in a Scientific Age can long indulge.”*

The second counsel of perfection of the Agnostic teachers is, as above said, “to welcome the conclusions of Atheism, and especially the doctrine of annihilation of consciousness at death, not merely as truth, but as the latest gospel of good tidings.”

This lesson, though repeated more or less by nearly all Agnostic and Comtist writers, has been this year most prominently brought to the front in the Life of Harriet Martineau. I shall take her observations and example as the text for the remarks I wish to offer upon it, as I have done the papers of Mr. Frederick Harrison for those just made on the doctrine of Posthumous Activities.† These are some of her utterances which touch on the matter :

“I soon found myself quite outside of my old world of thought and speculation, under a new heaven and a new earth, disembarassed of a load of selfish cares and troubles. . . . Hence it followed that the conceptions of a God with any human attributes whatever, of a principle or practice of Design, of an administration of the affairs of the world by the principles of human morals, must be mere visions, necessary and useful in their day, but not philosophically or permanently true. . . . The reality that philosophy founded upon science is the one thing needful, the source and the vital principle of all morality and all peace to individuals and goodwill among men, had become the crown of my experience and the joy of my life. . . . My comrade (Mr. Atkinson) and I were both pioneers of

* Age of Science, p. 49. Ward, Lock and Tyler.

† Mr. Harrison, much as he despises what he is pleased to call the “eternity of the labor” offered by Christianity, does not join in the chorus of gratulation which Miss Martineau and so many others have been raising on their discovery that Death *has* the victory after all. He seems to admit that it is a sad business, but desires, like a brave and good man, to make the best he can of it in a moral point of view. “We do not deny,” he says (p. 836), “Death’s terrors or its evils. We are not responsible for it, and should welcome any reasonable prospect of eliminating or postponing this fatality that waits upon all organic nature. But it is no answer to philosophy or science to say that Death is so terrible, therefore man must be designed to escape it.”

truth. We both care for our kind, and we could not see them suffering as we had suffered without imparting to them our consolation and our joy. Having found, as my friend said, a spring in the desert, should we see the multitude wandering in desolation and not shew them our refreshment? *Then* (in younger days) I believed in a Protector, who ordered my work and would sustain me under it, and however I may now despise that sort of support, I had it then, and have none of that sort now. I have all that I want, and I would not exchange my present views, imperfect and doubtful as they are, I had better say I would not exchange my freedom from old superstition, if I were to be burned at the stake next month, for all the peace and quiet of orthodoxy. Nor would I for my exemption give up the blessing of the power of appeal to thoughtful minds. . . . When I experienced the still new joy of feeling myself to be a portion of the universe, resting on the security of its everlasting laws, certain that its Cause was wholly out of the sphere of human attributes, and that the special destiny of my race is infinitely nobler than the highest proposed under a scheme of 'divine moral government,' how could it matter to me that the adherents of a decaying mythology were still clinging to their Man-God? Under this close experience (of illness), I find death in prospect the simplest thing in the world—a thing not to be feared or regretted, or to get excited about it in any way. I attribute this very much to the nature of my views of death. . . . Now the release is an inexpressible comfort. I see that the dying naturally and regularly, unless disturbed, desire and sink into death as into sleep. . . . I feel no solicitude about a parting which will bring no pain. . . . Under the eternal laws of the universe I came into being, and under them I have lived a life so full that its fulness is equivalent to length; thus there is much in my life that I am glad to have enjoyed, and much that generates a mood of contentment at its close. Besides that I never dream of wishing that anything were otherwise than as it is; and I am frankly satisfied to have done with life. I have had a noble share of it, and I desire no more. I neither wish to live longer here, nor to find life again elsewhere. It seems to me simply absurd to expect it."*

It is no part of the purpose of this article to discuss the *truth* of the doctrine that there is no God, and that death ter-

* Autobiography, pp. 333, 438.

minates human consciousness. Nor yet do I question whether a high sense of loyalty to what is understood to be truth may not make it appear to any one holding such doctrines that he is under the obligation to publish them frankly to the world. Many a man who is an Atheist as regards God, holds (what many Christians and Theists lack) a noble faith in Truth *as* Truth, a firm conviction that nothing can be better than Truth, and that, as Carlyle says, "to nothing but error can any truth be dangerous." It is not, then, the holding of such views as those above quoted, nor yet their frank publication and defence, wherewith we are now concerned; but with the *tone of exultation* with which they are announced, the disregard and contempt which is manifested for the dearest hopes, the purest aspirations, of the great mass of mankind.

Magnanimity has two phases. We may be magnanimous on our own account,—brave, calm and self-reliant in the face of things which appal feebler souls. Of this sort of personal magnanimity, this remarkable woman has given a very fine example. Here are the words she wrote twenty years after the foregoing pages, in her last letter to her friend:

"I cannot think of any future as at all probable except the annihilation from which some people recoil with so much horror. . . . For my part, I have no objection to such an extinction. I well remember the passion wherewith W. E. Forster said to me, 'I had rather be damned than annihilated.' . . . I have no wish for any further experience, nor have I any fear of it."* . . .

These words have in them a calmness, simplicity and courage, which demand our honour, written as they were by an aged woman (as she herself describes them a few lines further) "under the clear knowledge of death being so near at hand." The old vulgar theory, so frequently harped upon in the last generation, that the right place to judge a man's religious views is his death-bed, and that while orthodox believers alone can die bravely, sceptics must needs expire in anguish

* Harriet Martineau's last letter to Mr. Atkinson, Ambleside, May 19, 1876; Autobiography, Vol. III. p. 453.

and alarm, with "a certain fearful looking-for of judgment,"—has been thoroughly exploded by the now numberless instances of perfect courage exhibited by dying men and women, who had long before abandoned the hopes of a happy futurity which Revealed or Natural Religion have to offer. Harriet Martineau's serene self-resignation into eternal nothingness ought, if any further evidence were wanting, to suffice to set the matter finally at rest; and we may expect to see it cited very properly by disbelievers in Immortality as exhibiting what they deem to be the fitting and dignified tone of a philosophical mind drawing near to the horizon beneath which it will presently disappear for ever. No one can help respecting courage, under whatever form or circumstances it is manifested; and if a man think that he is on the verge of annihilation, it is truly dignified and praiseworthy to approach it with unflinching eye and unblenched check. This is *so far as the individual is concerned*. But is there not another and larger side of the question, which the very noblest man *ought* to feel as awful and heart-rending—nay, must feel to be so, in proportion to his nobleness and his power to extend his view beyond his own petty personality?

True magnanimity, it seems to me, must look far outside of a man's own lot, of his past share of life's feast and his readiness now to rise from it satisfied, and must take a wide survey of the lives (so far as they can be known or guessed) of all other men—of the poverty-stricken, the savage, the ignorant, the diseased, the enslaved, the sin-degraded—and attain the conclusion that for *these* also, as well as for himself, life on earth has been sufficient good, and none other need be asked or desired, before he can complacently speak of the *joy* of abandoning faith in God and Immortality. "I have had a noble share of life, and I desire no more," is an expression of personal sentiment which may or may not be right and fitting on the assumed hypothesis. But to join to such expression of individual contentment no word of regret for the closing in of all hope to the suffering millions of our race who have *not* had "noble" shares of life, and who do, with yearning hunger, desire more than has ever fallen to their

lot,—this is, as it seems to me, the reverse of magnanimity. This is littleness and selfishness almost as bad as that of the bigots whom these Atheists abhor, who rejoice to expect heaven for themselves, while leaving thousands of their brethren to perdition. It might be pardonable in one brought up to believe in hell, and who hurriedly leaped to the doctrine of annihilation from that intolerable yoke, and cried, “Let us all perish together, rather than that hideous doom overtake a single creature!” Such a choice would be generous and worthy. But when a woman, who probably never at any period of her life believed in the eternal perdition of a soul, proclaims herself enraptured at the joy of finding out that there is neither a God to protect the weak, nor, finally, any holiness or happiness beyond the grave,—then, I repeat, this is *not* magnanimity, but selfishness.

Let us think a little what it would signify to mankind to give up God and Heaven—that is, the *belief* in God and Heaven; for, God be praised! it rests with no philosophic school to put out the Sun or prevent the morning from breaking, but only to *blind our eyes to them*.

Mr. Martineau once made in a sermon the startling remark, that “if it could be known that God was dead, the news would cause but little excitement in the streets of Berlin or Paris.” The observation was doubtless true; for of *direct* thought of God, the streets of great cities are probably the emptiest of any places wherein mortals may be found. But there is an enormous share of human ideas and feelings not directly or consciously turned towards God, yet nevertheless coloured by the belief that such a Being exists. Perhaps it would be more proper to say, that in Christendom every idea and every feeling has imperceptibly been built up on the theory that there is a God. We see everything *with Him for a background*. Inanimate Nature and the lower animals—human history and society—poetry, literature, science and art,—every one of them has its religious aspect, which can only be excluded by a mental *tour de force*. Take inanimate Nature, for example—the region where it seems easiest to sever the

links of habitual thought, and which the doctrine of Evolution (according to some of its teachers) has already withdrawn from the domain of a Creative Power. We all love this Nature, and our hearts are moved to their depths by sympathy with it when we gaze round of a summer morning upon the woods and hills and waters, or later in the year upon the "happy autumn fields" of ripened corn, or on a winter's night up into the solemn host of stars. But is it merely the "glittering patines of bright gold," or fields of yellow wheat, or the block of wood and rock which form the forest or the mountain, which awaken in us such mysterious emotion? Are we not dimly worshipping the Soul of Nature through earth and sky,—the Spirit wherewith our spirits are in ineffable harmony, and of which all the loveliness we behold is but the shadow?

Let some Agnostic disenchanter come to us at such an hour and tell us, that, though it takes a man of genius to depict worthily on canvas a corner of this wide field of loveliness, yet that the whole great original had no Painter, no Designer; that the mountains had no Architect, the well-balanced stars no supreme Geometer, but that it all came about as we behold it through the action of forces, unguided by any Mind, undirected by any Will; and what revulsion shall we not experience? Shall we not feel like a man enamoured of a beautiful woman, whom he has believed to be good and wise and tender; but when he comes at last to look close into her face he finds her to be a soulless idiot, from whose stony and meaningless gaze he turns shuddering away?

Science, again, is but a mere heap of Facts, not a golden chain of Truths, if we refuse to link it to the throne of God.* In every department of human thought, in short, something—and that something the most beautiful in it—must be lost, some sacred spell must be broken, if we are to think of it as

* I have heard of two very great living philosophers who thought they had pretty nearly got rid of Final Causes, but who, in talking together, found it hard to avoid assuming their existence. One of them, in fact, in detailing his own observations and discoveries concerning animals and plants, used so often terms implying that there was a *purpose* visible in natural arrangements, that his friend stopped him and said, "Mr. —, you are getting strangely *teleological*!"

divested from the deeper sense which Religion has (all unconsciously to ourselves) given to it—the thread of Purpose running through; the understood promise of Justice; the sympathy of an unseen, all-beholding Spectator.

In the same way all human relationships will be stripped of the majestic mantle under which they have been sheltered. The idea of the common Fatherhood of God, which Paganism in its best days had begun to teach, and which Christ's lessons have made the familiar thought of every European child, has put a meaning into the phrase of Human Brotherhood which it is much to be doubted if the warmest Enthusiasts of Humanity would, without such preliminary training, have been able to give to it. The idea (poorly as it has been hitherto recognized) that the most degraded of mankind, those from whom we naturally turn in disgust, have yet the same Creator and the same Judge as ourselves, has beyond question an indirect influence of no small force over all our sentiments concerning them. The same reflection has even at last begun to exercise a perceptible influence over our conduct to the brutes. Christians and Theists of every shade may be found impressed with the sense that religion demands the humane treatment of all sentient creatures; and this whether they take the view of Cardinal Manning, that "if I owe no moral duties to the lower animals, I owe all the moral duties that are conceivable to the Creator of those animals—humanity, mercy and care for them;" or adopt the Theist standpoint, that, as we love Him, so we naturally look with sympathy and tenderness on everything He has made. Of course this motive of humanity to brutes disappears with the belief in God; and accordingly we find, with quite logical fitness, that while the opposition to brute torture is maintained by men of every varied shade of religious opinion from Catholicism to Theism, all the chief vivisectioners of Europe, and nearly all their prominent abettors, are professed Materialists. Vivisection is the logical outcome of Atheism as regards the brutes.

But it is in the region of the personal virtues—Purity, Truth, Temperance, Contentment—that the loss of the belief in God

will be most disastrous. I am far from maintaining that—putting Religion wholly out of sight—there are not motives of a purely ethical kind left which *ought* to make men practise the highest inward virtue. But I think it needs only a slight knowledge of human nature to perceive that the shutting up of the window of the soul, through which an awful and most holy Spectator has hitherto been thought to gaze into all its secrets, must leave a great deal in darkness which has been till now illumined with a sin-exposing light. It takes much for a man to say, like the author of *In Memoriam*,

“The *dead* shall look me through and through.”

The idea of any eye perceiving all that is going on in the recesses of the mind,—the double motives, the unfaithfulnesses, the vanities, the memories of old shameful errors,—this is hard enough. But the belief that such introspection is always taking place, and by the Holiest of all beings, is undoubtedly a sort of purification such as no mere solitary process of self-examination can resemble. Even a warm human friendship in youth brings with it always a burst of self-knowledge. We see ourselves quite freshly in our friend's view of us. But a thousand times greater of course is the self-revelation which comes with the realized Presence of God in the soul ; the flood of sunshine which discloses all the motes which fill the atmosphere of our thoughts. Now though it is only spiritually-minded men who know this experience in its full intensity, yet every man who believes in God has gleams of it at intervals through life which are never afterwards quite forgotten. But more (and this is a point which concerns the whole Theistic moral argument most importantly), the supreme experience of spiritual men is *filtered down* through all grades of minds by books and intercourse. The lofty standard of purity which has been revealed to them is partially exhibited by their words and example, and forms a kind of high-water mark for lesser souls. It is an immense gain, even to very poor sinners, that there should be a few rich saints ; and every man who has attained a lofty conception of holiness helps to make all the

world around him conscious of its unholiness. He is a mirror in a dark place; the ray of light which has fallen on him dispels somewhat of the gloom around.

Now if the belief in God be lost to humanity, we shall lose not only the direct, the incalculable effects on individual souls of the belief in a Divine Searcher of Hearts, but also the indirect and universal uplifting influence on society of the presence of men who have experienced such effects, and formed their moral standard accordingly. Is it too much to augur that the result will be a depreciation of the common ideal standard, and a consequently still further depression of the practical level of personal virtue?

What is left, when Religion is gone, to give to the personal virtues of Purity (of thought as well as act), of Truth, Temperance and Contentment, the high status they ought to hold? These virtues, in the history of the moral development of mankind, are always the last to be recognized. In the earlier ages of morality, nobody asks for more than negative merits—*not* to murder or rob or act treacherously. Then comes the great step, when the rabbinical precept, "Thou shalt *not* do to another what thou wouldest not he should do to thee," is exchanged for the positive Christian law, *Do* to another what thou wouldest he should do to thee. But only very slowly, above and beyond all social duties, the principle, "Be perfect, as thy Father in Heaven is perfect," has dawned on mankind as the aim of life; and how little it is yet the practical rule of mankind, there is no need to tell. Let us but let slip our faith in the perfect Father in Heaven, and will it not sink again by degrees into oblivion? We shall hear a great deal, doubtless (for a time, at all events), of the duty of Labouring for the Cause of Humanity, and be encouraged by promises of "post-humous activity." But where are the motives for personal and secret virtue to come from—that inward virtue without which even warm social benevolence soon becomes tainted? It *must*, it would seem, fall more and more into the background. There is, theoretically, no more reason for placing it forward—there is no more any "End of Creation" in contemplation, to which

the virtue of each soul, to be wrought out by its own struggles, must contribute its quatum. *The intrinsic moral character of each soul* will no longer be deemed the concern of any Being except the man himself, but only what *each is able to achieve in the way of contributing to the welfare of other people*. While the lesson of the higher ethics has been, "It is more important to *be* good than to *do* good," that of the new ethics must inevitably be, "It is very important what you *do*; it is of the smallest possible consequence what you *are*, except in so far as your neighbours may know it and be affected thereby."

In another way, also, I think Morality would be affected enormously, though still indirectly, by the downfall of Religion. Many of my readers will recall a very able article on Atheism in the *National Review* for January, 1856, by Mr. R. H. Hutton, in which it was maintained that "Atheism has no language by which it can express the infinite nature of moral distinctions. . . . It is not, as has been falsely said, that Right and Wrong take their distinction from measures of duration, but that faith in infinite personal life, and in communion with, or separate from, infinite Good, is the only articulate utterance which our conscience can find for its sense of the absolutely boundless significance it sees in every moral choice." Take away this *expression* of the infinite nature of moral distinctions, and the *sense* of it will very rapidly dwindle away.

And, after all, can it be said in the same sense, under an Atheistic as under a Theistic creed, that moral distinctions *are* "infinitely" significant? Is there any "infinite" left for us to talk about, when we have abolished God and Immortality? Some few thousands of years ago, on the Atheistic hypothesis, when man was just emerging from apehood, there was no Being anywhere who distinguished Right from Wrong;* and some few thousand years to come, when the final glacial period

* Or at least *our* Right from Wrong, for on Mr. Darwin's showing there may, it seems, be a different right and wrong for creatures differently constituted in other worlds, whose interests, being different, will cause different "sets" of their brains towards the lines of action useful to their tribes accordingly.

sets in, there will be nobody left to know anything about it. There is no Being now in the universe in whom Righteousness is impersonated, nor any world to come wherein the injustices of this will be rectified. From the eternal and immutable law of the universe, the ἄγραπτα κάσφαλὴ θεῶν νόμιμα, which Sophocles held it to be, the Moral Law has sunk to a mere "Rule of Thumb," whereby certain ephemeral creatures on our small planet find it most beneficial on the whole to regulate their behaviour. Is it in the nature of things to pay to such a Rule the sort of obedience and reverence we have paid to the Divine Law? And if, with the very highest sanctions which can be conceived, that Law has but too often failed to secure our obedience against the temptations of selfishness and passion, does anybody expect that, when it is divested of all those sanctions, it will prevail even so far as it has done hitherto?

These are some of the indirect ways in which mankind must lose Beauty and Truth and Goodness, as it loses faith in God and Immortality. But the direct losses inevitably to follow are, if possible, graver still.

The course of the moral life, after it has been commenced in earnest, probably passes through the same two great phases in almost every man who lives long enough. At first, Duty is a hard effort, and *all* effort. A strong hand seems to be laid on the man, urging him up a toilsome road. Every evil tendency of his nature has to be separately fought with and trampled down; every act of self-sacrifice for others to be performed with exertion of his will. The man labours heroically under his stern sense of duty, taking consolation in it *as* duty; but still looking rather to fulfil *his* obligation, than desirous that the end of each task should be accomplished. If he die at this stage, it is in some sense a release. He has discharged his duty as a soldier, and is glad to lay down his arms. If he is a religious man, he hopes to hear it said to him, "Well done, good and faithful servant! enter thou into the joy of thy Lord."

But if a man live many years, striving in earnest, however failingly, to do his duty, there comes by degrees a change in his condition. Old temptations die down, and, if no new ones

arise to give him trouble, the friction of the inner life diminishes so sensibly, that he is apt to be alarmed lest he be growing indifferent. As to his positive duties, those which he has been fulfilling merely because he felt it laid upon him to undertake them, by degrees acquire interest for him for their own sake. He is intensely anxious for the success of his labours, and no longer measures his efforts by what may be considered his moral obligations. He *wants* such and such aged or suffering persons to be relieved, such sinners to be reclaimed, such children trained to virtue, such truths published, such wrongs redressed, such useful laws, or reforms, or discoveries introduced. There is no need now for him to spur himself by reflections that it is his duty to work for these ends; the difficulty with him now lies to moderate his work with a view to the preservation of health and strength. It would be cruelty to tell him his task was honourably fulfilled, though the object of it has failed. He would cry, "Let me be accounted a faithless servant, but let the work be accomplished by another, and I shall be content." If he die *now*, he takes very little comfort from thinking he has discharged his duty. The work is not finished, and will miss his hand. He says, like Theodore Parker, "I am not afraid to die, but I wish I might live longer and carry on my work. I have only yet half used the powers God gave me."

Now, in all this history of the moral life, it appears that no ostensible difference need exist between the sentiments of an Atheist and a Theist, *provided we can carry the Atheist safely to the second stage of progress*. Once there, it is evident that no change in his opinions about God or loss of hope of Heaven will practically affect his conduct. The habits of self-control whereby he has ruled his passions will not be lost, the interest he has taken in unselfish objects will not dwindle. He will go on to the end, labouring for the good of his kind, and regret his own death mainly because it will stop those labours. But how are ordinary men, of no specially elevated moral fibre, to be carried up to that turning-point where Law is superseded by Love? I am far from thinking

that men may not, and do not often, begin their self-reformation when they are (so far as their own consciousness goes) quite alienated from God or disbelieving His existence. I know, on the contrary, that it is no uncommon experience that this should be so. But, in the ordinary history of the soul, the resolute effort to obey conscience, after a very little time brings with it a sense, first dim, then shining more to the perfect day, that there *is* (as Mr. Matthew Arnold says) "a Power not ourselves which makes for Righteousness;" or, in plainer revelation, that God watches and helps the soul which strives to do right. Henceforth the mechanical moral effort is aided by the electric force of religion, burning away the dross of sin in the fire of a Divine Presence, and making self-sacrifice sweet as an offering of love. But if this normal process whereby Morality leads up to Religion and becomes thereby aided through all future effort, is to be rigidly prohibited by reason—if we are to starve out the religious sentiment as a passion not to be indulged by a rational being—then, I ask, how many are the men and women who, after their first good resolutions, will persist in the course of arduous moral effort long enough to reach that stage when duty becomes comparatively easy? Where are the aids to come from to keep them from self-indulgence? We have seen that the Moral Law itself is to be represented to them as merely an hereditary set of the brain, that they are not to dream there is any Holy Eye looking at them, any strong Hand ready to aid their feeble steps, any Infinite Love drawing them to itself, any Life beyond the grave where the imperfect virtue of earth shall grow and blossom in eternal beauty. All these thoughts are to be resolutely dismissed. The habit of Prayer (irreparable, immeasurable loss!) is to be discarded. Nothing is to be left save only the one motive of the Enthusiasm of Humanity, which is to replace God and Conscience and Heaven. Let me speak out concerning this much-boasted modern sentiment.

I have heard a good man, one of the best men I know, preaching on this subject, and saying, "Do you ask why should you love your neighbour? *Because you cannot help it!*" Now,

as I listened to that genuine philanthropist's utterance, my heart smote me, and I said to myself, "But I *could* help it, and only too easily! It comes to him spontaneously, I have no doubt, to love his neighbours; but I have been trying to do it for many years, and have very imperfectly succeeded. Instead of *beginning* with love, and going on to duty towards them as the result of love, I have had to begin with duty, and, only with many a self-reproach for hardness of spirit, learned at last to feel love—for some of them!"

I do not think my experience is exceptional. I think the people who can and do love spontaneously that terribly large section of our race who are commonplace, narrow-minded, and small of heart, are the exceptions, and that if we are to have no benevolence except from born philanthropists like the good man I have named, we shall see very little in future of the Enthusiasm of Humanity.

No! It takes for most of us, all the help to loving our brother which comes from believing that we have a common Father and a common Home—all the help which comes to the heart in answer to the prayer that God would melt its stoniness, and make it blossom into tenderness and sympathy—to enable us to attain the Love which is, not the *spring* of Social Duty, but its *climax*—the "fulfilling of the law."

I honestly think that the process of making Atheists, *trained as such*, into philanthropists, will be but rarely achieved. And I venture to propound the question to those who point to admirable living examples of Atheistic or Comtist philanthropy—How many of these have passed through the earlier stage of morality *as believers in God*, and with all the aid which prayer and faith and hope could give them? That they *remain* actively benevolent, having advanced so far, is (as I have shewn above) readily to be anticipated. But will their children stand where they stand now? We are yet obeying the great impetus of Religion, and running along the rails laid down by our forefathers. Shall we continue in the same course when that impetus has stopped, and we have left the rails altogether? I fear me not.

In brief, I think the outlook of Atheism as a *Moral Educator*, as black as need be. Viewed with the utmost candour, and admitting all the excellence of its living disciples, I think Atheism must deduct from Morality the priceless training to Reverence afforded by religion; the illuminating consciousness of an unseen Searcher of hearts; the invigorating confidence in an Almighty Helper; the vivifying influence of Divine Love; and finally, the immeasurable, inestimable benefits derivable from that practice of Prayer which is God's own education of the soul.

But whatever may be its results as a system of moral training, Atheism in its ultimate aspect must be, to every religious man and woman who is driven to adopt it in later life, the setting of the Sun which has warmed and brightened existence. We may *live* in the twilight, but that which gave to prosperity its joy, to grief its comfort, to duty its delight, to love its sweetness, to solitude its charm, to all life its meaning and purpose, and to death its perfect consolation and support, is lost for ever. There are no words to tell what that loss must be—worst of all to those who are least conscious of it, and who have therefore lost with their faith in God those spiritual faculties in whose exercise man has his higher being, and whose very pains are better worth than all the pleasures of earth.

Atheism involves a far *worse* loss to humanity than the exclusion of the belief in a Life after Death; but we can form no fair estimate of the deduction which our complacent Agnostics are prepared to make from the sum of human virtue and happiness, if we do not thoroughly realize what it is they are talking of when they tell us so cheerfully to abandon the hope of Immortality, as well as the belief in God, and that they are quite satisfied to do both.

As far as each individual is personally concerned, such hope is of course a very variable sentiment. There are those who say (as Miss Martineau mentions Mr. W. E. Forster saying to her), "I would rather be damned than annihilated." And there are

others who say, as she does herself, "I have had a very noble share of life, and I do not ask any more." With the latter feeling *per se*, no one has a right to quarrel. To many, no doubt, especially persons of feeble bodily health or overstrained conscientiousness, the notion of final repose is more grateful than that of an immortality of activity. They feel in our day, as it would seem almost everybody did in more trying times, that it was the "rest which remaineth for the people of God," beyond the storms of the world,—the "everlasting beds of rest" on which the weary may lie,—rather than our more modern notion of a Heaven of Progress, to which they aspire. There are Buddhists of the West as of the East, to whom, by some natural or acquired habit of mind, existence itself seems a burden, and they extend the *tedium vitæ* which they feel here, by anticipation to any future state to which they could be transferred. With such persons as these, as I have just said, we have no claim to contend, even though we may think, with Tennyson, that, if they knew themselves better, they would recognize that even in uttermost lassitude,

"Tis *life* of which our veins are scant ;
O Life, not Death, for which we pant ;
More life, and fuller, *that* we want."

The dreams of men as to what they desire beyond the grave are infinitely varied, from Nirvana to Valhalla, and nothing is to be said, so far as he himself is concerned, respecting a man who wishes it to be written on his tombstone that he

"From Nature's temperate feast rose satisfied,
Thanked Heaven that he had lived and that he died,"

except this ; that his choice of eternal sleep betrays the fact *that there is no one in this world or the next whom he loves well enough to wish to be awakened to meet them again*. Of course a man may have abundance of kindly and dutiful sentiments for his relatives and friends, and yet (thinking they will do well enough without him) be satisfied to quit them for ever. But I cannot believe that any one who has ever lost the object of the higher and more absorbing human affection, nor who

leaves behind him in dying one united to him by such transcendent love, who must not passionately desire immortality. He may *resign* himself through philosophy or religion (if his religion takes the strange and rare form of belief in God and not in a life to come), to see his beloved one no more ; but not to *desire* to meet, at any cost of unwelcome ages of life, the being we profess to love supremely, seems to be a contradiction in terms. Were there to loom before us worlds to climb and centuries of labour, we would surely thankfully go through them all to reach the hour when we shall say,

“Soul of my soul ! I shall meet thee again !
And with God be the rest.”

But because a man may, without blame, be content to let death drop a final curtain on his own consciousness, it is quite another matter for him to be equally placidly resigned to the extinction of the hopes of others, who have had no such feast of life as he, or who yearn for the renewal of affection hereafter. As I have elsewhere attempted to shew, in a little parable, such resignation *on behalf of other people* is very much like that of Dives, who, having fared sumptuously, should be serenely contented to let Lazarus starve.*

* The following letter appeared in the *Spectator*, Aug. 19, 1877 :

[TO THE EDITOR OF THE “SPECTATOR.”]

“SIR,—Indulging in the pernicious habit of reading in bed, I last night perused with profound interest Mr. Greg’s letter in your current number, your own remarks thereupon, and also Mr. Greg’s generous defence of his old friend, Harriet Martineau, in the *Nineteenth Century*. As my eyes closed on the last paragraph of this article, I seemed to behold a vision, which I shall take leave to describe to you.

“Dives had just eaten a particularly plentiful dinner, and was standing at the door of a pretty cottage in Ambleside. Lazarus, looking up at him, said pitifully, ‘I perish with hunger.’ Thereupon Dives observed with great serenity, ‘Lazarus, I have had an excellent dinner. There is not a crumb left. But I am quite content, and you ought to be the same.’

“Poor Lazarus, however, instead of seeming satisfied, wailed yet more sadly, ‘But I hunger, Dives ! I hunger for the bread of life ! I hunger for human love, of which I had only begun to taste, when it was snatched away. I hunger for justice, of which such scant measure has been dealt me, and to millions like me. I hunger for truth, I hunger for beauty, I hunger for righteousness ; I hunger for a love

Miss Martineau herself was vividly aware of the place which the hope of an immortal renewal of affection held in the minds of some of her personal friends. She says, in writing to Mr. Atkinson : * "What does give me a qualm sometimes is thinking what such friends as —— and as —— will suffer whenever they come to know that I think their 'Christian hope' baseless. They are widows, and they live by their expectation of a future life. I seriously believe that —— would go mad or die if this hope was shaken in her, and my opinions are more to her than any other's since her husband's death." This able and clear-sighted woman had then a "qualm" about the *effect of her opinions* on a faithful widowed heart. But in entertaining the opinions themselves, and dismissing her poor friend's hope, by which she "lived," as "baseless," she had no "qualm," and seemingly no shadow of regret. She is, on the contrary, in a rapture of satisfaction at her discoveries in the region of non-entity. "My comrade and I both care for our kind, and we could not see them suffering as we had suffered without imparting to them *our consolation and our joy*. Having found, as my friend said, a Spring in the

holy, divine and perfect, which alone can satisfy my soul. I hunger, Dives ! I hunger, and you tell me there is not a crumb left of the rich feast of existence, and bid me be content. It is a cruel mockery.'

"Then Dives answered yet more placidly, 'I never dream of wishing anything were otherwise than it is. I am frankly satisfied to have done with life. I have had a noble share of it, and I desire no more ; I utterly disbelieve in a future life.'

"At that moment my respected friend Mr. Greg passed by, and heard what Dives was saying ; on which, to my great surprise, he made the following observation :— 'This is, unquestionably, the harder—*may it not also be the higher?*—form of pious resignation. The last achievement of the ripened mind.'

"As for Lazarus, on catching Mr. Greg's remark, he turned himself painfully on the ground, and groaned :—'I never heard before of anybody being '*piously resigned*' to the woes and wants of *other people*. La Rochefoucauld was right, I suppose, to say, '*Nous avons tous assez de force pour supporter les maux d'autrui ;*' but for my part, I should not precisely call Dives's satisfaction in his 'noble share' of the feast, while I am doomed to perish starving, by quite so fine a name as 'pious resignation.' Pray, Mr. Greg, with your large humanity, take *my* case into consideration, before you credit Dives with anything better than stupendous egotism.'

"Startled by the vehemence of poor Lazarus, I awoke.—I am, Sir, &c."

* Autobiography, Vol. II. p. 291.

Desert, should we see the multitude wandering in desolation and not shew them our refreshment?"* Would it not have been a more appropriate simile to say: "Having found that the Promised Land was a mirage, we hastened back joyfully to bring the interesting tidings to our friends in the wilderness, some of whom we expected would go mad when they received our intelligence, to which, from their great respect for us, we knew they would attach the utmost importance. By some strange fortuity, however, they did not quite believe our report, and went on their way as before, under the Pillar of Cloud."†

Nor is it only the *comfort* of expecting to see our beloved ones again which we shall lose with the hope of a future life. I am persuaded that a great deal of the higher part of love itself will fade out of human society altogether if that hope be generally abandoned. Every one knows how Friendship and Marriage are hallowed by the thought of their perpetuity even in this world—how a union is debased if it be, consciously to those who make it, temporary and transitory. Hitherto we have loved one another as Immortal Beings, as creatures whose affections belonged to the exalted order of eternal things. When that ennobling and sanctifying element evaporates, when Love, like everything else, is reduced to a matter of days and months and years, will it not undergo somewhat of the same degradation as now belong to the brief contracts of passion? Even those who might still be able to feel all the holiness of love would, when they learned it was destined to end in the agony of eternal separation, check themselves from indulging a sentiment leading up inevitably to such a termination, just as a man would turn from a path ending in a precipice.

Thus, I believe, the Affections would irretrievably suffer from the loss of the hope of immortality. So would in a mea-

* P. 344.

† In a note (p. 291), she concludes the history of her two widows: "I need not have feared; one was offended, and the other grieved . . . and both presently settled down into their habitual conceptions."

sure the Intellect and the Imagination, driven from the wider expanse back on the poor fleshly life which is to be the end-all of man, and which must be destined to assume an importance it has never possessed since our race emerged from its brute and barbarian origin. Nor would our Moral life fail to suffer also, and grievously, though in another way from that which has been alleged. I think we can scarcely now estimate the *minifying* consequences of closing all outlook beyond this world, and shutting up of morality within the narrow sphere of mortal life. As I have said before in this Review: "It is not possible we should continue to attach to Virtue and Vice the same profound significance, if we could believe their scope to reach no further than our brief span, and Justice to be a dream of our puny race never to be realized throughout the eternal ages." In theory, Right and Wrong must come to be regarded as of comparatively trivial importance; and, practically, the virtue which must shortly be extinguished for ever would seem to the tempted soul scarcely deserving of an effort. Life, after we had passed its meridian, would become in our eyes more and more like an autumn garden, wherein it would be vain to plant seeds of good which could never bloom before the frosts of death, and useless to eradicate weeds which must be killed ere long without our labour. Needless to add, that of that dismal spot it might soon be said:

"Between the time of the wind and the snow
All loathsome things began to grow;"

and when the winter came at last, none would regret the white shroud it threw over corruption and decay.

But it is when we come to think of Humanity *as a whole* that the prospect of final extinction appears so unutterably deplorable, so lame and impotent a conclusion for all the struggles, the martyrdoms and the prayers of a hundred generations who have gone to the grave in hope and faith—and *perished there*. We Englishmen and women have been wont to think proudly of the vast geographical extension of our country's dominion, the grandeur of the Empire on which the

sun never sets; and the remark has often been made that there is not a petty corporation or board in the kingdom whose proceedings are not, in a degree, dignified by the sense of England's greatness. The politicians who have expressed a readiness to give up our Colonies have been taunted, and justly, with lack of the nobler patriotism which regards not only financial and administrative details, but the larger interests and glory of what we have delighted to call our Imperial Race. But what would be the loss to the prestige of England of the severance of Australia and Canada and India, compared to the loss to mankind of that glorious empery of Immortality in which it has prided itself since the beginning of history? Everything we have achieved and thought—our literature, art, laws, kingdoms, churches—have all been wrought and built up in this faith, which has given value to the soul of the humblest child, and added grandeur to the most splendid deeds of the hero and the martyr. With that Hope disappears not only the consolation of all bereaved hearts, but the very crown upon the head of humanity.

It is no argument for the truth of my opinion, that the disclosure of its falsehood may have disastrous consequences. Nothing that has been advanced in this paper proves, or has been offered as proof, that there is a God, or a Life to come. The foundations for those beliefs belong to a different order of considerations. But I think thus much may be presumed to have resulted from our inquiry—namely, that their value to the virtue and the happiness of mankind is so incalculably vast, that the work of demolishing them ought to be carried on by any man professing to love his kind, in a very different spirit from that which is generally exhibited by Agnostics. Even if their position be true, and if they be morally bound to make known to the world that such is the case, and to put an end to the baseless dream which has deluded our race for so many thousand years,—even granting this, I think it remains clear that their task is one to be undertaken only under the sternest sense of duty, and with immeasurable mournfulness

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and regret. I think that, instead of rejoicing over the discovery of "a Spring in the Desert," it behoves them to weep tears, bitter as ever fell from human eyes, over the grave wherein they bury the Divine Love and the Immortal Hope of our miserable race.

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

II.—THE PRIMITIVE HEBREW LAND TENURE.

AT the first glance, there does not appear to be much connection, even of a remote sort, between Land Tenure and Theology. Though from a consideration of Land Tenure we might certainly glean some insight into the social life of the Hebrews, which might have some bearing upon their religion, this information could probably be gained more easily, and perhaps more fully, from other sources.

It is not so much in the subject itself, as in the standpoint from which it has to be viewed, that its interest consists. The standpoint is one which has as yet hardly received due recognition. As far as language is concerned, it is fully admitted that many words, such for instance as Shaddai, El, Elohim, have an importance quite apart from the meaning they bear in the later writings, inasmuch as, beyond this, they witness, through their derivations and their linguistic affinities, to certain of the primitive religious ideas and aspirations of the Hebrews.

But though the intrinsic value of words is now duly prized, the same consideration is not yet extended to customs. While it is fully recognized that a word, in spite of its changes of meaning, is ever an index to the thoughts of its first users, it is far from being fully recognized that there are customs and regulations which, whatever the height of culture amid which they appear, and whatever the esoteric explanations then given of them, are an equally sure index of the social

condition of the people among whom they first obtained. It is true that not infrequently we see a custom compared somewhat casually with one or another of analogous customs; but the careful examination of a custom and its analogies, with the object of ascertaining its approximate place in the social development of a society, and the condition of life which it denotes, is, I venture to think, somewhat rare. And yet it seems evident that if we could draw conclusions from customs with anything like the certainty that we can from words, our sources of information about primitive times would be much increased, and many of our conclusions in other branches of inquiry confirmed or perhaps modified.

To illustrate these propositions, I have chosen the recondite subject of Land Tenure, because, on the one hand, the principal passages relating to the subject (Lev. xxv. and Numb. xxvii. 1—11) have received in Dr. Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* an ample investigation, one in which the resources of purely linguistic criticism seem exerted to the utmost; and, on the other hand, the analogous customs of other countries have received unusually full treatment from investigators into the History of Law and Jurisprudence.

Let us, in the first place, glance at the conclusions at which Dr. Kuenen arrived. Our main text is Lev. xxv., containing the legislation, familiar to all, concerning the year of jubilee and the redemption of land. The legislation on this subject was, if I rightly read Dr. Kuenen, written down with many other laws during the captivity in Babylon, and officially promulgated after the return to Judea. It "displays the priestly notions on the ownership of land."* "The priestly lawgiver's chief object, however, was the maintenance of the hereditary ownership of land. With this in view, he thinks he must confine within very narrow limits the right of the individual to dispose freely of his property. Or rather, he does not allow the individual any property, in the strict sense of the word."† Again, the "very exhaustive law respecting the year of jubilee

* *Religion of Israel* (E. T.), II. 281.† *Ib.* 283.

.... must be regarded as the highest development of the sabbath idea ;” and the ordinance respecting the sabbath year “is distinguished from the older law in this, that it prescribes that the land shall lie fallow every seventh year.”* Altogether, “his ordinance sounds very well in theory, but practically it is impossible.”† And, finally, it is part of a legislation of a “theoretical and abstract character.”‡

Clear and doubtless well founded as is this statement, it gives us no clue as to the source whence the law was derived. It seems at first plausible to infer that the lawgiver invented it himself ; but “impossible” is a relative expression : what is impossible in one state of society is possible in another. And if the lawgiver had come across some obsolete legislation or customs, or traditions of such, it is at least as likely as not that he utilized them if they answered his purpose. But where can we learn whether or not the legislation in question was actually at any time possible ? Critical analysis of the text is out of the question. It would be hopeless to endeavour to disentangle any early fragments from a short piece written under the assumed conditions. Evidently our only resource is to ask whether there are analogous customs elsewhere, and if so, at what period of social growth they arise. And if we find, as I believe we shall, that there are such customs, and that they date from primitive times, we shall have rendered it at least possible that these customs are preserved in the legislation in question ; and we can then proceed to ask whether the special conditions of the question are, or are not, such as to increase that possibility, if not to a certainty, at least to a probability.

As a preliminary step, it is necessary to divest the legislation of its special Hebrew characteristics, and present it in a general shape. In the year of jubilee a man is to return “unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers.”§ Coupling the expression, “possession of his fathers,” with

* Religion of Israel (E.T.), II. 281.

† Ib. 283.

‡ Ib. 284.

§ Lev. xxv. 41.

“return every man unto his own possession” (vers. 10, 13), it is clear that the “possession” is hereditary. But what is the “family” (משפחה)? The word is given by Ewald,* Fürst and Movers† as equivalent to *gens* or *δῆμος*, corresponding therefore approximately to our “clan.” And that that is its meaning here is determined by ver. 41, where the man “he and his children with him” are to return to the clan; and by ver. 49, where a man’s “uncle or uncle’s son” are instanced as “nigh of kin unto him of his משפחה.” The clan, as a body, is assumed to dwell together,—for the individual accidentally separated by poverty is assumed to return to them,—and to dwell together upon the “possession of their fathers.” And as it is of the essence of a clan to be descended in the last event from *one* ancestor, we arrive at the general conception that the tract of ground occupied by a clan is supposed to be the tract originally occupied by that one ancestor, and from him inherited by his various descendants. If we carry the same principle higher still, we have the heads of clans considered as themselves sprung from one still more remote ancestor, the father of the “tribe.” And upon this theory, the expression, “possession of his fathers,” is literally exact for any individual, seeing that he holds a plot which is portion of a larger held by his family, which larger plot is again a share of the tract held by the clan; and this, finally, is a portion of the district held by the tribe.

That this was the actual Hebrew theory is proved by Numb. xxxvi., which relates how the “chief fathers of the clans of the children of Gilead” complained of the possibility that the “inheritance of their fathers” (ver. 3), i.e. “the inheritance of the tribe of their fathers” (ver. 4), might be diminished if the daughters of Zelophehad married beyond the tribe. And the decision given was that the inheritance of the children of Israel should not remove from tribe to tribe (ver. 7), so that

* Alterthümer, 3e ausg. 319.

† Die Phönizier. II. (1) 481. For *gens* and *δῆμος*, Movers gives *φρατρία* and *curiæ*.

every man might enjoy the inheritance of his fathers (ver. 8). From this we not only obtain proof that, as said above, the tract occupied by a clan (we may now say, a tribe) is supposed to be the tract originally occupied by the one ancestor; but we gain a clue to the rights of the tribe and the individual. Why should the tribe of Joseph have been so anxious to keep the inheritance of Zelophehad's daughters in their own tribe? The answer is given in Numb. xxvii. If a man die without issue, "ye shall give his inheritance unto his brethren; and if he have no brethren, ye shall give his inheritance unto his father's brethren; and if his father have no brethren, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his kinsman that is next to him of his clan" (vers. 9—11). A man, therefore, has not any property in the strict sense of the word, as Dr. Kuenen says. The land is simply held for life, with a kind of remainder to his children, but the freeholder of the land is the tribe. This we learn from the order of inheritance. A man's descendants (this is the general law) have a right to the whole of his land. Hence if one son dies without issue, the rest have a claim to their deceased brother's share. If all the sons die, or there is only one and he dies, the inheritance merges into that of the grandfather, and is distributed among his remaining sons, i.e. the "father's brethren" of Numb. xxvii. And, finally, in the unusual case of a grandfather's line dying out, the inheritance merges into that of the "next of kin" then living. From this it becomes clear that the inheritance is really tribal, that all the descendants of the tribal ancestor have a claim to a share of that ancestor's land, and that on failure of the minor branch the share merges into that of the larger.

It is at once evident that the rights of an individual holding under such a tenure will be very circumscribed. The holder, in fact, is in an analogous position to a modern tenant for life with remainder to his children. He cannot sell their rights, and he cannot do anything to prejudice them. *He can only sell his own life interest.* This in the legislation before us was commuted, so to speak; the life interest was exchanged for an interest terminable in the year of jubilee. A purchaser, there-

fore, purchased what we should call the lease of the property ; and it is clear from vers. 27, 50 f., of Lev. xxv., that the value was calculated, exactly as by us, according to the number of years the lease had to run.

Even in the matter of sale, however, the next-of-kin had the right, if not exactly of pre-emption, of what was practically the same thing. They might, within a limited period, redeem from the stranger the land which their poor relation had parted with (vers. 25, 26, 48, 49 f.).

Divested of its peculiar nomenclature, the Hebrew theory is revealed to us as that of a community united by the ties of consanguinity or common descent, and dwelling upon a tract of land which, though divided for purposes of occupation and cultivation among the various members, remains, nevertheless, as an undivided whole, the property of the tribe.

In this description are immediately recognizable the essential features of the Village Community, an institution which is found among Germans, Celts, Hindoos, the Slavonic peoples of Europe and Asia, the Semites of Northern Africa, and even the Aborigines of America. I do not propose to discuss all these specimens of the institution ; the features are everywhere alike ; and it will fulfil our purpose to follow the delineation of the Teutonic Village Community as given by Von Maurer, and of the Hindoo given by Sir Henry Maine.

"The primitive cultivation of land proceeded, not from individuals, but from kindreds and tribes,"* (*Geschlechtern und Stämmen*); and the Village Community in general is characterized by the "double aspect of a group of families united by the assumption of a common kinship, and of a company of persons exercising joint ownership over land."† The Teutonic "village" consisted of three parts, the village proper, the divided field-mark, and the undivided field- or wood-mark.‡ The basis of the village community was a mark-community.

* V. Maurer, *Einleitung zur Gesch. d. Mark-Hof. &c., Verfassung.* p. 3.

† Maine, *Village Communities*, p. 12.

‡ V. Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorfverfassung.* I. 30, § 13. The "mark," I may observe, was the district belonging to the community.

In the old free village communities each father of a family received at the first settlement an equally large lot of land (ackerloos), either for a series of years, or for an indefinite period; to be held, however, originally for use only. For the right itself to the ground and land, as the case might be, i.e. either the joint property or the joint right of user, &c., remained still, afterwards as formerly, in the collective body of the communists (*Gesammtheit der Genossen*) in respect of the undivided field- and wood-mark as well as of the divided.*

In general terms, we are assured by Sir H. Maine, the same description is applicable to the Hindoo village. There, too, the system is one of "common enjoyment by village communities, and inside the communities by families."† The unit is the "patriarchal family;"‡ the land is distributed, "if not in the same manner" as in Germany, yet "upon the same principles;"§ and there are still clear traces of "an original proprietary equality between the families composing the group."||

So far, then, as regards the two points of common descent and tribal ownership of land, the Hebrew theory does not stand alone, but has a full analogy in societies, some of which are yet existing.¶

As to the next point, that of the slender right of the individual, we find Sir Henry Maine, in addition to passages assuming the family right to the whole district,** using these remarkable words: "In those parts of India in which the collective holding of property has not decayed as much as it has done in Lower Bengal . . . the individual has almost no power

* V. Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorfverf.* I. 87. As "genossenschaft" is represented by "community," I have ventured to use "communist" as a convenient term to express "genoss."

† Maine, *Vill. Comm.* 41. ‡ *Ib.* 18. § *Ib.* 12. || *Ib.* 123.

¶ Just to shew that these features are not peculiar to the Teuton and Hindoo, I subjoin the following as to the Russian village: "The Russian peasants of the same village really believe, we are told, in their common ancestry, and accordingly we find that in Russia the arable lands of the village are periodically redistributed, and that the village artificer, even should he carry his tools to a distance, works for the profit of his co-villagers." Maine, *Early Hist. of Institutions*, p. 81.

** E.g. *Vill. Comm.* 113.

of disposing of his property ; even if he be chief of his household, the utmost he can do, as a rule, is to regulate the disposition of his property among his children within certain very narrow limits.”*

In the Teutonic village community, birth gave a person conditional rights only. It freed from the disabilities of a total outsider, but it gave no right to the paternal home and land except in the few cases where a *personal* burgher-right had developed.† The sale of land was also subject to restrictions—curiously coincident with the Hebrew.

“A further consequence of the field- and mark-community, and the closely connected exclusion of all who were not communists, is the prohibition of the sale of land to strangers which is occasionally met with. Further, the wide-spread right of preëmption by the communists, and the ‘communal release.’ The land, namely, before it could be sold to strangers, must previously have been offered to the communists or the community itself, who then had the right of preëmption. . . . If, however, the land were sold before being offered to the communists, these latter had, like the mark-communists in the great Marks, the right of redeeming (*retrahiren*) within a certain time the land sold to a stranger. . . . The right is most intimately connected with the existence of the village community, and is clearly therefore not of late origin. Rather it is as old as the community itself.”‡

On the point of individual rights, therefore, the Hebrew theory has close analogies with other communities.

I think, then, that I may claim to have removed the Hebrew theory from the category of things theoretical and abstract and impossible *à priori* ; and to have rendered it at least possible that, under similar circumstances to other village communities, the Hebrew theory also might have been put into practice.

But before proceeding to inquire the period at which the realization of the Hebrew theory would from analogy be most probably found, I must note an analogy in a matter of detail,

* Vill. Comm. 41.

† V. Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorfvf.* I. 184, 185.

‡ V. Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorfvf.* I. 320 ff. It is hardly necessary to mention that Von Maurer gives by reference and quotation ample proof of his assertions.

which in the Hebrew theory has received a variety of esoteric explanations, but elsewhere is explained in a very matter-of-fact way. I refer to the law of seventh-year fallows. The use of a fallow year as regards the land itself needs no explanation, but why should the regulation have been embodied in the law? Because, the reply is in the case of village communities, the fact that at intervals more or less frequent the land is redistributed, renders it necessary that some order should be taken that the ground may not be unduly worked by one family or generation to the detriment of others. "Thus," says Von Maurer, "the mode of enjoying the fields remained a communal matter, to be arranged not by individuals, but rather by the entire community. Among such matters are the sequence of crops, the regulation of ploughing, seed and harvest time, the regulation of the mode of harvest, the fixing of open and close times and of the consequent fencing of fields, the alternation of *ploughing and fallow years*," &c.* Similarly, we read of "the minute but multifarious rules governing the proceedings of the cultivators [in India], rules having the object to reconcile a *common plan and order* of cultivation on the part of the whole brotherhood with the holding of distinct lots in the arable land by separate families."†

At this point, the hypotheses which might be framed as to the source of the legislation in question are three: (α) that the legislation was borrowed from that of an adjacent country; (β) that it was the invention of the lawgiver himself; and (γ) that it is based upon primitive custom.

The first hypothesis does not seem to receive much support, if any. Had the legislation been borrowed, some traces would almost certainly have been found of the parent laws or customs, and would assuredly not have escaped the keen eyes of scholars like Ewald. No such traces, however, seem to have been found.

The question lies, therefore, between the second and the third hypotheses.

* Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorf. v. I.* 36.

† Maine, *Vill. Comm.* 109.

The arguments in favour of the third hypothesis are cumulative. First there is the argument from the general character of the village-community phenomena. I have already mentioned, upon Von Maurer's authority, that the village community is found among representatives not only of the Aryan, but also of the Semitic and Turanian races.* And the primitive character of the phenomena is distinctly stated by the same authority in the opening words of his book: "The first village settlements are bound up with the first cultivation of the land, and extend with it back to prehistoric times."† Sir Henry Maine goes so far as to say that "the collective ownership of the soil by groups of men either in fact united by blood-relationship, or believing or assuming that they are so united, is now entitled to take rank as an ascertained primitive phenomenon, once universally characterizing those communities of mankind between whose civilization and our own there is any distinct connection or analogy."‡

When, therefore, we find in a society customs analogous to those which are characteristic elsewhere of this wide-spread, if not universal, "primitive phenomenon," a considerable presumption arises that in this society also the customs should be referred to the same cause, unless any better explanation be forthcoming. In the present case, no explanation is offered except the coincidence of invention. But the improbability is very great that a lawgiver, at a somewhat advanced stage of civilization, should have hit by chance upon a scheme bearing such numerous and fundamental analogies to primitive phenomena.

But the improbability is greatly increased when it is found that another body of legislation dealing with different subjects is based upon the same idea. This legislation comprises those laws in Deuteronomy in which the "elders of the city" appear as judges. After the investigations of Ewald on the system of popular government among the Hebrews, and of Movers upon

* Cf. Maine, *Early Hist. of Inst.* 77.

† V. Maurer, *Gesch. d. Dorfvf.* I. 1.

‡ Maine, *u.s.* 1.

the parallel theory in Phœnicia, it is unnecessary for me to do more than recall the results of those inquiries to the reader's memory. The authority of the elders is of the kind known as patriarchal. Originally they are real fathers of families, each one supreme over his own household, but acknowledging no authority over himself. As the families expand into clans and tribes, authority settles in the persons of the chiefs, who stand, or are assumed to stand, in the position of heads by birth of their clans and families. But these chiefs, like the original fathers, acknowledge no superior, and what little business they transact is transacted in a democratic kind of assembly, the traces of which survive in the later councils, senates, and the like.* We may therefore safely look upon the "elders of the city" as representing the heads of the various families dwelling in the town. These elders have their analogue in the village council of the Aryan village community. Such a council, we are assured, "is everywhere discernible." "Sometimes owning a responsibility to the entire body of villagers, sometimes disowning it," it is "never altogether obscured."† It is found in India, not universally, but very frequently;‡ In the Teutonic community the original patriarchal character of the council comes out very clearly. Only fully qualified communists could appear in the council. Fathers of houses were therefore the only persons admissible; and in cases where two or more households dwelt in one house, only the oldest housefather was admissible to the council. In other cases, where the whole community had a general meeting the housefathers transacted the business of the village in a smaller and closer council.§ The analogy of constitution thus existing

* Ewald, *A Germanen*, 219 f. *Monum. die Phœnicier*, II. (1), 514 f. Ewald's words, "It would be an other misconception to assume that every father of an actual house *ist* at one time *senex* or *senilis*," must be considered as qualified by his own statements elsewhere that the "house" is the basis of patriarchal rule, and by the later view of the primary character of two house governments. Cf. the *Lehre der Röm. von Gort. I* 179, III 492 seq. The point of government existing where the housefather is at all, may be seen in *Brünner's Geschichte*, I. 565.

† *Monum. Early Hist. of Iran*, 308.

‡ *Monum.*, VII. *Comm.*, 124.

§ V. Maunier, *Revue A. Orient.*, II. 77 f.

between the Hebrew and Aryan council is strengthened when we observe the analogy of function. Many matters which are now relegated to the domain of personal redress are in the Hebrew and Teutonic communities matters of public importance. The responsibility of the whole city for the murder of a man within its district has already been compared with the Teutonic law of *wehrgeld*. But in both communities it was the duty of the communists to see justice done upon criminals.* So, too, if a man's cattle were lost or in trouble, it was obligatory to assist them.† The poor also were supported by the Teutonic community, as by the Hebrew.‡ And the curious legislation in Deut. xxii. 13—21 is paralleled by Teutonic legislation of an inverse kind, and, if possible, still more primitive than the Hebrew.§

Thus far the direct analogies between the Hebrew legislation and the Village Community.

The argument may now be carried a step further. To the presumption derivable from the direct analogy must now be added the presumption arising from the fact, that upon the assumption of the reality of the analogy all the peculiar features of the year of jubilee are easily explicable.

Viewed from the literary standpoint, the Jubilee legislation is far from perfect. Professing by its enactments to maintain the hereditary descent of property, it not only exempts from its scope the most valuable property—that in the great towns—but reduces the facilities for redeeming such property to a minimum.|| And that inconsistently, for priestly property in the great cities is, on the other hand, expressly included in the scope of the law.¶ And if it were possible for priestly property to revert, why was it not equally possible for ordinary property

* Deut. xix. 11 f. V. Maurer, u.s. I. 334.

† Deut. xxii. 1—4. V. Maurer, I. 337. The quotation from the old law is: "Wann einer seines nachbarn vieh sähe umkommen, wie sollte er thun, dass solch vieh gerettet würde? Derselbe soll seine eigene arbeit anstehen lassen, sie sei so eilig als sie wolle, und thun bei dem viehe, wie er es selbst gern wollte."

‡ V. Maurer, I. 340 f.

§ Ib. 338.

|| Lev. xxv. 29, 30.

¶ Ib. 32, 33.

to revert also? The Levite, again, may sell his house, but not his field.* Put the other way about, the restriction would be comprehensible; but it is difficult to see what benefit the homeless Levite was expected to derive from ground which he could not sell. And the restriction was the more unnecessary that the reversion was already protected by the general year of jubilee.

If, however, we assume that we have here some form of the Village Community, we shall find no difficulty in explaining these seemingly absurd regulations. As was stated above, the Village Community is based upon the joint occupation of land. Originally the shares of the land were redistributed at various periods, so that while the extent of land held by each communist never varied, no one could say of any particular share that it was *his*. He only held that share until the next distribution, when that share would pass to some one else, and the former holder would receive a fresh one. This system, traceable both in Germany and India, is known as that of "shifting severalties."† Gradually, however, private property in shares arose. It is needless to go into detail. In time the share became hereditary; but the old communal rights still remained in those rights of preëmption and redemption, and in the duty of common cultivation above discussed. Then towns grew up, with no remnant of village customs, and so one country would shew examples of villages of all stages of growth. Evidently this is the state contemplated in Lev. xxv. In the large towns private property is so well developed, that only a very limited right of redemption remains. In the smaller towns and in the agricultural districts, the communal rights are still in force. And the priesthood (conservative here, too, as Dr. Kuenen well observes) still retain in their absolute right of redemption of town property, and their inability to sell field property, traces of the very early absolute communal rights.

If the Hebrew community once was in the stage of "shift-

* Lev. xxv. 33, 34.

† Maine, *Village Comm.* 81 f., 112; V. Maurer, I. 35.

ing severalties," we ought to find some traces of it. If the legislation in Deut. xv. be compared with that in Lev. xxv., two points of divergence at once appear with regard to the bondman. While Leviticus does not contemplate the bondman's continuance in servitude, Deuteronomy does not contemplate his return to any inheritance. It is self-evident that the Levitical law, having given a man a perpetual inheritance, could not permit him to be a perpetual slave. But the man in Deuteronomy was far better off, if he had any property to return to. I doubt whether he had. Let us assume that this Deuteronomic law originally dates from a time when "shifting severalties" are still in force. Then, of course, all claims will lapse, and a redistribution of the land be made, every seventh year. In that year the bondman could again claim a share of the land of his community. But he might allow the redistribution to be made without him, and by so doing he would forfeit his claim. For private property being not yet recognized, the whole land of the community had been distributed among the rest of the communists.

If, now, a legislator had before him the various phases of decay of the community with all its conflicting rights, how could he most simply do justice to all? To revive the "shifting severalty" would militate against the newly developed private rights; to entirely ignore it would militate against the still vigorous tribal rights. *But revive the shifting severalty once in every seven times*, what will be the result? This; that a man will be able to dispose of his property (i.e. grant a lease of it) for a term not exceeding forty-nine years; at the end of the period it, and all other property so disposed of, will revert to the tribe, and become subject to tribal rights. But within the tribe the individual has a claim to his hereditary share, and so the piece he parted with returns to him. Thus, by the lengthening of the period of reversion, the individual has reasonable exercise of his rights; while the fact of reversion at one time or another preserves the communal rights. That is the explanation which I offer of the year of jubilee.

Here my argument ends. It divides itself, as the reader

will have seen, into two branches : that of the direct analogy, shewn by two distinct branches of Hebrew legislation, and that of the indirect analogy, in so far as by the assumption of parallel development we are enabled to explain much that is otherwise dark.

In conclusion, I have to revert to the matter of standpoint referred to in my opening paragraph. All the conclusions here obtained have been obtained without the assistance of literary criticism. And their stability is independent of it. No conclusions as to time, place, or manner of origin, can shake the fact that such and such legislation exists. And until it is shewn that it was borrowed wholesale (if I may use the word), the inferences drawn from such existence are impregnable. On the other hand, it must be freely admitted that from our present basis we could only rise with great difficulty, if at all, to the results of literary criticism. The differences indeed are well exemplified in the respective treatment by the two methods of Lev. xxv. 4, "the seventh year shall be a sabbath of rest unto the land." We inferred above from the fact that the fallow year was a matter of legislation, that a certain kind of community existed *when that law first arose*. This literary criticism could not do. But literary criticism, taking the expression "sabbath of rest," and comparing it with others, was enabled to judge of the ideas and intentions of the author of *the present form of the law*. This sociological criticism could not accomplish.

Nevertheless, it will no doubt have occurred to the reader that our sociological results seem to confirm now one and now another of the rival literary theories. It would be premature, not to say presumptuous, for me to attempt to correct any literary results by the light of those just obtained ; I simply present this paper to the notice of scholars as a sample of results which may be greatly increased by more extended investigations.

JOHN FENTON.

III.—THE SHEPHERD OF HERMAS.

Hermæ Pastor Græce, addita Versione Latina recentiore e Codice Palatino. Recensuerunt et illustraverunt Oscar de Gebhardt Adolfus Harnack. Patrum Apostolicorum Opera Fasc. III. Lipsiæ. 1877.

Quo tempore Hermæ Pastor scriptus sit. Dissertatio Inauguralis quam publice defendet auctor Guilielmus Heyne. Regimonti Pr. 1872.

Ueber den Verfasser der Schrift welche den Titel "Hirt" führt: Historisch-kritischer Versuch von Heinrich M. Th. Behm. Rostock. 1876.

Hérma Nabî: the Ethiopic Version of Pastor Hermæ examined. By George H. Schodde. Leipzig. 1876.

Supernatural Religion. London: Longmans. Vols. I. II., 6th ed., 1875; Vol. III., 1877.

THE works at the head of this article are proof of the interest which is taken in the problems suggested by the Pastor of Hermas. Heyne's able Dissertation is part of a prize essay, and is occupied entirely with determining the date of the Pastor. Behm's work is also a prize essay, and shews great ability in the discussion of the date and authorship. Schodde's Dissertation is devoted to an examination of the Ethiopic translation, and affords the reader an opportunity of comparing its readings with those of the Leipzig Codex and the Sinaitic Codex. Gebhardt and Harnack's work is the concluding fasciculus of their admirable edition of the Apostolic Fathers.

The task of an editor of the Pastor of Hermas must be confessed to be very difficult, and it will be allowed by all that Gebhardt and Harnack have overcome the difficulties well. The collection and recording of various readings is a work of great labour, and Gebhardt has shewn conscientiousness, accuracy and skill, in performing it. The reader has before him the means of judging fairly the evidence of the various sources from which the text is derived, including not

merely the Greek codices, but the Vulgate and Palatine translations, the Ethiopic version, and the ancient writers who quote Hermas.

The only predecessor that Gebhardt has had in his work is Hilgenfeld. Anger and Dindorf edited the corrupt copy of the copy of Simonides, but it was intended to be merely an accurate collation of the MS. Such also was Tischendorf's edition of the genuine copy and the Athos leaves, and of the Sinaitic Codex. Hilgenfeld was the first to attempt to constitute a Greek text of Hermas on the basis of all the materials which lay within reach; and he did the work remarkably well. But the task is not one that can be fully accomplished by a single editor; and therefore scholars will welcome this second edition. The new editor has contributed his share to the purification of the text. Some of his emendations are exceedingly good, such as *πάρεμι* for *παρ' ἐμοί* in the Athos leaves, and *νηπιότητα* for *ἡπιότητα*. On the other hand, we think that he has estimated the value of the Sinaitic Codex too highly, and retained some readings which seem corrupt. Thus we should read, with Hilgenfeld, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγκώνων*, in Vis i. 4, 3, and not *τῶν ἀγκώνων* alone, as the MSS. read; for the genitive cannot by itself yield the meaning which is required.

Gebhardt and Harnack give in their Prolegomena a full and satisfactory account of the various manuscripts, and their worth, of editions and writings bearing on the Pastor of Hermas, and of the discussions in regard to date and authorship; and Harnack has furnished a commentary of great value, full of patristic learning, and characterized by judiciousness and fairness. Everything that the student of the Pastor requires to know for a complete prosecution of his study is supplied him in this exceedingly useful edition. We draw attention to one or two points.

The first is as to the text. The problem which the text presents is one of the most difficult in early Christian literature. Let us note the facts. Up to quite recent times, the Pastor was known to us only in a Latin translation. Of that Latin translation there are a considerable number of manu-

scripts. But as yet, of these manuscripts some have not been collated at all, and others only imperfectly. Hilgenfeld has published a careful collation of one, and deserves all praise for his work. Several of the best manuscripts are in England, and it is to be hoped that some of the rising theologians of Cambridge, who, under the guidance of Prof. Lightfoot and Prof. Westcott, are so well trained for the task, will undertake an accurate collation of the Cambridge MSS., as well as a more accurate one of the Lambeth. But this much is known of these manuscripts, that, though they are believed to flow from the same source, there are many and important differences to be found in them. Whence have these differences arisen? Quite recently, Dressel discovered another Latin translation, which he called the Codex Palatinus, and which Gebhardt has re-edited in the volume under notice. This translation was plainly not the same as the Vulgate. Was it derived from a different text, or how did it arise? The prevalent idea is, that it is later than the Vulgate and based upon it, and that the more recent translator tried to improve the older translation so as to bring it nearer to the original Greek. The matter is not yet decided, and requires further investigation—an investigation, however, which must be postponed till we have something like a satisfactory edition of the Vulgate.

Shortly after Dressel had discovered his Palatine version, Simonides appeared in Germany with three leaves of a Greek manuscript of Hermas from Mount Athos, and a copy of nearly the whole of the rest. The copy first offered by him proved to be a much altered copy of another and earlier copy of which he retained the possession; and when this was discovered, means were taken to compel him to give up his earlier and more genuine copy. Tischendorf edited the three leaves and the genuine copy in Dressel's *Apostolic Fathers*, and it was seen at once that the Greek corresponded much more nearly with the Palatine version than with the Vulgate. Tischendorf maintained strongly that the Greek text which he edited was a re-translation from the Latin. Soon after was published an Ethiopic version of the Pastor of Hermas. It

differed from the Vulgate and the Palatine versions and the Leipzig Codex, and added complications to the question. Before its publication, Tischendorf discovered his Codex Sinaiticus, with the Pastor of Hermas nearly complete in Greek at the end. The Greek of the Codex may be pronounced nearly the same in substance with that of the Leipzig Codex, but there is great variety in the readings and forms. The difference, however, is not such as in the slightest degree to diminish the force of the arguments which Tischendorf adduced to prove that the Greek was a re-translation from the Latin. The critic, nevertheless, changed his opinion on falling in with the Sinaitic Codex. Strangely enough, just as the Greek of the Leipzig Codex was found to agree more with the recently discovered Palatine than with the Vulgate, so Schodde affirms that the Codex Sinaiticus agrees more with the recently discovered Ethiopic than with any other. Gebhardt thinks that Schodde has omitted to notice certain divergencies; but, on the whole, Schodde's account may be taken to be correct.

Here, then, we have several representations of the Pastor of Hermas—the Vulgate and the Palatine versions, the Codex of Leipzig and the Codex Sinaiticus, and the Ethiopic version. How are we to account for the differences? Which of them is nearest to the original Hermas?


We do not intend to discuss these questions fully in this place. But we draw attention to some aspects of the question.

And first it may be noticed that all of them may be regarded as giving a substantially true representation of the original work, except the Ethiopic. The Ethiopic has unquestionably omitted or abbreviated large portions. Some of these omissions might possibly be accounted for by the circumstance that the passages were not in the original Greek; but as others of them were certainly made for dogmatic reasons, it is likely that the Ethiopic translator dealt somewhat freely with his text.

In the other forms there is no clear proof that any interpolations were introduced for dogmatic purposes. Whether we take the Vulgate or Palatine Latin, or the Leipzig or Sinaitic

Greek, we have substantially the same doctrine; and this doctrine bears in every feature of it the thought of the first or second century, and no trace of a later age.

This circumstance takes away the force of the argument which Gebhardt has used against the supposition that the Greek of Hermas which we now have is a re-translation from the Latin. He supposes that this hypothesis implies the following pedigree:



It is here assumed that the Vulgate and Palatine both proceed from the Greek which we now possess. Can this be assumed with anything like certainty? Is there not considerable divergence? Are there not large omissions in the one which are not found in the other? Does not the Vulgate differ widely from the Palatine in Mandata xi. and xii.? And if this is the case, why might not the original Greek of Hermas be the source of the translations as well as the re-translated Greek, if there was really no material difference in thought between the original and the re-translated Greek?

The phenomena which gave rise to the opinion that the Greek was a re-translation are certainly very peculiar and interesting. They form themselves into two classes.

First, there are words and grammatical forms and constructions which seem to indicate an age later than that of Hermas. We need not go minutely into these. Dindorf has mentioned some in his Preface to Anger and Dindorf's edition of the Pastor of Hermas. Tischendorf has adduced a considerable number in his tractate in Dressel's edition, "*De Herma Græco Lipsiensi.*" He speaks there of the barbarous character of the Codex. And I have adduced a number in my Apostolical Fathers. Secondly, there are expressions, and even large passages, which seem to be translated from the Latin; and there is a considerable admixture of Latin words in the Greek text.

Zahn has tried to account for these phenomena by supposing that Hermas was illiterate, that he was a Jew, and that Greek was to him as a foreign language. In order to prove his Jewish origin, he appeals to a number of phrases which apparently are derived in form from the Hebrew. But he himself supplies us with facts which practically nullify this part of his supposition. He draws attention to the circumstance that Christians were familiar with the language of the Septuagint. They also became familiar with the language of the New Testament. Nay, it is likely that the language of the New Testament was the language in which Christians regularly heard the facts and doctrines of Christianity proclaimed to them. The Hebraisms passed into the ordinary speech of the Christians. I have known illiterate Greeks who could repeat the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles word for word, from having heard the priests in the church read the lessons. It would be impossible for such men not to have their language coloured by their recollections; but the Hebraistic phrases which they sometimes used were no proof that they were originally Jews, or brought up in a Jewish household. And it has to be noticed that in the Pastor of Hermas there is the absence of some of the most prominent Hebraistic forms, such as the use of ἐγένετο for "it came to pass." One has only to turn to Winer's paragraphs on the Hebraisms of the New Testament, and compare those which are there mentioned with the few which occur in Hermas, to feel that a familiarity with the Septuagint and the language of early Christian circles is sufficient to account for all the phrases which Zahn has collected. And from these phrases considerable deduction has to be made. Thus ἐρωτᾶν is used not merely "to request," but also "to ask a question;" and supposing that ἐρωτᾶν was always used in Hermas "to request," and ἐπερωτᾶν "to ask a question," an analogy could have been found in the Latin *rogare* and *interrogare* as well as in Hebrew. So, again, Zahn appeals to the use of εἰς and ἐν in Hermas. εἰς is continually used in the sense of ἐν, and ἐν is sometimes used in the sense of εἰς. But the peculiarity here noticed need

not, and did not, owe its origin to Hebrew. εἰς and ἐν are originally the same word, and ἐν is used with the meanings of both in some dialects. A similar phenomenon occurs in Latin. The Palatine translation in Simil. ix. 1, 4, has "deinde duxit me in Arcadia, in monte quodam ubere." Rönsch has collected numerous examples of the use of *in* with the acc. to express rest (Itala, p. 406), and *in* with the abl. to express motion (p. 410), some of which are taken from the best classical writers.

Zahn has also appealed to the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs as presenting great similarity of style. There is no doubt that there is similarity, and a comparison of the two books is most instructive. But in making the comparison we encounter a difficult problem which meets us everywhere in these investigations, namely, how far the peculiarities of the text are to be ascribed to the writer, and how far to the transcribers. Thus if we take Mr. Sinker's edition of the Testaments, which is based on two manuscripts, one in Cambridge and the other in Oxford, we shall find that the Oxford differs from the Cambridge MS. in the points that are most characteristic. The Cambridge, for instance, gives ἐπιθυμοῦσαι τὰς φαντασίας, making ἐπιθυμέω govern the accusative; but the Oxford MS. changes τὰς into τῆς, and restores the classical construction. The Cambridge reads ἀφίει, the Oxford ἀφίησι. The Cambridge gives the first aorist ἀμαρτήσητε, a late form; the Oxford has ἀμάτητε, the classical form. The Cambridge has ἐτίμουν, the Oxford ἐτίμων. So in the Pastor of Hermas we find nearly the same difference to exist between the Sinaitic Codex and the Leipzig, as we found between the Sinaitic Codex and the Constantinopolitan in the Epistle of Clemens Romanus. Thus the Sinaitic reads ἀπολήμψεσθε, the Leipzig ἀπολήψεσθε; the Sinaitic ἀπῆλθαν, the Leipzig ἀπῆλθον; the Sinaitic ἦλθαν, the Leipzig ἦλθον. In these cases we may believe with considerable certainty that the Sinaitic transcriber has introduced the peculiar forms, for he himself in other parts has ἀπολήμψεσθε, ἀπῆλθον and ἦλθον. Now if we remove from the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs the

forms that may be due to the transcriber, we shall find that they are much more Hebraic in expression and much less neo-Hellenic in forms. The genuine optative occurs in the Testaments; it never occurs in Hermas, except in one passage, where it is absurdly used if the reading is correct. The use of *εἰς* for *ἐν* does not occur in the Testaments in any indubitable instance. It occurs continually in Hermas. And forms like *συνχύνου*, *συνίω*, *τιθῶ*, *ἀφίονσι*, meet us frequently in Hermas, but are not to be paralleled in the Testaments. And these peculiar forms are not found in the Sinaitic Codex alone, but appear even more frequently, and sometimes nearer to later neo-Hellenic, in the Leipzig Codex. If we wish to see similar Greek, we must go to the mediæval Apocalypses Apocryphæ, where the same combination of Hebraistic turns and neo-Hellenic forms meets us in every page.

Nor do we think that the facts bear out the supposition of Zahn, that Hermas was illiterate. The book is a work of considerable literary merit, of clear judgment, of elevated morality, and of no mean power of thought. The phraseology also takes a wide range. Several of its words, such as *ἰταμός*, *ἀναιδεύομαι*, *κατάχυμα*, are Aristophanic. Many of them, such as *ὀδεύομαι*, *πολυπλοκία*, *βληχρός*, *εὐθαλής*, *τηλανγέστερον* and *πρόσοψις*, are to be found almost exclusively in the Greek classical poets. These words, indeed, are not proof that the writer took them from the authors in whose works they are now to be met; for Aristophanic and poetical words were adopted by later writers, became imbedded in the current language of conversation, and are scattered over the Greek speech of the present day. But they indicate a fuller vocabulary than one would expect in an illiterate man. And the same inference may be drawn from the words which occur only in Hermas, and some of which he in all probability coined, such as *συμφυρμός*, *ἀσνγκρασία*, *χερσώω*, *ἀποστιβάξω*, *ἔθελοδιάσκαλος*, and probably *χονδρίζω*, though it may be doubted if this last is a Greek word at all, and not a corruption of the text. We may add to this that the writer of the Shepherd is remarkable for his frequent use of the second

aorist pass and second future pass. Unquestionably, the neo-Hellenic tendency is to introduce regularity, and to do away with second aorists entirely. The opposite tendency shews itself in our writer. And some of these second aorists are of rare occurrence, are found only in late writers, and it is noteworthy that the Sinaitic has several times the second aorist form where the Leipzig has the first aorist. Among the later forms may be mentioned ἡνοίγην, θλιβήσομαι, ἡρπάγην, ὠρύγην, προσετάγην, παῖναι.

We do not think, therefore, that Zahn has been successful in proving his main proposition, though his chapter on the subject is deeply interesting, and a valuable contribution to the history of the Greek language. We still hold to the opinion that the mould of Greek in which the work of Hermas is cast belongs to a later age than that of the original writer.

There are two ways by which we may account for this peculiar form. The one first adopted and then renounced by Tischendorf is to suppose that the present Greek is a re-translation from the Latin. But there is unquestionably a difficulty in drawing this inference from the facts of the case—indeed, in at any time drawing the inference that a book is a translation. An Englishman writing an original work in German would be sure to introduce English phrases and idioms into his German, but their presence would not prove that the work was a translation, but that the writer was an Englishman. So the writer of the Shepherd was without doubt a resident in Italy. It is possible that he may have been born and brought up in Rome. Latin may have been his native tongue. If so, then his Greek style would be largely modified by his Latin mode of thought, especially if he were not a purist in style. There is no doubt that the writer of the Shepherd has introduced Latin words and Latin phrases, and there are some passages of considerable length which seem to us to read exactly as if they were translated from the Latin. But do these warrant the inference that they were translated? May not the writer have thought them out in Latin and written them in Greek?

The other way of accounting for the peculiarity is to suppose that the work was modernized in the course of time. The book was popular among the Greeks. The number of MSS. of the Vulgate translation is proof that it was not unpopular also among the Latin-speaking Christians of the Middle Ages. Like popular books, it suffered all kinds of treatment. It was abridged, as the Ethiopic translation shews. It was carelessly transcribed, a fact proved by the numerous omissions that occur in the Sinaitic and Leipzig Codices, and divergencies of readings in the Vulgate and Palatine. Its contents also were treated with great freedom. There are extant two works which appropriate large portions of Hermas without acknowledgment. One of these, carefully edited by Dindorf, appears in two forms. It bears the title of "Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀθανασίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Ἀλεξανδρείας Διδασκαλῖαι πρὸς Ἀντίοχον τῶν ἄρχοντα," or, as the other title gives, "πρὸς Ἀντίοχον δοῦκαν." It contains nearly all the commandments of Hermas as they now appear in the Sinaitic Codex. The style of the commandments is the same as that which is used in the rest of the work of the pseudo-Athanasius, and the writer speaks of the commandments as those "of the holy father and bishop Athanasius." The authorship had completely fallen out of sight. The work was common property and was treated as such.

If we put all the facts of the case together, perhaps the hypothesis which will account for all the features of the problem is a combination of the two ways already mentioned. We have the fact that the extracts made by Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen differ considerably from the text of Hermas as it now stands. We have the fact that all the forms in which Hermas has come down to us differ from each other. The very first sentence is widely different in most forms, and is slightly different in all. Then the Greek of Hermas partakes much more of neo-Hellenic peculiarities than any contemporary work; and there can be no doubt that the substance of the book was presented to mediæval readers not merely as the production of Hermas, but as the production of writers of a much later age. We have to add to this that large portions have

a considerable Latin element in them. Putting all these circumstances together, we think that the best solution of the problem is to suppose that we have, as the basis of our present Greek manuscripts, a recension and modernized version belonging to the sixth or seventh century, and that the editor used all the materials at his command, having probably in his possession large portions of the original text, but filling up gaps from some Latin translations, introducing parts from some modifications of the text, such as those of pseudo-Athanasius, and clothing the whole in the language current among the Christian populace of his day. We may add that the texts of Hilgenfeld and Gebhardt partake somewhat of the character which we have assigned to our sixth-century recension. They have used the Latin translations to amend the Greek, and where the Greek is defective they have re-translated the Latin into Greek.

The hypothesis we have proposed we do not deem by any means certain. The subject is one which awaits fuller investigation. We have been compelled to omit considerable portions of our argument, for they would occupy too much space; but it is enough to draw attention to some of the most prominent characteristics of this curious problem. It is not one of great consequence, as far as the substance of *Hermas* is concerned. It has much more to do with the date of the Sinaitic Codex, and the evidence points to a strong confirmation of Hilgenfeld's opinion that that Codex is not earlier than the sixth century.

We pass from this subject to another that demands notice from us here—the date and authorship of the *Pastor of Hermas*. It is noteworthy that in more recent times scholars have been inclined to believe the words of the Muratorian Canon implicitly. Zahn and Ledrain are exceptions. Harnack, Heyne and Behm, regard the statement in the Canon as strictly or nearly correct. Behm comes to the conclusion that the author is unknown, but that the true date is given. Harnack and Heyne have no hesitation in accepting the whole as strictly correct. The reason why the statement is so readily accepted

is, it seems to us, its definiteness. It states precisely who wrote the Pastor, and when he wrote it. Heyne argues as if modern critics had only two alternatives—either to accept the opinion of Origen that the author was the apostolic Hermas, or to accept the statement of the Muratorian fragment. One could scarcely hesitate, if such were really the case. But we think that the definiteness of the statement has acted as a kind of illusion, so that we are apt to forget how the matter really stands. We forget that the Muratorian fragment is an unauthenticated document. No ancient writer has mentioned it. This circumstance need not compel us to refuse belief in the document, but it must diminish the force of our belief. At any time we may discover that it is a forgery, or, as Thiersch thought, a jocular mystification. Then, again, the text is guaranteed to the least extent possible. It occurs only in one manuscript. That manuscript is a fragment. It is unquestionably corrupt. According to many, it is also a translation, and may be a mistranslation. And we have no means of ascertaining whether it has been interpolated or not. All these facts are acknowledged; but it may be questioned whether many do not allow the absence of all various readings to strengthen rather than diminish their faith in the statements of the Canon.

There are also some features of the Canon which do not seem to us to have received due consideration. We select one or two of these, especially as they bear upon the statement that the Canon makes in regard to the Pastor of Hermas.

The Canon gives a list of the Epistles of St. Paul. It first mentions the larger Epistles in the following order :

Corinthians,

Galatians,

Romans,

and then it mentions the whole :

“ad Corinthios prima,

ad Ephesios secunda,

ad Philippenses tertia,

ad Colossenses quarta,

ad Galatas quinta,
 ad Thessalonicenses sexta,
 ad Romanos septima."

The numbering of the Epistles leaves no doubt that the arrangement is deliberate. Now such an arrangement of the Epistles of St. Paul occurs nowhere else. It is unique. Various explanations of this order have been suggested, and recently Hesse has maintained that it is chronological. But the explanations are unsatisfactory. It seems to us that it is based on the order that is now used in our Testaments. Our order is :

Romans,
 Corinthians,
 Galatians,
 Ephesians,
 Philippians,
 Colossians,
 Thessalonians.

The Canon has made the first last, and the third from the beginning the third from the end. With these slight alterations, its order is the same as ours. The writer's procedure as to the other Epistles is still more manifest. He has simply reversed the order. Ours is, Timothy, Titus, Philemon ; his is, Philemon, Titus, Timothy. The variations which he has made seem purely arbitrary, except in the case of the Epistle to the Romans, of which we shall speak anon.

The date, then, of the Muratorian Canon is subsequent to the arrangement of the books of the New Testament which we now have. This arrangement is guided by the number of lines or *στίχοι* in each Epistle, the longest being put first. It implies a completed collection. What is the earliest date to which we can trace such an arrangement? Volkmar, in Credner's *Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Canon* (p. 374), thinks that Tertullian's order was the same as ours, but he has adduced no proof. Tertullian never quotes the Epistles in this order. He quotes them in Marcion's order, or he refers to them geographically; but on all occasions that he quotes or refers to the books, his order is different, and it is likely that

the order, as Münter supposes, was not yet settled.* I can find no clear proof that our order was prevalent in the Church till the fourth century. It may have been earlier. Probably it was earlier, but the proof does not appear till the fourth century, and at any rate the circumstance is one that might well make us hesitate to assign a very early date to the Muratorian Canon.

But why is the Epistle to the Romans put last? Tertullian puts the Epistle to the Romans last in two of his references to the Epistles of St. Paul, but the reason is obvious.† “Si autem Italiæ adjaces habes Romam unde nobis quoque auctoritas præsto est” (Præscr. c. 36); “quid etiam Romani de proximo sonent” (Marc. iv. c. 5). It was because, of the Churches to which St. Paul wrote, the Romans were the nearest to the Africans, that he mentions them last. He begins with those at a distance, and ends with those most close to him. That cannot be the reason of the order in the Muratorian Canon. It is not geographical. Perhaps the following suggestions are fanciful, but at any rate they may awaken thought. The references to the Romans and St. Peter are throughout such as would be disappointing to the Romans, and especially to the Roman hierarchy. The letter to the Romans is twice put last, and not first. No mention is made of the Epistles of St. Peter. No explanation can be given of the omission of the first Epistle, as it must have been known at the supposed time of the writer. Then the reference to the Apocalypse of Peter is not altogether complimentary. The Apocalypse of John is canonical; that of Peter “certain of our people do not wish to be read in the church.” Some have proposed to read *quas* for *quam*, but it seems to me that the *quam* reveals the intention of the writer. In the only other allusion to St. Peter, is it too much to suppose a somewhat depreciatory notice? The passage is corrupt. I proposed to read it: “Sic, etsi notæ, passionem Petri evitavit declarare sed et profectionem Pauli.” “So, although they were known, he avoided stating the passion of Peter,” &c. But whether this be the right reading or not,

* See Rönisch, Das Neue Testament Tertullian's, p. 320.

† Rönisch, p. 319.

the passage plainly intended to state that the Acts took no notice of the martyrdom of St. Peter. And then, as if to add to the annoyance of those who might expect in such an early document some honourable allusion to the man who was the first among the apostles and the head of the Roman Church, the fragmentist breaks off, if I may so speak, from the beginning of his fragment, the passage in which St. Peter's connection with the Gospel of St. Mark would have been related.

The passage relating to Hermas seems to be conceived in the same spirit. It appears to say: "Hermas, a brother of a Pope of Rome, ventured upon claiming prophetic powers. He gave himself out as inspired. His brother helped him to get his book recognized as Scripture. But we believe that the claim to inspiration is false, even though backed by a Pope. The time of inspiration closed with the apostolic age, and even Hermas, the brother of a Pope, must be excluded from the number of the prophets. His book may be read in the church, but it is not inspired." The phraseology may even have something of a sting in it. The writer describes Pius as "sitting in the chair of the Church of the city of Rome." Hermas himself always speaks with contempt of those who sit in chairs.* He represents the Church as sitting in a chair on account of sickness and weakness, and he gives the same position to the false prophet, and indeed specially accuses him of aiming at the first chair (*πρωτοκαθεδρίαν*). Can the writer of the Canon have used Hermas's own words for the purpose of casting a slur on Pius, the Roman hierarch?

All this may be mere imagination. Let others judge. But there is enough in it surely to make us cautious in receiving the testimony of an unauthenticated document.

Harnack agrees with the author of "Supernatural Religion"† in maintaining that there is no reference in the Pastor of Hermas to the Gospel of St. John. "In parabolis enarrandis et in formulis theologiæ ab utroque prepositis haud raro necessitudinem quandam Joannem inter et Hermam intercedentem

* See Heyne, p. 22.

† Vol. II. p. 253.

invenies, sed tantum abest, ut inde Hermam imitatore apostoli dicere fas sit, ut nisi aliis innitaris rationibus, contendere audeas, scriptorem evangelii effata Pastoris adhibuisse. At revera nulla apparent certa vestigia, quibus alterum alterius scriptura usum esse docearis."

Harnack has hit the mark exactly in this statement. *Hermas* quotes expressly from no book of the Old or New Testament. His own work is as much a product of the Christian Church as the Gospel of St. John. The sentiments and thoughts of both books must have been expressed in innumerable oral communications delivered in the Christian churches throughout the world. In all these churches the same thoughts and the same facts were continually rehearsed, and it is likely that the same modes of expression would be used even in churches widely apart from each other. Similarity of thought or of language is therefore no proof that one Christian writer has borrowed from another. The quotation must be precise. And the difficulty of drawing inferences is manifested in a strong light in this case. Some of the most orthodox maintain that the *Pastor* was written at an earlier period than the Gospel of St. John. In this case St. John must have borrowed from *Hermas*. Others maintain that the *Pastor* was written after the Gospel, and see in the words of the *Pastor* the influence of St. John. Both make unwarrantable inferences. If we felt quite sure that the one book was written before the other, we might convince ourselves that the one borrowed from the other, but we never can convince those who differ from us as to the relative priority of the books. But if an inference were to be drawn at all, the inference would be, as Harnack says, in favour of the priority of *Hermas*. *Hermas's* utterances in regard to the Son of God are simpler, less penetrating and subtle, and with less of a philosophical tinge about them, than are those of the Gospel. But the inference is not sound. The simple does not always precede the more penetrating and sublime thought, and we must therefore hold that there is no proof that the writer of the Gospel knew the work of *Hermas*, or that *Hermas* knew the Gospel.

JAMES DONALDSON.

IV.—PAUL AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS.

1. *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, &c.* By F. C. Baur. English Translation. Theological Translation Fund Library, Vol. I. (Revised), 1876 ; Vol. II., 1875.
2. *The Acts of the Apostles critically investigated.* By Dr. Ed. Zeller. English Translation. Theological Translation Fund Library, Vol. I., 1875 ; Vol. II., 1876.
3. *Paulus, de Apostel van Jezus Christus, &c.* Door J. W. Straatman. Amsterdam : J. C. Loman, Jr. 1874.
4. *The Apostle Paul and the Preaching of Christianity in the Primitive Church.* By Sir Richard Davis Hanson. London : Williams and Norgate. 1875.
5. *Les Seconds Chrétiens : St. Paul, 37—66.* Par Hippolyte Rodrigues. Paris : Michel Lévy Frères. 1876.
6. *La Bible, &c.* Par Edouard Reuss. Nouveau Testament : Deuxième Partie : Histoire Apostolique (Actes des Apôtres). Paris : Sandoz et Fischbacher. 1876.
7. *De Bijbel voor Jongelieden : Zesde Deel.* Door Dr. J. Hooykaas. Harlingen : J. F. V. Behrens. 1873. [About to appear in English. London : Williams and Norgate.]

RECENT investigations of the *origines* of Christianity have centred in no small degree round the person of Paul. He stands out even more prominently than heretofore from the Apostolic group as the chief object of interest. That in England this interest is unquestionably rising, any one will be convinced who will glance over the list of "this week's books" in a few successive numbers of the principal weekly reviews. That this tendency of inquiry is appreciated by the projectors of the Theological Translation Fund Library is clearly indicated by the fact, that of the seven works which are already in whole or in part in the hands of their subscribers, three, those of Baur, of Zeller, and of Pfleiderer, are chiefly occupied with Paul, while Hausrath's "History of the New Testament Times," which is promised shortly, largely treats the same subject-matter.

Nor need any surprise be felt that, in a season like the present, the story and the teaching of the great Apostle should prove a strong magnet to the minds of many. The fact is determined by two principal considerations. In the first place, as the divergences of the gospel narratives become, under the microscope of the modern critic, more and more conspicuous, and it is felt that the Jesus of history must be re-constructed, the Paul of history is recognized as one of the safest bridges by which to get back to the founder of Paul's faith; for Paul alone of the apostles has left to us undoubted writings of his own, instinct with the life and consciousness of that hour of dawn. In the second place, the theology of Protestant churches is founded on, or derived from, the doctrine of Paul chiefly; and therefore, that theology being on its trial, the Pauline letters invite to renewed study and criticism. To these causes is to be added the growing apprehension that, had there never been a Paul, there would never have been a European Christianity.

Indeed, the English movement is but a wave of the great movement in Pauline investigation to which Schneckenburger and Baur gave the first start on the continent, and which is still active in the German and Dutch "Theological Reviews."

Yet half a century of intense, varied and wide-spread research has not sufficed to bring scholars to give a unanimous account of Paul. Putting out of consideration altogether those writers who have given hostages to orthodoxy and never sally too far outside the walls of the citadel of tradition, we find that even such as have no desire but to discover and publish the facts of history diverge from each other to an astonishing degree in the conclusions they draw concerning Paul from the New Testament documents, and paint us portraits of him which, were they hung side by side, none would recognize as representations of the same great character.

Let us take as samples of the different lights in which the story of Paul may be read, and the different tones in which it may be re-told, the three several accounts of him which are offered to us by the three most important of his latest biogra-

phers : Heer Straatman, a retired Dutch preacher, already well known for sundry critical monographs ; Sir Richard Hanson, late Chief Justice of South Australia, the literary industry of whose last years affords a proof that eminence in a great civil profession need not debar from a broader culture or from interest in the problems that occupy the theologian and the biblical critic ; and, lastly, M. Hippolyte Rodrigues, who shews us that it is not M. Renan only among Frenchmen who can dress the story of the early Church in vivid language, and adorn it with the interest—if, also, with other and less appropriate attributes—of a romance.

Straatman concludes his brilliant critique with a sketch of the moral person of Paul,* which he believes himself to have deduced by strict methods from the documents of the New Testament ; and this will afford us a good point of comparison with the other writers named above. Straatman lays it down that Paul was one of the few men in universal history who have founded a religion, and that this alone is a proof of greatness. The founder of a religion necessarily partakes in large measure of several eminent qualities. Religion is the philosophy of the multitude, and its *credenda* are decided by the heart, and not the head. While, therefore, the philosopher has but to address the intellectual understanding of the few, the founder of a religion must have capacity to sway the tumultuous hearts of the many. His own heart must beat in sympathy with their deepest longings, and he must attract them by declaring to them a remedy for all their ills. And this was the case with Paul to an unparalleled degree. Taken captive by the gospel himself, he could not rest till he had proclaimed its glory and its hope to the children of his people—nay, the time came when the passion of his humanity bore him out beyond the boundaries of Israel, and he addressed his preaching to the wide world. Nor could Paul lack such characteristics as should aid him in his tremendous task. Many-sided rather than profound, with a view to practical effect

* Paulus, &c., pp. 412—433.

rather than to abstract truth, he yet needed and possessed the power of sifting from the old what would serve his lofty purpose, while he set aside all useless tradition, or so transformed it by his interpretation, as to be able to press it into his service after all. Nor was Paul wanting in religious imagination. He instinctively felt what was needed to attract, and this he declared as truth, assuming it to be the witness of the Holy Spirit; and the theology of his letters, like all theological dogmatics, is simply an attempt to build up on a basis of reason beliefs to which he had been led solely by the impulse of the heart. His writings contain no philosophical speculation, original or profound: they give no new conception of God or man. His conceptions were those of his people; and his universalism, the only radical thought in which he diverged from Israelitish notions, was brought to him by circumstances, and only adopted after long and painful hesitation. Even this doctrine, really so foreign to Judaism, he tried to argue out from strictly Jewish premises; and, with wonderful ingenuity, he contended that Gentile salvation was a part of the original plan of the Mosaic dispensation. Christ, not truth, is all in all to him; his one aim to make all things point towards salvation in Christ, not impartially to seek out truth. And with this unity and intensity of purpose, this eager spirit of self-sacrifice, and this inexhaustible and, in a sense, unscrupulous dialectic skill, Paul could not but succeed. His personality left an indelible impression, and even adversaries were moved by him; the impressionable Peter was, for the moment, swayed by him as a reed in the wind; even the reluctant James was compelled to stretch out to him the right hand of fellowship. But this personal power, like that of all the greatest men, made partizans rather than friends. No man ever needed love more; perhaps no man ever possessed fewer loving friends. Questions of the day, that seemed to the "pillars" and to the men of Galatia or of Corinth great, to him seemed pitifully trivial. He strove to descend to them, shew interest in them, and solve them; but the condescension was so manifest as to be unattractive. His soul was wrapt up in the loftiest problems, and

he could not unbend to chatter naturally on the eating of meats or the propriety of marriage. He strove to be to the Jew a Jew, to the Greek a Greek; but to Jew and Greek alike it was manifest that he was really indifferent to the sentiments that animated them. He was an eagle among barn-door fowls;* and he could not hide his royal plumage. And the consciousness of this defect in tact for little things was the "thorn in the flesh"† which Paul bewailed. Posthumous greatness costs present unpopularity; and to be feared, not loved, to move in too high a sphere to touch the daily life of common men—therefore to be misunderstood and suspected by those for whom he would gladly have given his life—this was the spiritual martyrdom far more grievous to Paul than all the physical sufferings detailed in his letter to the Corinthians. To see the influence and authority of the "pillars" everywhere set above his own, simply because he could not come down to the level of the petty problems which they exalted to the first position of importance, this was indeed a "thorn" keen enough to make him wince. Paul's absorption in Christ had caused him to cease to be a practical man, and the result was misunderstanding on the part of his converts, disappointment on his own. After more in the same vein as this, Straatman pronounces the Apostle of the Gentiles one of the world's greatest men, and propounds the daring question, Which was greater, Paul or Jesus?‡ The answer, he says, can only be given when the life of the Master shall have undergone as strict an investigation as that of the Apostle. It will then probably appear that the two are complementary to each other; that Jesus excelled in energy and strength of will, and in force and scope of imagination, Paul in intellectual penetration, free range of thought, and emancipation from national prejudice. It would never have occurred to Paul to declare himself the Messiah; the idea of the evangelization of the Gentile world would never have presented itself to Jesus. Jesus was the Luther, Paul the Zwingli of that great era. Paul took the gospel of Jesus,

* *Op. cit.* p. 430.† *Ibid.* p. 422.‡ *Ibid.* p. 432.

the culmination of the Israelitish cult, and enlarged it to a world's religion. He purified it, and breathed into it a new force, and he made it attractive and accessible, no longer to an oriental tribe alone, but to a multitude of nations.

In vivid contrast with this exalted estimate of the Apostle is that formed by M. Rodrigues. It has been M. Rodrigues' ambition to defend Peter at any cost from the criticisms to which modern research have exposed him ; and, with this view, he has not hesitated to vilify Paul in the most extraordinary manner. Reversing the adage, he has unscrupulously robbed Paul of good repute to pay Peter ; and, could he persuade us, we should all look upon the great missionary Apostle as a second and more execrable Judas, the betrayer of all that should have been sacred to him, the wily perverter of the gospel for his own base ends. So far from applauding the great work of Paul in striking the fetters of Judaism from the form of Christianity and presenting a free gospel to the world, Rodrigues can see in him nothing but an impostor passing forged credentials upon the unwary. If Paul submitted to the council of Jerusalem—and our author does not doubt that he did so—the submission was dictated by a coward's fear, and was accompanied by a violent hatred of Peter.* Moreover, Rodrigues, by accepting and even elaborating the account of the council given in the book of Acts,† and holding Paul honourably bound by its decision, is able to retort on him the charge of falsity which Paul at Antioch launches against Peter, and to put an evil interpretation on every subsequent step of progress made by the Apostle of the Gentiles. If Paul never wrote an Epistle to Antioch, his silence is induced by the shameful memory of how Peter there confounded him and exposed his double-facedness.‡ The journey of Paul with Silas from Antioch into Asia Minor was undertaken by command of the true apostles, that by the circumcision of Timothy at Lystra, and by the

* Saint Paul, &c., p. 114.

† Rodrigues holds that the council decreed the submission of all Christians to circumcision, both Jew and Gentile, which, we need not point out, far exceeds the statement of the book of Acts.

‡ Op. cit. p. 146.

confession of his own mouth, he might acknowledge the error of his teaching of uncircumcision, and bring his churches into the one true fold; and Silas was attached to Paul to see that the wily schemer carried out his bond. But at Antioch of Pisidia, Paul's patience gave way. This humiliation before all the churches to whom he had boasted his immediate commission from Christ, was too trying to his undisciplined mind. He resolved to break at once his bond and his bonds. Having seduced Timothy and Sylvanus,* he escaped from Silas, and taking a feigned name,† and choosing a difficult and circuitous route which should baffle pursuit, he escaped to Europe, there to renew in a new field his most ambitious and deceitful pretensions, and to attempt the planting of a group of churches of the uncircumcision, which should look up to him with undisturbed allegiance and yield him a solid pecuniary harvest. For a little while he had all his own way; but Peter, apprised of his labours, pursued him, and, in one of his churches after another, exposed the sordid motives of his labours, the conscious falsehood and impurity of his teachings, the base spirit of flattery and compliance which induced him to preach uncircumcision, and the irregularity of his own life. Paul wrote letters, indeed, such as 1 and 2 Thessalonians,‡ to rebut these grave charges, but he dared not meet his accuser face to face with

* M. Rodrigues has the effrontery, in the name of "rational" criticism, to inform the reader in a foot-note that the Silas of Acts is in fact a confusion of two personages—Silas, the disciple of Peter, one of the seventy sent out by Jesus, a member of the council, and the appointed guard of Paul in his journey of humiliation, and Sylvanus, a young doctor, originally attached to the same party, but perverted by Paul during the journey to Lystra. M. Rodrigues, indeed, acknowledges, with an air of infinite caution and candour, that it is not easy to decide which of these was called Silas and which Sylvanus, and apports the names "*sous toute réserve*"—an affectation which will disarm the suspicions of the uninformed reader, and leave him without an inkling that the whole of this ingenious bifurcation of the personality of the Silas of Acts xv. 27, 32, 34, 40, and xvi. 19, 25, 29, is the pure and absolute invention of the critic! Tradition places Silas over the see of Corinth, and Sylvanus over that of Thessalonica; but we need hardly say that no such distinction as that attempted by our author can be built on this foundation. Rodrigues, *Op. cit.* p. 156, note 2.

† Paul, for Saul.

‡ Ces *Épîtres* n'étant autre chose que des réponses de Paul aux accusations de Pierre, c'est dans leurs flancs qu'il convient de rechercher les pièces d'un procès sur lequel il a été répandu des ombres si épaisses. *Op. cit.* p. 209.

the shame of Antioch still fresh in his memory ; and Peter refuted his feeble defence, line by line and phrase for phrase, in the public assembly of the church. Beaten at every point, and knowing that he could not maintain his ground, Paul at last conceived the idea of an open rupture with Judaism, and of founding a rival Christianity which should not only permit uncircumcision, but should set aside the whole of the Judaic law and tradition, hoping, by aid of his own genius and his own audacity, to re-conquer his lost churches and to extend his influence over a still larger area. Then came a season of feeble wavering. Now, as at the moment at which he took the Nazirite vow, he leant towards once more seeking reconciliation with the apostolic college ; now, the temptation was strong upon him boldly to develop and declare his own independent doctrine. He even went once more up to Jerusalem to seek terms of amity. But James refused to treat with him, or to accept any attitude but that of absolute submission, and Paul hurried away in anger. Repulsed by the apostles, despised by his disciples, he now broke finally with the Judaic party, and "resolved to elaborate a new theodicy, the mystic ground-work of which should seduce the feeble-minded and captivate the enthusiastic ;"* and seeing clearly that this ground-work would not bear the least examination, he declared, in the name of Jesus, that it must be accepted without examination, and that they who should refuse to rest their faith upon it could not be saved at the approaching day of judgment. Such was the mood in which he penned the notorious Epistle to the Galatians, a composition which rendered him whom they had once worshiped as a man of supernatural endowment, for ever after odious in their eyes. "See," said Peter, as he finished his refutation of the personal and doctrinal pretensions of this letter, "See to what lengths one may be led by a rebellious, fanciful and wicked spirit!"†

It is unnecessary further to trace the story of Paul as told by M. Rodrigues. We have given the reader a sufficient

* Op. cit. p. 259.

† Ibid. p. 281.

account of his manner of treating the Apostle to shew him how radically different is his estimate of the character of Paul from that formed by Heer Straatman. Yet both these writers profess a purely scientific criticism, and claim to have founded the verdict they pronounce, on the documents of the New Testament without fear or favour.

We will pass on to the no less sincerely written essay of our own countryman, the late Sir Richard Hanson, a work which, if it lacks the brilliancy of either our Dutch or our French biography, is at any rate compiled with far more caution than the latter.

After warning the reader against forming either too favourable or too depreciatory an estimate of Paul, Sir Richard Hanson thus sums up his own impression :

“We appear to see faith, hope, love, zeal, knowledge, ability—courage in confronting danger—persistence in the face of opposition—a resolute pursuit of truth without regard to consequences, and an assertion of the inalienable rights of the reason and the conscience in defiance of authority, which has been of inestimable value to the Church in many periods of its history. But these are accompanied by what in an uninspired man would be called pride, jealousy, disdain, invective, sophistry, time-serving, and intolerance; by a systematic depreciation of those who differ from him, and denunciations of their opinions and themselves, which have been too faithfully copied by succeeding theologians. . . . The loftiest tone of sentiment, and the utmost eloquence of style in writing and in speech, may consist with a low practical standard of feeling and conduct. Elevated conceptions of virtue, duty, and holiness, are perhaps, more often than we like to confess, associated with grievous lapses into error. And if in the case of Paul we find that his ideal of the essential characteristics of Christian love did not induce him to suffer long, or prevent him from vaunting himself, or from being easily provoked, or from thinking and speaking evil of whomsoever opposed him, so his inculcation of other virtues affords us [no (?)] proof that he exemplified them in his life. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to suppose that there was an earnest endeavour to raise himself to the level of his own teaching, and to exhibit in his intercourse with the world the virtues which he enforced upon the Church. We should, probably, judge him unfairly if we were to

estimate his habitual temper and demeanour by the occasional outbursts of violence that have been preserved to us. He was a man of high qualities and eminent virtues. He set a great example, and he performed a great work. But neither his life nor his teaching was free from error, nor has their influence upon the history of the Church been wholly beneficial." *

If the three writers whom we have cited widely diverge in their estimate of the character of Paul, their accounts of the incidents of his life are no less radically opposed to one another. The original and startling narrative of the life of the Apostle given to the world by Straatman has already been reproduced in outline in the pages of this Review.† Enough has been said above of the work of Rodrigues to shew that he deduces a very different story from his materials. The third of our biographers, Hanson, frequently hits upon an interpretation of an incident, or gives a turn to an occurrence, that nearly tallies with the account given by the Dutchman or the Frenchman; but he, too, often offers an entirely original statement concerning some crisis in the life of his hero—as, for instance, when he supposes that it was with unbaptized, and not merely with uncircumcised, Gentiles that Peter ate at Antioch, and that he did so until he had obtained the sanction of James and the apostles to put a stop to such a practice, and that therefore the question in dispute was something quite outside the subject-matter of the apostolic decree. Hanson, however, concurs with Rodrigues in his opinion that the incident ended in the complete discomfiture of Paul and the public justification of Peter.‡

For the general outline of Paul's career, however, according to these diverse historians, we must refer the reader to the works themselves. We have sufficiently indicated the remarkable diversity of their contents, and we proceed to ask how it is that writers priding themselves on their emancipation from

* Paul and the Primitive Church, pp. 433 seq.

† Theological Review for July, 1875, pp. 455 seq.

‡ Hanson, *op. cit.* pp. 214—221.

all merely traditional views, and anxious to investigate and to solve the problems presented by the life of Paul in accordance with the principles of rational and scientific criticism, can arrive at results so far removed from one another.

A considerable allowance must unquestionably be made for that factor, so vitiating in all researches that comprise a subjective element—personal bias. No critic can ever hope to eliminate altogether from his studies the error arising from the “personal equation.” That the Jewish sympathies of M. Rodrigues amount to the determining element in his critique is only too obvious, and the violence of those sympathies altogether disqualifies him for the delicate task of adjusting the rival claims of Paul and of Peter to our regard. No such vehement partizanship mars Sir Richard Hanson’s work ; but, in spite of his conscientious and judicial temper, he has not succeeded in removing from his solution a residue of bias against Paul as the writer from whom the theology of Augustine has derived its support. Even in the composition presented to us by Straatman, a delicate instrument will detect traces of an agnostic or anti-theological temper, which renders it difficult for him to do true and full justice even when he most extravagantly praises. But the personal bias, by no means a determining quantity in Straatman or Hanson, however overwhelming in Rodrigues, is not enough to explain the extraordinary differences in the results they reach. We must seek some further cause, and that cause will be found in the nature of the documents from which nineteen-twentieths of the evidence concerning Paul and his career have to be drawn.

These documents, we need not remind the reader, are the book of the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles attributed to Paul. But, inasmuch as the authenticity of the majority of these Epistles is disputed, and can only be determined after the nature of the character and the career of Paul have been settled, the documents practically at our service in determining that character and career are reduced to the book of Acts and the four great and universally acknowledged Epistles—Romans,

1 and 2 Corinthians, and Galatians.* The real determining factor, then, of any characterization of Paul, is the critic's view of the relation of these documents to one another. And this relation, as is well known, is not easy to determine. A writer who should ignore the book of Acts would have no great difficulty in sketching the personality of Paul from his four great letters. On the other hand, one who should refuse to regard those letters would have a comparatively easy task in painting Paul's portrait from the book of Acts. But while it is often the case that documents *by* a man and documents *about* a man when combined enable us to form a more characteristic conception of him than either class of documents alone, throwing a stereoscopic effect upon the canvas,—any attempt to combine the Paul of Acts with the Paul of the letters ends in a blur upon the page, or, if we will have clear lines, results in the picture of a being approaching more or less closely to the conditions of moral and intellectual monstrosity.

Schneckenburger, Baur and Zeller, have rendered it for ever impossible to revert to the position of Paley, or to chronicle "*Horæ Paulinæ*" in which the coincidences and the discrepancies between the Epistles and the Acts shall be pressed with equal welcome into service, the former to prove the accuracy, the latter the good faith, of either set of documents. No sober critic will ever again venture to treat the book of Acts as a simple narrative of facts. The close parallelism between the deeds and adventures of Paul and of Peter, both in the realm of natural events and in the realm of miracle; the "Paulinizing" of Peter and the "Petrinizing" of Paul;† the silence

* So reduced, at least, until other Epistles can be shewn to come from Paul or from his immediate followers. The doubts of Bruno Bauer concerning the authenticity of Galatians need no more qualify its inclusion among the "universally acknowledged" Epistles than recent pseudo-scientific vagaries should qualify a statement that the earth is now universally acknowledged to be a globe.

† The writer is painfully aware that in writing these words he subjects himself to episcopal condemnation as a "subtle" man. "Peter did not teach one thing and Paul another, yet in these days subtle men would try to make out distinctions—make a Paulite (*sic*) school, a Peterine (*sic*) school, a follower of St. John, and so on. There was nothing in Scripture that called for such distinctions." Sermon

concerning all serious disagreement between the two, such as the letters of Paul reveal; the hundred-and-one historical incongruities; the attachment of Paul to that Judaic law which we know him to have regarded as no longer anything but a hindrance to the gospel; his deference to the older apostles, in spite of his own assertions of equality or superiority;*—all these characteristics of this book have forced upon all parties the conviction that, even though it contain much that is of high historical value, it is still something other than mere history for its own sake,—a polemic, an eirenikon, or in some other way a document of specific purpose; and that the modern historian, in drawing material from its narratives, must bear its character in mind and use it with discrimination.

This is the well-known position of Baur and Zeller, and their shot has completely riddled the structure of this book. They have pierced holes in narrative after narrative. Not a miracle has escaped their cannonade; not a speech has been safe from their attack. It is needless here to detail the relentless and powerful criticism to which they have exposed chapter after chapter and verse after verse. Every English reader now has the opportunity of familiarizing himself with their methods and their results. Almost all along the line they have conducted an irresistible attack.

But there is, nevertheless, a limit to the havoc they have wrought. Not only have they substantially accepted those sections of the work in which the first person supersedes the third; but, while merciless towards so many isolated narratives, they adopt the general frame-work of the career of Paul which the book of Acts presents to the reader. They accord ready credence to the statement that the conversion occurred on the road to Damascus, to the outline of the missionary journeys, to the arrest at Jerusalem, the detention at Cæsarea, the transference of the prisoner to Rome. Their criticisms are directed against the subsidiary incidents of this series of events,

preached at Penwortham Church, by the Bishop of Manchester, reported in *Manchester Examiner and Times*, Aug. 28, 1876.

* 2 Cor. xi. 21—23, x. 12; Gal. ii. 6—8, &c.

and not against the events themselves. Yet, if the book of Acts had not been preserved to us, these circumstances would have rested for us only on an unsubstantial tradition, if known at all; and it is on the authority of that book alone that they are or can be seriously put forward as ascertained facts of history. Straatman lays against Baur the impeachment, that after turning out the authority of Acts at the front door, he lets it slip in again at the back gate; and it is impossible to assert that the impeachment is without foundation. We may roughly state the practical attitude of Baur and Zeller thus: when the statements of the book of Acts clash with the authentic Epistles of Paul, or are in themselves incredible, they are to be disbelieved; when they obviously conduce to establish the dogmatic standpoint of the writer, they are to be suspected; otherwise, they are to be believed.

Now Straatman holds such an attitude to be illogical, and we do not see how any other view can be taken. If a work exhibits a large number of unhesitating and most important statements which it is conceded must be disbelieved, and a large number more which it is conceded must be suspected, no logical reason can be given for believing such other statements as are in themselves, indeed, neither incredible nor suspicious, yet are supported by no other authority than that which has thus forfeited its character for veracity. If a reader of the New Testament choose to take up the position of Rodrigues, and to start from the assumption that the letters of Paul are tissues of impudent and pretentious mendacity, he may, it is true, account for the miraculous in the Acts of the Apostles as the mere after-growth of honest legend, and escape altogether the recognition of a "Tendenz" in the book; and it will remain for him an invaluable source of historical information. But critics who have recognized the comparative historical worth of the letters and the biography, have surely deprived themselves of all right to appeal to the historical authority of the latter.

Emancipated thus from traditional views of the course of Paul's career, Straatman sets himself to construct a new and

true biography. Yet, after all, however different his results, his method is precisely that which he has condemned in his illustrious predecessor. He, too, submits section after section of the book of Acts to a criticism at once minute and powerful. Yet, if that book is discredited, if we are not even to allow its authority to slink in at the back door, what has he to do with it who is engaged in making out what truth he can concerning the life and deeds of Paul? Why is he to fill his book with the careful sifting of one of its narratives after another, any more than with criticisms of the speeches put, with so thin a disguise, into the mouth of that Apostle in the Clementine Homilies? This, however, is Straatman's method, as it is that of every other biographer of the great Apostle. The difference between his handling of the book of Acts and that of Baur is, after all, a difference of degree only, and not of kind. It is true that he turns more of the narratives of "Luke" inside out than does Baur; but still even his foundations are built upon those narratives, and the Epistles are used by him only as corrective and supplementary.

Nevertheless, Straatman deals some very heavy blows at what ruins Baur and Zeller have left standing of the credit of the book. Passing over his treatment of its earlier portions, we come to the extraordinary assault which he has made upon that famous, and hitherto sacred "*ἡμεῖς* source," which is built into the main structure, and had previously yielded so little to the batteries of the critics. While the countrymen of our author have by no means left his essay unnoticed, and have set themselves to rebut many of his novel criticisms,* we are not aware that any serious endeavour has been made to break the force of the reasoning by which he attempts to discredit the whole story of the arrest in Jerusalem, the detention at Cæsarea, and the captive voyage to Rome. Yet the brilliant chapter in which that reasoning is unfolded will have to be fairly met and confuted before even the "*ἡμεῖς* source" can again be cited as a valid historical document.

* *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Sept. 1874 (Loman), and Jan. 1875 (Blom and Koch).

All that is possible here is to pass the heads of that reasoning under review in the briefest manner. The older critics had long ago shewn that the alleged conduct and language of Paul during his final sojourn in Jerusalem, and the behaviour of the Sanhedrin, and their officers as well, are to the last degree anomalous. Straatman, in an exhaustive analysis of the conduct of the Roman, Lysias, contends that, in a military officer of the empire, it, too, is far from credible. He further argues that the non-Christian Jews could have no interest in arraigning Paul, and that at any rate the charge of being a leader among the Nazarenes is one which they would not bring at a time when James, the head of that community, enjoyed a universal popularity. Having undermined the whole of the statements which form the basis of the two years' captivity at Cæsarea, Straatman further ventures to discredit that captivity itself. The appeal to Cæsar—that standing difficulty to the historical inquirer—and the consequent consignment of the Apostle to the centurion for shipment to Rome, fall away at the same time. Rather, it is urged, was it as a free man that Paul hastened to that mighty city, to see which his heart so long had yearned. No Roman magistrate, indeed, would despatch a state-prisoner in a chance trading vessel; but the fervid missionary might well, in all haste, seize the first opportunity of getting a ship-board on whatever deck he could win a footing by payment, for his eager purpose was to reach the capital, and declare and establish his gospel, ere the Jewish-Christian traducers and opponents, with whom he had just come to a final rupture, should reach its gates. No Roman guard of prisoners would give his prisoner leave to land at Sidon and seek out the brethren,* but a free man might snatch a moment's converse with them before a voyage of many hundred miles. No Roman prisoner would be permitted by his custodians to give his vote on every occasion whether to go or stay;† but a free man might give his advice, and it would have the weight of his character and sea-faring experience. No prisoner would be allowed to tarry seven days

* Acts xxvii. 3.

† Acts xxvii. 31, 33—36; cf. xxvii. 9—11, 21—26.

with "brethren" at Puteoli;* but a free man might gladly seize that brief recreation between the fatigues of a protracted voyage and the severe duties of apostleship in the metropolis of the world. No prisoner could be met at Appii Forum by brethren from Rome;† but a free Apostle they might well come out to greet. And Straatman maintains that the ἡμεῖς document, so distorted by these strange anomalies, reads naturally and simply as can be wished directly we eliminate from it Julius and all that is connected with the pretended captivity. The centurion, with his mere typical Roman name, is "the fifth wheel to the coach."

Such is very briefly and roughly the line of reasoning by which the Dutch critic endeavours to disprove the whole story of a Palestinian arrest and the subsequent events as detailed in the book which has hitherto been treated by critics of every school as the main source for the life of Paul after the period dealt with in the first two chapters of Galatians. But now let us inquire whether, in this typical instance, criticism might not have got at the true state of the case with that independence of the book of Acts which we must contend to be largely necessary to the historian who would become the safe and accurate biographer of the Apostle.

Let us start from the Epistle to the Philippians. It will be remembered that the inveterate habit of piecing in the Epistles one by one in their supposed respective places in the course of the narrative of Acts, has led a few critics to ascribe a Cæsarean origin to this letter.‡ We may observe in passing, that, were the book of Acts fairly out of the way, so indefensible an hypothesis would never have occurred to any one. By the vast majority of inquirers, the internal evidence preserved in the letter itself has been allowed its just weight, and the composition of the document has been unhesitatingly assigned to Rome. But what is more to our purpose, a great controversy rages round the question of its authenticity. Baur rejected it on doctrinal and historical grounds. Holtzman, Hofmann,

* Acts xxviii. 13, 14.

† Acts xxviii. 15.

‡ So, Böttger and Paulus.

Hilgenfeld and others, have, however, successfully disposed of the main objections of the great Tübinger; and it was not till three or four years ago that Hinsch broke up new ground, and marshalled a fresh array of difficulties for the defenders of the authenticity to overcome. To him Hilgenfeld at once replied; and his reply called forth a rejoinder of great length and force from Hoekstra,* and another of still greater length and force from Holsten.† If we take Hilgenfeld, Hoekstra and Holsten, as representatives of the three possible views in the present stage of the controversy, we find the first of these giving the weight of his authority to the absolute authenticity of the Epistle; the second, Hoekstra, boldly postponing its composition till after that of the Acts, chiefly on grounds connected with a higher respect for the historical validity of the latter than we can entertain; and the last, Holsten, denying, indeed, the authenticity, but assigning the letter to a date between the years 70 and 90 A.D., with a preference for the earlier portion of that period.

We must refer the reader to Holsten himself for the grounds which lead us to incline strongly to his view of the matter. The important thing is, that even if the Epistle be not from Paul's own hand, yet, if it belong to a date so early after his death, it may be used as a safe authority for facts of outward biography, only allowing for a little exaggeration natural to the mourning disciple in the description of his master as well known throughout the court and its precincts,‡ and sending greetings from the household of Cæsar.§

The Epistle, then, establishes beyond all dispute an imprisonment of Paul at Rome—an imprisonment, of course, by Roman authority, and for which those poor and impotent Judæans who had slunk back to the capital when the death of Claudius had annulled his decree of banishment, could not possibly have the responsibility.

* *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, July, 1875.

† *Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie*, &c., 1875, No. 3; 1876, No. 1, No. 2.

‡ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ. Philip. i. 13.

§ οἱ ἐκ τῆς καίσαρος οἰκίας. Philip. iv. 22.

But the Epistle does not anywhere imply an imprisonment originating in Palestine. Such an imprisonment would never have been thought of but for the book of Acts. On the contrary, it implies an imprisonment recently begun. Though the hints in the Epistle are few, they are sufficient to indicate that the imprisonment had been preceded by an active and not a very brief ministry in Rome itself—a ministry, at any rate, active and protracted enough to awaken not only goodwill, but affection* towards the Apostle on the part of some at Rome, and on the part of others jealousy, contentious rivalry and intrigue;† while some had been so incensed as even to desire to stir up trouble for Paul in his very chains.‡ Nor, were it not for the book of Acts, would any one ever have ventured on the wild supposition that a prisoner from Palestine, remaining a prisoner, even with the utmost laxity of guard that Roman discipline can be imagined to have permitted, could have possible opportunity of thus affecting considerable bodies of men.§

It is not difficult to imagine grounds for the arrest and bondage of Paul at Rome. Tumult from one quarter or another might easily ensue from his preaching, or he may have approached some one “of the household of Cæsar” with too bold exhortation or rebuke. The story told by Chrysostom, to the effect that Paul was imprisoned and executed by Nero because he had persuaded a concubine of the emperor to embrace a life of Christian chastity, although pronounced by Rodrigues “tout à fait historique,” is not likely to be trustworthy; but the germ of truth at the bottom of it may well be, that the Apostle lost his freedom and his life through pressing his gospel on persons connected with the imperial establishment.

There are abundant indications in the subsequent history of

* εὐδοκία, ἀγάπη. Philip. i. 15, 16.

† φθόνος, ἐρις, ἐριθία. Philip. i. 15, 17.

‡ θλίψιν ἐγείρειν τοῖς δεσμοῖς. Philip. i. 17.

§ τοὺς πλείονας τῶν ἀδελφῶν. Philip. i. 14.

Roman Christianity as compared with that of Greece and of Asia, that Paul did indeed so minister in the world's metropolis as to impress his influence indelibly on some section, at any rate, of its inhabitants. It is no part of our present purpose to shew what motives actuated the compiler of Acts in his perversion of the facts of Paul's latter years, or with what calculating audacity he manipulated that ἡμεῖς document which has for so long been the mainstay of his credit; though we conceive that the task would not present much difficulty. We have allowed ourselves a long digression, in order, by one striking example, to suggest to the reader how much more direct a road to the facts biographers of Paul would have taken, had it been their practice to start from the Pauline and immediately post-Pauline Epistles, and use the book of Acts at the most as supplementary, instead of setting out from the latter, and using the former as supplementary and corrective. It is true that the biographical material of the Epistles is meagre; but at least it is truthful and authentic. The biographical material of the more pretentious work is copious; but then, the more it is scrutinized, the more impossible does it become to deny that it is compiled with an utter disregard to historical fact. Had historians adopted the method we suggest, and started from the *data* of the letter to the Philippians in compiling the life of Paul, the story of a Palestinian imprisonment would never have got a footing amongst them; but because they have set out from Acts, it has been reserved for so late a writer as Straatman to see through the disguise which the romancing narrator has thrown over the latter days of the Apostle of the Gentiles.

We have said of the book of Acts that it is "compiled with an utter disregard to historical fact;" and this is a grave phrase, implying no mere unconscious departure from the truth, but an open-eyed untruthfulness. Nor is it a phrase that should be carelessly employed concerning a book, not only held in reverence by the majority of Christendom in all times, but actually comprising much that is noble in its exaltation or

exquisite in its pathos.* Yet we fear that the whole drift of the most searching criticism tends to bring out the fact that the author of this work not only distorts events and disguises men under the impulse of strong personal sympathies and desires, but does so most deliberately and with the fixed intention of deceiving,—an intention which has been abundantly fulfilled. The book of Acts is a “Tendenz” writing, and the Synoptical Gospels are Tendenz writings; that is to say, they are both composed by men under the sway of powerful sentiments which colour their narratives of events. But they are Tendenz writings of radically different species. The more we study the Synoptics, the more clearly do we perceive that they have *grown up*, that they are organisms. Even the third, which bears marks of coming from a single narrator in its present form, is the *product* of the influences under which the writer lived. Each Gospel bears, indeed, the colouring of the circle in which it came into being, and the sentiment of this or that section of the early Christian community is freely reflected in the figure and the teaching of the great subject of the biography itself. But there is nothing to lead us for a moment to suppose that the editor of Matthew, for instance, said to himself, “I will set to work and construct a Jewish or anti-Pauline Gospel.” On the contrary, the strain of Judaic sympathy and anti-Paulinism which runs through the composition is evidently woven of the very tissue of the compiler’s mind. He has not wrought it in because it appeared to him expedient so to do, but because he could not help it, and it was part of the inherent or acquired habit of his mind. But such is by no means a true account of the manner in which the book of the Acts of the Apostles was composed. Nothing but a preconceived theory of the nature of the book could lead any one to see in the author’s account of the apostolic council,† the candid

* Beyond all, xx. 13—38, which we do indeed give up with a pang. Yet 16 last clause, 23, 25, 29, 30, are all indefensible. 31 may not be fatal, since it is only inconsistent with the chronology of Acts itself, xix. 8, 10.

† Acts xv. 6—29.

attempt of a writer labouring under certain prejudices to amplify the narrative of Paul in Galatians.* On the contrary, we cannot help recognizing an artful and elaborate modification and enlargement of what Paul himself had told. In the account of the subsequent events at Antioch,† we cannot fail to perceive an equally deliberate distortion and suppression of what Paul had related‡ in his precious fragment of autobiography. Similar marks of settled purpose and political aim characterize the work from beginning to end. If it be admitted that the *ἡμεῖς* document has really been as freely doctored as Straatman supposes, or even modified at all, what a master-stroke it was to retain the first person in that awkward way, when so much else was being changed, thus stamping the new tradition of a Palestinian imprisonment, which the author was deeply interested in creating,§ with the apparent visible and indisputable authority of an actual companion of Paul!

The "Tendenz" of the Synoptics is under the control of law, and it is only our ignorance of the precise conditions and relations of parties at the time of their growth that prevents us from reasoning back from them, and, by a process of elimination and rectification, arriving, without error, at the actual Jesus of fact. But no such law controls the "Tendenz" of the apostolic history. It represents not so much the current of thought of a party and the tinge of their meditations on the past, as the personal views of an individual and the tinge of his policy for the future. Its representation is not the mean average result of a group of minds, in which, indeed, a main tendency of an erroneous nature may still be preserved, but

* Gal. ii. 1—10.

† Acts xv. 35—39.

‡ Gal. ii. 11—21.

§ There can be no question that the author is interested, for whatever reason, in impressing his readers with the conviction that Paul enjoyed high consideration with the Romans. See Acts xiii. 5—12, xvi. 37, xxii. 25, xxv. 11, xxvii. 3, xxviii. 7, &c. He is therefore naturally unwilling to relate that Paul was ignominiously seized in Rome by the Roman authorities, and put to death. Neither the courtesy of Lysias nor the consideration of Festus could count for much against such a fact as that. As, however, the fact of Roman imprisonment cannot be denied, it is a skilful expedient to throw back the arrest, and lay the responsibility of it on Jewish parties, the Romans only figuring as mitigating the vengeance of the Jews.

the exceptional aberrations of individuals are cancelled against each other; it is the result of the prejudices and the motives of a single mind, and therefore far more arbitrary and erratic in its departures from the line of ascertained history. Where it can be tested and checked by other documents, it is found to depart in innumerable instances from veracity; and the most elementary principles of caution, therefore, debar the careful inquirer from employing those portions of it which cannot be tested or checked for the purpose of constructing history.

In all that has been said, it will be obvious how radically we must dissent from the whole scheme of M. Rodrigues, who bases his account of Paul upon this book, and gives it the strong preference over the Apostle's own letters.* It is with

* We cannot part with M. Rodrigues without presenting the reader with a characteristic passage or two from his work, and at the same time justifying our application to it of the epithet, "Romance." "Towards the close of a hot evening in the year 41, a belated traveller entered Jerusalem by the ancient gate. The traveller, with his crooked legs, great aquiline nose, and face pale with fatigue beyond its wont, gesticulated as he walked as if he were reciting or composing some heroic strain. His grotesque appearance combined so strangely with his majestic air that the soldiers on guard at the gate burst out laughing as he passed. . . . But our traveller pushed on without obstruction till he reached the resort of the Ebionites, and there he inquired for brother Barnabas. The door-keeper answered that he was engaged at evening prayer—but that service was almost over—and that he and the whole congregation would pass by immediately. Then the traveller, pleading that he was tired with his journey, inquired for Barnabas' apartments, and at once betook himself thither. Presently Peter, accompanied by Barnabas, entered the house which they shared together. 'A decided success,' said Barnabas gently; 'every one was in tears while you were speaking, Master,'" &c. &c. (Rodrigues, *Saint Paul*, pp. 59—61.) Or again: "Par une belle matinée de l'an 46, Barnabé, arrivant à Tarse, aperçut de loin un ouvrier en train de terminer la voilerie d'une barque. 'Indiquez-moi la demeure de Saul,' dit Barnabé à cet ouvrier, en s'approchant de lui. 'Saul, c'est moi,' répondit l'ouvrier travaillant fiévreusement sans regarder qui lui parlait. 'Et moi je suis Barnabé.' 'Barnabé, tu viens me chercher pour aller à Jérusalem,' s'écria Saul, le regard enflammé. 'Non,' dit Barnabé, 'mais me suivre à Antioche.' 'Antioche!' dit Saul, avec surprise et regret. 'Oui, Antioche; écoute bien, l'année dernière, en 44, il se déclara une grande famine à Jérusalem,'" &c. &c. So well does Barnabas plead, that Saul soon cries with impatience, "'Partons, partons de suite!' 'Un instant,' dit Barnabé, 'd'abord la barque ne met à la voile que demain, et puis enfin, j'ai besoin de quelque repos.' 'Ah!' dit Saul, 'c'est bien fatigant le repos.'" (Ibid. pp. 81 ff.) Dr. Rovers, reviewing this preposterous work (*Theologisch Tijdschrift*, May, 1877),

a deeper regret that we find ourselves obliged to regard Prof. Reuss's recent contribution to the literature of the subject, which forms the second part of the New Testament division of the great Bible translation and commentary which he is now issuing, as almost a wasted effort. Prof. Reuss is throughout an apologist for the author of the Acts. "Without this book," says he, "we should be unable to form the vaguest idea of the manner in which the two most important facts of this first period came about, the evangelization of the pagan world, and the separation of the Church from the Synagogue."* Yet on those very points the book utterly deceives us, and has to be entirely corrected from Paul's Epistles. The retention of the first person in the *ἡμεῖς* document, it is suggested, may be explained by the author's certainty that Theophilus would not misunderstand it:† The author appears to Reuss to be "un narrateur généralement naïf et simple."‡ Reuss holds it to be "the one thing certain" that the author of Acts had not Paul's Epistles before him,§ and is therefore able to lay great stress on those statements in Acts which are confirmed by those documents.|| For those who hold it to be the one thing certain that the author *had* those letters before him, or at any rate Galatians, this point will have no importance. He adds, that if in some cases reconciliation must be given up as a bad job, yet in others it is very easy.¶ Where he cannot defend the credibility of a narrative, he declares that, after all, its moral purpose is the main thing, and that "the form of the narration" serves admirably to bring it out.** Nay, having expounded how the purpose of the story of Pentecost is to bring out the likeness of the Holy Spirit, in its action on the soul, to wind and fire, he condescends to tell those who still wish to weigh the historical value of the narrative, that it is because

says, "Looking at the works of Renan and Rodrigues, one is tempted to ask whether it is possible to a Frenchman to appreciate Paul" (p. 333), and adds of the latter, that "his stupidities are beyond all bounds" (p. 334).

* Reuss, *Histoire Apostolique*, p. 9.

† Op. cit. p. 22.

‡ Ibid. p. 26.

§ Ibid. p. 23.

|| Ibid. p. 33.

¶ Ibid. p. 33.

** So, of the gift of tongues, p. 44.

they themselves have never been touched by the Holy Spirit.*

We know well that a temper such as that of Reuss will receive the praise that it is cautious, while that tone of mind with which we have not concealed our own sympathy, that which Straatman exhibits in a striking degree, will be pronounced rash and headstrong. To us it has long appeared that he who is ready off-hand to assign a given document, descended to us from the darkness of a primitive age, to a given author, on the strength of a literary tradition the origin of which he cannot know, but which he does know to have been proved in the case of other documents to be perfectly worthless, is a far bolder and less cautious man than he who declines to ascribe the work to a given authorship without something more than tradition to go upon. We know, for example, that tradition has assigned several letters to Apostles which were not written by Apostles. He, then, who accepts at the outset the strong tradition that the so-called Epistles of Peter were written by Peter, the Epistle General of James by James, or the Epistles to Colossians or Philippians by Paul, is more "rash" than he who hesitates to do so. No doubt, a great deal may be said in support of any or all of these traditions. All we maintain is, that, until it has been said, it is more prudent to retain a posture of doubt, and be content to assign no definite authorship, than to give assent to the tradition. When a particular authorship is in question, the burden of proof rests with the maintainers of the affirmative. We believe the most cautious critic may find warrant for asserting that Paul wrote the four great Epistles which stand at the head of his alleged writings. We believe that it is a matter of some boldness—though possibly a wise boldness—to ascribe to him the letter to the Philippians. We believe it would be rash and headstrong to

* As those who only know Reuss at his best may not easily believe that he is capable of so vulgar a taunt, we transcribe his words: "Ces deux idées sont, dans notre texte, la chose essentielle; la forme est un élément très-secondaire, et le besoin d'en discuter la valeur ne se fait guère sentir que là où l'expérience intime n'a jamais familiarisé l'interprète avec le fait lui-même" (p. 45).

assign to him the letters to Timothy. We know that there are critics who do so: we have no quarrel with them; but for us, with our present lights, their conduct would be rash and headstrong.

In the same manner we regard it to be the prudent and cautious part to withhold credence from such narratives in the book of Acts as cannot be confirmed from other sources; the rash and headstrong course to accord credence to unsupported narratives in a book which, where it can be checked, is shewn to diverge very widely indeed from accuracy. We may still set a high value on the book for the insight it gives us into the state of party and of sentiment at the epoch of its composition; but that insight it only begins to give us when we begin to disbelieve it. For seventeen centuries the book has filled the mind of Christendom with the image of an unhistorical Paul. It is time that the historical Paul were allowed to speak for himself, and that his words were taken in their simple meaning, and not stretched a hair's-breadth in deference to the subsequent romance.

A true and full account of the life and work of Paul is what the world can never now, alas! possess. But it still remains for a biographer to go to the Pauline and immediately post-Pauline Epistles, and from them, and them alone, to construct the best biography he can, resisting the temptation to fill up the inevitable *lacunæ* even from those sections of the book of Acts which have not been shewn to comprise misstatements. Even if the accuracy of those sections can never be disproved, it never can be proved. The biography drawn up rigidly from the Epistles, and the Epistles only, will, we believe, diverge considerably in chronology and otherwise from even the most cautious that has been drawn up with the aid of the Acts of the Apostles. When it shall have been constructed firmly, we may legitimately turn to the book of Acts, to the Clementines, and to all other apocryphal literature that sprang up in the early Christian Church, and profit by any further light which they may be capable of throwing on that glorious figure which Comte has grouped with those of Cæsar and Charlemagne as

the world's supreme triumvirate ;*—that being who, to the Christian eye, incomparably transcends these and every other European hero, and stands in the sublime grouping of all history's men of might and holiness below One only,—that One whom he delighted to call "Master."

RICHARD ACLAND ARMSTRONG.

V.—THE GENESIS OF QUAKERISM.

The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth : considered principally with reference to the Influence of Church Organization on the Spread of Christianity. By Robert Barclay. 8vo. London : Hodder and Stoughton. 1876.

A BARCLAY writing upon Quakerism, and from a new point of view, has a native right to make his voice heard, and is certain of an audience whose curiosity is piqued by the occasion. In the present case there is the added interest always attaching to a posthumous publication ; one, too, never absolutely brought to completion, the last two chapters being necessarily put forth in an unrevised state, "the author having been removed by death after a short illness, when a few sentences only remained to be written."

The lamented author of this superbly printed volume, in one of his genial letters to the present writer, joyfully announcing the near completion of the work, rallied him on a former allusion to hereditary sources of the family characteristics,† and invited him to pronounce as his verdict upon his new book, "after your statement of the barrenness of our wits, that it is wonderfully clever for a Barclay, and that it must be all owing to a streak of the blood of Luci Gordon being thrown to the surface at

* Auguste Comte, *System of Positive Polity*, Vol. I., translated by J. H. Bridges, p. 81.

† No. XLVII. (Oct., 1874), p. 533.

last." Wonderful, from a cadet of the Urie line, this exhaustive treatise unquestionably is. The wonder, however, does not depend on its possessing, what every good Barclay inherits from the Dean of Sarum's daughter, that ardent tenacity of Protestant purpose which, at a critical moment in the history of the Urie family, rescued the future Apologist from Romanism. The peculiarity of the work before us rests in the remarkable fact that it exhibits a genius for discerning the historical strength of Quakerism as a form of Christian organization, quite as precious in its way as the genius for demonstrating the power of Friends' spirituality, in which the great Laird of Urie still stands unrivalled.

Here we may as well at once say that the general title of the book is a misnomer. It is the second half of the title which approaches to a description of the contents. With the "inner life" of Commonwealth variations upon the traditional Christianity of England, using the phrase in its commonly accepted meaning as designating their interior or spiritual life, a life essentially rooted in mysticism, our author has no very acute sympathy, and consequently no very deep acquaintance. The internal machinery of these strange sects he has studied with singular perseverance and unusual penetration; and the exhaustive process by which he has arrived at his results constitutes the value of his work. Rich as it is in rare *collectanea*, crammed as it is from end to end with curious lore from all sorts of forgotten sources, this ample volume nevertheless remains an unsatisfactory book for the purposes of a student of English religiousness during the golden period of the Commonwealth upheaval. It is, however, a magazine of unexampled utility, considered as embracing a vast amount of original material for the science of religious organization.

Two sorts of tendencies were strongly illustrated in the abnormal Religious Societies of England's Commonwealth. Strenuous revolt against the dogmatic system, in which the speculative Christianity of our country had been confined at the Reformation, ran hand in hand with a fierce dissatisfaction in regard to the ecclesiastical polity, which gave form to its

practical Christian life. Theologies, constructed *de novo* by a blending of literal Scripture with popular prophecy, were preached with vehemence in the highways, and accepted with enthusiasm by the multitude. The press was a more powerful agent even than preaching for flooding the restless and ill-educated mind of the middle and lower classes with strange and novel doctrine. A largely diffused and deeply planted distrust of traditional teaching and conventional opinions made any heresy, old or new, certain of a hearing, and assured of at any rate a fleeting run of temporary success. The shelves of libraries were ransacked for occult lore ; and from the Cabbala and Trismegistus to Paracelsus and Boehme, crude translations in uncouth English sped their way to the book-stall and the pedlar's pack, and found a ready market. Anything and everything which offered to plumb the mysteries of being and of futurity, was eagerly gathered up and widely studied. The impulse of amateur theologizing was in the air. It acted as a kind of electricity with which the atmosphere was charged.

This impulse, however, is quite a distinct thing from the sect-making impulse, which by no means necessarily acts in connection with it. On the one hand, the broachers of new opinions, and still more the pensive and self-enveloped children of religious contemplation, who seek to dive into depths, to rise into heights, beyond the reach of the received doctrines, are often little disposed, as well as little qualified, to embody their followers as a separate force in the outlying world of resolute action. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical organizers of mankind are not always the innovators and discoverers, or even the appreciators of innovation and discovery, in the region of religious experience and divine philosophy. There have been times in the history of Christendom when these opposite impulses have ceased to contradict each other, and have worked strongly together. Such a period was the Commonwealth of England ; and the peculiarity which it exhibits, in more than one instance, of a powerful combination between the innovating and the organizing faculty,—the innovating faculty in religious apprehension, the organizing faculty in

religious association,—constitutes the history of its Religious Societies a field of surpassing interest for the reverential student.

The Society of Friends of Truth exhibits in its formation each of the characteristic tendencies of its age, in a marked degree. As developed by its founders, it was at once a mysticism of the purest, and an ecclesiasticism of the most cohesive kind. It is strange how completely, in both its aspects, the real personality of Quakerism has been fated to suffer misapprehension. Thus, on its speculative side, it has been depicted and extolled in terms which shew that its would-be admirers have regarded it purely as an unctuous type of freethinking; have taken the Inner Light to be no more than every man's own religious genius; and have missed the central truth and governing idea of Fox and Barclay, the spiritual presence and inward speech of Christ. In a previous article* we have endeavoured to delineate more exactly the "marrow," as we have called it, of Quaker divinity. Hicksism, the pantheistic graft upon the Quaker stock, is quite as foreign to its native purity, as is the insipid Gurneyism which has dried up the spirit of modern English Friends. It is true that the one may be regarded as a spurt of new life, while the other is obviously a sheer sign of decay. A development, even a partial and unhealthy one, is always to be ranked on a higher level of promise than a retrogression, or than the corruption of a stagnant state. But neither in its literalistic decay, nor in its rationalistic development, can the essential religious life of Friends be studied to any purpose. It is customary to apply the term rationalistic to the Hicksite pantheism, but in strictness, we may add, the anxiously "orthodox" Gurneyism must itself be considered a rationalizing successor to Friends' early faith. The original Friends believed in the inspiration of the apostles as something supernatural, and in the inspiration of their own founders as identical with it in kind and comparable in

* No. L. (July, 1875), p. 398.

degree. Of these two propositions, both of which are essential to the faith of a true Friend, Hicksism dissolves away the first, Gurneyism gets rid of the second. There are still a few left, a very few, in whom dwells Quakerism undefiled. But our author is not among these.

An image of Quakerism has taken hold of the popular mind, which is fully as inadequate on the side of practical capacity and structural arrangement, as on that of religious doctrine. The drab coat, the broad brim, the stiff phrase, the quaint style,—these trifling though very noticeable accessories, which for nearly two centuries gave singularity to a Quaker's outward man and social manner, have been currently mistaken for that which they have often hidden and rarely helped, the organic bond of religious fellowship among Friends. The methodical ways of Friends, their early exactness in registration, the unexampled neatness and precision of their records, have long won the praise of those who had occasion to consult their archives. Here, however, the vision of Quaker order indulged in by the outside world has commonly ended. The last notion likely to enter the head of a practical Christian in these days would be to seek in Quakerism a standard of ecclesiastical administration, and especially a model of church institutions for purposes of active evangelization. The absence of a paid ministry and the disuse of visible sacraments have created a very prevalent impression that the Quaker organization is in its very nature imperfect, and ineffective for a vigorous Christian propagandism.

The misconception inherent in this view, the book which lies before us is excellently fitted to dispel. Its author, an evangelical Christian of the Arminian type, who "found himself a member" of the Society of Friends "positively without thought or choice, and simply by the accident of birth,"* invites our attention to the origin and development of the religious body to which he belongs; claiming for it "a special interest, because

* P. xxviii.

it is unquestionably the history of a great *experiment* in church organization," or rather "one of the *links* in the chain of *experiments in church organization* which were made at the period of its rise." He asks us to see with him how Quakerism arose, why it flourished, wherefore its decline. He compels us to go with him through the process of investigation, which he thinks will settle us in the conclusion that these questions cannot be altogether decided from the spiritual point of view. Much as may be said about the purity or the dimness of Friends' Light, in accounting for the early triumphs of their body, and for the subsequent neglect which has fallen upon it, there is certainly another side to the picture. The direct influence of the mechanism provided by Friends for the spiritual ends of their association; the effectiveness of their system as an agency for the spread of the kingdom of Christ; the power and nature of its internal structure, viewed as a religious corporation,—must henceforth be taken into account in weighing the conditions of the success and failure of the movement. In the problem of Quakerism, the "Truth" is one and the prime factor; but it will not do to forget that the "Society" is another.

"The Society of Friends exhibited, in the early stages of its existence, an amount of energy and vitality which form an extraordinary contrast with its subsequent history. In the year 1700, it was a strongly organized and increasing church. It was probably as numerous, compared with the population, as the Wesleyan Society fifty years after the Wesleys had commenced preaching. . . . In tracing the causes which led to this decline, the writer will endeavour to shew that the principles which led to the sudden rise and increase of this Society are those which have governed, and must govern, every vigorous and increasing church; and that the principles of church government which led to its rapid and almost unexampled decline in numbers, are such as offer a lesson of warning to other Christian Churches."*

There is something pathetic in the author's account of the circumstances and motives which turned his studies in this direction. The spectacle of London heathenism, in its vastness

* Pp. xxviii, xlix.

of extent and its solemnity of detail, strongly affected his religious imagination and his religious heart. With startling and oppressive force of illustration, he brings before us the fact, that in that grandest city of the earth, "if all the churches, chapels and buildings devoted to public worship, were filled to their last seat, there would be still left outside the buildings as many people as the whole population—men, women and children—in the cities of Leeds, Bristol, Sheffield and Birmingham." No wonder that a soul that could realize the true meaning of this state of things, and was actively engaging itself in the absorbing and unending work of Christian Missions to the neglected districts of the metropolis, should ponder well the difficult problem presented by the "utter inadequacy" of all existing methods of religious recovery. "As the writer walked at night through the narrow streets teeming with a labouring population, the question, *how* this great city is to be evangelized, seemed to him worthy of something more than a moment's thoughtfulness or a passing sigh."

The general verdict upon existing methods to which his experience originally pointed, and which the whole result of his observation and study appears to confirm, is a very remarkable one. Few would expect it from a Quaker. Coming as it does from a practical man, who had gone seriously into the *rationale* of religious success, it deserves, we think, in an especial degree, the deep attention of Christian workers in all our large towns. Our own experience, so far as it has gone, compels us to endorse its truth. It is this: "that Home Missions not in connection with any Church, and without any system of membership, had few of those elements of success, vitality and stability, which the direct efforts of Christian Churches to extend their borders and church system seemed to him to possess."* Our author shall explain his position a little more fully:

"The means at present in existence for the evangelization of London consist, first, of certain Societies employing paid agency,

* P. xxiii.

which are not *churches*, but which are intended to supplement the deficiencies of all churches; secondly, the Missions of individual Christians, who are often left to cope with difficulties which can only be overcome by united action; thirdly, the Home Mission agency of particular churches, the object of which is to remove the obstacles which exist to the direct action of these churches; and lastly, the work of Christian Churches in forming offshoots from the original body. This last method is seldom employed, except for the purpose of obtaining religious ordinances for those portions of the middle classes and the labouring population who already appreciate and are willing to bear the pecuniary burden requisite to obtain them. It is comparatively seldom that the degraded and depraved, or even the sceptical well-to-do artizan classes, are sought for as church members.”*

Our author well remarks that “there is about this isolated action a want of permanence.” His observation has taught him that “the zeal which commenced the work is not communicated to others; it is like a plant which does not succeed in propagating its species.” He altogether denies, however, that “the only thing which is lacking is this zeal and earnestness.” He believes that “in every religious denomination, and probably in every congregation, there are a considerable number of Christian men and women who are fully capable of the sacrifice;” but he has made the discovery that “enthusiasm and self-sacrifice soon die out” when, in addition to an adequate object, “the right means of accomplishing that object” fails to present itself; and he registers his conviction that “such is the nature of our religious organizations, that they are found, *when fairly tested, unable to afford a place for every one who is willing to work in the service of Christ.*”†

A further step in our author’s investigation was suggested by the important fact that, apart from dogmatic considerations, he “thought he saw a great difference between the various Churches in respect of their evangelizing power.” This led him to “an examination of the question as to what tends to help and what tends to hinder the exercise of the converting

* P. xxv.

† P. xxvii. All italics are the author’s own.

and assimilating power which is inherent in the Christian religion." Naturally he turned now, with a new motive of research, to the religious history of the denomination in which he had a birthright ; in which his ancestors, during the critical period of its formation, had borne an illustrious place ; and by which a revival and extension of religion, one of the most remarkable that our nation has seen, was sustained with steady and increasing force for more than half a century.

On the study of the Quaker movement at its fountain-head, our author entered without any prepossessions in favour of its supernatural origin, or its abstract perfection, which could blind him to the traces of its evolution as a system from previous and contemporary conditions of thought and action. Fox was to him a religious man who "had appropriated, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, an idea originally received through ordinary sources."* The founder of Friends' doctrine and polity was, our author holds, both a greater reader and a man better acquainted with the principles and the movements of like-minded predecessors than has usually been supposed. Indeed, we think that our author, from a want of sympathy with the mystical temperament, fails to render any just account either of Fox's personal power or of his spiritual pre-eminence. But this very coldness is of essential service to him, by enabling him to pursue a very necessary and delicate inquiry, unhindered by any of the blinding enthusiasm of a vehement disciple. The roots of Quakerism in the early Baptist societies of this country had already been partially laid bare by previous writers ; but until the appearance of the careful work before us, nothing systematic had been done to exhibit the antecedents of Fox's movement in their full extent and significance. The exhibition lends a peculiar value to our author's serious expression of conviction that "an intelligent adaptation of the ideas of George Fox to the religious needs of after times might have more fully realized his idea of a *Working Church*, and might have been more richly blessed in supplying the religious needs

* P. 213.

of our labouring population.”* This conclusion is reached by the scientific process of disengaging from the religious history of the post-Reformation period a most admirable account of “the rise and progress of religious thought, as it was exercised upon the question of the structure, organization, method and action, of a free and perfectly voluntary Christian Society.”†

We propose very briefly to review this account; first presenting an outline of its historical process, and then rapidly summarizing its resultant principles.

The pre-existent stage in the history of Quakerism opens at Zürich in the year 1523, with the separation of a handful of members from the ministry of Zwingli, to form a missionary church on Baptist principles, that is to say, on the principle of membership based on personal conversion, of which adult baptism (not, however, by immersion) was the visible seal. From Zürich we must follow this little flock in their migration to Strasburg, where in 1530 we find the gifted, the heretical, the enthusiastic Melchior Hoffmann assuming a leading part. Hoffmann had transferred himself to Strasburg from Emden, where he had left behind a disciple, Ubbo (Obbe) Phillips, having fired him with his own missionary zeal. Himself the son of a Catholic priest, Phillips received into the Baptist community, on the 11th January, 1536, the ex-priest of Pinningen, Menno Simons. And thus Mennonism drew its inspiration both of religious teaching and religious work from the Baptist separatists of Switzerland. But what has Mennonism to do with the Quaker movement? Simply this; that, as our author proves, after reviewing the Mennonite teaching and polity with great elaboration of detail, “so closely do these views correspond with those of George Fox, that we are compelled to view him as the unconscious exponent of the doctrine, practice and discipline, of the ancient and stricter party of the Dutch Mennonites, at a period when, under the pressure of the times, some deviation took place among the General Baptists from their original principles.”

* P. xxx.

† P. 675.

Mennonism gave birth to more than one offshoot of remarkable vigour and individuality. In 1619, the Collegianten, a kind of anticipation of the Plymouth Brethren, who did not die out till 1810, split off from the Mennonites at Rynsburg. In 1624 arose the controversy among the Waterlander Mennonites at Amsterdam, in which Hans de Rys reinforced the doctrinal positions of Menno, in relation to the Inward Light, by help of the writings of the holy Silesian knight, Caspar von Schwenkfeld (1490—1561). Schwenkfeld, whose direct followers still linger in Pennsylvania, held sacramental views totally at variance with those of the Mennonites; and these views became well known in the course of the controversy. At the time when the matter was agitated, there were in England five churches of Arminian Baptists (in London, Lincoln, Sarum, Coventry and Tiverton) living in full and close fellowship with the church of Hans de Rys at Amsterdam. Fox, during the four years between his coming to London in 1644 and the beginning of his Society, was in immediate intercourse with the Arminian Baptists, to whom he was introduced through his uncle Pickering, a member of their body. His connection with them at this juncture will certainly help to explain how it was that outward Baptism and the Lord's Supper, rejected by Schwenkfeld, were disused also by Fox, who in other respects received the full influence of the Mennonite views.

Mennonism was a missionary Church, constructed and organized for that purpose; and it is instructive to notice that, as Fox's plans of Christian organization matured in his hands, they shaped themselves into Mennonite forms. That a leader of Fox's practical capacity should have paid this tribute to structural arrangements originated by the Baptists of Zürich is proof that the machinery worked well. As an organization, Quakerism may be said to have had for its first centre the historic mansion of Swarthmoor Hall. Here, from 1652, Margaret Fell, whom our author styles "the Lady Huntingdon of the new society," acted as the secretary, and in no little degree as the stimulus of Fox's plans. Children of Light was the

name by which Friends then called themselves, adopting a designation in use of old by German Baptists, and probably well known to Margaret Fell, the descendant of Anne Askew, who had embraced martyrdom as a devotee to the views of Hoffmann. From Swarthmoor Hall the Children of Light went out in pairs, Bible in hand, to preach to the people. In 1653, there were thirty such preachers; by the following year the number had doubled. Camp meetings were held, churches were invaded; the hysterical seizures attendant upon emotional excitement were produced; there was every phenomenon of a religious revival. The striking parallel between this early missionary aspect of Quakerism under Fox, and the subsequent career of Methodism under Wesley, can escape no intelligent eye. In 1656, Fox began to reduce to method and consistency the somewhat irregular agency which he had called into being. By 1668 (at which time Penn joined the Society), the whole outline of its constitution was complete. It followed the ecclesiastical pattern of the Mennonite Churches in every important particular. Its charter is the so-called "Canons and Institutions" promulgated by George Fox in 1669.

"The only object of the organization which Fox established was, in his mind, the propagation of the Gospel, and the orderly internal arrangement of the churches. The system worked well as long as it had for its sole object the promotion of the Gospel, and while the members were strictly limited to those who gave evidence of conversion, and while their officers were those exclusively who gave their earnest personal labour to that great end."*

In pursuance of this object, Fox devoted the machinery at his command to "provide for the utmost possible extension of lay-preaching." He was frequently "applied to, to supply preachers for congregations who wanted them;" and there exists a most remarkable testimony to the public sense of the value of his missionary work, in a circular published in 1681 by lay members of the Church of England. "We find," say the authors of this document, "that divers and several of those

* P. 404. The machinery of Quakerism will repay a minutely careful study.

people called Quakers are also very good Christians, and preach true doctrine according to Holy Scripture; and we therefore declare that it is our opinion that such a voluntary ministry, to preach on free cost as aforesaid, is of excellent use and exceeding necessary to be allowed of in the Church of England. . . . In great parishes there is need to be at least two congregations; the parish church for the orthodox minister and the rich, and a tabernacle for the lay prophets and the poor.”*

The first sign of an element of declension was due to the absorption of the party of Seekers, who liked the mysticism but did not share the Christian activity of Friends, nor loved the church structure which was its manifestation and its channel. This influence, conjoined with the persecutions of the Restoration, increased the tendency to silent meetings, a very unusual exception in the early practice of Friends. Intervals of sacred silence were a borrowed feature of Mennonite ritual conspicuous in Friends' gatherings from the first; but meetings wholly silent would have seemed to them evidences rather of dryness than of spirituality. However, the system maintained its general efficiency, and preserved its chief features intact, from 1668 till about 1720, when Quietism took deeper hold, and the work of earnest propaganda was abandoned; when the minutiae of external conduct became the subjects of rigorous and ludicrously oppressive legislation; when education was neglected; and when the poor-law of the community at once destroyed the self-respect of the humbler members, thus alienating and driving them off, and introduced the vicious system of birthright membership, by allowing the claim of members' children to be ranked as members. This beneficiary claim had no doubt something to do with the persistent expulsion of all members who married out of the connection.

All these causes of decline are described by our author with copious details of great historical interest. None was more destructive, both in itself and in its effects, than the admission of birthright membership in 1737. This led to the institution

* P. 531.

of lay elders, to supervise the work of the preachers ; filled the offices of the Church with men whose gifts turned more toward secular legislation than towards gospel labour ; and produced an alarming decrease in the ministry.

“As a contrast to the activity of the time of Fox, in 1820 in Ireland there were only two men and twelve or fourteen women Ministers, and for some years previously there was only one man ‘acknowledged’ as a Minister. In the church in Dublin, numbering during a very long period about 800 members, they had not had a single male person *acknowledged as a regular Minister for a period of nearly a century*. In Scotland, so small was the idea of the general public joining with them in their worship, that in 1759 it was the practice of Edinburgh meeting to keep ‘the doors of the meeting-house *barred or locked* in the time of worship.’”*

Meanwhile, what were the Friends doing? Having lost their zeal for the souls of the outside population, they began to devote themselves, in the latter half of the last century, to the better education of the young people still left to them, and to measures of general philanthropy. They thus secured, and doubtless deserved, the high respect of their contemporaries ; but all the while their numbers kept hopelessly declining. The mantle of Fox lay disused on the ground—unless we hold, with our author, that it was in fact transferred to the shoulders of Wesley.

Our author has a very forcible lesson to deduce from his story, and the details of proof which he accumulates upon his reader carry a strong conviction of its substantial truth. First, then, every Church that is to flourish must be a missionary institution. A Church exists, not for itself, but for the world. Its mission is to convert and gather in souls. Its propagandism is its salvation. A healthy life, and holy state of the private soul, is only to be secured by activity in the spiritual work of reclaiming the sinful and the lost. The query, wont to be addressed by the Yearly Meeting to its subordinate churches, was, “How doth Truth prosper?” Its modern substitute runs,

* P. 548. “Ministers” are *travelling preachers*.

"How do Friends prosper in the Truth?"* Self-inspection has taken the place of the love of souls.

Further, every missionary church must be able to rely upon its members as disciples from personal conviction; and must give them full liberty, and find them fair opportunity, to carry out their conviction in personal work. "Without exercise and utterance, the fire of religious emotion goes out."† Hence the judicious multiplication of small churches, demanding not pecuniary outlay, but personal exertion on the part of lay-workers, is the ideal mode of evangelization on a large scale. "We believe," says our author, "that the world will be ultimately Christianized by every Church quietly doing its duty by adding to its members from the ranks of the irreligious population which surrounds it, and in so doing raising the tone and standard of Christian feeling and action among its members."‡ In this connection he furnishes census tables and ample statistics which will repay some study on the part of all who are interested in the question of "the relative position, and power of increase, shewn by various ancient and modern Religious Societies in the propagation of the Gospel."

Lastly, our author has risen above the dread of those feared and fancied evils which some have supposed inseparable from the co-existence of a multiplicity of sects. He perceives that "difference of constitution, and organization of various religious Church Societies, is no proof of schism or sectarianism." He understands the full significance of the fact that different bodies of men may best work on their own distinct lines for a common good. In a memorable passage, he thus blends the force of the elementary principles deducible from the historical teaching of his lengthened survey:

"All that the existing Churches require to bind them more closely together is greater earnestness in the two great objects of the Church of Christ, viz., the evangelization of the world, and the development of a nearer approximation to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ in their individual members. They must both go

* P. 515.

† Quoted from Rev. J. Clifford, p. 671.

‡ P. 630.

together, for the first aids in the development of the second, and this re-acts on the first. Active effort in the evangelization of the world is to the Church what exercise is to the human body; the members cannot enjoy health without it; they will disagree, and not work harmoniously. If the health of the individual members is maintained by exercise, if all are aiming at the same great object in sympathy and in unison, an intelligent subordination and harmony will enable the body to perform miracles of strength and endurance, and thus carry out far more fully the object of Christ, its Holy Head."*

We close this volume with the conviction that, fully allowing for all its drawbacks, it is the most important contribution to the religious history of our country which this generation has seen. This will hardly appear on the face of our review, inasmuch as we have confined ourselves to the simple task of disengaging only its main argument. Among other remarkable features of the work will be found at once the most candid and the most impressive account of the religious failure of the Puritan movement with which we are acquainted. It is rare to encounter at the command of a single author so much research and so much thought. Tayler's *Retrospect* has thought, but no depth of research to inspire it. Hunt's *Religious Thought in England* has the dry bones of genuine research, but no grasp of the materials which lie ticketed and unutilized upon his pages. Mr. Barclay manifests in a high degree the priceless combination of zeal to gather facts and power to use them. His premature death is a real loss to the philosophical study of English Religion.

ALX. GORDON.

* P. 9.

TWO ENGLISH FORERUNNERS OF THE TÜBINGEN
SCHOOL:

THOMAS MORGAN AND JOHN TOLAND.

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It has been not unjustly said that Ferdinand Christian Baur has been for the criticism of the New Testament what Niebuhr and Wolf were for classical literature. Baur's labours not merely begin the most recent epoch in the historical study of the doctrine, the constitution and the literature of the early Christian Church ; they also define the standpoint from which such investigations must thenceforward start, and give a specific method to all subsequent works of note on these subjects. Students of the first Christian centuries must declare for the founder of the new Tübingen school, or against him.

No one who knows anything of the literature of the subject will cast a doubt on the uniqueness of Baur's labours in this region, whether regard be had to the many-sided learning he brought to the subject, to the scholarly perseverance with which he advanced point by point to his ultimate position, or to the startling ingenuity with which, supported by his disciples, he applied his hypothesis of the primitive Church to the explanation of the whole mass of early Christian literature. But it is historically unfair to speak of Baur as if he were wholly without predecessor in looking on the early Catholic Church as a fusion of opposite elements, as the—not altogether happy—result of a long-continued struggle between two great Christian parties consciously differing on fundamental truths, and maintaining alongside one another a degree of more or less hostile independence. "Treading in the footsteps of Marcion and of Semler, to whose earlier labours Baur did not pay sufficient heed," says Hilgenfeld, in his Introduction to the New Testament (*Einleitung*, p. 193), "Baur pointed out the profound opposition between the Jewish Christianity of the original apostles and Pauline Gentile Christianity." But those who recognize Semler's partial anticipation of Baur's

results, seem universally to regard the "father of rationalistic criticism" as the foremost modern pioneer in the work of laying down a boundary between the two great parties of apostolic times. So Professor Dorner, in his *History of Protestant Theology*, p. 706 : "Thus he [Semler] was the first to lay stress on the importance of the contrast between Paulinism and the Judaizing party in ancient Christendom." So Professor Fr. Nitzsch, in the *Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie*, Vol. I. p. 256 : "Semler recognized for the first time with any degree of clearness the distinction and the relation between Judaism or Petrinism and Paulinism within the pale of the primitive Church."

Yet Semler was not without precursors in this path, who were extensively read and plentifully refuted both in England and Germany. And while in applying his historical results to explain the origin of the New Testament canon, Semler was much in advance, it seems clear that, in several important points, the earlier authors anticipated in a more striking way than he the characteristic Tübingen view of the state of parties in the apostolic Church. That view Professor Zeller has thus summed up in his sketch of Baur contributed to the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, now in course of publication : "From the most careful examination of the New Testament and patristic literature, Baur came to the following result. Already in the apostolic Church and amongst its leaders there did not reign that unanimity of view which is commonly taken for granted. The most ancient Christianity, that of the congregation in Jerusalem and its apostles, stood at first very near Judaism. Paul was the first to free Christianity from this narrowness ; but the great majority of the Jewish Christians and the original apostles themselves were unable to adopt his universalism, and opposed it, now with greater, now with less decidedness, at times even with passionate hostility. In the controversy the Judaistic or Ebionite party long maintained the supremacy ; and it was not till long after Paul's death, and mainly under the influence of the movement called forth by Gnosticism, about the middle and after the middle of the second century, that, after many ineffectual attempts to strike

a middle course, the contending parties were united into the universal or catholic Church, by the help of the dogmatic system of the fourth Gospel and the episcopal constitution of the Church. The various stages of the process are, as Baur believes, marked by documents which are extant, not merely in extra-canonical literature, but also in the New Testament."

We have not here to deal with the most interesting and brilliant part of Baur's work, the course of argument by which he sought to refer the various Christian writings of the first centuries to Paul, to the apostle John, or to nameless representatives of the many mediating shades of opinion that arose during the struggle between Paulinism and Judaism; our subject confines us to the conception of the early Church on which that course of argument was based. But it cannot be uninteresting or wholly unprofitable to trace a clear anticipation of this conception, often regarded as essentially modern and characteristically German, in the England of the eighteenth century; even though, as our title shews, we have to look for it amid the deep oblivion to which, bating a few general, vague and frequently very incorrect notions, the nineteenth century has seen meet to consign the multifarious labours of the English Deists.

I.

One of these forgotten labourers in the vineyard of the Tübingen theology was Thomas Morgan, a Nonconformist minister who lost his charge in 1726 on account of his Arian views, and subsequently practised as a physician in Bristol. At his death in 1743, he had for some years been earning by his pen a precarious subsistence in London. The following extracts indicate one of the many lines of thought unfolded in his "*Moral Philosopher: in a Dialogue between Philalethes, a Christian Deist, and Theophanes, a Christian Jew,*" published anonymously between 1737 and 1740.

"The religion of Jesus consists in the inward, spiritual worship of one true God, by a strict regard to all the duties and obligations of moral truth and righteousness, in opposition to all the animal affections and mere bodily appetites, and to the

bent and bias of a corrupt, degenerate world ; . . . and all this under the powers and influences of a future, invisible world, or the firm belief and expectation of immortality and eternal life, as a free gift and reward from God for such moral righteousness or gospel obedience. And because Jesus Christ came into the world and was sent to restore and republish this religion, . . . therefore he is the great prophet of our profession." ("The Moral Philosopher," Vol. I. p. 393.) Peculiar to the Christian dispensation as originally understood, however, "was salvation and eternal life only in and by Jesus, as Christ, the Messiah, Saviour, and deliverer of the Jews, or the restorer of the kingdom to Israel and to the house of David: besides whom, as the Jewish Messiah, there was no other name given under heaven by which men could be saved" (p. 349). But it cannot be shewn that Christ ever made the least claim to be "in any peculiar sense the Saviour of the *Jews*" (p. 329). Nevertheless, "in the days of Christ and the apostles, the Jews who adhered to Jesus as the Messiah, after his resurrection believed that he would . . . restore the nation and set up his kingdom at Jerusalem. And this was properly the Jewish gospel, which Christ's own disciples firmly adhered to and preached" (p. 328). Jesus had in some measure to abstain from contradicting national prejudices ; "no Christian Jew ever believed in Jesus as the common Saviour of the world. . . . Christ had in his lifetime many things to say which that generation could not bear, and which must have eluded the whole design of his divine mission had he declared it then. And the principal thing here was, no doubt, his coming into the world as the common Saviour of mankind, without any distinction of Jew and Gentile. And therefore when he began his own proper ministry, . . . and sent out his twelve apostles and the seventy, it was with an express order not to go amongst the Gentiles or the Proselytes of the Gate, nor to enter into any of the cities of the Samaritans, but to preach . . . among the circumcised Jews, and to declare that he was sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And this express exclusion both of the Gentiles and the Samaritans is an evident proof that

Christ himself, while he abode on earth, did not think it proper or expedient to open his commission further; and that the prejudices even of his own apostles and disciples, and of the whole circumcision, in this case were invincible. And this national prejudice they continued in for a long time after the resurrection and ascension of Christ. They had preached him as their national Messiah . . . at least five years to the circumcised Jews only. . . . And though Peter afterwards . . . opened the gates of the kingdom to the devout Gentiles or proselytes, yet neither he nor any of the rest of these circumcised Christians could ever be prevailed upon to let in the heathen Gentiles without proselytism or Jewish naturalization" (pp. 375, 376). It is plain "that as many of the Jews in the apostolic age as embraced Christianity continued as firm Jews, in obedience to the whole law, afterwards as they had been before. These *Judaizers* or Christian Jews received nothing new on their becoming Christians but the single article that Jesus was the Messiah in the sense of the prophets, i.e. in their own national sense" (p. 329). "Nay, his own disciples had all along adhered to him in this vain hope, and even after his resurrection they never preached Jesus as the Messiah in any other sense. No Christian Jew ever believed in Jesus as the common Saviour of the world, without distinction between Jew and Gentile. This was St. Paul's gospel, which he had received, as he declared, by immediate revelation from Christ himself; and had never advised or consulted with any of the Jewish apostles about it, as well knowing that they would never come into it" (p. 353). "And therefore when St. Paul" (who preached the gospel in its power and purity, Vol. III. p. 194) "came to preach Christ as the common Saviour of the world, there was not one Jew that would ever give in to his scheme" (I. p. 361).

"The gospel having been preached for about seven years together to the Jews only, Peter was now informed by the vision of the sheet let down from heaven, that God designed to take in the Proselytes of the Gate also, as persons sufficiently qualified for the kingdom of heaven, without any further compliance with the law of Moses." Peter accordingly received

Cornelius and his company. But the church at Jerusalem, who were all converts of the circumcision, unanimously condemned Peter. To justify himself, Peter gave an account of the whole matter, and told them that he could not deny the new converts baptism and brotherly fellowship, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost had fallen on them, as it had done on themselves and the converts of the circumcision at the beginning. This being confirmed by the witnesses, the brethren at Jerusalem came to the same view, "and resolved for the future to preach the gospel to the Proselytes of the Gate, and to receive them as brethren. And accordingly from this time for eight years forward, or to the year 45, the gospel was preached over all Palestine, Phenicia and Syria, both to the Syriac and Hellenist Jews and proselytes, and no dispute arose in the churches about brotherly love, fellowship or communion. But this year, Paul having been owned and recognized by the church of Antioch in Syria, he entered upon the execution of that office, which he had never done before, but acted only as a prophet or teacher. But now he set out with Barnabas, and travelled through the lesser Asia, where he preached the faith of Christ at Antioch in Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra and many other places, not only to the Jews and proselytes, but to the idolatrous Gentiles also ; among whom having made great numbers of converts and settled many churches, he returns to Antioch in Syria, where he now went on with the same work, preaching the gospel of Christ and salvation by him alone to the heathen. This was about the beginning of the year 48. . . . But this occasioned very great troubles and commotions in the Church, and was like to have produced a schism never to be healed. For though the Jewish Christians, upon the revelation formerly made to Peter, had received the Proselytes of the Gate into their communion, who had purged themselves from idolatry according to the law of Moses, before ; yet they did not think that they could thus receive the whole Gentile world without any legal qualification at all. Nay, the most zealous of them, upon this quarrel, raised their demands higher than ever, and insisted on it that the heathen idolaters could not be received into the

Church upon the same terms with the Proselytes of the Gate; but that they must first be made Proselytes of Righteousness, that is, be circumcised and submit to the whole law, before they could receive them into the Christian communion and own them as brethren. Now this was a question of the last importance, as it related to the essential constitution of the Church, and the terms upon which the several converts to Christianity were to hold communion with one another; and therefore it was thought necessary, before the matter was grown desperate, to appeal to Jerusalem, and lay the matter before the apostles, brethren and elders there, which was accordingly done in the year 49. Upon this occasion, Paul and Barnabas, with certain others, were sent up from Antioch to Jerusalem, where the apostles, elders and brethren, being convened in full Council, after great heats and debates upon the question, came at length to this unanimous vote, that no other or greater burthen should be laid upon those who from among the Gentiles had been turned to God than these few *necessary things*, namely, that they should abstain from fornication, from things offered to idols, from things strangled and from blood. And accordingly circular letters were writ by order of the Council, and sent to all the churches abroad where there had been any converts made from the idolatrous Gentiles, and who were now obliged upon these terms to hold communion with the converted Jews. The Gentile converts were to submit to the law of proselytism, as the Proselytes of the Gate had done for ten years before; and the Christian Jews were to receive and communicate with them as fellow-christians upon the legal condition alone, without laying on them any further obligations to the law. Upon receiving these letters, containing the decree or resolution of the Council, the church of Antioch and all the other foreign churches where Jews and Gentiles had been mixed were perfectly satisfied; they glorified God for so happy a pacification, and gladly joined in brotherly communion with each other. But then it is here manifest that the Jerusalem Council enjoined this law of proselytism upon the Gentile converts as *necessary*, or as a matter of religion and conscience, without which the

Christian Jews could not be justified in communicating with them or receiving them as brethren. But this soon occasioned fresh troubles and disturbances in the Church; for St. Paul could never submit to the imposition of this law of proselytism upon his Gentile converts, at least not in the sense of the Council, *as necessary*, as a matter of *religion*, or as the law of God, upon the authority of Moses; though yet he allowed them to comply with it occasionally, as a matter of liberty and for the sake of peace, to satisfy these Christian Jews and to prevent an open rupture with them while they were mixed together in the same church-societies and obliged to mutual communion. And here we see how it came about that things in their own nature indifferent were, in the opinion and decree of the Council, connected and joined with things morally necessary, as of equal force and obligation, in point of religion and conscience, with the eternal, immutable law of nature" (pp. 72—77).

This same Jerusalem Council Morgan again discusses at p. 361. Paul "had been preaching Christ as a common Saviour to the Gentiles, without any regard to the law, for now above fourteen years"—for seventeen, Morgan thinks—when the difficulties arose which led to the deputation to Jerusalem. Paul "went up some time before the sitting of the Council, and communed privately with James, Peter and John;" and no doubt "pressed as earnestly as possible for an exemption for the heathen converts from the laws of proselytism. . . . These leading men among the Christian Jews then seemed satisfied with St. Paul's account of the matter, and gave him the right hand of fellowship as the Apostle of the Gentiles. . . . But when it came to the trial, they could not carry the matter so far in the Council; for, after much disputing and the warmest debates, it was resolved upon that these legal qualifications should bind all the Gentiles without exception" (though it was the "more moderate part" in the Council that prevailed, Vol. II. p. 242; the other parties being on the one hand the Jewish zealots, and Paul on the other).

"St. Paul, not having been able to carry his point in the

Council, was forced afterwards to go on in his own way, and to declare against their authority. Upon the rising of the Council, Peter went down with Paul to Antioch, and there lived for some time, eating and drinking with the Gentile converts in the new hospitable way. . . . But it was not long before certain brethren, Judaizing zealots, went down from James to break off this alliance between Peter and Paul, and to demand submission to the Council. This frightened Peter out of his new alliance, and from henceforth he separated from the Gentile converts, and would never eat or drink or maintain family intercourse with them more. St. Paul could not but be highly provoked at this fickleness and irresolution of Peter, and hereupon he withstood him to the face, i.e. they had a warm debate before the whole church. But Peter, not being able to bear St. Paul's reproofs nor answer his arguments, separated from him, and drew off Barnabas, who was carried away with the "dissimulation of those of the circumcision." St. Paul in the two first chapters of his Epistle to the Galatians mentions Peter five or six times, to let them see that he was the principal person aimed at as the head and ringleader of the Judaizers, who would still keep up the separation between Jews and Gentiles in the Christian churches or kingdom of Christ" (I. pp. 362—364).

The relation of the Jewish converts to the Mosaic law, and Paul's personal practice as regards conforming thereto, is discussed on p. 56 and following pages. After a summary statement of the decree of the Council relieving the Gentile converts, afterwards more fully considered, as above quoted, at p. 72, Morgan proceeds: "But this did not put an end to St. Paul's troubles and persecutions in propagating the gospel; and indeed that great apostle of our religion seems not to have been entirely satisfied with the decree of the Jerusalem Council mentioned just now, though he himself had been personally present at it. For at his next return to Jerusalem, not many years after, when he had been preaching up and down the several cities of the Lesser Asia, he had a weightier accusation brought against him than what he had been charged with

before, and from which the apostles, elders and brethren, then at Jerusalem, could not so well acquit him upon the decree of their former Council." Paul and Barnabas, with Silas and Judas, or John Mark, had in the course of their mission been well received, "and both the Jewish and Gentile converts seemed to have been perfectly well satisfied with that decree and resolved to abide by it. But, as I observed, St. Paul did not seem to have been perfectly well satisfied with that decree, or did not think they had gone far enough. He saw plainly that this joining of two contrary and inconsistent religions would never do, and could serve only to continue and propagate the old superstition and slavery. It was clearly his opinion that all the converts to Christianity without the boundaries of Judea, whether Jews or Gentiles, ought to be exempted from any obligation to the Jewish ceremonial law. And therefore in his preaching up and down in several towns and cities of the Asiatic and European Greece, he ventured to advance a new doctrine of his own. Whenever he came into the Jewish synagogues, and where there was always a mixed multitude of Jews and Gentiles, he endeavoured to convince the Jews that the ceremonial law of Moses could be no farther binding upon any such Jews as should embrace Christianity, being out of the confines of Judea and under the protection of other states; for that the Jewish sacrifices and ceremonial law, having been only figurative and typical of the great Christian sacrifice, must consequently be nulled, abolished and done away by the sacrifice and death of Christ, the only true propitiation for sin, and consequently could be no longer obliging to the Jews any more than to the Gentiles, after they had embraced Christianity; who were now both together to form a new, spiritual society, not under the jurisdiction of Moses, but of Christ alone. That this was Paul's doctrine in all his Epistles to and ministry among the foreign churches, is too plain to be denied. But how he came off with it, or what the consequences were when he came to make his report of it to the rest of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem, I shall now relate. . . . When he came to Jerusalem he found many Asiatic Jews who . . . arriving before

St. Paul had fully apprized the Jerusalem Jews that this apostle, in all the synagogues where he had preached in Asia, had absolved the Jewish converts from all obligation to the Mosaic law, especially the ceremonial law. . . . That this charge was true in fact, and too plain to be denied, is evident from all St. Paul's Epistles still extant. . . . How was this matter to be got over? Not by denying the fact ; but, upon the advice of the other apostles, elders and brethren, by the "evasive method" recorded in Acts xxi. 23. The brethren remind Paul of the decree to which he had been a party ; point out that "the many thousands he saw converted in Judea were all 'zealous of the law,' and observed every branch of it as they did before ;" and suggest that, in order to "take off the credit of these reports" against him, he should "comply with the law in the strictest sense" by purifying himself, shaving his head, and offering sacrifice with the four Nazarites. Paul's compliance, however, neither appeased the zealots nor warded off the tumult which led to his imprisonment. The objection that Paul here temporized unworthily is a mistaken one ; Paul "always acted on the same steady, uniform principles of religion, whether he was in Judea, Greece, Asia, Arabia, Egypt, or anywhere else. St. Paul was a Jew by nature, and could not refuse obedience ["in a civil or political capacity," p. 54] to the law of his country as long as that law subsisted and he continued a subject. But then you must observe that St. Paul's scheme of Judaism was very different from the common national scheme, and even from the notions which the rest of the apostles, elders and brethren, in that famous Council at Jerusalem had of it. . . . The truth is, that St. Paul was the great free-thinker of his age, and the brave defender of Reason against Authority. . . . But our truly Christian apostle continually laboured under this great disadvantage, of being opposed in all his ministry by the whole Jewish nation, and having a decree of Council standing out against him, passed at Jerusalem by a large assembly of apostolical Christian Jews ; yet he still stood to his point, and would never admit the obligation of the law as the law of God, or as any way binding in point of religion or conscience. And

herein St. Paul had not one apostle, prophet or teacher, of that age who heartily joined in with him, except Timothy" (pp. 56—72).

"The great concerning debate, therefore, of that time ["the standing controversy between St. Paul and the apostles and teachers of the circumcision," p. 54] was reduced to these two questions: first, whether the Jewish converts were still obliged, in point of religion and conscience, to obey the whole law? and, secondly, whether the Gentile converts, as a matter of religion and conscience, were bound to comply with the Mosaic law of proselytism, as the necessary condition upon which the Christian Jews were to hold communion with them? In both these points the apostles, elders and brethren at Jerusalem, in consequence of their decree, stood to the affirmative; while Paul as stiffly maintained the negative against them. . . . This controversy continued all St. Paul's lifetime, that is, from the year 49, in which the decree passed, to the year 68, when St. Paul was martyred at Rome. This controversy at length rose so high that the rest of the apostles, not excepting Peter, Barnabas and John Mark, not being able to come into St. Paul's scheme, thought themselves obliged to separate themselves from him, and leave him to preach his 'own gospel,' as he called it, among the Gentiles, in his own way. And though St. Paul still insisted upon immediate revelation for this, yet the rest of the apostles, it seems, never had any such revelation, nor could St. Paul ever convince them. . . . Upon the whole, I think, it is evident, from all the memoirs of this great apostle's life which are still extant among us in the history of the Acts and his own genuine Epistles, that all his sufferings and persecutions all along arose from his struggling as much as possible for natural right and reason against the superstition of the Christian Jews and their pretended religious obligations to the law of Moses, which they thought themselves still as much obliged by as before" (pp. 78—80). In support of his claim to apostolic authority, and his right to preach Christ free from legal conditions, "Paul strenuously asserts himself to have been constituted and appointed sole apostle of the Gen-

tiles by a revelation from Christ ; he denies all jurisdiction and authority of the circumcision over them, not excepting, but expressly including, Peter himself" (p. 377). "If we take St. Paul's word for it, Peter had no more right to the apostleship of the Gentiles than he" [an opponent of Morgan's] "or I have" (Vol. II. p. 244). "There is no authentic account of any of the Twelve but Peter, James and John, as having had any share in preaching and spreading the gospel ; and the rest, having been disappointed of the kingdom, might have betaken themselves to their fishing and respective callings again, for anything we know to the contrary" (Vol. II. p. 232).

The baneful spirit of Jewish Christianity was shewn not merely in persistent rejection of Paul's truer view of the faith : see Vol. I. p. 364. "But these Judaizers or Christian Jews did not stop here ; but soon fell into gross idolatry, and set up a great number of mediators and intercessors with God instead of one. We have, indeed, no distinct, plain account of this in profane story, as we have very little of that kind before the end of the third or beginning of the fourth century. But it is confessed on all hands that the Apocalypse was writ long before, and is a book of the apostolic age. I think Sir Isaac Newton has proved it to be a genuine work of St. John's, and that it was written in Nero's time, two or three years before the destruction of Jerusalem. And however dark and obscure the prophetic parts of it may be, yet the doctrinals contained in it are very clear and cannot easily be mistaken. And from this book, I think, it appears plainly that the Christian Jews, so early as this, had established the mediation of angels, the invocation of the saints, and prayers for the dead. They prophesied the sudden downfall of the Roman empire, and the near approach of a fifth monarchy, by the coming of Christ with a sufficient power from heaven to set up his temporal kingdom at Jerusalem, when all enemies were to be destroyed by fire and sword, and the government of the earth to be given to these militant saints. . . . But the great and dangerous part of the scheme, with regard to these primitive Christian Jews, was that they confined salvation to themselves. They believed in

Christ only as their national restorer and deliverer, or the hope and salvation of Israel ; and they excluded the whole Gentile world from all the benefits of the kingdom, but on the condition of their being circumcised or at least being naturalized by proselytism. No Christian Jew ever believed in or preached Christ as the common Saviour of the world, of both Jew and Gentile, by a new law of his own, independent of the law of Moses. They always took the fifth monarchy or kingdom of the Messiah to be a temporal kingdom, which was immediately to succeed the destruction of the Roman, Latin or Western empire sealed at Rome. And they founded this kingdom in blood and temporal destruction, as the four monarchies before had been successively founded. And they believed that a new Jerusalem would be the metropolis of this empire, a city to be built without hands, and coming down from heaven, twelve thousand furlongs square, or fifteen hundred miles ; and that all the Gentiles would be forced to bring in their riches and treasures as contributions and marks of homage to their Jewish Messiah, whose reign was to be a thousand years. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses and the prophets, and all the believing holy Jews in every age or country, were to be raised from the dead to possess this kingdom, and to glut their revenge upon the Gentile, unbelieving world. This was the Jewish gospel, and this is the plain and evident doctrine of the Apocalypse. And whoever does not believe this must be damned, and the deepest curse or anathema is denounced at the close against that man who should add to or diminish from the words of this book. . . . It is plain that the author looked upon all the events there represented to him as very near at hand and just ready to be accomplished. It is a revelation of things which were 'shortly to come to pass.' . . . It is evident that the author confines salvation to the Jews only : for when the saints come to be marked and entered into the book of life, to prevent their common destruction with the Gentile world, there are none marked or entered but Jews ; only twelve thousand out of each tribe are marked for life, and these are gathered and selected out of every kindred and tongue and nation, where they were

then scattered and dispersed ; but not one Gentile was to be saved" (pp. 364—372). The Jewish Christians narrowed the limits of salvation even more than the Jews had done (Vol. II. p. 250).

Morgan does not fail to observe and propose a solution of the inevitable problem as to how it was that "the Jewish and Gentile Christianity, or Peter's religion and Paul's," thus seemingly opposite and inconsistent, came "so soon afterwards to unite into one Catholic, Christian Church. The persecutions drove them together ; and particularly that first and bloody persecution under Nero, as well as those that followed, in which the Gentile Christians were punished as Jews. For when the Gentile converts found that the heathen Gentiles were their common enemies, they united with the Jewish Christians, to the great advantage of Judaism in the Christian Church. They separated from the heathen Gentiles, as the Jews had always done before, and so became Jewish proselytes, which had been the chief thing in dispute. They likewise came into the notion of the fifth monarchy, or a temporal Jewish kingdom, by the sudden coming of Christ from heaven to destroy the Roman empire and to set up his own kingdom at Jerusalem. And the Gentile Christians being thus far reconciled to the Christian Jews, they joined with them likewise in setting up a hierarchy in the Church, or an external, visible authority and jurisdiction over conscience in matters of religion and eternal salvation. This hierarchy they called the true, visible, Catholic Church, out of which there could be no salvation. They assumed all the gifts and powers of the apostles to cast out devils and to give the Holy Ghost. . . . And the efficacy of all this they declared to depend on their administrations and the regular succession of their bishops from the apostles. They excluded all heretics, or dissenters and protestants, who would not submit to this church authority or anti-christian hierarchy, out of the kingdom of heaven ; and declared episcopal disobedience to be not only a damnable but unpardonable sin, never to be expiated, even by the blood of martyrdom. This was the primitive, Catholic Church of the first three centuries" (pp. 377—379).

But it is a mistake to suppose "that the Catholics were then the *whole Church*, or the *best Christians*, any more than they are now. They called themselves the Catholic Church because they were the majority, and because they had impudence enough, on the strength of this majority, to claim a universal authority over the consciences of all Christians. They pretended to be the true and only rightful successors of the apostles. . . . But at the same time there were great numbers of dissenters and protestants against this anti-christian claim of spiritual power, and who strenuously asserted and maintained the liberty of conscience and right of private judgment upon St. Paul's scheme, against any such general and enormous apostasy and depravation of all religion by a power claimed from Peter. But these truly primitive Christians . . . were branded as heretics, called in derision by the general name of *Gnostics*, because they pretended to be wiser than the Church, and claimed a right of judging for themselves" (pp. 380, 381). By their persecutions the early Catholics make it clear "that their anti-christian kingdom, or visible, Catholic, authoritative Church, subsisted before Mr. Whiston's date by several hundred years; and that St. Paul was not in the wrong when he declared it commenced in his time; and that it would be more fully and compleatly revealed and established as soon as 'he [*this apostle himself*] who then hindered it should be taken out of the way.' This is the plain and natural construction of St. Paul's words and sense" (p. 380). The Catholics claimed authority from St. Peter. "And though they could never prove by any authentic evidence that St. Peter ever was at Rome, or that his apostolical office and character would admit of his being bishop there, yet they built the Roman ecclesiastical hierarchy upon this most absurd and senseless supposition. But it must be owned that this hierarchical form of government in the Church did not begin at Rome. It began at Antioch in Syria, which was the mother Church of Christendom till the conversion of the Roman emperors shut her out, and substituted Rome and Constantinople in her place. But still you will find the same hierarchical anti-christian scheme in the

Apocalypse, the Apostolical Constitutions and the Epistles of Ignatius" (p. 383). We must be careful not to accept unhesitatingly the testimony of their Catholic enemies against the heretics. "They called the dissenters and protestants of that time in general *Gnostics*. . . . They branded all dissenters at that time as being the disciples of Simon Magus. . . . But, in short, the grand heresy, and in which all the separate parties at that time agreed, was denying the authority of the Church" (p. 387). When the Catholics accuse the heretics of joining with the heathens, not only in common eating and drinking and intermarriage, but even in public festivals, we must admit (p. 388) that it was true, but remember that their plea for this was just, and grounded on St. Paul's doctrine in this very case; inasmuch as Paul had declared that the idol was nothing to him, and meat offered to it no more than common food. The charge was not a moral one, but one affecting Christian liberty only. The mystery of iniquity was then already working, and the practices of the Catholic party answer to Paul's description of the man of sin or son of perdition, which was just then ready to be revealed (p. 390). Other methods of repressing the heretics failing, the Catholics "were obliged to fly to the authority of the Church in synods and councils, in which a few ignorant, superstitious bishops, meeting together in some small province or corner of the world, pretended to be under the immediate direction of the Holy Ghost, and to make laws and decretals for all Christendom. . . . I should have said that about this time the Catholics had collected a canon of Scripture, and endeavoured to make themselves the sole authoritative interpreters of it" (p. 397). "If we consider, therefore, by whom and upon what principles the canon of Scripture as we now have it was at first collected, revised and published, it is no wonder if it leans strongly towards Judaism, and seems at first sight to connect two opposite and contradictory religions one with another" (p. 441).

So thought and wrote Morgan in the second quarter of the pragmatistical, unhistorical, one-sidedly abstract eighteenth century, wholly without the aids of modern Biblical criticism,

recent historical methods, or the Hegelian philosophy ; of all which the newer Tübingen theology is usually alleged to be a by no means independent outcome. And yet the question irrepressibly suggests itself, How many well-informed Englishmen, lay or clerical, not being systematic students of scientific German theology, would have cherished a suspicion, had the above statement by Morgan been presented to them as a translation of one of the many recent popular expositions of Baur's scheme of the early Christian Church ? Nor does it appear to us that if the Bristol physician of 1737 were set to the strange work of popularly expounding to the last quarter of the nineteenth century the outlines of results arrived at by an important school of historical criticism in the second quarter of this same century, he could be accused of missing or seriously misrepresenting the essential features. Of course it would be as easy as it would be interesting to point out considerable errors and deviations ; but Morgan's deviations from the founder of the Tübingen school would hardly be greater than those to be pardoned in a somewhat unscientific disciple of the master, loyal in the main. It is certainly not wonderful that his "Deistic" view of "the religion of Christ" as opposed to "the Christian religion" should seem to us antiquated ; or that he should make somewhat wild work of the Gnostics as collectively free-thinking Deists (as if the forte of the Gnostics had been "common-sense" theology—as if Valentinian's system had been in the main one of "Natural Religion" !) ; or that his argument at large is not sufficiently accompanied by a scholarly examination of the Scripture passages on which he founds, and that he neglects to consider pressing objections and difficulties. Much more singular is it that, writing when he did and as he did, he should so nearly have hit the track to which Baur, by a different path, was long after led ; that he should so nearly have succeeded in putting together the elements of Baur's scheme of early Christianity, and that too in its more developed phase.

The reader cannot have failed to remark that, while in the above abstract the Moral Philosopher is left to speak for him-

self, with as few connective interpolations as possible, the order of statement chosen by Morgan has been somewhat altered. But if this should excite a doubt lest a series of detached extracts should have failed fairly to convey Morgan's meaning, the first glance at the *Moral Philosopher* will shew that, to avoid repetition, such an inversion of Morgan's order was inevitable. The exigencies of the dialogue form, unhappily chosen by Morgan and far from artistically managed, by no means account for the extraordinary confusion in which almost all the subjects debated by the Deists come up for discussion. Free-thinking, Natural Religion, the Sacraments, Inspiration, the moral character of the Old Testament heroes, Miracles, emerge in the most unexpected way to disturb the main argument, which, it should be mentioned, is to expose and extirpate Judaistic elements in Christianity by help of Paul's teaching and practice, the key-note being already struck in the title of the work. Nor does it seem possible to explain why the same themes should continually re-appear, to be asserted again, without any new elements, in much the same shape as before, with copiousness of set phrases and reiterations. Morgan's critics seem all to have complained of this (so Leland, in the "*Divine Authority of the Old and New Testament asserted*") ; and his reviewer in the *Bibliothèque Britannique*, Vol. XIII., prefaces his re-arranged exposition with the remark that there are three reasons why an argument should be confusedly stated : it may be that the author has not taken time to arrange his ideas, that he has not the capacity to do so, or that he wishes to confound and overwhelm the reader. The reviewer leans to the last hypothesis ; we incline to the first. But a re-arrangement was necessary ; and a reference to the *Moral Philosopher* will undoubtedly shew that this particular argument has neither lost nor gained in purport. Even without going beyond the quotations given, there are materials to make it clear that the collocation of the various passages accords with Morgan's view of the relation of Acts xv. and Galatians ii. In the *Moral Philosopher*, the Jerusalem Council of Acts xv. is first discussed at p. 54 as preliminary to the examination of the difficulties that led to the

tumult of Acts xxi. The same Council, with its Henoticon, is treated at great length again at p. 73. And there cannot be a doubt that the Council of pp. 362—364, here made to follow the “communing” of Gal. ii., is the same; though here Morgan specially founds on Galatians, and does not note that whereas at p. 73 he had spoken of Paul and Barnabas being sent as deputies from Antioch, he takes no note of Barnabas here. It is clear that Morgan adopts the views subsequently maintained by Neander and Lechler in their attempt to harmonize Acts and Galatians; namely, that the “communing” with Peter, James and John, just preceded the Council called by them immediately after. Morgan nowhere refers to Paul’s earlier journey or journeys to Jerusalem (Acts ix.; Gal. i. 18; Acts xi. 30); and the phrase, “at his next return” (p. 56), shews that Morgan had not noticed Acts xviii. 18—23, or taken the trouble to examine the chronology of the journeys at all carefully. There are two minor points, however, on which it may be doubtful whether Morgan’s full meaning is given above. In several passages in the *Moral Philosopher*, Morgan seems certainly to suggest that Jesus shared the hopes of his followers in looking forward to a restoration of a Jewish national kingdom; and that Paul’s conduct was not always quite straightforward, in the matter of conformity to the law, even while his personal beliefs remained consistent. But even then the quotations certainly represent the opinion which Morgan generally and explicitly asserted; while on the main question, the relation of Paul’s teaching as a whole to that of the other apostles and the Jewish Christians, the extracts abundantly shew what Morgan believed.

The brief statement of Baur’s general position given at the beginning, cannot enable readers otherwise unacquainted with the works of the Tübingen school to appreciate the very many specific points in which Morgan has so nearly hit their mark. For the sake of such readers, we draw attention to some of the more outstanding features common to both, or in which they very nearly agree. 1. The Epistles of Paul, especially the second chapter of Galatians, are the key to the whole position. And though Morgan does not directly impugn the authorship

of Acts by a truth-speaking apostolic man, he manifestly accepts Paul's statements unhesitatingly, and regards the account of the Jerusalem Council given in Acts with unmistakable suspicion. The author of Acts did not at least tell the whole truth when he represented Paul as accepting the decree of the Council. And the substance of Paul's teaching in *all* his Epistles is treated as wholly discordant with the tone of Acts throughout. 2. The controversy between Paul and Peter at Antioch is the outcome of the "standing controversy" between Paul and the Twelve on questions of vital importance, not on a matter of mere detail with regard to occasional conformity. The quarrel between Paul and Barnabas had its origin in the same difference as to the law. The "certain that came from James" were Judaizing zealots, but had James's direct sanction. The Asiatic Jews who accused Paul on his last visit to Jerusalem were not unbelieving Jews, but Jewish Christians. 3. Paul's "own gospel" was a very different one from that of the Twelve. The first Christians were Jews who, on conversion, changed their creed in no way save by adding the belief that Jesus was the Messiah. 4. The main questions in dispute between Paul and the apostles were as given by Morgan, and continued to harass the Church all Paul's lifetime and long after his death. 5. Paul asserted a direct call to the apostleship from Jesus, as immediate and authoritative as that of the Twelve, and he asserted it *against* them. If the opinion as to the mode of Paul's call from Christ, attributed by Morgan to Agrippa and Festus, is, as seems most likely, Morgan's own, this would be an additional ground of comparison (not direct agreement) between him and Baur: that Paul was a "man of the strictest honesty and integrity, but of a warm imagination and a little tainted with enthusiasm, or too much inclined to be influenced by dreams, visions and supernatural communications" (Moral Philosopher, Vol. I. p. 69). Against Peter, Paul claims *sole* apostleship of the Gentiles. Peter's presence or episcopate at Rome is a pure fiction. 6. The "four necessary things" of the Jerusalem decree, which, unlike Baur, Morgan regards as having really been promulgated in the way

recorded in Acts, substantially agree with the conditions under which friendly Gentiles were admitted to the standing of Proselytes of the Gate (cf. Baur's *Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. I. p. 103, 3rd ed.; Ritschl, *Entstehung der Alt-kath. Kirche*, 2nd ed., p. 103). At the Council there were two parties amongst the Jewish Christians, a narrower and a more liberal one (cf. *Paulus*, 1st ed., p. 128). 7. As to the relation of the two parties to the Catholic Church, Morgan is rather to be compared with Schwegler; it was in the main the Jewish side (Ebionitism) that developed into Catholicism. With Baur, stress is laid on the establishment of the hierarchy in this same connection. The Gnostics represent (according to Baur, some of them held extreme forms of) Pauline, anti-judaical Christianity. When the Gnostics are charged with eating things offered to idols as a crime, they are using only the liberty allowed by Paul (cf. Baur, *K. G.*, I. 80). 8. The canon was not formed till late in the struggle between the Catholic party and the sects, and bears the marks of the controversy. It represents the triumph of Catholicism. [Morgan knows nothing of mediating books in the canon. Here he stands furthest from Baur's position.] The ingenious though manifestly erroneous exegesis of 2 Thess. ii. 7, shews that Morgan was disposed to find in the Epistles he accepted as Paul's, direct hits at the progress of the Judaizing party in the Church. 9. The Apocalypse is the work of the apostle John. Its strongly-marked *tribal* particularism, combined with gross Judaical chiliasm, stands in the sharpest and most direct contrast to Paul's universalism and more spiritual hopes.

Here are unquestionably materials enough to shew a most striking and interesting agreement between Morgan's views and those of Baur, both in its general tendency and in many points of detail. When the resemblance is so singular, it is marvellous that nobody has thought it worth while to call attention to its existence. Yet, so far as can be seen, this has been done neither in England nor even in Germany. Morgan is frequently referred to as the one who, among the Deists, first directed the controversy of the eighteenth century against the character of the Old Testament revelation; only in this con-

nection does his name seem ever to be mentioned. It is extremely hard that an English author, Mr. Mackay, when writing a history of "The Tübingen School and its Antecedents," should in a valuable and learned work on such a subject make but passing reference to "the first hurried negations of the English Deists." But there is one case in especial where the loss of interest in the Deistic writers hardly suffices to explain why Morgan's view of apostolic Christianity should not in some way have been compared with Baur's. Lechler, in his invaluable *Geschichte des Englischen Deismus*, has not only discussed Morgan's works at large, but has given an accurate enough summary of his views on this very point (see p. 384). Now Lechler wrote in 1841, and was at the very time a *Repetent* in Baur's own University. Even then the general tendency of Baur's investigation was abundantly well known far beyond the class-rooms of Tübingen. Ten years after, in 1851 (2nd ed., 1857), Lechler published his *Apostolisches und Nachapostolisches Zeitalter*, in direct opposition to Baur, thus becoming, as Baur says (*K. G.*, Vol. I. p. 50, 3rd ed.), a *Hauptauctorität* of his opponents. Yet, inexplicably enough, in discussing Morgan again in his sketch of him for Herzog's *Realencyclopädie* (published 1858), he goes out of his way to insist on the "surprising resemblance" between Morgan and Marcion (as he had done before in the History of Deism) on the comparatively insignificant matter of evil angels, and in a note refers to Baur's *Gnosis* as a source of information on Marcion. But even here he has not a word of the resemblance, infinitely more surprising, between Morgan and the author of the *Gnosis* himself. Nor is it much less singular that D. F. Strauss, in his *Reimarus*, should have omitted to notice subject for remark in this direction when treating of matters that brought him directly to speak of Morgan. He is of opinion, manifestly with justice, that Reimarus was indebted to Morgan for some of his criticisms of Old Testament worthies. Further on he takes occasion to say (*Reimarus*, p. 248): "In regard to the opposition between Paul and the older apostles, it is remarkable to observe how Reimarus partly anticipated modern criticism, and partly

lost the fruit of his accurate observation by a false application ;” inasmuch as through his aversion to Paul’s doctrines as a whole, Reimarus unreservedly accepts Acts as historically accurate, and makes Paul’s account of himself in Galatians to be an ill-natured, self-magnifying falsification. Had Strauss known the “Moral Philosopher,” or remembered what Lechler says of Morgan, he could not but have found it still more remarkable that Reimarus should have lost his labour, while a writer from whom he learnt much had made the same accurate observations, and had not failed to gather what to Strauss must have seemed their richest and ripest fruit.

It is clear, from what has been already shewn, that Morgan deserves to be compared with Baur rather than with Marcion, and that he much more singularly anticipated, upon the matter of apostolical dissensions, important conclusions of modern research than Reimarus did. That, on the problem that here interests us, Morgan has shewn great acumen, is as unquestionable as that he has given a plausible conspectus of a very complicated case. With the truth of his conclusions we have here of course nothing to do. But we are bound to say that his work, even if we confine ourselves to what he has given us on the early Church, bears the marks of some of the worst faults that can mar such investigations. There is little trace of acquaintance with early Christian literature other than the Authorized Version, and he never examines thoroughly the passages of Scripture he founds on. His statements are almost always wide and loose, and he is everywhere eager to draw the largest and extremest inferences. Worse still, he keeps out of sight objections that must have presented themselves forcibly enough to him. And his replies to opponents display his defects most strikingly. Many of the works written in reply to him set forth undeniable objections to his view, and precisely such objections as have been urged, not without effect, against those who have since taken up his position. Leland, for example, in his “Divine Authority of the Old and New Testaments asserted” (Vol. I. chaps. xiv. xv. ; Vol. II. chap. v.), even while quoting Acts as of equal weight with Paul’s Epis-

ties, was led by a happy instinct to press the controversy home on him by passages from Paul's Epistles, dwelling on the community of doctrine seemingly taken for granted by Paul in his very retort against Peter in Gal. ii. 16—21, and pointing out the unfairness of assuming, against much good authority and without any proof, that the conditions of the Jerusalem Heno-ticon were identical with those of old imposed on the Proselytes of the Gate. It is incredible that one of Morgan's parts, who had carefully examined the whole subject as it required, and had convinced himself that he had arrived at a truth of as great importance as he represents it to be, could or would reply as he does. For, as his critics justly complained, he in almost every case simply re-asserts his original statement, with hardly any attempt at its rational defence, overloading his reply with vituperation of an interested priesthood and sneers at scholastic systems of divinity. And the numerous refutations, though abounding with the polemical phrases usual in those days, demanded another answer and in a different tone. There is in the "Moral Philosopher," especially in the second and third volumes, not a little reason to suspect that it was itself at least as much a *Tendenz-schrift* as an impartial inquiry; and that a main regulation in his attempts to prove disharmony within the college of the apostles was the wish to grasp at whatever might discredit their inspiration, the wish to "set the apostles together by the ears,"—the motive he makes Theophanes, the orthodox interlocutor of the Dialogue, attribute to himself, the Christian Deist. If *divide et impera* was consciously present to Morgan's mind in his study of Paul's Epistles and the Acts, this does not of course affect the significance of facts he dwelt on; but it seriously diminishes the credit he might otherwise have claimed for having made a singular contribution towards the new light upon the Biblical theology of the New Testament. It is doubly important to lay some stress on this here, when we venture to put his name alongside Baur's, lest by any chance we should seem insufficiently conscious of the immeasurable distance that separated the two in almost all the qualities most essential for historical research.

Not that we would assert Morgan to have disbelieved or even doubted the opinions he professed; but he manifestly omitted to take the only trustworthy means of establishing what he affirmed, that of carefully weighing all that could be fairly brought for or against his confident and paradoxical contention. He who on such a matter was content to rail at his opponents, deserved to be discomfited as he seems to have been; if he was soon forgotten, it was at least partly his own fault; though the really interesting elements in his scheme of Paulinism and Petrinism seem justly entitled to be rescued from the dust and forgottenness of his three volumes, as a curiosity in the realm of modern Biblical controversy. The above-mentioned defects in Morgan's method, and much about the whole style of his work, suggest the belief that he made a copious use of tools which he found somewhere lying ready to his hand. In all the then extant theological literature, no one work is so likely to have given Morgan materials for his view of the apostolic Church as a once notorious dissertation by John Toland.

II.

Toland, born near Derry in 1671, studied at Glasgow and Leyden, graduated at Edinburgh, travelled in Germany on political missions, wrote volumes or pamphlets, with the old *perfervidum ingenium Scotorum*, on all sorts of subjects, from the Druids to the Bank of England, and died, still in the thick of theological controversy, in 1722. Of his many contributions to theological literature, that which here concerns us is his *Nazarenus: or Jewish, Gentile and Mahometan Christianity* (1st and 2nd ed., 1718); together with *Mangoneutes*, a defence of *Nazarenus* (in Toland's *Tetradymus*, published in 1720).

In the first of the two letters which compose *Nazarenus*, Toland gives an account of an Italian translation of an Arabic Gospel professing to be by the apostle Barnabas, discovered by Toland at the Hague, which, though with extensive Mohammedan alterations and interpolations, Toland conceives to be, in all probability, substantially that Gospel attributed to Barnabas which is mentioned in the decree of Damasus, Gelasius

or Hormisdas, and elsewhere. He does not suppose the Gospel to be authentic, any more than the Epistle of Barnabas, which, as directed against the Judaizing Christians, is manifestly by another hand than this Judaizing Gospel of Barnabas. But in order to prove that neither the Ebionite Christology of the latter, nor its explicit opposition to Paul, in any way disproves its very ancient origin (rather the contrary, indeed), or excludes those who accepted it, be they Ebionites or Mohammedans, from a claim to the name of Christians, Toland is led to discuss "the original plan of Christianity." And from the history of the Nazarenes (*Nazarens*, Toland spells it, while in *Mangoneutes* he defends himself against the charge of having confounded *Nazareni* and *Nazaræi*), "as being the most primitive Christians most properly so called, and the only Christians for some time," he endeavours to shew that from the time that the gospel was preached to the Gentiles there were two sorts of Christians, namely, those from amongst the Jews and those from amongst the Gentiles; "not only that in fact there was such a distinction, but likewise that of right it ought so to have been." The main points in the argument may be briefly summed up thus.

The Nazarenes and the Ebionites were probably the same society under different names. The Jewish converts were termed *Nazarenes*, from Jesus of Nazareth, ere they were called Christians at Antioch. They were likewise called by way of contempt (as the Flemish Protestants were called *Gueux*) *Ebionites* or Beggars. The man Ebion, afterwards assumed as their founder, is an ignorant fiction; and the hypothesis that the name arose from the Ebionites' poor and low notions of Christ is far-fetched and exploded. Though there were doubtless some diversities among them, what we hear of the doctrines of the Ebionites and the Nazarenes agrees in the main; but it would be wrong wholly to confound the Nazarenes of the first with some of the third and fourth centuries. The Ebionites, like the Nazarenes, regarded Paul as an apostate from the law, and rejected his Epistles as those of an enemy and impostor. In this they mistook the more catholic scope of Christianity; the non-Jewish Christians erring not less seriously on the other

side in declining to admit the Christianity of those who, bred as Jews, continued to observe the rites of the Mosaic law, along with the profession of faith in Christ. Paul does not deny the charge of the Ebionites that he did not learn "his gospel (a phrase familiar to him)" from those who were immediately taught by Christ. He asserts that he had received it directly by revelation from Jesus Christ, without the mediation of the older apostles. (Here Toland goes carefully over Paul's own account, as given in Galatians, of his relations to the Twelve.) The Gospel of the Uncircumcision was committed to him, that of the Circumcision to Peter [the two gospels are emphasized as watchwords by large capitals]; though the Ebionites denied the harmonious arrangement of the matter. The statements of the Acts of the Apostles the Ebionites rejected, together with the whole book, as did also the Cerinthians and Marcionites. The Acts of the Apostles accepted by the Ebionites gave a very different account of Paul, his designs, his conversion and work, from that in the canonical Acts. [This is discussed at length.] In the "most remarkable and incontestably ancient" Epistle from Peter to James, prefixed by Cotelierius to the Clementines, it is Paul who is aimed at as the ἐχθρός ἀνθρώπου [a lengthy extract from the Epistle being given]. Paul withstood Peter to the face at Antioch, because he had departed from the agreement come to at Jerusalem. The separation between Paul and Barnabas was not caused by dissent as to the obligation of the law; the Acts tell us "quite a different story." Paul's conformity to the law, as recorded in Acts xxi. 20—26, proves irrefragably that Paul contended only for the liberty of the Gentiles from circumcision and the rest of the law; he did not teach that the Jews should forsake Moses, or that they ought not to circumcise their children. Otherwise Paul must have dissembled. 1 Cor. vii. 17—20 ("Is any man called being circumcised, let him not become uncircumcised. Is any called in uncircumcision, let him not be circumcised. Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing," &c.), quoted to the same purpose by Rhenferd, bears out this view fully. Jews and Gentiles were to be united

in the Christian Church without losing all distinction; and "this union without uniformity, where Jew and Gentile are one in Christ, is the admirable economy of the gospel and the "mystery" of which Paul speaks in Eph. iii. 3, 5, 6, 9; Col. i. 26, 27 [cf. Baur, *K.G.*, I. p. 117, 3rd ed., on these and cognate passages, as intended to prove that union of Jew and Gentile in Christ is the mystery]. "In comparison of the 'new creature,' circumcision and uncircumcision are as nothing; which no more takes away the distinction of Jew and Gentile Christianity than the distinction of sexes; since it is likewise said in the same sense that in Christ there is neither male nor female." The maintenance of this distinction alone "reconciles Peter and Paul about circumcision and the other legal ceremonies, as it does Paul and James about justification by faith or by works; it makes the Gospels to agree with the Acts and the Epistles, and the Epistles with the Acts and one another; but, what is more than all, it shews a perfect accord between the Old Testament and the New." [Toland had a genuine respect for the Old Testament revelation.] The four "necessary things" imposed by the Jerusalem Council on the Gentile converts without limit of time or place, supposed for so long a time by the Western Church to be binding on all Christians, as they still were by many in Toland's time (Whiston, Curcelæus), were not of *moral* significance. For though they were by Moses' law of obligation for Proselytes of Justice, they were *not* so for Proselytes of the Gate. The principle in them was only that expounded by Paul to the Corinthians, of not putting stumbling-blocks in the way of weaker brethren. They were of force only when Jewish and Gentile converts were mingled together in the same Christian community; and they would be of force for us now, were the Jews as a nation to embrace Christianity, as they very probably would have done long since had the Christian Church shewn them the consideration designed to be paid them, in the matter of their national observances, by its founders. Similar considerations solve the difficulty about the seventh-day sabbath. And when Paul in his Epistles insists on the obsolescence of legal rites, we must

understand that as James wrote for Jewish Christians, so Paul was writing for Gentile converts. So in Galatians, so in Romans. "It is God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith. Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid! yea, we establish the law" (Rom. iii. 30, 31). Apostolical tradition was afterwards used as an engine to introduce new customs and suppress old ones; but Jesus and the Scriptures did not forbid the Jews to abide by their law. The Ebionites were wrong in charging Paul with dissimulation; they were right in adhering to their rites and the levitical law, which were "no less national and political than religious and sacred; that is to say, expressive of their peculiar nation, essential to the being of the theocracy or the republic, and aptly commemorating" the national history. Only sacrifices were to be excepted. [This is taken for granted, and not fully explained. Toland says it cannot be discussed without going into the examination of Hebrews at length, as if he had read Baur, *K.G.*, I. pp. 109—115.] We cannot judge from the conduct of a few zealots amongst them, that the Jewish believers as a whole insisted on obliging their Gentile fellow-christians to do as they did. [Here Toland seems hardly consistent with what he had said about all Ebionites rejecting Paul and his teaching.] Justin Martyr made no scruple about regarding as Christian brethren the Jewish believers who adhered to the law, though he, erroneously, thought they were mistaken in considering themselves as in any way bound by it. Augustine was at first disposed to the same catholic and tolerant view; though he ultimately gave way to the vehement protests of Jerome, a "hot-headed, raving monk," who most unchristianly said that all Christians, whether of Jewish or of Gentile race, continuing to observe the ceremonies of the Jews, "were plunged in the gulf of the devil," and blasphemously called their churches "synagogues of Satan." Toland does not like to call names in religion, and never professed to be of Paul, of Cephas, or of Apollos. Yet, for more than one reason, he has "less exception to the name of Nazaren than to any other." It was the first name given to the followers of Jesus; and it

was the name afterwards given to those who understood the plan of Christianity as he does, in so far as the relation of Jews and Gentiles to one another in the Church is concerned. For settling the questions about the ancient parties, it is most unfortunate that we have lost the Gospel recognized by Ebionites and Nazarenes, identified by Toland with the Gospel of the Hebrews and with the Gospel of the Twelve Apostles (*not* with the Proto-evangelion of James or with the newly-discovered Barnabas Gospel), which was apparently prior to the Gospels received as canonical, and was presumably one of the many Luke had before him when he wrote his. The Ebionite book of Acts is also unhappily no longer extant. Toland here repeats questions formerly asked in "*Amyntor*" (published 1698). How the immediate successors of the apostles could so seriously err about the genuine writings of their masters? Why books received as genuine by Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Tertullian, were afterwards rejected? Whether on grounds such as those alleged by Irenæus for receiving four and only four Gospels? And (further) how the Nazarenes, admittedly the first Christians, and of whom were the twelve apostles, came to be regarded as the first to form wrong conceptions as to the doctrine and design of Jesus?

Toland pleads his cause with much elaborateness and ingenuity; and his plea, though differing in aim from Morgan's, was quite sufficient to have set Morgan on the track. Toland's phraseology is indeed not quite foreign to Morgan; in Vol. II. of the *Moral Philosopher*, we occasionally hear of "Nazarene or Christian Jews" (see pp. 91, 98, 250). In several important respects Toland's method is advantageously different from Morgan's. Everywhere he seems anxious to examine whatever relevant authorities, ancient or modern, he could lay hands on. There are numerous and precise references to the views of Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Epiphanius, Eusebius, Tertullian, Nicephorus, Maimonides, and a host of ancient and modern authors; with copious, perhaps ostentatious, quotations in the original languages. To examine the justice of his citations would lead us far from our present subject; but there

appears to be no reason for assuming that the argument was otherwise than *bona fide* even where manifestly incomplete, though Toland was always affirmed to have a special liking for the paradoxical. The attempt seems legitimate enough. Originality and erudition, whether well digested or not, abound even when conclusiveness seems far short of the standard. And on all that concerns the historical investigation of the origin of Christianity, one cannot help feeling that Toland stood on a very different platform from those Deists whose "short and easy method" for settling all problems was common sense. Herein he seems to have differed from them as much as in the philosophical basis of his religious speculation; and in both respects the translator and admirer of Giordano Bruno, the careful student of Spinoza, the upholder of a pantheistic nature-philosophy, has never received the meed of consideration he deserves from those who lay down the law on the history of English thought in the eighteenth century.

Of the two attempts to clear up the relations of Paulinism and Petrinism which we have had before us, that of Morgan anticipates most fully the developed Tübingen theory. Toland's general position, indeed, rather agrees with Baur's opponents than with Baur: see especially Hofmann's almost incredible exegesis of 1 Cor. vii. 17; and cf. Lechler, Ritschl, Weisse. Morgan held the differences between Paul and the Twelve to be fundamental and irreconcilable; Toland believed that the original relations between Jewish and Gentile Christians, if cleared of some misunderstandings, were the true and permanent ones. But in several very important features the author of *Nazarenus* comes much nearer Baur than Morgan does, though his name seems never to be mentioned in this connection. Schliemann, in his work on the Clementines, notes that Toland interested himself in the Ebionite character of the Homilies. And Mr. Hunt, in his article on Toland in the *Contemporary Review* for June, 1868, curiously enough compares Toland's identification of the Nazarenes with that of Reman, who of all notable recent writers on apostolic times had, when he wrote the *Vie de Jésus*, taken least pains to appreciate Baur's work. Yet

some of the coincidences between *Nazarenus* and Baur's earliest epoch-making article on "The Christ-party in the Corinthian Church" (*Tübinger Zeitschrift*, 1831, *Heft* iv.) are really startling. In 1831, Baur still so far agreed with Toland as to hold that Paul and the other apostles were not responsible for the dissensions amongst their followers. Both Baur and Toland illustrate and support their allegation of the existence of well-marked parties in the most ancient Church by the character of later sects. Toland, who was, as we have seen, well acquainted with the extra-canonical Christian literature, makes use of some of it precisely as Baur does. Both quote in much the same form the Ebionite account of Paul's conversion, and of the grounds of his aversion to the law. Toland quotes the letter of Peter to James, prefixed to the Clementine Homilies; and the very same passage is one of those quoted and dwelt on with emphasis by Baur in the article above mentioned. Both agree that the hit at a "man who is an enemy" in this letter is directed against Paul himself. There are even verbal coincidences which would be interesting if there were any ground to suppose that Baur knew anything of *Nazarenus*; though where both are treating the same matter from the same point of view, verbal agreement is almost inevitable. For example: Baur introduces the Homilies as "this most remarkable document" (*höchst merkwürdige Schrift*); Toland uses almost the same words of Peter's Epistle, "this most remarkable and incontestably ancient piece." As to the relation of the terms of the Jerusalem decree and those imposed on Proselytes of the Gate, Toland, unlike Morgan, agrees with Meyer and others of Baur's opponents in holding that they were not identical; but it is clear that Toland had really examined the subject, whereas there is nothing to shew that Morgan had. But the main reference in which Toland approaches Tübingen more nearly than Morgan does, is the connection into which he brings the constitution of the Christian canon with the parties within the pale of the Church and without it. It is in this respect also that Semler admittedly stood nearer the Tübingen criticism than either of his English predecessors, inasmuch as he detected

a mediating purpose in some of the New Testament books. So far neither Morgan nor Toland went. Save in the matter of the Apocalypse, when curiously he stood quite on Tübingen ground, and in denying, with reasons, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was Paul's, Morgan was content to indicate his belief that the Catholic Church had accommodated its canon to its own purposes, and by changes and omissions had suppressed some of the traces of independent Paulinism. But Toland, as we have seen, opens up the whole question of the canon, so fully that in the numerous replies to him this is treated as his most grievous heresy. Indeed, though Toland's "History of the Canon of the New Testament" (treated therefore quite apart from the Old Testament), which in "Hodegus," p. 13, he refers to as already extant, was never published, it would be but fair that, in view of the extraordinary interest which he excited on the question, "Canonical or non-canonical?" as is testified by the numerous and really scholarly replies "Amyntor" called forth, Toland and several of his opponents should at least be mentioned in histories of the criticism of the New Testament, where the later and more fragmentary suggestions of Reimarus and Lessing are dwelt on. The method proposed by Toland, and which his opponents followed, was the historical investigation of the testimonies for and against apostolical authorship. Semler was *not* the first (see Hilgenfeld's *Einleitung*, p. 180) to assert that the canon was not constituted till the end of the second century: see "Amyntor." Nor was Semler singular (cf. same page of Hilgenfeld) in making the word *Canon* mean simply *List of books*. This is Toland's habitual usage; and Whiston, with whose works Semler was well acquainted, and against whom Semler first tried his critical weapons, had gone out of his way to prove that *Canon* did not at first mean *Rule of Faith* or *Digesta* for the guidance of the Church, but was simply a collection of occasional writings.

III.

Thus we see that the controversy as to the meaning and importance of the Christian parties in apostolic times had gone

through two distinct stages* ere Semler had passed into the *Secunda* of the Saalfeld school (in 1742: see Semler's *Lebensbeschreibung von ihm selbst abgefasst*, Vol. I. p. 39), two or three years ere he set out for the University. Did he remain entirely unacquainted with, was he wholly uninfluenced by, the prior stages of the debate in which he was to bear such an important part? As Professor in Halle, Semler was by his indefatigable labours to compel the theological mind of Germany to novel ideas, and to be the foremost apostle of free critical inquiry. He was to point out local and temporal elements in Scripture; to insist on differences of view amongst the founders of the Christian Church, as displayed in the various writings that compose the New Testament; and, by his grouping of these differences, to open up the path in which Baur followed.

It is proverbially difficult to find anywhere in Semler's multitudinous works a summary treatment of any one subject. But the following notes will shew in a general way how Semler regarded the early Church, its parties and its canonical literature. The Church Fathers erred in not noticing the distinction of a double gospel emphasized by Paul, the gospel of the Circumcision and the gospel of the Uncircumcision. At first, unity of spirit in the Church was held to be enough, without suppressing *docendi illud genus quod peritiores ab imperitioribus dividebat*. The spirit of Judaism grew and nearly crushed the free spirit of Christianity. New astute leaders substituted a forcible external union for oneness of spirit. *Quidam parum spirituales auctores* endeavoured to incorporate the two parties, neither of which accepted the books or the institutions of the other. A middle party arose by union of the two: the Catholic, namely, which made our present canon authoritative. And now the Catholic party called all others heretics, both those

* To a third stage of the same controversy we can refer only in a note. Peter Annet, whose first (anonymous) works were so much in Morgan's spirit that they were commonly supposed to be from Morgan's pen, wrote also on "The History and Character of St. Paul" (Collected Works, pp. 27—94). The relation of Acts to Galatians and the spirit of Paul's universalism are, *inter alia*, examined: Paul is said to have "modelled Christianity," and to have been practically the founder of a new religion.

who Judaized and those who professed *Gnosis*. (From the *Præfatio ad illustrandam Catholicæ ecclesiæ originem*, prefixed to Semler's *Paraphrasis in Epistolam 2 Petri*.) Many of the Gnostics were sensible and accomplished Christians (Autobiography, II. 168); the Nazarenes and Ebionites were one and the same party (Semler's Preface to Baumgarten's *Theol. Streitigkeiten*). In the canon Semler saw a collection for the use of the united parties, the Gospels especially for the Judaists, the Pauline Epistles for the Gnostic Christians, the Catholic Epistles for promoting the union of both. (From the sketch of Semler in Eichhorn's *Bibliothek*, Vol. V. 1—200.) The Apocalypse is of another spirit from the rest. This "obscure and silly book" is marked by savage Jewish feelings of revenge, grossly chiliastic views, and wholly unchristian standpoint; it is to be wholly rejected from the canon (*Abhandlung von der freien Untersuchung des Kanons*). The same views are to be found in many others of Semler's works; especially is it remarked by the author of the article in Eichhorn's *Bibliothek* that "all Semler's historico-critical researches upon the New Testament are pervaded by his hypothesis that there were two gospels."

If we compare Toland and Morgan on the one hand, and Semler on the other, with the Tübingen school, it will be apparent that Semler anticipated its conclusions most nearly by his view of the relation in which our canonical books stood to the process of union between the two parties; as also in holding that this process was a fusion of both, though with a Judaical spirit, whereas Morgan held that the formation of the Catholic party was rather the suppression of the Pauline by the Judaical, and Toland thought that the Catholics had been too hard on the Judaizers. But in regard to the relation of the heads of the parties to one another, both Toland and Morgan are more explicit than Semler in expounding each his own view; and on the Judaistic Apocalypse, Morgan was at least as emphatic. Upon the whole, Semler's agreements with Toland and Morgan, as the case may be, are much more remarkable than his differences from them: for example, on the double Gospel, the continued division in the Christian

camp, the growth of a Judaical and intolerant spirit, the relation of the Catholics to the heretics, and the character of the Apocalypse. But the most important fact, in examining the possibility of Semler's having been influenced by Toland and Morgan, is, that the latter had directed very specially the attention of theologians to those very points in regard to which Semler afterwards took up so prominent a position. Apprehension of the *status quæstionis* is often as important an element in priority as the direct suggestion of one particular solution. And on the issue between Pauline universalism and Petrine particularism, it may be affirmed that Toland and Morgan were without predecessors. The interest in discussing the relation of Ebionites to the Catholic Church had hitherto been almost purely Christological; so Zwicker, so Rhenferd (quoted by Toland). If we have materials to shew that Semler knew the works of Toland and Morgan quoted above, will it not be reasonable to conclude that the views of his English predecessors not merely helped to force upon him the questions on which he afterwards came more or less nearly to agree with them, but directly contributed to mould his opinions?—and that the chain which, with some imperfect links, stretches from Baur to Semler, may be regarded as extending, unbroken, backward from Semler to Morgan, and from Morgan to Toland?

It would be by no means irrelevant to insist on the general relation then subsisting between English and German theology—a relation so strangely the converse of that which now obtains. The great impulse given, especially in their critical labours, to such men as Pfaff, Mosheim, Michaelis, as well as to the popular and unscientific *Aufklärer*, by their English studies or English travels, by the freer theological atmosphere of England [!] (see Tholuck's *Geschichte des Rationalismus*), is admitted on all hands; but the interesting task of tracing the precise points on which England set Germany to the work in which she has now so long been content to be little more than a receptive pupil, has never been sufficiently carried out. Here, however, we must limit ourselves to a presumable influ-

ence of Toland and Morgan on Semler; and the materials must be drawn mainly from Semler's own *Lebensbeschreibung*, Halle, 1781, 1782.

That Semler knew and studied diligently the principal English writers is manifest all through the Autobiography. He frequently complains, with patriotic regret, of the backwardness of German theologians at large; they are not even to be compared to the French and English in the matter of early Church history, the canon, and the investigation of the original Greek and Latin authorities (I. 302, II. 169). Criticism is a new field for Germany. Semler's revered teacher, Baumgarten, the Halle Wolfian, kept to the old and unsatisfactory traditional German plan in historical work (I. 20). In his frequent almost apologetic explanation of his desertion from Baumgarten, he gives it to be understood that it was chiefly the more thorough historical works of France and England that moved him. "Clarke's English works" first made clear to him the source of many difficulties about the early sects, namely, the incompleteness of the New Testament writings; Ebionites and Nazarenes rejected Paul's Epistles and John's Gospel (I. 262). Semler early studied "Whiston's English works;" his disputation for his degree was against Whiston's innovations in biblical criticism. Besides that Whiston and Clarke were in the thick of the Deistic controversies on the Canon, and had both written against Toland, we have evidence that the Deists did not escape Semler's attention in the fact that he made diligent use of the library of Hofrath Lenz in Halle, which was rich in "so-called heterodox works" (I. 113).

Add to this that Toland and Morgan were amongst the most notorious and most copiously refuted of the English Deists. Toland is treated at great length by Thorschmidt in his *Freidenker-Lexicon*; and pp. 188—278 are devoted to *Nazarenus* and its opponents. In the long list of refutations, ten or a dozen are by German divines. And while many of the refutations deal chiefly with the question of the Canon, several take up expressly Toland's distinction between Jewish

and Gentile Christianity as an unheard-of slander. To this the famous Mosheim expressly addresses himself in his *Vindiciæ Antiquæ Christianorum disciplinæ adversus celeberrimi viri Joannis Tolandi, Hiberni, Nazarenum* (1st ed. 1720; 2nd ed., extended, 1722). The German theologians had not yet learned to speak of Toland's writings as a manifest token of the near approach of the final temptation, or to entreat the Lord "to rebuke this black devil" (see Lechler's *Deismus*, p. 473). Toland is here treated as a man of parts and learning, with the courtesy of a scholar (as he is by Fabricius in the *Codex Apoc. N. T.*, and by Pfaff). This work, which was one of Mosheim's earliest, and which in no small degree contributed to bring his name before the learned world, follows Toland point by point, and, with great learning at command, endeavours to deny almost all that Toland had advanced; especially anything like important variety of view or practice amongst the early Christians. Toland's other "paradox writings" and *Nazarenus* too are reported on in the *Nachrichten von einer Hallischen Bibliothek*, Vol. III.

Morgan is reviewed in several continental periodicals of the period; in the *Zuverlässige Nachrichten*; the *Acta Eruditorum*; (at great length) in the *Bibliothèque Britannique*, Vol. XIII.; and in the *Nach. von einer Hall. Bib.* Further, Jöcher, a Leipzig Professor, published in 1745 a special pamphlet, *Historiæ Controversiarum a Thoma Morgano excitatarum primæ linæ*; a pamphlet hard to be got at, and which, besides a list of the works of Morgan and of his opponents, contains little but strong denunciation of Morgan as one who had excited so great commotion, both in Britain and on this side the sea, that *nemo in republica literaria adeo hospes putari debeat, quin infensissimi hujus sacrorum turbatoris nomen sit auditum*. The Moral Philosopher is *spurcissimus omnium qui unquam typis descripti sunt liber* (mainly because of its treatment of the Old Testament); insomuch that all that Celsus, Porphyry, and the worst enemies of the faith, have written, is, in comparison with Morgan, courteous, modest and mild. Amongst other refutations of Morgan mentioned by

Jöcher is one attributed to Baumgarten, in 1745, under whom Semler was then studying, with the title, *de Paulo Gentium Apostolo*, which had evidently dealt specially with our question. Whether Jöcher has not here erroneously assigned to the foremost of the Halle theologians a disputation said by the *Nachrichten von einer Hall. Bib.*, presumably better informed on matters connected with the Halle University, to have been delivered under precisely the same title and in the same year by Herr C. E. Windheim, we are unable to decide, as neither the one disputation nor the other is accessible. But a public disputation on that subject must have taken place in the year given; and this is additional proof that Semler, the first student of his time, could not but have become acquainted with Morgan's opinions. But what may be taken as conclusive proof of this is, that Semler tells us in the Autobiography, I. 117, that he himself wrote several of the reviews of English works for the *Nach. von einer Hall. Bib.*, edited by his professor and friend Baumgarten in 1749-51; and of the English works reviewed in that journal, those of the Deists are among the most numerous and important. So that it is not only certain that Semler was well acquainted with the work done for the *Nachrichten* by the other contributors who occupied the same field as himself, but even highly probable that the reviews of Nazarenus and of the Moral Philosopher are from his own pen.

It is true that Semler nowhere, so far as can be discovered, mentions the name or works of Toland or Morgan in connection with his own opinions on the double Gospel or the Judaistic Apocalypse of John. This is not, however, hard to explain. In Semler's time, the Deists had become unmentionable by respectable scholars and divines; at all events, none referred to them save in direct polemic. And Semler had special reasons for avoiding all appearance of being associated in any way with the Deists; one of the principal arguments his opponents brought against his revolutionary theological work was that of putting him in the same category with Deists and Naturalists. Yet he was never tired of asserting

that he and they had little or nothing in common ; although the curious distinction he endeavoured to make between the freedom of *Privat-Religion* and obligation to conformity with the Established Church seems never to have been satisfactory or even intelligible to friends or foes. The great apostle of perfect freedom in the examination of traditional views or prejudices, wrote, to the amazement of Germany, against Bahrdt and the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist ; and to the disgust of admirers and the contempt of the orthodox, he appeared as the public defender of the minister Wöllner's notorious *Religionsedikt*. Semler's difficulty in making his position clear, and in drawing the line between himself and those who seemed to work with the same weapons towards the same end, embittered his last days ; and will serve to explain how, as a *Privat-gelehrter*, he might have learnt much from the Deists, and yet studiously endeavour to avoid appearing in any way their pupil.

Whether our two English Deists communicated their spirit or their ideas to the indefatigable Halle critic, so much more learned, laborious and influential than they, is a comparatively minor question. The main plea of this paper has, we conceive, been established beyond dispute. Toland and Morgan had, long before Semler, seen fully the importance of the problem to which Baur has since compelled the whole theological world to allow its due weight. They saw that the growth of the constitution and doctrine of the Catholic Church could not be understood without careful exploration of the rivulets which joined to form the broad stream of Catholic tradition. They tried with boldness, originality and ingenuity, to solve, each in his own way, a difficult and complicated problem. That they took up the question at all, is their chief merit ; now it can hardly be worth while to examine precisely the measure of their success. But we may fairly apply to them a comparison like that used by Baur in contrasting the *Leben Jesu* with his own work on the Gospels. If Toland and Morgan failed in their attack on the citadel of Christian tradition, if their bold but ill-supported assaults were beaten back and

they ultimately driven off the field, it must at least be said of them that they fairly warned the defenders to look to their time-honoured, moss-grown bulwarks, to strengthen and extend their works on that very same side against which Baur, with his numerous and well-equipped followers, directed his systematic, steady and prolonged siege.

DAVID PATRICK.

VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, comprising Pirke Aboth and Pereq R. Meir in Hebrew and English, with Critical and Illustrative Notes.* Edited by Charles Taylor, M.A., Fellow and Divinity Lecturer of St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press. 1877.

It is scarcely necessary to remark in this Review how important a knowledge of the Mishnah and the other older parts of the Talmud is to the history of Jewish and early Christian thought on theology and philosophy, as well as to that of the Old Testament, and even of the New. Yet this Hebrew literature has been left singularly inaccessible to the student. Its language is not easily mastered, if indeed the language of books separated by many centuries of time and produced in many different countries can be called one language at all; it is always founded on the Biblical Semitic, sometimes distinctly Aramaic, sometimes Hebrew, but very freely develops new formations, and gives new significations to old forms, and borrows largely from neighbouring tongues—Latin, Greek and Persian. Moreover, a great wealth of honorific titles and constantly recurring technical terms are introduced, which are always printed in abbreviations; and these are a great stumbling-block to the beginner. It would perhaps be impossible to compile a lexicon which would clear up all these obscurities, though more might certainly be accomplished than has yet been done. In any case, it seems that experience and patience will long continue to be the sole key to unlock the mysteries of the Talmud; and as the time and power are not given to all who would gladly know something, the knowledge must be obtained largely at second-hand.

But vast as is the entire extent of the Talmudic literature, its various parts appear to differ greatly in their importance to the student of general history or theology. Indeed, the portions that will interest him are but few, and are chiefly contained in the older portion, the Mishnah especially. Among the various tracts of which the Mishnah consists, *PIRQE ABOTH*, the "Sayings of the Jewish Fathers," as Mr. C. Taylor renders it, occupies a distinguished place. Indeed, as Mr. Taylor observes, "its simplicity and intrinsic excellence have secured for Aboth a widespread and lasting popularity, and have led to its being excerpted from the Talmud, and used liturgically in the Synagogue at certain seasons from an early period." It consists mainly of the philosophical and religious maxims attributed to the *Fathers* who lived from the time of the men of the Great Synagogue to two centuries after Christ. "The Great Synagogue," Mr. Taylor observes "(as we may conclude in accordance with a prevalent tradition, which attributes its establishment to Ezra), arose some time after the return from the Captivity, and included 'all who presided over the teaching of the law in Judæa down to Simon Justus' (Jost, *Gesch.* A. 42)." And "from statements in Aboth about the Great Synagogue, it would seem that it was regarded as comprising a *succession* of teachers." We here learn something of the principles that animated the great Hillel, Gamaliel, and others who are known generally only by their names. Much instruction may be found in this ancient tract concerning the view then taken of the precepts of the Thorah or Law, and the relation in which other books of Scripture stood to it. Christian theological controversies are found often to be anticipated here. Thus there is much on the rival claims of Faith and Works ("whosoever works are in excess of his wisdom, his wisdom stands;" "not learning but doing is the ground-work; and whoso multiplies words occasions sin"); on sins that cannot be forgiven ("he that profanes things sacred, and contemns the festivals, and annuls the covenant of Abraham our father, and acts barefacedly against the Thorah, even though he be a doer of good works, has no portion in the world to come"); on Free-will ("everything is foreseen; and free-will is given; and the world is judged by grace; and everything is according to work"). Love to God and to mankind is especially inculcated; in fact it is a principle running through the whole work like a golden thread: "Let the property of thy friend be precious unto thee as thine own; set thyself to learn Thorah, for it is not an heirloom unto thee; and let all thy actions be in the name of

Heaven ;" "Beloved are Israel that they are called children of God ; greater love (was it that it) was made known to them that they are called children of God, as it is said, Ye are the children of the Lord your God ;" "despise not any man, and carp not at any thing ; for thou wilt find that there is not a man that has not his hour, and not a thing that has not its place."

Mr. Charles Taylor has set himself a useful and by no means an easy task in preparing an edition of the *Pirke Aboth* which can be used by Hebraists and non-Hebraists alike, and which receives copious illustration from other Hebrew works and from the New Testament in an ingenious commentary. The text has been carefully examined and purified, and the critical notes appear generally satisfactory. The English version is excellent, and can well be used (with the help of the appended commentary) by those who cannot read the Hebrew. The commentary is drawn from extensive reading in the Talmudic literature, and deals with literary, philosophical, and biographical, as well as grammatical points. There are also some useful *Excursus*. In one of these I am glad to see that Mr. Taylor vindicates the Hebrew division of the Decalogue, according to which the first *λόγος* is, "I am Jhvh thy God . . ." (Ex. xx. 2), and the second, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me ; thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . ." (3—6) ; the making of images being a necessary concomitant of polytheism, and mentioned in the same precept ; though the Speaker's Commentary does remark, sententiously enough, but not at all in a Hebrew spirit, "There is a clear distinction between polytheism and idolatry, which entitles each to a distinct commandment." He might have added another argument in favour of the Hebrew arrangement. According to that, the first sentence of the Decalogue is a simple *preamble*, not a *commandment* at all : and it accords well with this that the Decalogue is not called "Ten *commandments*," but "Ten *sentences*" (דְּבָרִים, *λόγοι*), both in Hebrew and in Greek.

While Mr. Taylor is to be commended for the pure and quasi-biblical style of his translation, I cannot equally approve of his practice of quoting passages of the Bible, sometimes of considerable length, in the Authorized Version, when he knows that to be incorrect and has to amend it in a note, as at p. 130. Why should such deference be paid to a popular version by scholars competent to correct it, and in a book intended for scholars only ?

I must in conclusion express a hope that Mr. Taylor, having

made so excellent a beginning, will be encouraged to go on in the path he has chosen, and give us similar editions of other Talmudic tracts of interest equal to this.

R. MARTINEAU.

2. *Pessimism: a History and a Criticism.* By James Sully, M.A., Author of "Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics." London: Henry S. King and Co. 1877.

Mr. Sully has produced another ably written work, which bears the marks of careful study as well as of thoughtful analysis. His main interest in his chosen subject evidently arises from the fact of his feeling the fatal incompatibility of Pessimism with Utilitarianism, or at any rate Hedonism. If happiness is shewn to be unattainable, hopeless indeed must be the attempt to induce men to make it the final object of all action. The book commences with an historical sketch of Pessimistic opinions, but the views of most writers are presented too briefly to do more than create a general impression in the reader's mind; Schopenhauer and Hartmann alone are allowed to expound themselves at anything like adequate length. We are glad, however, to notice that ancient Hebrew literature, instead of either being wholly ignored or put in a false position, furnishes a few quotations, which are placed side by side with others from Greek and Roman sources. After this, the subject is treated entirely from the Utilitarian's point of view. There is a certain advantage in this. We are glad to see this aspect of the question, even though we feel that there is a great deal more to be said about it, and absolutely refuse to allow the worth of life to be estimated according to the amount of its happiness. It helps us to construct an *a fortiori* argument, that if life is worth having on account of the happiness it affords us here, it is indeed an inestimable boon when regarded as essentially an opportunity for developing moral character. But from all such speculations our author rigidly excludes himself.

Of course a critic could hardly have an easier task than that of demolishing Schopenhauer's Ontology from the position that all our knowledge, whether of the Ego or the Non-ego, is phenomenal; and Mr. Sully, having assumed this position with very little argument, grinds his adversary to powder. And the view of Volition which is fundamental to his school enables him to make equally short work of the great Pessimistic doctrine that the "Will to live," all volitional self-affirmation, is bad, and tends to misery. For

according to modern empiristic teaching, volition does nothing but obey the stimulus of pleasure and of pain, seeking the former, shunning the latter, with the inevitable tendency, therefore, so far as it is successful, to increase the net amount of happiness. No doubt the random spontaneity for which Mr. Bain has secured an acknowledged place, cannot be credited with any direct tendency to produce happiness; but it is at least neutral, and, moreover, does not come under the head of true volition. All this is very convincing to disciples of the empiristic school, and herein consists, we fancy, the permanent value of the book. It shews very effectually indeed that those who adopt the fundamental principles of our author's school cannot logically become pessimists. This result, in view of the present vigour of that school, is something to be thankful for; but we believe any pessimist worthy of the name, not admitting what Mr. Sully practically assumes as premises, would deny the conclusions.

It is when we come to our author's chapter on the Sources of Pessimism that we feel most strongly the inadequate character of his mode of treating the subject. This careful and full analysis of varying degrees of susceptibility to pleasure and to pain, and of what are called differences of temperament, really accounts for no more than the fact that some people take desponding, others sanguine, views of life. It helps us to understand the popularity of the cynicism which may be studied to perfection in certain well-known journals. But it is especially inadequate to explain the systematic pessimism of Schopenhauer, who possessed many natural advantages which ought to have made him take comparatively cheerful views of life. It leaves untouched the most characteristic feature in his teaching, the way, namely, in which his pessimism was based upon his very peculiar Ontology. Schopenhauer had some profound personal experiences of mighty impulses stirring within him, and forcing him to act against his better judgment. All his life long he was struggling against these impulses, bitterly regretting their power over him, but continually finding that he did the evil that he would not, and left undone the good that he would.* Here surely is the key to his whole system. Will is primary, Intelligence is secondary, and the worse secures the triumph. But of these impulses and their relation to true volition, Mr. Sully's psychology can render no adequate account. They are not the same as random spontaneity, or as the volition which obeys the stimulus of pleasure

* See *Theological Review*, July, 1876, pp. 402, 403.

and pain. Indeed, without postulating an Ego apart from the "natural man," it is difficult to see what explanation can be satisfactory, and this is a step which has not been taken in any published Psychology with which we are acquainted.

H. S. S.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

The volume containing Mr. Cunningham's "Dissertation on the Epistle of St. Barnabas"* is a useful and scholarly work. Or rather it is two works; for first we have the Dissertation, occupying 117 pages, and then come the Greek and Latin texts, edited by Mr. G. H. Rendall, and furnished by the same gentleman with a commentary and English translation. The Dissertation is a revised form of an essay which obtained the Hulsean Prize in 1874, and forms a systematic introduction to the study of the Epistle. As it is impossible in the space at our disposal to discuss the various questions which have been raised in regard to this not very edifying relic of Christian antiquity, we must be content with pointing out the principal conclusions at which Mr. Cunningham arrives. He differs from the majority of recent critics in placing the date of the Epistle as early as 79 A.D., or not much later.† He does so on the ground that the "little king" of iv. 4 is most probably Vespasian, and that the relation of the Epistle to Gnostic controversies proves that "it goes back to a time when Christian teaching was indefinite, because it had not been rendered distinct by contrast with the heresies that had not yet arisen."‡ Notwithstanding this early date, the Epistle cannot have proceeded from the pen of Barnabas, for it is inconsistent with his known character and position, and he probably died before 62 A.D. It was the composition, not of an aged Jewish apostle, but of a youthful Gentile, and was addressed to the church at Alexandria,§ which formed "a united body of Jewish and Gentile Christians."|| The question as to the use of books contained in the New Testament is discussed with candour. Mr. Cunningham believes that the author was acquainted with St. Matthew's Gospel, but admits "that the argument from silence goes some way to shew that the Gospel . . . was not in common use as a recognized authority among those

* A Dissertation on the Epistle of St. Barnabas, including a Discussion of its Date and Authorship. By the Rev. William Cunningham, M.A. Together with the Greek Text, the Latin Version, and a new English Translation and Commentary. London: Macmillan and Co. 1877.

† Pp. xxxvi and cv.

‡ P. xxxvii.

§ P. xxxix.

|| P. xli.

to whom the Epistle is addressed.”* He thinks that it is “within the bounds of possibility that the author had the Epistle to the Romans and 1 Peter before him, possibly 1 Corinthians, and some would say Galatians, but that there is no sufficient reason for alleging that he had any of them at all.”† The Dissertation concludes with an interesting section on “the Theology of the Epistle,” in which the principal points are brought under review. On the whole, the essay furnishes a valuable and suggestive introduction to the Epistle. The style is sufficiently clear; but the thought does not always seem to be very happily expressed. There are several faulty sentences.‡ We cannot see why Mishnah should be spelled “Mischna,”§ as though we had no English mode of representing the Hebrew מִשְׁנָה. Nor can “Sybilline,”|| for Sibylline, be fairly set down to the printers, as it is placed in the index in conformity with the wrong spelling, while the word is correctly given in the commentary,¶ which proceeds from a different hand. *Éliverai* does not mean “this is come to pass;”** and we ought not to forget that strict accuracy is the foundation of sound criticism. These, however, are small blemishes, which may be easily removed from a second edition, and meanwhile do not materially detract from the excellence of the work.

Mr. Ross's *Life of Bishop Ewing*†† is a life-like picture of a very amiable man, who, if not a profound theologian, was an admirable Bishop and a large-hearted Christian. Nor was Dr. Ewing, if he never made up for the deficiencies of a somewhat scrambling and imperfect education, without that truer theological depth which is a matter of the developed character rather than of the trained intellect. The chosen associate of Maurice in England, of Erskine and M'Leod Campbell in Scotland, he represented a phase of theological thought which, as more than one untoward event proved, was much less at home in the Episcopal Church of Scotland than either in her Established Kirk or in the Church of England. He had little sympathy, except in so far as so wide a heart as his sympathized with all genuine forms of religious faith, with either the narrow hierarchical spirit of his own communion, or the rigid Calvinism of ordinary Scottish Presbyterianism. He was a Broad Churchman in the true

* P. xciii.

† P. xc.

‡ See p. xxi, line 6 sq.; lviii, 3 sq.; lxxii, note 1; xcvi, 2; cix, 25 sq.

§ P. xliii.

|| P. xxxv.

¶ P. 76.

** P. xxxi.

†† *Memoir of Alexander Ewing, D.C.L., Bishop of Argyll and the Isles.* By A. J. Ross, B.D. London: Daldy, Isbister and Co. 1877.

ethical sense of the word, willing to own his brotherhood with "all who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity," and impatient of the application of any other test. Like the men whose names we have already mentioned in connection with his, he was indifferent to critical questions, the real importance of which he hardly discerned; and on that account, we think, whatever he did is not likely to have much permanent influence. For although it is true that a high ethical conception of the character of God, for instance, is of infinitely greater importance than sound views on the authorship of the Pentateuch or the fourth Gospel, yet a large class of men, especially in this age, are asking themselves what justification they have for believing in God at all, and are not disposed to listen reverently to the voice of Scripture until they have ascertained to their own satisfaction what Scripture is. In a time of the upturning of men's thoughts, critical must often precede spiritual questions, even if felt to be intrinsically less important.

We cannot pretend within our brief limits to give a sketch of Dr. Ewing's life. There is the less need as we can very cordially recommend to our readers Mr. Ross's well-conceived and well-executed Memoir. From first to last, Dr. Ewing appears to have been one of the happiest-hearted and most fascinating of men. Struck down by repeated illness, which constantly compelled him to exchange the damp winds of the Hebrides for the drier breezes of Sicily, he always returned to his work with indomitable and ever-hopeful energy. His was indeed a singular position. The incumbent of a see which, till his acceptance of it, had been vacant for 160 years, yet the traditions of which went back to Columba's first settlement on the sacred shores of Iona, he was the Bishop of a flock scattered all over the Western Isles, including, as at Ballachulish and Appin, poor congregations whose attachment to the Episcopal Church was ancestral, but otherwise consisting for the most part of the landed aristocracy and their dependents. In the performance of his episcopal duties, he earned an income rather less than that which an Evangelical curate in England demands for his crude services. We are not informed what his private means were, but they must have been considerable, and he spent them freely, as well as himself, in the warfare of the Church. We have said that he was out of place in the Scottish Episcopal Church: we do not know that he would have been much more at home on this side the Tweed. But he comes much nearer our ideal of the Bishop whom the times want, than that much-vaunted product and patron of astute ecclesiasticism, Bishop

Wilberforce. A dozen such as he, armed with episcopal influence and authority, might yet regenerate the Church of England, and go far to make her once more the Church of the nation. But where to find them?

A translation of Pfeiderer's *Paulinismus** affords English readers the opportunity of making acquaintance with a characteristic production of German theological learning. The thoroughness of treatment and fullness of detail are striking—perhaps are carried too far. Could Paul himself read this analysis of his doctrine, he might be surprised to find that it was more systematic and clearly defined than he suspected. At the same time, there is no doubt much help to be gained in the study of the apostle's writings from these statements of his modern critic.

Another translated work is "*The Bible for Young People*,"† of which the third volume treats of Hebrew History from David to Josiah. The estimates offered of Scripture personages, and the dates assigned to Scripture books, are so widely divergent from the ideas commonly held, that some readers may be repelled; they will not, however, find it easy to meet and rebut the reasons given in support of the statements that are made, and the candid study of such a volume as this will give all people, whether young or old, a new insight into the real meaning and true value of a great portion of the Old Testament.

The tendency conspicuous in the Christian churches of the present day to fix attention on the human side of the career and character of Christ, finds another exemplification in the work of an anonymous writer, entitled, "*Leaving us an Example*."‡ The first part contains an elaborate analysis of the character of Christ; the second applies the principle of "the living example" to obtain a definition of "faith," which enables the writer to lay down a theory of justification, and to explain the meaning of the "atonement." The third part of the volume is occupied with a somewhat confused mingling of arguments in support of the existence of God and the divinity of

* *Paulinismus*: a Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology. By Otto Pfeiderer. Translated by Edward Peters. Vol. I. Exposition of Paul's Doctrine. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

† *The Bible for Young People*. By Dr. H. Oort and Dr. J. Hooykaas, assisted by Dr. A. Kuenen. Vol. III. Prepared by Dr. H. Oort. Authorized Translation. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

‡ "*Leaving us an Example*." *The Gospel for the Nineteenth Century*. Second Edition. Cassell, Petter and Galpin.

Christ. The whole work seems to owe its existence to the impression produced on the writer's own mind by some passages in Mill's *Essays on Religion*. It is not marked by any special power or originality.

The Rev. Henry Formby indulges, at the commencement of his work,* in some unnecessary scoffing at German historical critics. His want of sympathy with their principles and method is fully explained, when we find him so utterly indifferent to all historical credibility as to quote, as though they were undoubted authorities in regard to facts, the books of Genesis, Daniel, Jonah and Esther, the early Fathers of the Church, and the first books of Livy. The book seems to be written in the interest of the Roman Church. It aims at establishing the theory, by no means a novel one, though seldom heard of in modern days, that Numa visited Jerusalem, made acquaintance with Mosaism, and derived thence the religious rites and doctrines which he is said to have given to the Romans. The author not only fails to establish his theory, but uses such arguments, and so ignores generally acknowledged facts, that it is difficult to ascribe to him at once candour and scholarship.

Mr. Heard's volume† is an elaborate and well-considered plea for disestablishment. He considers that the Christian Church must rest on a dogmatic basis; in the present divided state of opinion in this country, no dogmatic Church can include the great majority of the people, and a truly National Church is therefore for us impossible. The arguments are ably stated, and the spirit is fair and moderate, but the style has somewhat of a leading-article and public-meeting tone.

The views of the Evangelical section of the Church are represented by Mr. Hole.‡ The purpose he keeps in view is to shew that the teachings of the Church correspond with those of the Bible. It need hardly be said that he ignores biblical scholarship, and quotes the Bible as in every part verbally inspired.

* *Monotheism in the Main derived from the Hebrew Nation and the Law of Moses, the Primitive Religion of the City of Rome.* By the Rev. Henry Formby. London: Williams and Norgate. 1877.

† *National Christianity; or, Cæsarism and Clericalism.* By the Rev. J. B. Heard, M.A., &c. London: Longmans. 1877.

‡ *Principles of the English Church. A new Apology for the Church of England. A Series of Letters to a Friend.* By the Rev. Charles Hole. London: Longmans. 1877.

The "Book of Natural Laws"* is a short "Guide to the Conduct of Human Life," in which the author sets forth first the laws, whether physical, intellectual, moral or spiritual, which chiefly affect the individual, and then goes on to deal with those which affect the community, as, e.g., the "laws of natural affection," of social, commercial and political intercourse, &c. In attempting, within the narrow limits which he has assigned to himself, so vast a theme as "a system of mental philosophy and social economy," he has done himself as well as his subject some injustice. His chapters are too short, and his sentences read rather as the heads of longer discourses or as hints towards the solution of the various problems started, than as a full discussion of the whole subject. This is, we should imagine, a first appearance as an author, and it would have been well if an experienced eye had overlooked the proof-sheets, since we have had sometimes to trust to the context, rather than to the phrase employed, to give us the author's meaning. These blemishes, however, will be no doubt removed in a second edition, which the book well deserves. It will be of great value in our adult classes, where the teacher can give the illustrations and fuller development of the argument which the book somewhat lacks. The sympathies of the author are all in the right direction, and his views are on the whole sound. We are therefore glad to be able to recommend it to our readers.

"From Traditional to Rational Faith"† is a little volume shewing how the author, from having been a Baptist minister, became an Unitarian. Its interest is almost wholly of the subjective kind; the only external facts which we gather from it being, that Mr. Griffin was born in England, there exercised his ministry for a while, fell under the influence of Mr. Spurgeon, and finally emigrated to America, where he made the doctrinal change the steps of which he records. The book is well worth reading, especially by those who are beginning to follow in the author's footsteps.—A little book which bears the somewhat ambitious title of "The Reconciliation of Reason and Faith,"‡ turns out to be a number of sermons preached in a village church in Oxfordshire. They are sensible and liberal,

* The Book of Natural Laws. By William Whitworth. Manchester. 1876.

† From Traditional to Rational Faith. By R. Andrew Griffin. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877.

‡ The Reconciliation of Reason and Faith. By R. E. Molyneux, M.A., Curate of Whitechurch, Oxon. London: Rivingtons. 1877.

without exhibiting any remarkable ability. The congregation that heard them may be congratulated on a supply of spiritual food much more nutritious than is commonly dealt out in village churches, even though Reason and Faith may continue for some generations to come to need reconciliation.

Among pamphlets, we have an earnest plea for the just treatment of those who question the inspiration of Scripture;* a reprint from the *Christian World of Essays and Letters* in support of "conditional immortality;"† and a free-thinking commentary on a portion of the evangelical narrative of events after the crucifixion.‡

Of sermons, we may enumerate Mr. Alexander Gordon's thoughtful and eloquent discourse before the British and Foreign Unitarian Association at its last annual meeting;§ Dr. Flint's inaugural sermon before the Pan Presbyterian Council;|| Mr. Sharnian's "Victory and Martyrdom of Science,"¶ preached at Plymouth on occasion of the meeting of the British Association; and "Four Sermons"*** preached to Mr. Voysey's congregation by Dr. Wild, formerly rector of Bisley, chiefly on the duty of Free Thought and Free Speech in matters of Religion.

E.

* *Scepticism and Social Justice.* By Thos. Horlock Bastard. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

† *Life and Death.* By the Rev. Edward White. With Three Letters on the same Subject, by the Rev. Samuel Minton, M.A. Elliot Stock. 1877.

‡ *The Journey to Emmaus.* By a Modern Traveller. Williams and Norgate.

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INDEX TO VOL. XIV.

- CLEMENT OF ROME, THE NEW MS. OF, 35.
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT, THE NEW, 49.
GOLDZIEHER'S HEBREW MYTHOLOGY, 358.
GENESIS OF QUAKERISM, 546.
HUMAN AUTOMATISM, 397.
JONAH: A STUDY IN JEWISH FOLKLORE AND RELIGION, 211.
JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL, I, 155; II, 323.
KENRICK, JOHN: IN MEMORIAM, 374.
KINGSLEY, CHARLES, 237.
LANG, HEINRICH, 299.
LIVERPOOL UNITARIAN CONTROVERSY OF 1839, 85.
MAGNANIMOUS ATHEISM, 447.
MARTINEAU'S HOURS OF THOUGHT ON SACRED THINGS, 29.
MISCELLANEA THEOLOGICA, 129.
MOZLEY (CANON) ON THE OLD TESTAMENT, 252.
NOTICES OF BOOKS, 141, 269, 433, 603.
PAUL AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS, 520.
PETER, THE LEGEND OF, 106.
PRIMITIVE HEBREW LAND TENURE, 489.
RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM, ITS ULTIMATE RESULTS, 65.
SHEPHERD, THE, OF HERMAS, 504.
SPENCER'S SOCIOLOGY, 334.
STRAUSS'S RELATIONS TO HEGEL AND THE CHURCH, 219.
SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS, 260, 422.
TITIAN, 187.
TRUE IDEA OF DIVINE KOSMOS, THE, 1.
TWO ENGLISH FORERUNNERS OF THE TüBINGEN SCHOOL: THOMAS MORGAN AND JOHN TOLAND, 562.
-

- Allon, H., D.D., "The Vision of God," noticed, 291.
ARMSTRONG, R. A., B.A., author of article, "Paul and his Biographers," 520.
Arnold, Matthew, "Last Essays on Church and Religion," noticed, 436.
Barclay, Robert, "The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth," reviewed, 546.
Bastard, T. H., "Scepticism and Social Justice," noticed, 614.

- Baur, F. C., "Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ," English translation, reviewed, 520.
- Baxter, Maurice, "St. Christopher, with Psalm and Song," noticed, 445.
- BEARD, C., B.A., author of article, "Titian," 187.
- Behm, H. M. Th., "Ueber den Verfasser der Schrift welche den Titel 'Hirt' führt," reviewed, 504.
- BELL, ROBERT, author of article, "Strauss's Relations to Hegel and the Church," 219.
- Benrath, K., "Bernardino Ochino," translated by H. Zimmern, noticed, 289.
- "Ueber die Quellen der Italienischen Reformationgeschichte," noticed, 290.
- Biedermann, "Heinrich Lang," reviewed, 299.
- Binney, F. A., "Religion of Jesus compared with the Christianity of to-day," noticed, 442.
- Bixley, J. T., "Similarities of Physical and Religious Knowledge," noticed, 292.
- Bryennius Philotheos, "Epistles of Clement to the Romans," reviewed, 35.
- Bunsen, Ernst von, "Das Symbol des Kreuzes bei allen Nationen," noticed, 144.
- Burgess, W. R., M.A., "The Realm of Religion," noticed, 444.
- Carpenter, Dr. W. B., F.R.S., "Principles of Mental Physiology," reviewed, 397.
- Carpenter, W. B., M.A., "Prophets of Christendom," noticed, 152.
- C. B. U., author of notice of books, 433.
- CHEYNE, T. K., M.A., author of article, "Jonah : a Study in Jewish Folklore and Religion," 211. Notice of books, 271.
- Cheyne, Driver, Clarke, Goodwin, "The Holy Bible, with various Renderings and Readings from the best Authorities," noticed, 296.
- CLEMENT OF ROME, THE NEW MS. OF, article by James Donaldson, LL.D., 35.
- Clifford, W. K., F.R.S., "Body and Mind : a Lecture," reviewed, 397.
- Clissold, A., M.A., "The Divine Order of the Universe," noticed, 444.
- COBBE, FRANCES POWER, author of articles, "Hours of Thought on Sacred Things," 29. "Magnanimous Atheism," 447.
- Collyer, Robert, "The Life that Now is," noticed, 292.
- Conway, M. C., M.A., "Christianity," noticed, 147.
- Cooper, Emily, "History of England," noticed, 274.
- Cox, Sir G. W., M.A., author of article, "Goldziher's Hebrew Mythology," 358.
- Crowe, J. A., and Cavalcaselle, G. B., "Titian, his Life and Times," reviewed, 187.
- CUNNINGHAM, W., M.A., author of article, "Spencer's Sociology," 334.
- Cunningham, W., M.A., "Dissertation on the Epistle of St. Barnabas," noticed, 608.
- Davidson, S., D.D., LL.D., "The Canon of the Bible," noticed, 269.
- Delitzsch, Hermann, "George Smith's Chaldäische Genesis uebersetzt," noticed, 141.
- Dods, Marcus, D.D., "Mohammed, Buddha and Christ," noticed, 440.
- DONALDSON, JAMES, LL.D., author of articles, "The New MS. of Clement of Rome," 35. "The Shepherd of Hermas," 504.
- DRUMMOND, JAMES, B.A., author of articles, "Justin Martyr and the Fourth Gospel," I., 155 ; II., 323.
- ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT, THE NEW, article by J. A. Picton, M.A., 49.
- E. M. G., author of notices of books, 141.
- Erskine, T., of Linlathen, "Letters," Vol. I., edited by Dr. W. Hanna, noticed, 433.

- "Eucharistic Worship in the English Church," noticed, 150.
- Evans, T. S., M.A., "Life of Robert Frampton, Bishop of Gloucester," noticed, 285.
- "Expositor," Vol. IV., noticed, 153.
- Fenton, John, author of "The Historical Significance of the Sacrifice of Isaac," *Miscellanea Theologica*, 139. Article, "The Primitive Hebrew Land Tenure," 489.
- Flint, R., D.D., LL.D., "Christian Unity," noticed, 614.
- Formby, H., "Monotheism the Primitive Religion of the City of Rome," noticed, 612.
- F., author of notice of books, 146.
- Gebhardt, Harnack and Zahn's "Patrum Apostolicorum Opera," noticed, 154.
- Gebhardt, Harnack, "Clementis Romani ad Corinthios quæ dicuntur Epistolæ," reviewed, 35. "Hermæ Pastor Græce," reviewed, 504.
- Geldart, E. M., M.A., translation of Keim's "Jesus of Nazara," Vol. II., noticed, 153.
- GENESIS OF QUAKERISM, THE, article by Alx. Gordon, M.A., 546.
- Godet, F., D.D., "Studies on the New Testament," edited by Lyttelton, noticed, 295.
- GOLDZIHNER'S HEBREW MYTHOLOGY, article by Sir G. W. Cox, M.A., 358.
- Goldziher, Ig., Ph.D., "Mythology among the Hebrews," translated by R. Martineau, M.A., reviewed, 358.
- GORDON, ALX., M.A., author of article, "The Genesis of Quakerism," 546.
- Gordon, Alx., M.A., "Gospel Freedom," noticed, 614.
- Greg, Samuel, "A Layman's Legacy in Prose and Verse," noticed, 443.
- Griffin, R. A., "From Traditional to Rational Faith," noticed, 613.
- G. V. S., author of notices of books, 269.
- Hackett, H. B., D.D., "Commentary on the Acts," noticed, 149.
- Hanson, Sir R. D., "The Apostle Paul," &c., reviewed, 520.
- Harrison, F., "The Soul and the Future Life," reviewed, 447.
- Heard, J. B., M.A., "National Christianity, or Cæsarism and Clericalism," noticed, 612.
- Heyne, S., "Quo tempore Hermæ Pastor scriptus sit," reviewed, 504.
- Hilgenfeld, Ad., "Clementis Romani Epistolæ," reviewed, 35.
- Hodgson, W., "Society of Friends in the Nineteenth Century," noticed, 151.
- Hole, C., "Principles of the English Church," noticed, 612.
- Hooykaas, Dr. J., "De Bijbel voor Jongelieden : Zesde Deel," reviewed, 520.
- HOURS OF THOUGHT ON SACRED THINGS, article by F. P. Cobbe, 29.
- HOWSE, E. S., B.A., author of article, "Charles Kingsley," 237.
- H. S. S., author of notice of books, 606.
- HUMAN AUTOMATISM, article by C. B. Upton, B.A., B.Sc., 397.
- J. F. S., author of notices of books, 144, 283.
- JONAH : A STUDY IN JEWISH FOLKLORE AND RELIGION, article by T. K. Cheyne, M.A., 211.
- "Journey to Emmaus, the," noticed, 614.
- J. R., author of notice of books, 277.
- JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL, article by James Drummond, B.A., I., 155; II., 323.

- K., author of "Our Lord's Interview with the Woman of Canaan," *Miscellanea Theologica*, 129.
- KENRICK, JOHN: IN MEMORIAM, article by James Martineau, D.D., LL.D., 374.
- KINGSLEY, CHARLES, article by E. S. Howse, B.A., 237.
- "Kingsley, Charles, Letters and Memories of his Life," reviewed, 237.
- Knappert, J., "Religion of Israel," translated by R. A. Armstrong, B.A., noticed, 441.
- Kuenen, Dr. A., "Prophets and Prophecy in Israel," noticed, 271. "The Five Books of Moses," translated by Muir, noticed, 444.
- LANG, HEINRICH, article by J. F. Smith, 299.
- Lang, Heinrich, various works, reviewed, 299.
- "Leaving us an Example," noticed, 611.
- Lewes, G. H., "The Physical Basis of Mind," reviewed, 397.
- Lias, J. J., M.A., "The Doctrinal System of St. John," noticed, 293.
- Lipsius, Dr. R. A., "Lehrbuch der Dogmatik," noticed, 283.
- LIVERPOOL UNITARIAN CONTROVERSY OF 1839, THE, article by Charles Wicksteed, B.A., 85.
- Macan, R. W., M.A., "The Resurrection of Jesus Christ," noticed, 439.
- MAGNANIMOUS ATHEISM, article by F. P. Cobbe, 447.
- MARTINEAU, JAMES, D.D., LL.D., author of article, "John Kenrick: in Memoriam," 374.
- Martineau, James, D.D., LL.D., "Hours of Thought on Sacred Things," reviewed, 29.
- "Martineau, Harriet, Autobiography," reviewed, 447.
- Martineau, R., M.A., author of notice of books, 603.
- Marchand, A., translation of Zeller, "Was Peter ever at Rome?" reviewed, 106.
- Memo, "Man Palæolithic, Neolithic," &c., noticed, 149.
- MISCELLANEA THEOLOGICA: "Our Lord's Interview with the Woman of Canaan," 129. "The Church of Württemberg," 135. "The Historical Significance of the Sacrifice of Isaac," 139.
- Mocatta, F. D., "The Jews of Spain and Portugal and the Inquisition," noticed, 444.
- Molyneux, R. E., M.A., "Reconciliation of Reason and Faith," noticed, 613.
- MOZLEY (CANON) ON THE OLD TESTAMENT, article by John Wright, B.A., 252.
- Mozley, J. B., D.D., "Ruling Ideas in Early Ages," reviewed, 252.
- Mullinger, J. B., M.A., "The Schools of Charles the Great," noticed, 295.
- Murch, Jerom, "Mrs. Barbauld and her Contemporaries," noticed, 445.
- NOEL, HON. RODEN, author of article, "The True Idea of Divine Kosmos," 1.
- Oort, Dr. H., and Dr. J. Hooykaas, "The Bible for Young People," Vol. V., noticed, 263. Vol. III., noticed, 611.
- Parker, Jos., D.D., "The Priesthood of Christ," noticed, 146.
- Pastor Emeritus, "Essay on the Apocalypse," noticed, 149.
- PATRICK, D., M.A., author of article, "Two English Forerunners of the Tübingen School," 562.
- PAUL AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS, article by R. A. Armstrong, B.A., 520.

- PETER, THE LEGEND OF, article by Albert Réville, D.D., 106.
- Pfeiderer, Otto, "Paulinism," translated by Edward Peters, Vol. I., noticed, 611.
- PICTON, J. A., M.A., author of article, "The New Elementary Education Act," 49.
- Porter, J. Scott, M.A., "The Fourth Gospel," noticed, 153.
- PRIMITIVE HEBREW LAND TENURE, article by John Fenton, 489.
- Pulliblack, Joseph, M.A., "Teacher's Handbook of the Bible," noticed, 149.
- R. P., author of notices of books, 147.
- RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM: ITS ULTIMATE RESULTS, article by F. R. Statham, 65.
- REVILLE, ALBERT, D.D., author of article, "The Legend of Peter," 106.
- Reuss, E., "Le Bible: Nouveau Testament: Deuxième Partie," reviewed, 520.
- Roberts, W. Page, M.A., "Reasonable Service," noticed, 152.
- Robinson, T., D.D., "Commentary on Job," noticed, 150.
- Rodrigues, Hipp., "Les Seconds Chrétiens: St. Paul," reviewed, 520.
- ROSS, A. J., B.D., "Memoir of Alex. Ewing, D.C.L., Bishop of Argyll and the Isles," noticed, 609.
- "Saul of Tarsus, or Paul and Swedenborg," noticed, 443.
- Schodde, G. H., "Hermā Nabī: the Ethiopic Version of Pastor Hermæ examined," reviewed, 504.
- Sharman, W., "Science, her Martyrdom and Victory," noticed, 614.
- Shute, R., M.A., "Discourse on Truth," noticed, 433.
- SHEPHERD, THE, OF HERMAS, article by J. Donaldson, LL.D., 504.
- SMITH, J. F., author of article, "Heinrich Lang," 299.
- SPENCER'S SOCIOLOGY, article by W. Cunningham, M.A., 334.
- Spencer, Herbert, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., reviewed, 334.
- STATHAM, F. R., author of article, "Religious Scepticism, its Ultimate Results," 65.
- Stephens, E., "Modern Infidelity Disarmed," noticed, 150.
- Straatman, J. W., "Paulus, de Apostel van Jezus Christus," reviewed, 520.
- STRAUSS'S RELATIONS TO HEGEL AND THE CHURCH, article by Robert Bell, 219.
- Strutt, Percy, "Inductive Method of Christian Inquiry," noticed, 281.
- Sully, James, M.A., "Pessimism, a History and a Criticism," noticed, 606.
- SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS, 260. Ridsdale case, 260. Cases of Mr. Dale and Mr. Tooth, 261. Resolutions of Church Union, 262. New Bishoprics, 263. Universities' Bill, 263. Burials' Bill, 264. Scottish ecclesiastical affairs, 264. Ridsdale judgment, 422. New Bishoprics, 425. Universities' Bill, 425. Burials' Bill, 425. Church of Ireland, 428. Bishop Beckles in Scotland, 428. Scottish affairs, 428.
- "Supernatural Religion," reviewed, 504.
- "Supremacy of Man," noticed, 148.
- Taylor, C., M.A., "Sayings of the Jewish Fathers," noticed, 603.
- Taylor, J. J., "Last Series of Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty," noticed, 277.
- TITIAN, article by C. Beard, B.A., 187.
- TRUE IDEA OF DIVINE KOSMOS, THE, article by Hon. Roden Noël, 1.
- TWO ENGLISH FORERUNNERS OF THE TÜBINGEN SCHOOL, THOMAS MORGAN AND JOHN TOLAND, article by David Patrick, M.A., 562.
- "Unitarianism Defended, a Series of Lectures," &c., reviewed, 85.
- UPTON, C. B., B.A., B.Sc., author of article, "Human Automatism," 397.

Vancesmith, P., M.A., author of "The Church of Württemberg," *Miscellanea Theologica*, 135.

Watterich, Dr., "Die Ehe," noticed, 145.

W. B., author of notice of books, 274.

White, Edward, "Life and Death," noticed, 614.

Whitworth, W., "The Book of Natural Laws," noticed, 613.

WICKSTEED, CHARLES, B.A., author of article, "The Liverpool Unitarian Controversy of 1839," 85.

Wild, G. J., LL.D., "Four Sermons," noticed, 614.

W. M., author of notice of books, 281.

WRIGHT, JOHN, B.A., author of article, "Canon Mozley on the Old Testament," 252.

Zeller's "Peter at Rome?" translated by Marchand, reviewed, 106. "The Acts of the Apostles critically investigated," English translation, reviewed, 520.

Zeischwitz, Dr. C. A. S., "System der praktischen Theologie," noticed, 144.

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